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Abstract 
Cognitive linguists believe that “language reflects patterns of thought” (Evans & Green 
2006:5). Based on this framework, this thesis investigates problem solving processes in 
unaided object assembly and their linguistic representation. This work extends 
traditional approaches to problem solving that focused on logic-based problems by 
investigating a real-life problem, namely assembling a two-story dollhouse. Assembly 
problems are frequently encountered in real-life as indicated by the vast research on 
manual design and results in a study on assembly experiences (Richardson 2007). In 
order to ensure that participants need to conceptualize objects and define their 
possible locations, the assembly was not facilitated by a manual in the experimental 
studies. Moreover, participants were provided with different amounts of information 
about the nature of the goal object. Some participants did not know anything about the 
nature of the object. Some participants were instructed to assemble a two-story 
dollhouse and some were additionally shown a picture of the goal structure.  
Methodologically, problem solving processes were studied by eliciting verbal protocols 
and performance measures such as time and success. Verbal data comprised protocols 
of concurrent verbalization during task performance, retrospective reports elicited 
immediately after the task, verbal instructions, and directed questions. The qualitative 
analysis of this data combined the well-established methodology of content-based 
protocol analysis with in-depth linguistic analysis in the framework of Cognitive 
Discourse Analysis. The linguistic analysis focused on highlighting the verbalization of 
experience in the verb phrase, the conceptualization of objects in the noun phrase, and 
recurring patterns of adjectives, adverbs, and further discourse markers. Based on the 
content-based description of problem solving processes, the structural patterns of these 
processes were analyzed. The qualitative analysis was combined by quantitative analyses 
in terms of descriptive and inferential statistics.  
The content-based analysis revealed that participants frequently formulated hypotheses 
concerning the function of objects, their arrangement and location, or possible 
manipulations. These hypotheses were most often followed by verbalizations of physical 
manipulation of objects, such as selecting objects and placing them. The new state was 
frequently evaluated as confirming to prior expectations or diverging from the expected 
results. This sequence corresponds to the ‘search and test’ procedure that is generally 
assumed in the literature on problem solving (e.g. Newell & Simon 1972). Moreover, the 
analysis revealed that participants described their mental state concerning emotions 
that are raised or when turning to themselves for answers. In the present context, 
participants commented on object features; a process that was frequently followed by 
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new hypotheses. This aspect of hypothesis generation was analyzed more closely. The 
analysis of guidance by object features revealed that participants used specific object 
features strategically to facilitate their assembly. Mention of these constraints was 
different between kinds of verbal reports. Participants verbalized different constraints 
during the assembly than when they were asked to recall their thoughts after the 
assembly. Interestingly, the comparison between constraints mentioned in those reports 
with constraints that were verbalized in instructions revealed that the same constraints 
were used but they served different functions. These insights are specifically interesting 
because no systematic investigation of constraints was reported prior to this thesis. 
Therefore, the presented analysis might inspire future research. 
The linguistic analysis of the identified problem solving process categories highlighted 
that those could be distinguished based on the verb type that was predominantly 
verbalized. Hypotheses, for example, were frequently marked by verbs of ‘being and 
having’ (Halliday 1985), such as ‘sein’ (be). Furthermore, the analysis of verb tense 
indicated that participants concentrated on the present situation and did not engage in 
elaborate mental planning activities. The analysis of different aspects of the noun 
phrase revealed that participants conceptualized half of all provided objects within the 
goal domain, i.e. ‘house', whereas all remaining references were on a general 
descriptive level, such as ‘thing’. The frequency analysis highlighted significant effects 
of prior information on referential form. First, participants who were provided with an 
external representation of the goal structure, i.e. a picture, referred to objects by 
pronouns more frequently than participants without this information. Second, 
participants who were not given any specific information about the goal structure 
tended to use structure-based terminology, such as ‘story’, when explicitly assigning 
function to objects. 
The presented work contributes to research in the field of problem solving by revealing 
that real-world problem solving involves the same mental processes as described for 
logic-based problems. However, the findings suggest that their structural patterns 
might be less well-organized than previously assumed. Methodologically, this thesis 
applies and refines a methodology that combines content-based protocol analysis with 
the analysis of systematic recurring linguistic patterns, namely Cognitive Discourse 
Analysis. The results highlight that problem solving processes can be distinguished 
based on verb type and discourse markers. For researchers who want to adopt this 
approach in their work, this thesis provides a comprehensive overview on previous 
findings and a theoretical framework for the analysis of German verb and noun 
phrases. The theoretical considerations on which the analysis of these aspects is based 
discuss how findings obtained in experiments in which speech is produced for an 
addressee can be adopted for the analysis of speech produced for oneself. These 
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theoretical contributions extend previous publications that applied Cognitive Discourse 
Analysis. 
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 1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates problem solving processes in unaided object assembly and 
their linguistic representation. Everyone who has tried to assemble new furniture 
by herself/himself has probably experienced numerous moments of puzzlement 
about provided objects, new ideas regarding their function, and the need to 
disassemble parts to rearrange them. These mental and physical activities are 
observable sequences of problem solving. Generally, problem solving is conceived 
of as a transformation process from the currently unsatisfactory state to the 
desired state either by well-known procedures or by the creation of new 
procedures. In cases in which people need to devise novel sequences of actions, 
either mentally or physically, they are involved in a problem solving process. As 
outlined above, object assembly potentially involves numerous instances in which 
new procedures need to be devised, such as how objects are connected and 
fastened as well as by which means. 
The aim to investigate the linguistic representation of problem solving processes in 
unaided object assembly involves two main research issues. First, the hypothesis 
that unaided object assembly results in problem solving activity needs to be tested 
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by identifying processes of problem solving in the recorded data. Second, the 
linguistic features, such as verb phrase, noun phrases, and structuring devices, of 
the identified processes are studied systematically. By studying the verb phrase 
information can be gained about the type of activity that is performed, i.e. mental 
vs. physical activities (e.g. Halliday 1985), as well as about the participants’ 
certainty about these actions. Whereas mental activities are expressed by verbs, 
such as ‘think’, ‘assume’, ‘believe’, physical activities are accompanied by verbs, 
such as ‘take’, ‘put’, ‘fasten’. The speaker may take a personal stance on the 
likelihood of a verbalized action by different grammatical aspects of modality, i.e. 
modal verbs, modal adverbs, or mood (e.g. Erben 1972). The investigation of noun 
phrases, on the other hand, allows to study the speaker’s conceptualization of 
objects and object arrangements (e.g. Rosch 1976). Noun phrases can be studied 
with regard to nominal vs. deictic references and nominal specificity, i.e. if an 
object is referred to in general or in domain specific terms (e.g. von Stutterheim et 
al. 1993). Furthermore, the analysis of structuring devices highlights the relations 
that the speaker assumes between information, such as temporal order, 
connectedness, or consequential relations (e.g. Halliday 1985; Schifrin 1987). 
This thesis explores a number of new directions, i.e. with regard to the task as well 
as concerning the combination of traditional content-based analysis with in-depth 
linguistic analysis, thus traditional frameworks need to be adopted and extended. 
Since this thesis presents empirical work, the refinement of the analysis procedure 
needs much effort concerning definitions of coding categories, the coding process 
itself, and decisions about appropriate quantitative measures. The next section 
introduces the research areas of cognitive linguistics and problem solving as well 
as general methodological motivations. The empirical studies that are central to 
this thesis will be briefly introduced in the third section before the structure of the 
thesis is presented. 
1.1 Motivation and research issues 
Certainly everyone would agree that he/she knows what language is and how to 
describe thoughts. However, defining each of these concepts precisely is quite 
difficult. Starting out by defining the concept of thought, the Oxford English 
dictionary states that ‘thought’ is “a person’s mind and all the ideas that they have 
in it when they are thinking” (OED 2000). Central to this definition is the concept 
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of thinking which is defined as the process in which mentally stored information is 
newly structured and combined (Beller & Bender 2010:15). Three main functions of 
thinking can be identified: representation, categorization, and combination of 
information (Brockhaus Enzyklopädie). It is assumed that information is 
abstracted, generalized, classified, and coordinated in the human mind (Beyer & 
Gerlach 2011).  
Language, on the other hand, is defined as a medium to convey information by 
words and their respective combinations (Beller & Bender 2010:16) being conceived 
of as a communication system (Reither 1996:207). Language exhibits the following 
three characteristics; it is generative since different words can be combined to built 
an almost infinite number of sentences.1 It is systematic because it has certain 
underlying rules of word and sentence formation and it is bound to the situation in 
which it is uttered (Beller & Bender 2010:16). As choices in language are influenced 
by the situation and communication is an act of social interaction, language is 
frequently shaped by communicative intention. Halliday (1985) captures these 
different functions of language in the distinction between ideational, 
interpersonal, and textual metafunction of language. The ideational metafunction 
of language describes the process of construing experience, i.e. the classification of 
objects and people around us to organize them mentally. The interpersonal 
metafunction encompasses the social function of language, i.e. building and 
maintaining personal relationships with other people. The ability to create fluent, 
discursively adequate, and coherent speech is subsumed in the textual 
metafunction of language.  
The basic question of how these two basic elements of human cognition interact, 
i.e. the internal process of thinking and the primarily externally directed system of 
communication, has been debated about for hundreds of years. This question was 
approached and answered differently by various philosophers and theorists. Based 
on theoretical considerations as well as on experimental studies and naturalistic 
observations, many theorists argue that thought and speech are closely connected 
(e.g. Kleist 1805/2002; Vygotsky 1934; Whorf 1956; Piaget 1959; Dörner 2006). The 
question of how thought is represented in the human mind is also central to 
investigations in the field of cognitive science. Cognitive scientists are interested in 
the study of “higher mental processes”, namely memory, reasoning, and language. 
                                                        
1 “Representational schemes that include rules for building complex symbolic structures 
out of simpler ones are called combinatorial, generative, or productive. Second, the 
meaning, or semantic interpretation, of a complex symbol is built up from the meanings of 
the syntactic parts of the symbol.” (Stillings et al. 1995:5). 
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Cognitive science is enriched by the interdisciplinary work of researchers from the 
fields of psychology, linguistics, computer science, philosophy, neuroscience, and 
anthropology (Stillings et al. 1996; Thagard 1996). All of these disciplines 
contribute different research questions and approaches to the methodology of 
cognitive science.  
Cognitive linguists believe that thought and language are closely connected, i.e. 
“language reflects patterns of thought” (Evans & Green 2006:5). More specifically, 
researchers in cognitive linguistics believe that the structure of language is 
influenced by the functions that language serves, e.g. as outlined by Halliday 
(1985), as well as by environmental, socio-cultural, developmental, and biological 
factors (e.g. Langacker 1999; Tomasello 2005). Therefore, they study the structure 
of human language, factors influencing linguistic structure, and developmental 
questions by drawing upon theoretical perspectives established in related fields, 
such as philosophy, psychology, linguistics, or anthropology (e.g. McCabe 2011). 
Moreover, they frequently relate the observed structures to theories and findings 
about the human mind, thereby “treating language as reflecting and revealing the 
mind” (Evans & Green 2011:50). By taking this multi-disciplinary approach, findings 
on structures of thinking, cognitive processes, and social communication are 
related to each other and distinct representations in language can be interpreted 
(Fauconnier 1999:96). 
It is assumed that each situation can be conceptualized and linguistically 
expressed in different ways, which systematically differ from all other possible 
choices (e.g. Tomasello 1999). These differences are studied, for example, in terms 
of who is speaking (perspective), which information is salient (foregrounding), and 
how concepts and events are described (framing) (e.g. Talmy 2000; Lee 2001). 
Conceptualizations are also studied in terms of mental models (e.g. Johnson-Laird 
1983; van Dijk & Kintsch 1983; van Dijk 2006), cognitive categories (e.g. Rosch 
1976), and image schemas (e.g. Slobin 1996; Gibbs & Colston 2006)2. Mental models 
represent different constructs of the human world, such as knowledge in general as 
well as discourse specific situations (Johnson-Laird 1998). These mental models are 
constructed based on linguistic as well as non-linguistic input and they are 
constantly manipulated integrating new information. Thus Johnson-Laird (2004) 
argued that they are involved in different aspects of human cognition, such as 
                                                        
2 Fore more detail on cognitive categories and image schemas see chapter 8 (Object 
reference). 
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representation of perceptual input, understanding of discourse as well as in 
thinking and reasoning. 
The linguistic analysis that is central to this thesis is based on the outlined 
theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics. The research area in which this 
theoretical framework is applied is that of problem solving in which thinking and 
reasoning are integral processes. The next paragraphs outline the theoretical view 
on human problem solving that is assumed in this thesis. 
As problem solving is a frequent activity in daily life, researchers have been 
interested in the mental processes that drive this activity and in the structure of 
these processes for a long time. Among the first proposals for a sequence of mental 
processes was the test – operate – test – exit unit, commonly referred to as TOTE 
(Miller et al. 1970). This unit contains the basic processes of ‘test’, ‘operate’, and 
‘exit’. It is based on the assumption that humans solve problems by mentally 
manipulating representations of possible states by different operations. A chess 
move shall serve as an example of this theoretical view. If chess players decide on 
the next move, they know the current state, i.e. the positions of all chessmen on 
the board, and they know which moves are allowed. The theory assumes that they 
would then think of possible new states by applying numerous possible moves; this 
process corresponds to the first ‘test’ process. Then they decide on one move and 
execute it by physically moving one chessman; this process corresponds to 
‘operate’. The new state is then evaluated and if it represents the desired goal state, 
this sequence is ended and a new sequence starts. In the example of a chess player, 
the execution of the action ends his/her turn. This example highlights that human 
problem solving behavior is conceptualized as information processing. Moreover, 
this framework assumes that problem solving is mainly taking place in the 
problem solvers’ mind and information from the environment is only partially 
integrated. This view is proposed by Newell and Simon (1972) in one of the most 
influential theories on human problem solving as information processing.  
A more recent approach to problem solving proposes that problem solving is an 
interactive process between the human and the environment. Researchers in the 
situated cognition community (e.g. Hutchins 1995; Kirsh 2009; Steffensen 2013; 
Cowley & Nash 2013) assume that humans shape the world to facilitate problem 
solving and this activity is influenced by environmental features. Kirsh (2009), for 
example, argues that people use objects to think with while working on a problem. 
He describes that people physically manipulate objects and try different 
configurations of objects to find a satisfactory solution to a problem. In cases in 
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which the objects cannot be easily moved or consequences of these changes 
cannot be predicted, people may build real-world models to change arrangements 
within them. Additionally, it is assumed that people look for clues that provide 
guidance as to how objects can be used (e.g. Hutchins 1995; Norman 2002). The 
basic assumption is that this interactive way is essential to thinking because it 
helps to structure the problem space and it extends the problem solvers’ 
perception and actions. 
This thesis adopts the theoretical view that problem solving is a search through a 
problem space in which new states are continuously created, executed, and 
evaluated. Traditional theories investigated logic-based problems, such as playing 
chess that involve a high level of planning, i.e. mental simulation of possible 
operations. This thesis, on the other hand, investigates if similar problem solving 
processes can be identified when participants solve a real-world problem. The 
assembly task resembles a problem in which operations may be performed without 
much prior planning because states can be redone. Therefore, it is specifically 
interesting to find out if the same processes are verbalized or if new ones can be 
identified. Additionally, it will be investigated if these processes are as well-
structured as identified for well-defined logic-based problems or if different 
structures are observed. In line with recent propositions concerning problem 
solving in the framework of situated cognition, the interaction between 
participants and the objects is studied to highlight how this interaction influences 
the problem solving process. 
Traditionally, human problem solving has been studied, for instance, by means of 
verbal protocol analysis, i.e. which information is verbalized while participants 
work on a problem (e.g. de Groot 1969; Dörner 1987) or what they report about it 
afterwards (e.g. Russo et al. 1989). Newell and Simon (1972), for example, based 
their influential theory of human problem solving on two sources of evidence. 
First, they drew on theoretical analogies between computer systems and human 
thinking and reasoning. Second, they analyzed mental processes involved in 
problem solving by means of think aloud protocols of one participant for two 
logic-based well-defined tasks3. Based on the practice of using verbal protocols in 
studies on problem solving, Ericsson and Simon (1984, 1993) outlined the model of 
verbalization of thinking and a theory of verbal protocols as data in research. 
Adopting the same theoretical concept of the human mind as an information 
                                                        
3  Newell and Simon (1972) analyzed one participant’s protocol working on a crypt 
arithmetic task and the protocol of one chess player. 
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processing system, they described how information on these mental processes 
could be investigated in verbal protocols. This protocol analysis is based on the 
content of verbal protocols. In the proposed application of protocol analysis 
identified traces of mental processes are compared to computer generated process 
traces in order to evaluate the predictive power of the proposed model. 
Some researchers (e.g. Roth 1985; Dörner & Bartl 1998) extended content-based 
protocol analysis by investigating the linguistic structure of think aloud protocols. 
These researchers investigated the difference in mental processes, such as forming 
hypotheses, by participants that succeeded in solving the problem as compared to 
participants who were unsuccessful. One further research group, headed by Caron-
Pargue (e.g. 1991, 2003, 2010), presented accumulating evidence that mental 
processes in think aloud protocols are systematically represented by linguistic 
markers, such as verbs, conjunctions, and connectives. However, their approach is 
restricted in two ways. First, they exclusively analyze think aloud protocols. 
Second, their analyses are restricted to two logic-based problems, namely the 
Tower of Hanoi and the Chinese rings.  
Similarly to Caron-Pargue and colleagues, Tenbrink (e.g. 2007, 2010) investigates 
systematic linguistic patterns in verbal data to connect those to the underlying 
mental processes. Based on Ericsson and Simon’s (1993) model of verbalization of 
thinking, Tenbrink analyzed different kinds of verbal reports that were elicited on 
different tasks. However, contrary to the previously introduced studies, Tenbrink 
and collaborators (e.g. Wiener & Tenbrink 2008; Hölscher et al. 2011) investigated 
different kinds of verbal reports on problem solving tasks. They investigated think 
aloud protocols as well as retrospective reports on related tasks, such as the 
Traveling Salesman Problem (e.g. Tenbrink 2008) and wayfinding studies in virtual 
as well as in real-world environments (e.g. Tenbrink et al. 2011; Klippel et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, Tenbrink and collaborators (e.g. Vorwerg & Tenbrink 2007; Tenbrink 
et al. 2008; Andonova et al. 2010) investigated the linguistic structure of verbal data 
highlighting central aspects of mental representations such as descriptions of a 
visual scene by combining psycholinguistic methods and cognitive linguistic 
analyses. These analyses revealed information about the speaker’s or writer’s 
conceptualization of the described situation or event. Recently, Tenbrink (2010) 
combined previous findings and experiences regarding procedure of data 
collection as well as data analysis to propose the methodology of Cognitive 
Discourse Analysis.  
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The present thesis adopts the methodology of Cognitive Discourse Analysis 
because the elicitation of think aloud protocols allows for the analysis of thoughts 
that reach the participants’ awareness and that are assumed to reflect mental 
processes. Furthermore, it allows for an observation over time. However, the 
content-based analysis allows only for the analysis of verbalized thoughts. By 
combining the analysis with in-depth analyses of linguistic features, it is assumed 
that the unconscious linguistic choices can be highlighted. The linguistic analysis, 
in this thesis, focuses on an in-depth analysis of two features, namely verb type and 
object reference. Whereas verb types encode the process that is verbalized, object 
references express the conceptualization of objects. Importantly, parts of the 
linguistic analyses investigate features that have not been studied in the proposed 
terms before. No verb type classification of problem solving processes was reported 
so far and object reference has been mainly studied in communicative settings. 
Therefore, the analyses combine well-established findings on linguistic features 
obtained in different conditions with theoretical assumptions about the 
investigated empirical design. As described in previous papers by Tenbrink and 
colleagues, the analysis investigates the correlation between these linguistic 
features and evidence from other discourse tasks or performance measures.  
In sum, this thesis investigates the hypothesis that assembly performance can be 
described in terms of problem solving and how these processes are linguistically 
expressed. Concerning the methodology, this thesis aims at contributing to the 
establishment and refinement of Cognitive Discourse Analysis by providing an 
overview of previous works on the analysis of linguistic features in think aloud 
protocols and by applying the methodology to a new field within the area of 
problem solving. 
1.2 Empirical studies 
The investigation presented in this thesis is based on verbal data elicited during 
and after participants solved an assembly task. Participants were instructed to 
assemble a two-story dollhouse but no manual was provided to them. In order to 
study the influence of prior information about the goal state, i.e. the goal object in 
this case, on problem solving aspects, such as conceptualization of objects, 
participants were tested in three conditions. Prior information about the goal 
object was verbally provided in the instructions. In one condition participants were 
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told to assemble a sensible object, i.e. no specific information about the goal object 
was provided. In the second condition, they were told that their task was to build a 
two-story dollhouse and in the third condition, they were additionally shown a 
picture of the assembled dollhouse. It was assumed that amount of prior 
information influences conceptualization of object parts within the mental 
representation of the goal structure as well as the perception and use of object 
features that provide information about possible functions, i.e. constraints. 
The elicited verbal data corpus contains think aloud protocols of 56 participants 
that were recorded during task performance. In addition, retrospective reports of 
all participants were collected immediately after the dollhouse assembly. Both data 
sets represent unconstrained natural language that is assumed to reflect 
participants’ unaltered thoughts. As it is generally agreed that verbal reports are 
not complete (e.g. Ericsson & Simon 1993; van Someren et al. 1994), the 
experimental session was closed by a number of guided questions regarding 
perception of specific object features. 
Moreover, a second study was designed to collect instruction data. In this study 20 
participants were instructed to assemble the same dollhouse as in the first study 
except that they worked silently. They were provided with specific goal state 
information: they were told that they need to assemble a two-story dollhouse and 
they were shown the picture. After their assembled dollhouse was assessed as 
correct, the participants were introduced to an addressee whom they were asked to 
instruct in a non-interactive setting given a shared workspace. The addressee could 
see the instructor and his workspace on a computer screen via skype and listen to 
his instructions. However, no interaction was possible. The elicitation of 
instructions was motivated by the fact that most research focuses on language use 
in interactive settings. The comparison between references elicited in a non-
communicative setting in assembly for oneself to those collected in a 
communicatively motivated setting was expected to highlight the difference 
between speech for oneself and speech for others. This difference is important to 
the assumption that think aloud protocols reflect participants’ unaltered thoughts. 
Additionally, this design included a silent control group for the third condition in 
the first study. 
In sum, the present approach combines controlled experimental set-ups with the 
elicitation of unconstrained natural language by recording participants’ 
verbalizations to the instruction of verbalizing everything that comes to their 
mind. The results of these studies are analyzed qualitatively focusing on the 
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description of the individual phenomenon, e.g. the content of the processes that 
are identified. Moreover, the content-based qualitative analysis is extended by an 
in-depth description of linguistic patterns concerning verb phrase form, object 
references as well as discourse markers that are identified. The qualitative 
description is supplemented by a quantitative analysis of the frequency of the 
categories. The collected performance measures, i.e. assembly and instruction time 
as well as assembly and instruction success, are also quantitatively evaluated. 
1.3 Structure of thesis 
This thesis focuses on the identification of problem solving processes in unaided 
object assembly and their description with regard to their nature as well as their 
linguistic structure. Therefore, chapters 2 and 3 provide the theoretical 
background on problem solving and verbal data analysis. The remaining chapters 4 
to 9 present the analyses of the empirical studies. Each of these chapters focuses 
on one specific aspect of the analysis. 
Chapter 2 introduces the research area of problem solving. First, problem solving is 
defined and two classifications of problem types are presented. Then a detailed 
description of two influential theories of human problem solving are provided. 
Newell and Simon’s (1972) seminal work on human problem solving as a search 
process through a problem space is introduced first. In the same line of thought, 
Dörner (1987) proposed that problem solving is a search through the 
‘Realitätsbereich’ describing the different components of the problem space in 
much detail. Newell and Simon’s (1972) theoretical work is important with regard 
to the general assumptions of human problem solving especially in combination 
with the methodology of protocol analysis as outlined by Ericsson and Simon 
(1993). Dörner’s (1987) theory is combined with his proposal for a classification of 
problem types to classify the problem of unaided object assembly with different 
levels of prior information. Besides introducing these classical theories, chapter 2 
reviews a more recent approach to study human problem solving in the framework 
of situated cognition. The chapter concludes by introducing methods that are 
employed in problem solving studied in the framework of classical theories and 
proposed by situated cognition theories. 
Chapter 3, then, focuses on one method for studying thought through language, 
namely on verbal protocol analysis. After providing a general introduction to 
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Ericsson and Simon’s (1984, 1993) model of verbalization of thinking, the chapter 
focuses on the methodology of protocol analysis. This methodology is the starting 
point for the analyses in this thesis. To illustrate the frequent use of protocol 
analysis in problem solving research and the scope of insights that have been 
gained by this analysis, the chapter reviews a selection of studies. In addition to 
this general introduction to the well-established methodology of protocol analysis, 
the methodology of Cognitive Discourse Analysis is introduced. The method 
extends Ericsson and Simon’s (1993) content-based approach to verbal protocol 
analysis by a systematic analysis of linguistic features. As this thesis provides an 
exploration and refinement with regard to the methodology, basic theoretical 
assumptions as outlined by Tenbrink (e.g. 2008; 2010) are reviewed. The 
application of the methodology is exemplified in a review of reported empirical 
studies investigating different discourse tasks and problem solving scenarios. 
These findings serve as a starting point for the analysis pursued in this thesis. 
Whereas these chapters provide the theoretical background for the analyses, 
chapters 4 to 9 focus on the empirical studies that are central to this dissertation 
project. After summarizing the empirical design in chapter 4, each of the 
remaining chapters presents one feature of analysis in detail. All of these chapters 
have the same general structure. First, the theoretical background for the specific 
analysis is summarized. Second, the research questions for the analysis are 
formulated and expectations are outlined. Third, the procedure of analysis is 
described to illustrate how the theoretical considerations are operationalized. 
Fourth, the results are presented. Fifth, the obtained results are discussed in the 
light of previous findings and new contributions are highlighted. For reading 
comfort, the appendix for each chapter is to be found at the end of the respective 
chapter. After this overview on the general structure, the content of each chapter 
will be briefly summarized. 
Chapter 4 introduces the motivation for the design of the two empirical studies. 
Besides providing an overview on the number of participants that were tested in 
the experiments, the procedure of each experiment is described including the 
exact instructions, a description of the equipment that was used, and the technical 
problems that were faced. Chapter 4 concludes by providing a general overview on 
the qualitative and quantitative analyses that are performed in the different 
chapters of analysis.  
Chapter 5 summarizes all performance measures that were collected along with 
the verbal protocols. These measures were assembly and instruction time as well as 
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assembly and instruction success. Furthermore, the chapter provides a summary 
on the number of the experimenter’s reminders to participants to keep thinking 
aloud. The video data of instructors assembling the dollhouse for themselves was 
analyzed regarding spontaneous instances of talk to oneself. 
Chapter 6 presents the content-based analysis for identifying problem solving 
processes in think aloud protocols in line with traditional problem solving research 
paradigms. Besides focusing on the identification, the processes are described in 
the qualitative analysis highlighting frequent linguistic patterns with regard to 
temporal markers, adverbs, and further discourse markers. The quantitative 
analysis, on the other hand, focuses on the frequency of identified processes within 
think aloud protocols. Moreover, recurring sequences of problem solving processes 
are identified across think aloud protocols. 
Chapter 7 focuses on one specific linguistic feature of the identified processes, 
namely on the verb phrase. Taking a functional approach to grammar as proposed 
by Halliday (1985), verb types in the linguistic representation of problem solving 
processes are described. A review of literature on modality and verb types as well 
as studies that investigated aspects of verb phrases in think aloud protocols, 
highlights that only selected aspects of verb phrases were studied so far, such as 
tense or mood. To capture the different aspects expressed in verb phrases 
systematically, verb type, modality, and tense are analyzed in this chapter. The 
discussion of the findings focuses on the identification of systematic differences in 
verb phrases between problem solving processes. 
The analysis presented in chapter 8 is concerned with the mental concep-
tualization of the given objects within the goal structure. First, an overview on 
accounts of reference production in communicative settings is presented since the 
communicative, interactive scenario is commonly used in studies of discourse 
analysis. Based on a literature review on reports investigating the influence of the 
speaker’s cognitive state as opposed to the assumed addressee’s cognitive state on 
the produced referential form, a theoretical proposal concerning the different 
degrees of interactivity and engagement between speaker and addressee is pre-
sented. Different types of conceptualization are distinguished in the analysis. 
Direct assignment of function is expressed in utterances such as “also das hier ist 
das Dach nehm ich an” (well this one is the roof I suppose). In this example the 
deictic reference ‘das’ (this) is connected to the domain specific terminology ‘Dach’ 
(roof) by the verb ‘ist’ (be). Indirect function assignment is analyzed by identifying 
goal structure specific nominal references, such as ‘Haus’ (house), ‘Wand’ (wall), or 
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‘Etage’ (story), at different points throughout the assembly process. The discussion 
focuses on the influence of prior information on referential form in direct as well 
as indirect function assignment. The comparison between referential form in think 
aloud protocols and in instructions aims at highlighting the influence of 
communicative intention on the verbalization of object conceptualization. 
In chapter 9 references to physical and cultural constraints are examined. This 
analysis is in line with recent work on problem solving in the area of situated 
cognition in which it is assumed that humans solve problems by actively engaging 
with the environment. As this is a not yet well-researched approach to problem 
solving, the presented analysis is explorative. Based on a review of literature 
discussing constraints in the context of problem solving in general, assumed 
functions of constraints and their use are proposed. The qualitative analysis on the 
nature and function of constraints is supplemented by a quantitative analysis of 
the frequency of constraints and their distribution within assembly conditions and 
in instructions. The discussion highlights which constraints are used and at what 
time during the assembly suggesting possible effects of the recognition of 
constraints on the problem solving process. Furthermore, the strategic use of 
constraints in instructions is discussed. 
Chapter 10 concludes this thesis by pointing out that unaided object assembly as 
investigated in the presented study, resulted in the creation of new procedures 
expressed by hypotheses, actions, and evaluations, for example, instead of 
representing actions based on known procedures. Moreover, the systematic 
linguistic analysis revealed that those processes differ with regard to verb type, use 
of modal adverbs, and referential form. By summarizing the main findings on the 
linguistic representation of problem solving processes, the contribution of 
Cognitive Discourse Analysis can be critically discussed. After a general reflection 
on the adopted procedure, the thesis concludes by some remarks on possible 
future directions. 

 2 Problem solving –  
A general introduction 
2.1 Problem: A definition and two classifications  
Imagine, you are at a friend’s house and you want to make yourself a coffee. So you 
walk into the kitchen and find the coffee in the fridge. Now you hope to find an 
ordinary coffee machine. However, what you find looks like the object in Figure 2.1. 
In this case, you are fortunate because you know the goal state and you know how 
to brew coffee with it, i.e. by placing it on the stove. Now you need to figure out 
how to disassemble the object into its parts. By this disassembly procedure you 
already know how to assemble it after you have inserted water and new coffee. But 
there are still open questions. First, you need to figure out how much coffee and 
water need to be inserted. Second, you need to know which temperature on the 
stove is appropriate and at what time the coffee is ready. At that time you have a 
number of choices, i.e. you may wait for your friend to come home, you can look 
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for information on the internet, or you simply try it. All of these choices represent 
problem solving strategies. 
 
Figure 2.1: Mokka maker on the stove (H. Bindewald). 
This chapter will start by providing a general definition of the term problem before 
two more fine-grained classifications are presented. Then the focus shifts from the 
problem as such towards the human who solves it. Two influential theories about 
mental processes involved in human problem solving will be reviewed in detail, i.e. 
Newell and Simon (1972) and Dörner (1987). Whereas those two theories describe 
human problem solving in terms of information processing, a more recent 
approach understands human problem solving as an interactive process between 
the problem solver and the environment. The approach of situated cognition on 
problem solving will also be introduced as it presents a different perspective on 
problem solving activities. Whereas traditional problem solving research focused 
on laboratory settings, researchers in situated cognition investigate problem 
solving observed outside the laboratory (e.g. Cowley & Nash 2013; Steffensen 2013), 
i.e. as it occurs in ‘the wild’ (Hutchins 1995). The chapter will conclude with the 
presentation of some commonly used problem solving methods as proposed in the 
literature. 
People are faced with a problem if the initial state and at least parts of the desired 
goal state are known but the exact actions that need to be taken to get from one to 
the other are unknown, as in the introductory example. This gap of knowledge 
needs to be filled with something new, thus problem solving is often classified as a 
creative thinking process (e.g. Dunker 1960; Dörner 1987). This is different for 
recurring tasks that can be solved by retrieving sequences of actions from long-
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term memory4. In these cases, reproductive thinking (Funke 2003) can be applied to 
generate an appropriate solution.  
Different classifications of problems can be distinguished with regard to the 
granularity level of the classification and their focus, i.e. information on the states 
of the problem solving process and appropriate operators. The most general 
distinction refers to the amount of information about the goal state: well-defined 
vs. ill-defined problems (McCarthy 1956). A very fine-grained classification, in 
contrast, takes into consideration the type of problem, its characteristics and 
content as well as the information processes that are required for solving the 
problem (Funke 2003).  
McCarthy’s (1956) broad distinction of well-defined and ill-defined problems is 
based on the specificity of information available about the goal state. If problems 
are well-defined, the characteristics of the goal state are clear and thus any current 
state can be evaluated regarding its potential adequacy as the goal state. An 
instruction such as “Paint the living room purple.” (adapted from Funke 2003) 
contains information on the action (paint), the location (the living room), and the 
color (purple). If the painting has been performed with purple paint in the living 
room, the problem is successfully solved. On the one hand, it could be argued that 
this instruction does not pose a problem to a professional painter but it can be 
considered a problem for a novice. The instruction: “Make my flat look nicer”, on 
the other hand, could even pose a problem for a professional painter. Although 
this instruction contains information on the location (my flat), no explicit 
information on the actions to be taken is provided. Since the goal state ‘look nicer’ 
is very subjective, the painter will probably ask for additional information. The 
initial instruction represents an ill-defined problem because it can be solved by 
multiple solutions and success is not guaranteed (also Kitchener 1983:223). 
Based on this introduction, the following working definition is proposed: if the 
current state does not represent the intended goal state, some things need to be 
changed. If the actions that need to be taken to change the current state into the 
desired state are not known, the person faces a problem. This problem can be 
solved by creatively combining known actions and objects or by including 
previously unknown objects and procedures. After this very general definition of 
problems, the next two sections introduce two ways of distinguishing different 
kinds of problems.  
                                                        
4 A presentation of the memory structure assumed by Newell and Simon (1972) is presented 
in sub-section 2.2.2. Furthermore, it needs to be pointed out that learning effects are not 
addressed in this thesis. 
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Greeno (1978) proposes a classification of problems based on mental skills that are 
required to solve them. His classification will be presented because this thesis is 
interested in mental processes involved in problem solving. Since Dörner 
published most of his works in German only, his contributions to the theory of 
human problem solving are just recently recognized beyond the German speaking 
community (e.g. Funke 2003; Betsch et al. 2010; Schott & Ghanbari 2012). Dörner’s 
(1987) theoretical considerations are important because, similarly to Greeno, his 
classification focuses on the components of the problem space and he specifically 
considers real-life problems in his classification. Since the analysis of problem 
solving in this thesis is investigated with regard to a real-life problem task, his 
theory is sketched as a second approach to classifying problems. In order to 
illustrate the applicability of the reviewed classifications, some well-researched 
problem tasks are classified according to them in sub-section 2.1.2. 
2.1.1 Two classifications of problems:  
Greeno (1978) and Dörner (1987) 
Greeno (1978) proposes a typology of problems that is based on the cognitive skills 
required to transform the initial state into the goal state. He distinguishes between 
problems of inducing structure, problems of transformation, and problems of 
arrangement. In problems of transformation, the initial and the goal state are well-
defined and the operators for getting from one to the other are known to the 
problem solver as well. Greeno (1978) argues that two kinds of understanding are 
crucial in solving these kinds of problems: initial understanding of the problem 
and understanding of the solution and the selected operations (Greeno 1978:252). 
The construction of a cognitive representation5 is important in the first kind of 
understanding because the generation of new possible states proceeds within this 
cognitive representation. Understanding the problem description and structuring 
the given information create an appropriate problem representation. The 
structuring process is facilitated by personal problem-solving knowledge that helps 
to identify concepts in the problem description. These concepts are identified by 
matching information specified in the problem description to the problem solver’s 
general conceptual knowledge. This matching determines the meaningfulness of 
the constructed cognitive representation in which the problem solving process is 
performed. Potential solution states are generated by a search through the 
cognitive representation and they are evaluated against the background of 
                                                        
5 Newell and Simon (1972) coined the term problem space to describe this cognitive 
representation. Their theory is defined in detail in sub-section 2.2.2. 
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meaningful general concepts. The search process can only be successful if the 
problem solver understands the underlying “relations between relatively large 
subcomponents of the solution” (Greeno 1978:255). 
In problems in which the goal state can be reached by arranging known elements 
according to given constraints, the problem solver needs abilities that constitute a 
successful constructive search (problems of arrangement). In the constructive 
search process partial solutions are generated and those are tested for their 
consequences. As this search is based on the generate-and-test procedure6, the 
problem solver needs to generate large amounts of potential solutions. Retrieving 
and applying known solution patterns facilitates this process. If the constraints are 
not explicitly stated in the problem description, the problem solver needs to be 
aware of general principles that confine search, e.g. phonological constraints or 
frequent combinations of letters in crossword puzzle tasks. In order to select the 
right general principles, the problem description and the goal need to be well 
understood. Successful problem solvers are assumed to have stored algorithms for 
forming arrangements (Greeno 1978:264).  
There are also problems in which elements of the problem description need to be 
restructured to find the solution (problems of inducing structure). These problems 
are based on the understanding of underlying relational structures, such as in 
problems of analogy. In these problems, the process of understanding 
encompasses recognition of relations and construction of an integrated cognitive 
representation (Greeno 1978:243). In analogical problem solving, common 
relations between elements of the base and the target problem need to be 
identified and mapped to each other by knowledge transfer thereby generating 
new solutions. These potential solutions need to be assessed against the 
characteristics of the goal state.  
Since not all problems can be clearly classified as belonging to one of the 
categories exclusively, Greeno (1978) stresses that the proposed typology does not 
represent a taxonomy. Most problems will contain elements of all three types. 
Therefore, understanding the problem state and the goal is crucial for success. 
More explicitly, Greeno (1978:263) defines understanding as the search for a 
cognitive representation in which the elements of the problem and the problem 
goal fit together. This definition of understanding is not limited to the area of 
problem solving, Greeno (1978:266) rather assumes that “there may be some 
                                                        
6 A description of this method is presented in the section on frequently observed problem 
solving methods and heuristics (sub-section 2.3.). 
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powerful general skill in understanding, planning, and composing rather than a 
single ability in problem solving”. Therefore, he assumes that more detailed 
knowledge about general problem solving skills may lead to a “satisfactory theory 
of general intelligence” (Greeno 1978:266). 
A different categorization of problems is presented by Dörner (1987). It is based on 
the assumption that problem solvers encounter different kinds of mental barriers 
that hinder the transformation from the initial state into the goal state. The basic 
assumption is that the problem space, that is identical to Greeno’s (1974) notion of 
cognitive representation, consists of initial state, goal state as well as all inter-
mediate states. Furthermore, it includes all possible operators7. As pointed out by 
Greeno (1978), Dörner also proposes that the structure and especially the 
components of the problem space influence the selection of problem solving 
strategies. The selection is further constrained by barriers that are faced by the 
problem solver. Dörner (1987:11-13) defines three barriers that depend on 
knowledge about the necessary operations and/or the goal state (summarized in 
Table 2.1): 
? Interpolation barrier: Initial and goal state are known as well as the 
operators needed to reach the goal state. The problem solver needs to find 
a suitable combination or hierarchy of necessary operators. 
? Synthesis barrier: Initial and goal state are known but the operators are 
unknown. The problem solver needs to select the necessary operators from 
a known repertoire of operators. 
? Dialectic barrier: The initial state and the operators are known but the goal 
state is unknown. It is defined during the dialectic process that consists of 
hypothesis, antithesis, and synthesis. 
 
 
 
Knowledge about  
the operators 
(means) 
Level of specificity of the goal state 
 high low 
high Interpolation barrier Dialectic barrier 
low Synthesis barrier Dialectic and synthesis 
barrier 
Table 2.1: Different kinds of barriers that need to be overcome by problem solvers (adapted from 
Dörner 1987:14). 
                                                        
7 The components of the problem space were first defined by Newell and Simon in their 
seminal work “Human Problem Solving” (1972) as will be described in detail in sub-section 
2.2.2.1. 
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Problems in which the problem solver is faced with an interpolation barrier are 
comparable to problems of transformation as defined by Greeno (1978). These 
problems call for an arrangement of known operators. Problems that pose a 
synthesis barrier can only be solved by a creative process in which established ways 
of thinking are overcome (Dörner 1987:13). But according to Dörner (1987), the 
majority of problems that people are faced with on a daily basis are problems that 
pose a dialectic barrier. In these problems, there is awareness for the problem at 
hand but the goal state is unknown. Dörner (1987:13) provides the example of a 
historian who needs to fill the gaps in a document that is only partially preserved. 
This example does not seem very explanatory for several reasons. First, it cannot be 
classified as a daily problem for many people because it is a rather specific case in 
one field of science. Second, the goal state is known to the historian in general 
terms, i.e. recover the document in a way to make it readable for yourself and 
others.  
Dörner’s (1987:13) explanation for the selection of the term ‘dialectic’ may help to 
get a better picture of the class of problems that he is referring to. He states that 
solutions to these kinds of problems are often found in a dialectic process in which 
a potential solution is evaluated against outer and inner objections. Outer 
objections are defined as objections that do not result from the potential solution 
itself but are constraints induced from outside. Inner objections, on the other 
hand, arise from the individual problem components themselves that are 
combined in a potential solution (Dörner 1987:13). This more detailed description 
of the class of problems with dialectic barriers highlights that they are comparable 
to ill-defined problems. Returning to the example introduced to illustrate ill-
defined problems, this correspondence gets even clearer. The instruction “Make 
my flat look nicer.” implies a number of constraints regarding potential solutions. 
Solution candidates need to be checked with the speaker and possibly the landlady 
(outer objections) and they need to satisfy inner constraints of the flat as a 
building (e.g. stability, noise etc.). Reither (1996) proposes methods that are 
specifically suited for solving the different problem types described by Dörner 
(1987) as summarized in Table 2.2. 
Similarly to Greeno (1978), Dörner stresses that problems may pose more than one 
barrier and they are not independent from the problem solver. The latter is 
assumed specifically in problems with synthesis barriers that are constituted by 
established procedures and ways of thinking (Dörner 1987:13). 
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Problem type 
(Dörner 1987) 
Preferred problem solving strategy 
Interpolation 
barrier 
Analytical heurism, i.e. analysis of specific differences between current 
and goal state and selection of adequate operators for reducing the 
difference.  
Synthesis barrier Creative thinking to overcome the functional fixedness of objects. 
Operations are systematically released from its learned functions and 
rearranged creatively. 
Dialectic problem Systematic reduction of possible action moves. It is characterized as 
the repeated creation of constraints that are then overcome.8 
Table 2.2: Preferred problem solving strategies when facing an interpolation or synthesis 
barrier or a dialectic problem (summarized from Reither 1996:196). 
2.1.2 Classification of problems that are commonly 
investigated in psychological studies 
A number of well-researched problems belong to the class of problems of 
transformation, as defined by Greeno (1978). The problem of the Tower of Hanoi 
represents a transformation problem in which the initial and the goal state are 
well-defined. The possible moves of elements, i.e. disks, are highly constrained9. In 
this task the problem solver needs to find the correct sequence of moves that 
adheres to the constraints and represents the described goal state. The problem of 
Hobbits and Orcs (e.g. Greeno 1974), formerly referred to as Missionaries and 
Cannibals10, is structurally similar but involves different constraints. In toy-block 
problems, such as Tetris, a goal arrangement is presented to the participants and 
they need to arrange the given blocks accordingly by preserving stable structures. 
A strategy that guarantees high success rates for problems of transformation is 
means-end-analysis11 (Greeno 1978:249) in which sub-goals that can be satisfied are 
                                                        
8 Reither (1996:197) points out that dialectic problems are rarely studied experimentally 
hence there is not much evidence as to how people go about solving this class of problems. 
9 The following constraints are formulated: “There are three discs of unequal sizes, 
positioned on the far-left side of three pegs so that the largest disc is at the bottom, the 
middle-sized disc is in the middle, and the smallest disc is on the top. Your task is to 
transfer all three discs to the peg on the far-right, using the middle peg as a stationing area 
as needed. You may move only one disc at a time, and you may never move a larger disc on 
top of a smaller disc.” (Sternberg & Sternberg 2012:452). 
10 For the exact problem description of this problem see for example https://www.cour-
ses.psu.edu/psy/psy002_nxt6/hobbits&orcs.html (17.04.2012). 
11 Selected common problem solving methods will be described in detail in subsection 3 of 
this chapter. 
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defined and which eventually result in the predefined goal state. Other common 
problems of transformation and arrangement are chess problems in which the 
initial state as well as possible goal states are known and the moves are highly 
constrained (e.g. de Groot 1965; Newell & Simon 1972). 
There are also problems that represent transformation problems in which the 
elements that need to be restructured are functions of objects. Some types of 
insight problems belong to this class of problems that pose a synthesis barrier. A 
classic example was presented by Duncker and is commonly referred to as candle 
problem. In the problem description Duncker (1974) asked his participants to 
install three small candles for optical experiments on the wall besides the door. In 
the laboratory, there was a table on which, among other things, there were pieces 
of paper, string, pencils, and an ashtray. All of these objects were irrelevant to 
solving the problem successfully but there were also three small boxes and pins 
(see Figure 2.2). The participants were told that all objects that were needed for a 
successful completion of the given task were to be found on the table. 
Additionally, the instructions stated that everything on the table could be used in 
any way the participant would see it fit (Duncker 1974:104). 
 
Figure 2.2: Duncker’s (1945) candle problem represented by the necessary objects (initial state) and the 
solution (Reisberg 2010:463). 
In this problem description all objects are provided and need to be rearranged in 
order to install the candles besides the door. This task can only be solved if the 
problem solver abandons his concept of boxes as containers of pins. By considering 
the idea of boxes as a candle stand, the objects can be rearranged with regard to 
their location but more importantly regarding their function. One pin needs to be 
used to fasten the small box on the wall and then the candle can be placed inside 
the box (Duncker 1976:103). This insight can be described as a creative process 
because known objects need to be conceptualized differently by abandoning their 
known function. A similar problem is the matchstick problem in which participants 
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need to rearrange matchsticks, mentally or physically, to represent a defined 
structure (e.g. Knoblich et al. 1999; Knoblich et al. 2001). 
2.2 Theoretical approaches to human problem 
solving 
2.2.1 Theories on human problem solving 
So far, two approaches to the categorization of problem types were presented. 
These categorizations do not make any claims about the mental processes that 
drive problem solving. The following section will provide a brief overview on the 
proposed nature of the processes that result in problem solving activities before 
three theories on human problem solving will be outlined in more detail.  
One of the first hypotheses on explaining human behavior on problem solving 
tasks was proposed by George A. Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl H. Pribram in 
1960. They postulated that human problem solving behavior can be summarized in 
a Test–Operate–Test–Exit12 unit that is executed in a repetitive loop (Miller et al. 
1970:26). The authors assume the TOTE pattern to be the underlying structure of 
human planning. They specify this claim by stating that 
“the test phase of the TOTE involves the specification of whatever 
knowledge is necessary for the comparison that is to be made, and the 
operational phase represents what the organism does about it – and what 
the organism does may often involve overt, observable actions.” (Miller et 
al. 1970:31) 
The authors do not go into detail about the processes that are involved in the 
operational or test phase. They more generally state that any mental process that 
determines the appropriateness of the operational phase belongs to the test phase. 
As Miller et al. (1970) stress, their thoughts are novel because they deviate from the 
well-established concept of the reflex arc13. Therefore, their first proposal cannot be 
expected to specify all details. Besides their idea of an inherent feedback loop in 
the TOTE unit, they also stress the hierarchical structure of TOTE units. More 
                                                        
12 In Miller et al. (1970) as well as in most literature it is referred to by its acronym TOTE 
unit. This abbreviation will be adopted hereafter as well. 
13 The novelty of the proposed thoughts can also be inferred from remarks such as the 
following: “The idea that problem-solving can be represented as searching through a large 
set of possibilities until we find one that solves the problem may seem odd at first, and 
somewhat novel to a person who has taken his heuristic plans for granted.” (Miller et al. 
1970:167).  
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specifically, Miller et al. (1970:32) assume that “the operational components of 
TOTE units may themselves be TOTE units”14. To exemplify their proposal, Miller 
et al. (1970) compare problem solving to perceptual searches through the 
environment. When facing a perceptual search problem, such as finding a 
hammer, the searcher can be observed to scan the room. This behavior can be 
described in terms of the TOTE schema. In the operational phase the searcher 
orients his/her attention toward an object. This action is followed by the 
perceptual test. In the test phase the located object can be evaluated as satisfactory 
or a new operational phase starts. To limit the duration of the search process, a 
stop-rule may be executed in the test phase. The processes that are at work in a 
mental search problem can be directly compared when the objects are assumed to 
be a set of alternative hypotheses (Miller et al. 1970:161). 
De Groot (1969) was among the first scholars to provide a detailed account of the 
mental processes involved in problem solving. He shows that the cycle of mental 
processes is the basic unit to such diverse human endeavors as creative, analytical, 
and interpretative thinking. The cycle of mental processes contains the following 
steps: end–problem–means–freedom–uncertainty–choosing–trying–testing (deGroot 
1969:11). First, the problem solver needs to formulate a problem and thereby the 
attention is shifted to the means by which the end can be reached (de Groot 
1969:7). The problem solver is free in the choice of strategies. This is likely to result 
in uncertainty about the adequacy of the means that are to be employed. Once a 
choice has been made, the selected strategy is applied and the resulting state is 
evaluated regarding the effectiveness of the strategy in a process of evaluation. 
Additionally, de Groot (1969:14) identifies observation, feedback, and new input as 
important components of experiential processes15. Even though observation is not 
explicitly mentioned in the cycle of mental processes, it is the first activity that 
connects the organism to the present situation in which the organism “perceives 
certain (selected) aspects of S116” (de Groot 1969:3). Observation, therefore, con-
stitutes the first process in the empirical cycle17. Highlighting the influence of 
                                                        
14 More specifically, Miller at al. (1970:32) state that “the operational phase of a higher-order 
TOTE might itself consist of a string of other TOTE units, and each of these, in turn, may 
contain still other strings of TOTEs, and so on.” 
15 The term experiential processes is based on de Groot’s (1969) fundamental belief on 
which he rests his thinking. He believes that “the organism transform[s] its experiences and 
observations into experiences about the world – which will enable it to function more 
efficiently than it did before, in a less experienced state.” (de Groot 1969:1). 
16 “S1 = the situation as it presents itself to O [= the organism]” (de Groot 1969: 2). 
17 De Groot (1969:2-3) introduces the empirical cycle to describe the processes that are 
involved in gaining experience without reflection. The cycle encompasses the process of 
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control processes in the cycle, de Groot (1969:13) specifies that feedback, in the 
sense of evaluation of results, may lead to modifications of the original idea. The 
importance of feedback is further stressed by the proposal that 
“a major cycle will often comprise a whole series of smaller ones, each 
dealing with a subproblem of the larger one. This complex, hierarchical 
structure is made possible by repeated (routine) ‘shifts from end to means’, 
which the subject performs repeatedly.” (de Groot 1969:9) 
This quote states that complex actions such as playing chess (macro-cycle) are 
divided into a sequence of micro-cycles. As the outcome of one cycle is “fed back 
into the input data that start off the next one” (de Groot 1969:12) repetitious cycles 
form a spiral. Discussing a number of studies and findings, e.g. the “hermeneutic 
cycle of Verstehen” (de Groot 1969:12), de Groot illustrates that the proposed cycle 
of mental processes is the basic unit of numerous human mental activities such as 
creative, analytical, and interpretative thinking including problem solving. 
2.2.2 Problem solving as information processing 
In the following paragraphs two influential theories will be sketched that also have 
the search paradigm at the centre of their theories. Proceeding in time, the 
theories by Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon as well as by Dietrich Dörner 
focused more deeply on the nature of the cognitive processes that drive problem 
solving. However, both approaches are based on the assumption that problem 
solving is comparable to information processing as found in computers. Gentner et 
al. (2001:7) consider the “common analogy between human information processing 
and the processing performed by digital computers” central to the development of 
cognitive science as this analogy guided work on cognitive processes such as 
memory, attention, and problem solving. This view is already stated by Newell and 
Simon (1972), who remark that “an abstract concept of an information processing 
system has emerged with the development of the digital computer” (Newell & 
Simon 1972:5).  
2.2.2.1 Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon – human problem 
solving as the execution of a program of primitive 
information processes 
As introduced above the thought that made Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon’s 
theory ground breaking was the proposition that human problem solving needs to 
                                                                                                                                                       
perception, the organism’s reaction to the present situation, the process of acting in ‘the 
world’, and the subsequent process of perception of the altered state to evaluate it. 
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be described and understood in terms of information processes. Along with this 
revolutionary concept Newell et al. (1958:151) proposed three basic assumptions 
about their theory. First, they assume that symbolized information is contained in 
different kinds of memories and that those memories are connected to each other 
by ordering relations. Second, the authors propose that there are numerous 
‘primitive information processes’18 (Newell et al. 1958:151) that operate on the 
information that is held in the memory structure. Third, these primitive 
information processes are combined into ‘programs of processing’ (Newell et al. 
1958:151) based on a clearly defined set of rules. By following the assumption that 
human behavior can be understood as programs of processing, Newell et al. argue 
that “the vaguenesses that have plagued the theory of higher mental processes and 
other parts of psychology disappear” (Newell et al. 1958:166). The authors are 
certain that their theory and their approach to use a program to study the 
processes at work will yield insights on a fundamental question. The question of 
how these mental processes “can be compounded out of elementary information 
processes and hence how they can be carried out by mechanisms” (Newell et al. 
1958:152). Importantly, Newell et al. (1958) stress that they do not understand the 
computer as analog to human behavior, they rather want to illustrate the 
advantage of understanding problem solving as being based on the execution of 
programs. They postulate that each mental activity can be described in such 
precise terms that a machine can execute the same actions. This basic idea is 
stressed by a quote that highlights the intentions of the first ‘symposium on 
information theory’ in 1956 as cited by Lenzen (2002:18). In their 1958 paper, 
Newell, Shaw and Simon illustrate the adequacy of their theory by referring to de 
Groot (1946) who described the behavior of chess players in ways that correspond 
to their idea of identifiable and describable processes. 
Their program, called the Logic Theorist (abbreviated LT), is based on basic 
assumptions about the processes involved in human problem solving. Those 
processes, as described in the previous section, are summarized as “searching for 
possible solutions, generating these possibilities out of other elements, and 
evaluating partial solutions and cues” (Newell et al. 1958:152). The basic idea of 
programming LT was not to investigate problem solving processes but to show 
that a program based on primitive information process can find correct proofs to 
mathematical problems. To accomplish this task, the computer needs to generate 
                                                        
18 Newell et al. (1958:151) do not define primitive information processes exactly but they 
state that “each primitive process is a perfectly defined operation for which known physical 
mechanisms exist.” 
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numerous alternative expressions. This generation process is driven by the 
application of four methods that are stored in its depository, namely substitution19, 
detachment20, forward chaining, and backward chaining21. As all of these methods 
are based on comparisons, Newell et al. (1958) identified and programmed two 
important sub-processes: the matching process and the similarity test. In the 
matching process two sub-expressions are made equal. The similarity test 
determines if two expressions are similar. The elemental idea for programming the 
LT to generate numerous possible answers was the assumption that “in its simplest 
aspect, the problem-solving process is a search for a solution in the very large 
space of possible solutions” (Newell et al. 1958:159). 
The analysis of the methods employed by the LT as specified in the program 
output as well as the sequence in which the methods are applied and the theorems 
that are employed revealed the following results. The LT does not apply the 
methods in random order but tries to solve the given problems by using 
substitution first. If this method does not yield satisfactory results, the program 
applies the detachment method. If this as well as chaining forward fails, then 
chaining backward is tried (Newell et al. 1958:159). Newell et al. (1958) call this 
effect ‘method set’22. Furthermore, two hierarchies of processes were identified, 
namely the component problem hierarchy and the sub-problem hierarchy. The first 
kind of hierarchy describes the application of the ‘method set’, i.e. the current 
problem is solved by the consecutive application of different methods. Hence, the 
current problem is divided into four problems if all four methods need to be 
applied to derive a satisfactory solution or to end the search process. The sub-
problem hierarchy describes the process in which new theorems are derived, 
tested, and used as input for new generations of theorems. These sub-problems 
may yield a satisfactory solution in the end. The problem–sub-problem hierarchy 
was already observed and described by de Groot (1946) (cited in Newell et al. 
1958:162). Based on these and other reported findings on human problem solving, 
Newell et al. (1958) conclude  
                                                        
19 In substitution new expressions are generated by “the substitution of variable and 
replacements of connectives.” (Newell et al. 1958:158). 
20 In detachment, the validity of a previously proven theorem is used to generate a new and 
valid expression. (Newell et al. 1958:158). 
21 Both methods of chaining are also based on the rules of syllogism as described for 
detachment. They differ in the direction of the argument (for examples see Newell et al. 
1958:158). 
22 Newell et al. (1958) use the term set as it is defined by Johnson (1955), namely “a 
readiness to make a specified response to a specified stimulus” (cited in Newell et al. 
1985:159). 
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“that the processes that we observed in LT are basically the same as the 
processes that have been observed in human problem solving in other 
contexts” (Newell et al. 1958:165). 
In 1972, Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon published their groundbreaking book 
“Human problem solving” that is now a standard for anyone who is interested in 
human problem solving. In their seminal work, they follow up on the ideas that 
have been summarized in the previous paragraphs by providing a more thorough 
description of the memory structures and the mental processes that are involved in 
problem solving. Their theory is based on the idea that humans can be viewed as 
processors of information (Newell & Simon 1972:5). This view allows for a 
reasonable comparison between human problem solvers and computer programs 
that solve problems of the same kind. But Newell and Simon (1972) also stress that 
their theory does not represent the most abstract form of an information 
processing system it rather “introduces a suitable abstract information processing 
system to describe how man processes task-oriented symbolic information” 
(Newell & Simon 1972:5). To accomplish this aim, Newell and Simon (1972) 
restricted their investigations to short tasks, i.e. tasks that do not take longer than 
30 minutes to be solved, and symbolic tasks23 that posed a moderately difficult 
problem for the problem solver. In their book, they investigate and describe the 
behavior of particular problem solvers on these problems.  
With regard to the scope of their theory, the authors argue that the investigation 
of the behavior of one particular man when solving one particular task yields “a 
symbolic model on the basis of which pertinent specific aspects of the man’s 
problem solving behavior can be calculated” (Newell & Simon 1972:5). But the 
behavior identified in the individual can be assumed to hold for other human 
individuals as well because the individual’s data is abstracted “down to a level 
where a simple interpreter (such as a digital computer) can turn the description 
into an effective process of performing the task” (Newell & Simon 1972:11). 
Furthermore, the approach of comparing computer performance and solution to 
human behavior allows for very precise descriptions of the input and the processes 
of output creation. Each new state can be described in relation to all previous 
states and the operations that have been applied to yield this new state because “a 
program generally specifies a discrete change in a single component of the state24 
(that is, in just one symbol structure) at a moment in time” (Newell & Simon 
                                                        
23 Those symbolic tasks were chess, problems in symbolic logic, and algebra like puzzles 
(Newell & Simon 1972:3). 
24 A state is defined as a collection of symbolic structures in a memory (Newell & Simon 
1972:11). 
30 PROBLEM SOLVING – A GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
1972:11). As a counterpart to the output data of the computer program, Newell and 
Simon (1972) propose to use think aloud protocols to gain insight on human 
thought processes.25  
Newell and Simon (1972) identify two essential components of problem solving, 
namely the information processing system and the task environment (Newell & 
Simon 1972:88). Both components will be briefly described in the following 
paragraphs. The general structure of the information processing system (hereafter 
abbreviated as IPS) is illustrated in Figure 2.3 (p.31). The memory, more specifically 
the long-term memory, stores and retains symbol structures26. The processes that 
operate on the symbols27 and that produce new symbols are called information 
processes. The processor that is connected to the receptors, receiving input, as well 
as the effectors, contributing output, consists of three basic structures. It 
encompasses a set of elementary information processes and a memory structure 
that has the symbol structures of the elementary information processes as its input 
and output. Newell and Simon (1972:29) characterize elementary processes as 
those that “are not further analyzed in the theory into still simpler processes”. 
Furthermore, the processor contains the interpreter that determines the sequence 
of the elementary information processes that is to be executed.  
The IPS, as illustrated in Figure 2.3 on page 31, contains a number of features that 
characterize it as an adaptive system. These features are thought to be 
independent of the problem solver and the task environment. The IPS varies only 
marginally between individuals with regard to memory size, rates of reading and 
writing, and rates of accessing modes within the different memories. Additionally, 
the information processing as well as the rates of retrieval of elementary 
information attribute a serial character to the IPS. The global program 
organization exhibits a production-like and goal-like character (Newell & Simon 
1972:792). The memory system contains three memory structures, namely the 
short-term memory, the long-term memory, and an external memory. The long-
term memory (abbreviated LTM) contains a potentially infinite vocabulary of 
systems, has an essentially infinite capacity for symbol structures28, and is an 
                                                        
25 For an in-depth description of the methodology including a discussion of its strengths 
and weaknesses see chapter 3 (Verbal protocol analysis and Cognitive Discourse Analysis). 
26 Symbol structures are defined as “states of instances of symbols that are connected by a 
set of relations” (Newell & Simon 1972:20). 
27 The authors repeatedly emphasized the notion of symbol tokens as those symbolic 
elements that can be judged to be equal or different by a computer program (Newell & 
Simon 1972:23). 
28 Remember that symbols are the smallest unit of information held in LTM. If symbols are 
connected by relations, they are referred to as symbol structures. 
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associative memory. Similarly, the short-term memory (abbreviated STM) also 
works in an associative way but it can only hold few symbols. Based on previous 
research, Newell and Simon (1972:795) assume that the STM can hold five to seven 
symbols at a time and that there is little variation over tasks. Oberbauer (2012) 
argues against Newell and Simon’s (1972) hypothesis that there is a specific amount 
of information that can be held in STM. He proposes a cognitive model illustrating 
that the limited capacity of working memory is due to interference by 
superposition of distributed representations. According to Oberbauer (2012), this 
allows the conclusions that the capacity of the STM is variable over tasks. 
Information that is stored in STM is immediately available as input to the IPS 
system and all output of the IPS is first stored in STM before it may be transferred 
to LTM. In addition to these two internal memory structures, Newell and Simon 
(1972) propose that the IPS has access to an external memory (abbreviated EM) 
that is defined as the “immediately available visual field” (Newell & Simon 
1972:809), for example a paper or a chessboard. Functionally, STM and EM appear 
to form a single unit in which EM stores information that cannot be held in STM 
anymore. EM provides fast access to this information in the upcoming processing 
act, is potentially infinite in capacity, and can be accessed by means of linear 
scanning. 
 
Figure 2.3: General structure of an information processing system (IPS) (Newell & Simon 1972:20). 
Besides the information processing system, the task environment influences the 
problem solver’s behavior as the task environment determines which behavior is 
appropriate to reach a certain goal (Newell & Simon 1972:55). These thoughts rest 
on the assumption that the problem solver always thrives to accomplish the goal. 
Hence, a theory on problem solving needs to account for the demands of the 
environment (task environment) and for the psychology of the problem solver 
(problem space). The problem space is defined as the internal representation of the 
task environment including actions that the individual considered to perform but 
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which were not executed. The postulate of the existence of a problem space is 
based on the thought that  
“the subject in an experiment is presented with a set of instructions and a 
sequence of stimuli. He must encode these problem components – defining 
goals, rules, and other aspects of the situation – in some kind of space that 
represents the initial situation presented to him, the desired goal situation, 
various intermediate states, imagined or experienced, as well as any 
concepts he uses to describe these situations to himself.” (Newell & Simon 
1972:59) 
Thus, the search space includes entities, referred to as nodes, that either represent 
realizable or imaginable states, i.e. those states that are internal to the problem 
solver. The links that connect the different nodes represent the actions that change 
one state into another one. Since in mental activities there are no limitations to the 
application of operators, unsatisfactory states can be generated. This results in a 
large scope of the problem space (Newell & Simon 1972:76). The problem solving 
process itself is described as a search through the problem space as outlined in 
Newell et al. (1956). From the description of the task environment as well as the 
problem space it becomes apparent that their characteristics influence the 
structure of the search. In addition to these two components, the program, i.e. 
strategy, that is chosen by the problem solver influences the problem solving 
process.  
The problem solving process follows a general organization, as displayed in Figure 
2.4, in which the internal representation is created first (step 1). Then the problem 
space is selected (step 2). This mechanism is referred to as input translation 
(Newell & Simon 1972:88). The initial step is of high importance as all search 
activities take place in the created internal presentation. Then a method is selected 
from the method store. Newell and Simon (1972:88) define method as “a process 
that bears some rational relation to attaining a problem situation, as formulated 
and seen in terms of the internal representation”. The application of the method, 
step 3, controls the internal and external behavior of the problem solver. 
Nevertheless, the action can be halted at any time. If a method is terminated, three 
options can be taken by the problem solver in step 4. The problem solver may 
either apply another method, select a different internal representation29 and thus 
                                                        
29 Even though Newell and Simon (1972) do not go into detail regarding the mechanisms of 
creating a new internal representation of the problem space, such reorientation will 
probably be based on visual or other perceptual clues. Only by re-evaluating the problem 
description and all additional information that is given a new representation can be 
created. The additional information may be symbols or objects. Furthermore, hints might 
be provided to the problem solvers that help to restructure the problem space.  
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reformulate the problem, or the problem solver may abandon solving the problem 
altogether. In some problem solving encounters, sub-goals may be chosen and 
pursued first to open up new solution possibilities before the actual problem is 
revisited and solved. Importantly, the problem solver can only execute one 
program at a time (Newell & Simon 1972:89). This observation stresses the 
importance of the memory system within the IPS since all untried solution 
possibilities and methods are stored there.  
 
Figure 2.4: General organization of the problem solver (Newell & Simon 1972:89). 
The process summarized above can be represented in the basic circuit of “select a 
goal ? select a method ? evaluate the results ? select a goal again” (Newell & 
Simon 1972:90). The selection of a method is based on the problem description 
because the method in itself is not bound to a problem situation. The strategy is 
selected by the process of interpretation of the information that is encoded in the 
task environment and the transformations contained in the problem space. Since a 
problem space is likely to include more information than is necessary for the 
application of one method, several candidate methods can be selected during the 
interpretation process. Various methods have been described to be used by human 
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problem solvers. A selection of the most frequently mentioned ones are described 
in detail in 2.3. 
2.2.2.2 Dietrich Dörner – human problem solving as a search 
through the ‘Realitätsbereich’ 
In his theoretical proposal Dietrich Dörner focuses on the different features of the 
mental problem representation that effect the selection and appropriateness of the 
adapted problem solving process. He argues that those selections have a main 
impact on the success of the whole problem solving process. Dörner’s theory is in 
line with Newell and Simon’s (1972) basic concept of problem solving as 
information processing, i.e. problems are solved in a process of transformation of 
states. The mental space in which the transformation process takes place is called 
‘Realitätsbereich’ (space of reality) (Dörner 1987:15). Dörner (1987) specifies that 
this ‘Realitätsbereich’ contains ‘Operationen’ (operators) and ‘Sachverhalte’ 
(states). This specification shows that the concept of ‘Realitätsbereich’ is generally 
equivalent to Newell and Simon’s (1972) problem space. But as Dörner (1987) is 
more specific with regard to the nature of the different states and it is difficult to 
say if the two theoretical concepts are equivalent on the specific characteristics of 
states, Dörner’s German term ‘Realitätsbereich’ will be retained.  
Contrary to Newell and Simon (1972), Dörner (1987) argues that the nature of the 
‘Realitätsbereich’ as well as the appropriate problem solving processes depend on 
external as well as internal factors. The appropriateness of the problem solving 
process is dependent on the nature of the barrier that is being faced by the 
problem solver and the nature of the ‘Realitätsbereich’. The later one, on the other 
hand, is dependent on the problem solver’s goal, such as finding the fastest 
solution as compared to learning how to solve a specific class of problems. Hence, 
the features of the states and the operators in the ‘Realitätsbereich’ constitute its 
character (Dörner 1987:17). Dörner (1987) identifies five features of states and five 
features of operators. Those features and their influence on the nature of the 
‘Realitätsbereich’ are summarized in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. 
Feature of states Influence on the ‘Realitätsbereich’ 
Complexity A high degree of complexity may call for additional methods 
to reduce complexity, e.g. abstraction, combination of 
elements, reduction. 
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Dynamics Dynamic situations30 force the problem solver to act under 
time pressure and make informed guesses about future 
events. 
Connectedness If different states are highly connected, the problem solver 
needs to consider which consequences his actions with regard 
to one state have on the other states.31 
Transparency If few elements constituting a situation can be directly 
understood or observed, transparency is low and thus effects 
of actions might not be easily predicted. 
Amount of free 
components for  
object construction 
A high amount of components that can be integrated into the 
problem solving process fosters the problem solving process. 
Table 2.3: Overview on features of states and how they influence the nature of the ‘Realitätsbereich’ 
(Dörner 1987:18-21). 
Feature of operators Influence on the ‘Realitätsbereich’ 
Wirkungsbreite (impact32) If an operator can change many states, its impact is 
considered very high. 
Reversiblity If actions are easily reversed, i.e. if the initial state can be 
easily restored, the problem solver can engage in extensive 
trying in the world.33 
Größe des 
Anwendungsbereichs  
(scope of application) 
If many restrictions are bound to the application of an 
operator, its scope of application is very low. A low scope of 
application forces the problem solver to predict the influence 
of his actions on other states and the problem solver might 
need to formulate sub-goals to meet prerequisites for the 
application of a certain operator . 
Wirkungssicherheit  
(certainty of effect) 
If the application of an operator under certain circumstances 
leads to one and only one result, the certainty of effect is 
highest. 
Material and temporal 
costs 
If the energy and the time that is needed to apply an 
operator is considered too high in relation to the assumed 
effect, this operator should not be applied. 
Table 2.4: Overview on features of operators34 and how they influence the nature of ‘Realitätsbereich’ 
(Dörner 1987:21-23). 
                                                        
30 Dörner (1987) distinguishes dynamic from static ‘Realitätsbereiche’. If a ‘Realitätsbereich’ 
changes only by the problem solver’s actions it is called static, e.g. a game of chess. But if 
the ‘Realitätsbereich’ changes without the problem solver taking action it is classified as 
dynamic, e.g. politics.  
31 The analysis of resulting effects is called “Nebenwirkungsanalyse” (Dörner 1987:20). 
32 The translations are provided by the author of this thesis since no translations by Dörner 
himself could be found. They are not literal but content based.  
33 Dörner (1987:22) calls this behavior “spielerisches Probierverhalten” (playful probing).  
34 Dörner (1987) distinguishes between operators and operations. The former term denotes 
general schemas of actions transforming state A into state B whereas the later denote the 
actual performance of actions to transform A into B (Dörner 1987:15). Furthermore, 
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Dörner (1987) describes the different features of states as well as operators in so 
much detail because the theoretical knowledge about the various influences 
enables researchers to formulate claims about a general psychology of problem 
solving (Dörner 1987:25). He argues that if researchers know about the nature of 
the ‘Realitätsbereich’ by describing its states and the system of operators therein, 
the scope of validity of the respective findings can be assessed objectively. This 
objectivity can be assumed because the problem solver mentally wanders through 
the ‘Realitätsbereich’ getting from one state to another one without knowing the 
way between them. Newell and Simon (1972) associate this mental activity closely 
to the problem solver’s memory structures. Dörner (1987) also mentions working 
memory and long term memory adding to it the sensory storage capacity35. The 
later one contains all sensory input, i.e. impulses from the nervous system. Its 
capacity is large but the information is only accessible for a very short time, i.e. 
about half a second (Dörner 1987:28).  
With regard to the mental activities that the problem solver applies when he 
wanders through the ‘Realitätsbereich’, Dörner (1987) distinguishes between 
mental operations and heuristics. Mental operations are not important as processes 
themselves but they rather appear as parts of a cluster of mental processes (Dörner 
1987:45). Those mental processes are processes of change in which known 
information is changed into new information or hypotheses, processes of control, 
and processes of goal explication (Dörner 1987:38). These categories of mental 
processes contain the elementary processes of logical deduction, analogical 
deduction, abstraction, comparing, and classification36. 
The analysis of think aloud protocols showed that the problem solver tends to 
engage in unguided search right after encountering the problem (Dörner 1987:38). 
This phase is followed by guided behavior that is introduced by the process of goal 
explication. In the guided search phase, Dörner (1987) observed that processes of 
change are frequently followed by processes of control. Thus, Dörner (1987:39) 
concludes that mental processes do not occur in random order. He assumes that 
mental processes are ordered, referring to this ordering structure as heuristics. 
Heuristics are defined as programs of mental processes that are likely to result in a 
satisfactory solution to a specific class of problems (Dörner 1987:38). Dörner (1987) 
                                                                                                                                                       
operators are often combined into larger elements (macro-operators) which function as an 
operator system (Dörner 1987:23). 
35 German terminology: “sensorischer Speicher” (sensory storage) (Dörner 1987:28). 
36 Dörner (1987:39) points out that this list is only a selection of possible mental operations. 
But he does not give reasons for the selection of those specific mental operations. Thus, it 
is not understandable to the author of the thesis on which criteria the selection is based. 
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finds the basic ordering unit of processes of change and processes of control 
represented in the TOTE unit. Dörner (1987) supports the hypotheses of 
hierarchical orderings of TOTE units in the operational phase37 by empirical 
observations. The data revealed that the test-phase is often succeeded by 
numerous hierarchically ordered operation phases before the next test phase 
follows (as illustrated in Figure 2.5). 
 
Figure 2.5: Extension of the TOTE-unit as proposed by Dörner (1987:41);  
Zi  (state in the ‘Realitätsbereich’), T (Test), E (Exit), + (positive evaluation), - (negative evaluation). 
Thus, the TOTE unit can be assumed to be one possible ordering scheme of mental 
operations in a heuristic (Dörner 1987:43). Dörner (1987) explicitly names two 
heuristics, i.e. the analytical heuristic and the try-and-error heuristic (those will be 
presented in more detail in section 2.3). Furthermore, he points out that basic 
schemes of mental operations can be extended by conscious acts of combining 
mental operations. This active new combination is always necessary if stored 
heuristics do not yield satisfactory results. Newly derived heuristics that prove to 
be successful are stored in the so-called heuristic structure38 (Dörner 1987:47). 
Dörner’s (1987) repeated definition of heuristics and his in-depth description of 
their content expresses the importance of heuristics in the process of problem 
solving. Following his argumentation, those programs of mental operations are the 
distinguishing factor between creative and productive thinking as compared to 
                                                        
37 Remember that Miller et al.’s (1970) proposals were based on theoretical assumptions 
and research that had been conducted until 1960, which was not as rich as it was when 
Dörner first published his theory about 16 years later. 
38 Besides the storage for heuristics the heuristic structure also contains the capacity for 
analyzing the characteristics of the ‘Realitätsbereich’ and of the given task, as well as the 
control system. The control system determines if the application of a heuristic was 
successful or unsuccessful (Dörner 1987:47). 
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reproductive thinking39. Only by thinking in new terms, the problem solver will be 
able to solve problems and overcome barriers that he has not encountered before. 
2.2.3 Problem solving with external support – suggestions 
for a situated cognition approach 
The theories on problem solving that have been outlined so far are grounded in the 
line of thought of mental empiricism. De Groot (1969) defines this approach as the 
“trying out, in the mind, of possible alternatives in hierarchically coordinated, 
ever-growing cycles” (de Groot 1969:8). He extends this definition to include 
observations “in a carefully designed and closely controlled experimental set-up” 
and concludes that “these are obviously important and characteristically human 
variants” of problem solving (de Groot 1969:15). Researchers in line of situated 
cognition, in contrast, stress the importance of agent-environment interaction in 
problem solving. This recent line of research will be briefly outlined in the 
following paragraphs. 
Kirsh (2009) points out that no theory of problem solving with external support 
exists at this point of writing but he defines the core of a new theory on problem 
solving in the line of thinking in situated cognition as follows:  
“problem solving is an interactive process in which subjects perceive, 
change, and create cues, affordances, and large scale structures in the 
environment, such as diagrams, forms, scaffolds, and artifact ecologies that 
they work with as they make their way toward a solution.” (Kirsh 2009:290) 
This quote stresses the importance of an interactive engagement between the 
problem solver and the environment as the problem space is extended by this 
interaction. Furthermore, the quote contains the four areas that are central to a 
situated theory of problem solving, namely hints, affordances, thinking-with-things, 
and self-cuing. Kirsh (2009) argues that classical theories of problem solving, as 
described in the previous sub-section, fail to explain how the exploratory search 
process through the problem space proceeds. Furthermore, empirical 
investigations are based on specific classes of problems, mainly logical reasoning 
tasks such as chess and math problems. For this class of problems, no special 
knowledge from outside, i.e. background knowledge, is needed and they are well 
defined. This makes it easy for researchers to formulate assumptions about the 
components of the problem space or ‘Realitätsbereich’ and thus predictions about 
                                                        
39 The distinction between productive thinking and reproductive thinking is based on 
Funke (2003). Reproductive thinking denotes the behavior that is needed to cope with 
known, repetitive tasks. The sequence of actions that is needed is stored in long-term 
memory and can be applied without further revision. 
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the problem solving process40. In order to explain less restricted problems, Kirsh 
(2009) argues, that it is necessary to highlight  
“those aspects of problem solving that reveal how much of the machinery 
of inference, computation, and representation is embedded in the social 
cultural and material aspects of situations.” (Kirsh 2009:265) 
Hints are defined as “verbal or nonverbal cue[s] that act like a heuristic bias on 
search” (Kirsh 2009:291). They are central to the generation of candidates by 
suggesting possible ways of proceeding to the problem solver. Additionally, they 
are useful components in the evaluation of possible solutions. This role of hints is 
also acknowledged in central theories of problem solving. The importance of hints 
can be seen in the fact that some experiments focus on the nature and the 
influence of hints that help problem solvers to proceed. As shown in the previous 
sub-section, it is generally assumed that each problem solving process is driven by 
some component of generating candidate actions and other components that 
enable the problem solver to test these actions and evaluate them afterwards. But 
so far it is unknown, which characteristics make a hint a successful hint and it is 
not well researched which hints are offered by the environment and to which 
degree problem solvers make use of them. First attempts to tackle this question 
have been made in way-finding. In this field, researchers investigate which general 
strategies problem solvers use when entering for example an unknown building 
(e.g. Passini 1981; Hölscher et al. 2009) and which environmental hints they take 
into consideration, such as art work and glass doors (e.g. Frankenstein et al. 2010). 
Besides hints that are perceived in the environment there are also cues that are 
inherent in the object itself, i.e. so-called affordances. Norman (2002:9) defines 
these as “perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily those fundamental 
properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be used”. He stresses 
the effect that affordances have by suggesting how a thing should be handled. To 
illustrate this, Norman (2002) gives the example of door handles as there are 
numerous different ones but we know how to use them by merely looking at them. 
Kirsh (2009:293) points out that problem solvers will not detect all affordances 
right away but it depends on the cues that the problem solver encounters during 
the activity. This leads to the postulate that the environment, which the problem 
solver engages in, is partly co-constructed by the performed actions. Kirsh 
(2009:296) claims that the active engagement of the problem solver with the 
                                                        
40 This high level of transparency was Dörner’s (1987) motivation to describe the nature of 
the ‘Realitätsbereich’ in much detail. 
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environment by projecting knowledge41 or acting to change objects is not included 
in classical theories.  
However, it can be argued that classical accounts of problem solving acknowledge 
the interaction between problem solver and environment by assuming that the 
problem space is constantly changing based on performed actions. Although 
Newell and Simon (1972) as well as Dörner (1987) draw most attention to mental 
operations, their theories also include changes in the actual world. If the game of 
chess is considered, the performed chess move will constitute a new state of the 
world that is defined as the new starting point. Nonetheless, it can be argued that 
classical theories do not discuss hints or affordances because those are properties 
of real-life problems rather than of logical problems. However, the later ones are at 
the center of most problem solving research so far. 
It is generally assumed in problem solving theories that internal representations 
are supplemented by external representations. As Kirsh (2009:297) points out, 
written sentences, illustrations, numbers, or gestures are listed as external 
representations. Even though the reduction of cognitive load may be the most 
prominent reason for externalizing thought, Kirsh (2010) presents further ad-
vantages of externalization that foster the process of thinking and reasoning. By 
converging texts into graphs or other graphical representations, physical 
constraints can be used to limit the amount of possible options. This process 
highlights which actions and performances are possible and which ones are 
prohibited by some rule (either logical, learned, or physical) – these insights might 
not be gained if thinking and manipulation is performed only mentally (Kirsh 
2010:443). Furthermore, externalization of thought makes the state stable and 
public. It is stable in the sense that one possible state is displayed. Although it can 
be changed the next moment, it remains unchanged at least at that point of time. 
Thoughts that are kept in mind are always subject to change when other 
impressions or thoughts enter the mind. A thought becomes public by being 
externalized because it can be shared with others and it can be subject to 
discussion. It stands by itself and is not bound to the thinker anymore, i.e. it 
becomes intersubjective (Kirsh 2010:449). To summarize, external representations  
“can be operated on in different ways; they can be manually duplicated, and 
rearranged. They can be shared with other people. Tools can be applied to 
them.” (Kirsh 2010:447) 
                                                        
41 Kirsh (2009:293) points out that transfer is the result of detecting similar affordances and 
constraints or invariants. 
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The interaction with external representations allows for the creation of novel inter-
pretations (Kirsh 1995:64) because even though people can manipulate their 
internal representations in a way to rearrange objects, internal representations are 
always private. This means that novel arrangements and thoughts from other 
minds cannot become part of the thought process. Sterelny (2004) as well as 
Vallée-Tourangeau et al. (2011) also stress that externalization fosters the 
perception of structures or relations that are not recognized during mental 
manipulation. Sterenly (2004:243) describes that this transformation has the 
general purpose of converting a difficult cognitive problem into a perceptual one 
that is easier to solve. 
However, Kirsh wants to extend this view and argues that people also use objects 
to think with, e.g. they build real-world models to change arrangements within 
them. Thinking-with-things describes the interaction with physical materials, 
scaffolds, tools, and structures based on the idea that “thinking is somewhat tied 
up with the way we encounter and engage the world” (Kirsh 2009:300). This 
interactive way is essential to thinking because it helps to structure the affordance 
landscape and it is “a mechanism for extending our perception, action, and 
regulation” (Kirsh 2009:300). As an example, Kirsh (2009) compares people who 
encounter an assembly tasks in which the external help, i.e. the manual, is missing 
to people who are confronted with a tangram task. In both cases the problem 
solvers will use the different parts as objects to think with. Kirsh (2009) points out 
that it is necessary to find out which objects are used to think with and to define a 
thorough theory on thinking-with-things.  
So far, two conditions have been described that need to be met. First, all changes 
that are made can be reversed easily, i.e. the previous stage can be restored or a 
state can be achieved from which a new path can be taken. Second, all changes 
that are made and actions that are taken will not have disastrous consequences 
(Kirsh 2009:299). Assembly tasks are specifically mentioned to meet both of these 
conditions. 
Acting in the real world has numerous advantages as compared to mentally 
manipulating the current state in order to find a possible solution. One great 
advantage of real-world manipulation is the precise knowledge about the outcome 
of the action. In a recent paper, Cowley and Nash (2013) report a study conducted 
by Nash in which soldiers were faced with a version of the ‘Hobbits and Orcs’ 
problem. One experimental group was allowed to use pen and pencil whereas the 
other experimental group was provided with a papier maché model (Cowley & 
Nash 2013:191). Unfortunately, no discussion of the effect of an available model on 
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problem solving is reported in this paper. Vallée-Tourangeau et al. (2011) ran a 
similar experiment investigating matchstick algebra problems. In one group, 
participants were presented with the problems printed on a sheet of paper whereas 
the other group of participants was presented with the problems on a magnetic 
board with magnetized matchsticks (Vallée-Tourangeau et al. 2011:275). The results 
revealed that participants in the ‘interactive group’ were more successful in solving 
these problems highlighting that interactivity fosters insights. Vallée-Tourangeau 
et al. (2011) suggest that  
“interactivity encourages the rearrangement of the matchsticks which 
generates configurations revealing new affordances. (…) Manipulation thus 
leads to opportunities that would otherwise require cognitive effort to 
identify.” (Vallée-Tourangeau et al. 2011:277) 
Kirsh (2009) points out another mechanism that needs to be incorporated in a 
situated theory of problem solving: self-cuing. In classical theories, the search 
through the problem space is driven by the application of operators resulting in 
the generation of new states. This search takes place in working-memory, thus the 
search for heuristics, and operators in general, is based on states that are currently 
active there. In these theories, search processes do not extend to the environment 
besides those aspects that enter the working-memory through perception. In the 
account of a situated theory of problem solving the problem solver is assumed to 
search the environment by intentionally making decisions to look elsewhere. 
Research in the field of self-cuing is assumed to reveal “new interactive strategies 
(…) that show unanticipated ways subjects use the environment to shape their 
problem solving cognition” (Kirsh 2009:302). The central insight that the theory of 
situated cognition contributes to research on problem solving is summarized to be 
the observation that “the environment provides organization for cognitive activity, 
[and] that the world enables and supports such activities” (Kirsh 2009:303).  
The objective of researchers working in the framework of situated cognition is to 
“explain how internal and external control processes work with these supports and 
organization structures to regulate intelligent activity” (Kirsh 2009:303). Those 
questions are not well explained by classical theories and they have seldom been 
the objective of empirical research to date. In order to tackle the question of agent-
environment interaction, it is not sufficient to study problem solving in 
constrained laboratory contexts because as people adapt to the world they live in, 
their behavior needs to be studied in these contexts as well (Kirsh 2009:302). 
Kirsh’s list could be extended by Norman’s (2002) notion of constraints because as 
Norman argues constraints are powerful cues for possible actions. Norman 
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(2002:84-87) distinguishes between physical, semantic, cultural, and logical 
constraints. Physical constraints are those that limit possible actions. Semantic 
constraints rely on the problem solver’s world knowledge as the situation 
constraints possible actions. Norman (2002) gives the example of a motorcycle and 
a rider. The semantic constraint is that the rider needs to sit on the motorcycle 
facing the front of the motorcycle. Cultural constraints are bound to cultural 
conventions. In Germany, for example, most roofs have a triangular shape, whereas 
in other countries roofs are conventionally flat. The category ‘logical constraints’ 
subsumes constraints of the general nature, e.g. there is one object piece left and 
one spot to be filled, hence the piece needs to fit the spot. If the piece does not fit 
in the spot, the problem solving process needs to restart. 
2.3 Methods in human problem solving 
So far, the concept problem was defined and influential theories about mental 
processes involved in finding solutions to problems were summarized. As these 
theories are based on theoretical considerations as well as on empirical 
observations one focus of investigation was always the identification and 
description of strategies and heuristics that are used by human problem solvers. 
The reviewed theories highlight that search and test processes are assumed to be 
the driving force in problem solving. Dörner (1987) repeatedly stressed that new 
states are generated out of information provided in the problem description by 
means of heuristics. Newell and Simon (1972), more generally, state that “ends 
arise out of the formulation of goals and subgoals” (Newell & Simon 1972:91). In 
their theory, they further specify that methods by themselves are not bound to 
problems or certain problem situations but that it is rather the selection of the 
problem solver that determines which method will be applied first. Thus this 
concluding sub-section provides an overview on some methods applied to solve a 
given problem. In empirical studies, human problem solvers have been observed to 
have a great repertoire of methods at their disposal therefore the presented 
methods are those that are frequently mentioned in the literature42. 
                                                        
42 The selection is based on the methods that are described in the majority of the following 
works, namely Newell and Simon (1972), Newell et al. (1958; 1960), as well as introductory 
literature on psychology and problem solving (Funke 2003; Mietzel 2006) and cognitive 
psychology (Anderson 2005). 
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The recognition method is introduced as one universal method of problem solving 
by Newell and Simon (1972:95). This method can only be applied when the answer 
to a problem is stored in long-term memory and its retrieval is evoked when the 
problem description is interpreted. It can be described as a universal method 
because it can be applied to all kinds of problems since it is not sensitive to details 
of the problem description. Newell and Simon (1972) propose that this method is 
often combined with the reduction heuristic. By this combination, general heuristic 
problems are reduced into a number of sub-problems until one of them can be 
solved by means of the recognition method. 
If there is no solution to a problem stored in long-term memory, a new answer 
needs to be generated. The generate-and-test method is a likely one to yield a 
successful solution. The information that is available from the problem description 
is used to generate numerous potential solutions. Each of these is thereafter tested 
for its adequacy as a member of the set of actual solutions. According to Newell 
and Simon (1972:95-97), the method has two weaknesses. First, the generation and 
test process work independently from each other, which implies that partial 
solutions are not used as new input for the generation process. Second, the 
method is time consuming depending on the position of a member within the set 
of actual solutions.  
The generate-and-test method is the heart of the heuristic search. In this heuristic 
the input elements are not restricted to the problem description, instead all 
elements contained in the problem space are available as input for the generation 
process. Generation and test processes are assumed to be combined in the 
following general cycle: selection of an element form the problem space → 
selection of an operator → attempt to produce a new element of the problem space 
→ test whether it is a solution to the problem (Newell & Simon 1972:101).  
If a generated solution is accepted as a member in the set of actual solutions, it is 
stored for later use. If it is not accepted, it is stored as an ‘untried-problem’ and 
may be tried again with another method later. The cycle ends by either one of the 
following three choices: the application of operators on a current element is 
continued, the current element is replaced by a new element, or the solution-
path43 is abandoned altogether in which case attention turns back to an untried 
sub-problem. 
                                                        
43 A solution-path is defined as a sequence of expressions belonging to the set of original 
solutions (Newell & Simon 1972:76). 
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A number of methods are described that are part of those more general heuristics. 
These methods are based on the general assumption that sequences of operators 
can be defined in terms of ‘solution-action-sequences’ (Newell & Simon 1972:76). If 
the selection of potential operators is based on information that is encoded in the 
current state, the problem solver works forward in the sequence. In these cases, the 
selection of operators is combined with evaluative information on the plausibility 
of the possible operator before it is tested (Newell & Simon 1972:119). The method 
of working backwards starts form the other end of the solution-action-sequence; 
namely with the outcome of the process, i.e. the desired goal state. By applying this 
method, the problem solver interprets the observable or described goal state and 
extracts information to generate a list of possible operators. This list includes only 
operators that are assumed to change the initial state to correspond to the 
intended goal state. This method involves much planning because a plan of action 
is mentally created and evaluated before it is executed (Funke 2003:64). 
Newell et al. (1960) describe means-end-analysis as the most powerful heuristic 
observed in the LTS. It is based on the reduction heuristic in which a goal is divided 
into a number of sub-goals. These sub-goals (also called means) are characterized 
by two features. First, they are only temporary and they can be reached by the 
application of a known operator (end) (Anderson 2005:256). Second, if a sub-goal is 
defined that has these features solving, this sub-goal takes precedence over the 
initial goal. By solving the sub-goals, the problem solver continuously gets closer to 
the solution of the initial problem. Miller et al. (1970) provide a very good 
description of this heuristic by summarizing the theoretical questions that the 
problem solver is faced with when applying means-end-analysis. They describe the 
process of applying means-end-analysis as follows: 
“‘I want to get from A to B, but I do not know how. What is the difference 
between what I have and what I want to get? The difference is D. How can I 
reduce D? Operator T will reduce D, but I do not see how to apply it. 
Transform A so that T will apply to it. Now apply operator T and get a new 
object A´. The new problem is to get from A´ to B, but I do not know how. 
What is the difference?’ And so the means end analysis continues.” (Miller 
et al. 1970:189) 
Another method that is similar to means-end-analysis is hill climbing. However, 
those two methods represent two distinct perspectives on the overall problem 
solving process. Problem solvers who select the hill climbing method evaluate the 
potential new state with regard to its resemblance to the goal state. Only if the 
new state resemble the goal state more closely than the previous state, the selected 
operator is applied. In contrast to problem solvers who accept to approach the 
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initial problem by defining intermediate problems and solving those, these 
problem solvers expect to get closer to the goal state by every step. They do not 
apply operators that are evaluated to create assumed detours (Anderson 2005:256). 
A method that is frequently discussed and that is at the heart of the presented 
theories on human problem solving is the planning method. Newell et al. (1960), 
for example, observed that it was a very effective method in their Logical Theorist 
system. Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979) proposed a model that specified the 
mental processes involved in planning. Miller et al. (1970:190) provide a more 
general description of the method. They assume that by applying this heuristic the 
problem solver consciously selects certain details of the problem description 
whereas others are disregarded. By this selection, a simpler version of the problem 
is defined and a solution is generated for this one. If the simpler problem is solved, 
the missing details are integrated into the problem representation. The selected 
strategy is then applied to solve the more complicated problem. As all of these 
processes happen mentally, planning involves a high cognitive load for the 
problem solver. 
Another method that has been widely studied in experimental settings as well as in 
real-word scenarios and in scientific reasoning is that of analogy. In the process of 
identifying analogies, elements of a source (also called base) are mapped onto the 
target problem. If this mapping is successful, the problem solver can assume that 
the operators that were successful in solving the source problem are also 
appropriate for solving the current problem (Anderson 2005:251). This description 
already highlights that analogies can only be applied successfully if the appropriate 
source problem is selected. Although many people would agree to use analogies on 
a daily basis, it has been observed that participants rarely notice and apply 
analogies in experimental settings (e.g. Gick and Holyoak 1980). If participants use 
this method, they are most often guided by superficial similarities of elements 
instead of relations between elements. This mismatch between elements often 
results in erroneous transfer, which does not yield successful solutions (Anderson 
2005:253). In a recent project, Taatgen (2012) modeled the solution process on 
different control tasks, namely task switch, N-Back, and the Troop task to show 
that all processes are based on small production units. The comparison of the 
computed solution processes for these different tasks revealed that the solution is 
derived by either single comparison or single atomic actions. Based on these 
findings, Taatgen (2012) argues that the generic components of comparison and 
atomic action are reused by the problem solver when constructing an action plan 
for a similar problem. Thus, he proposes that it is not the action-sequence that is 
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transferred in analogies but rather the individual components. This finding may 
imply that analogies are used more often than previous experiments suggested. 
In tasks in which the problem description can be represented by actual objects 
thinking-with-things may be applied. In these cases, the real world is the model in 
which different configurations are tried and potential solution-paths are created. 
Vallée-Tourangeau et al. (2011) observed participants who solved matchstick 
algebra problems by manipulating magnetized matchsticks on a magnetic board 
(Vallée-Tourangeau et al. 2011:275). Participants were observed to place their 
fingers on the matchsticks, picking one up and holding it for some time, and 
moving matchsticks into new positions. Vallée-Tourangeau et al. (2011:277) 
interpret the last action as instances of “physically testing ideas before placing 
them back to their original position”. Even participants who were shown the 
equation printed on a piece of paper were observed to  
“move their finger across the printed equation as if to guide or focus 
thought, often using their finger to represent a matchstick, mimicking 
rotations and movements to aid visualisation and test spatial 
configurations.” (Vallée-Tourangeau et al. 2011:275) 
The observation that participants used their fingers to represent matchsticks 
supports a claim put forward by Kirsh (2009). He argued that problem solvers 
create models, i.e. representations, of the elements contained in a problem 
description if objects in question cannot be used for these manipulations. By 
manipulating the representations of the elements, they can try different potential 
methods without too much cognitive cost. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an introduction to the research field of problem solving by 
starting out with a definition of problem solving and outlining two influential 
theoretical frameworks of human problem solving. These traditional approaches 
understand problem solving as a search through the problem space in which new 
states are continuously created and checked for their validity as the final goal state. 
These manipulations proposed to be mainly mental in nature, i.e. executed in the 
problem solvers’ mind. To present different perspectives on human problem 
solving, a more recent approach was introduced as well. This approach stresses 
that problem solving is accomplished in an interactive process between the human 
and the environment. Researchers in situated cognition argue that people actively 
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shape the world to support their problem solving activity either in search for new 
information concerning a current problem or in the form of reminders for future 
actions. Both perspectives, traditional and situated, emphasize the search process 
through a problem space although the scope of the problem space is defined 
differently. Thus, the theoretical framework in this thesis is based on the 
assumption that problem solving takes place in a problem space which is defined 
by old and new states.  
In this chapter assumptions have been reviewed regarding the structure of the 
search process, i.e. the structure of the involved mental processes. Traditionally 
these structures have been investigated on well-defined, logic-based tasks. This 
approach is extended in this thesis by investigating the nature of the verbalized 
mental processes and their structure in an assembly task, i.e. a less logical based 
but rather physical manipulation task. At different times throughout this chapter, 
it was outlined that many studies investigated mental processes involved in 
problem solving by analyzing verbal protocols, such as think aloud recordings. 
This traditional and well-established approach will be adopted in this thesis. 
Therefore, the next chapter introduces the methodology of verbal protocol analysis 
and an extension of this content-based analysis by in-depth linguistic analyses as 
proposed in Cognitive Discourse Analysis. 
 3 Verbal protocol analysis and 
Cognitive Discourse Analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
“The central problem which cognitive scientists face in studying thinking is 
that thinking cannot be observed directly by people.” (Ericsson 1999:425) 
This introductory quote highlights one of the main obstacles in the endeavor to 
understand, describe, and model human cognition. Over the past decades, 
numerous new techniques have been developed to study traces of human mental 
processes, such as brain activation and eye movements (for an overview see e.g. 
Funke & Spering 2006). Protocol analysis is among the more traditional 
methodologies since it has been used from the beginning of the cognitive 
revolution44 (e.g. de Groot 1965). While recordings of brain activity constrain the 
participant’s ability to move, recordings of verbalization interfere less with the 
                                                        
44 The period defined as cognitive revolution in the human sciences is characterized by the 
goal to study the human mind taking contextual and physiological factors into 
consideration. Its beginning dates back to the mid 1980s (Sinha 2007). 
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participant’s physical space. However, one of the arguments frequently raised 
against the methodology of recording verbalization during task performance is the 
potential danger of reactivity, i.e. the mutual effect of verbalization on task 
performance. Studies that investigate this effect directly reported different results 
but these results are difficult to compare because those studies investigated 
performance on different tasks and providing different instructions for 
verbalization. The first meta-analysis of studies reporting performance measures 
on think aloud conditions and silent conditions (Fox et al. 2011), on the other hand, 
provides evidence that the task to think aloud did not tend to affect performance 
(see section 2.2 for a detailed discussion).  
Besides potential interference on primary task performance, one basic question 
concerning verbal protocol analysis is how conscious mental processes are (e.g. 
Sternberg & Sternberg 2012:177). Some researchers caution that people have little 
access to higher order mental processes, such as decision-making, and thus doubt 
the insights that can be gained by verbal protocols (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson 1977). 
However, other researchers believe that people can “give verbal expression to those 
thoughts that spontaneously emerge in attention during the generation of the 
solution” (Ericsson 2006:228). Ericsson and Simon (1993) introduced a model of 
verbalization of thinking that proposed specific assumptions about which processes 
can be recorded and by which procedure they need to be elicited. This model will 
be introduced in the second section of this chapter (content-based protocol 
analysis); strengths of this approach are highlighted and limitations are discussed. 
As think aloud protocols allow for a sequential observation over time, the 
methodology is widely used in problem solving research (e.g. de Groot 1965; 
Newell & Simon 1972; Chi et al. 1989; Siegler & Stern 1998; Ericsson et al. 2004; 
Bilalić et al. 2008). In most studies, verbal protocols are analyzed by applying 
protocol analysis. This methodology, as proposed by Ericsson and Simon (1984; 
1993), is described in section 3.2.3 and its application is exemplified by a review of 
selected studies. The third section of the chapter introduces studies that extend 
Ericsson and Simon’s method by combining the proposed content analysis with 
the investigating of the linguistic structure of verbal protocols. This section focuses 
on the introduction of the methodology of Cognitive Discourse Analysis that is 
applied in this thesis. 
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3.2 Content-based protocol analysis 
3.2.1 Ericsson and Simon’s model of verbalization of 
thinking 
In 1984, Ericsson and Simon published their seminal work on “verbal protocols as 
data”. In their book, they specified a theory of human information processing and 
the use of verbal protocol analysis to analyze recorded verbalizations of these 
processes. Cognitive processes were defined as a “sequence of internal states 
successively transformed by a series of information processes” (Ericsson & Simon 
1993:11). Ericsson and Simon (1993:xxxv) argued that these internal states, i.e. 
products of perception and retrieval from long-term memory, can be verbalized 
when they reach attention. 
Their proposed model of verbalization of thinking45 was based on four main 
assumptions. The first assumption addressed the theory of human problem solving 
behavior. In line with the theory that the human problem solver represents an 
information processing system, as proposed by Newell and Simon (1972), Ericsson 
and Simon (1993) assumed that 
“the subject’s behavior can be viewed as a search through a problem space, 
accumulating knowledge (not always correct) about the situation as he 
goes.” (Ericsson & Simon 1993:263) 
Second, they assumed that current problem states could be changed by the 
application of operators. Ericsson and Simon (1993) proposed that all likely 
operators are held in short-term memory (STM) along with newly created states. 
Third, the participant’s verbalizations correspond to the information that is 
currently held in STM and recently acquired information. This leads to the fourth 
assumption in which Ericsson and Simon (1993:264) specified that information 
recorded in verbal reports  
“consists primarily of knowledge required as inputs to the operators, new 
knowledge produced by operators, and symbols representing active goals 
and subgoals that are driving the activity.” (Ericsson & Simon 1993:264) 
Their assumptions allowed for precise expectations regarding the nature of heeded 
information, i.e. operators, knowledge states, goals, and subgoals. Their model 
predicted that different knowledge states that are represented in the problem 
space are encoded in current-state information, future-state information, and as 
                                                        
45 Different labels are used to refer to the model, e.g. model of verbalization of thought 
(Ericsson 2006:237) or model of verbalization of thinking (Fox et al. 2011:337). 
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probable-state information (Ericsson & Simon 1993:223). These specific assump-
tions lead to the general proposition that the kind of information which is 
verbalized depends on the memory system from which the information is 
retrieved.  
In their model of verbalization, Ericsson and Simon (1984 (1993)) distinguished 
between information that is verbalized at the moment in which it is attended to 
and information that is retrieved from long-term memory (LTM). Information that 
is currently attended to is assumed to be held in STM. They proposed that the STM 
has a limited capacity and is non-permanent46. Long-term memory, in contrast, 
was assumed to have a large capacity for storing information units and to present a 
permanent storage (Ericsson & Simon 1993:11). This assumed memory structure is 
important because the model of verbalization proposed by Ericsson and Simon 
(1993) rests upon these structures. More specifically, they proposed “that any 
verbalization or verbal report of the cognitive processes would have to be based on 
a subset of information held in STM and LTM” (Ericsson & Simon 1993:12). 
Level 1 and level 2 verbalizations were assumed to elicit information at the moment 
of thinking. Ericsson and Simon (1993:16) proposed that some information can be 
verbalized in the same form in which it is heeded; this is referred to as level 1 
verbalization. They argued that this is the case if information is already verbally 
encoded. In verbalization at level 2 the heeded information is not in verbal code 
and thus needs to be recoded before it is verbalized. Importantly, Ericsson and 
Simon (1993:18) argued that the sequence of heeded information is not changed in 
level 1 and level 2 verbalizations. Verbalizations at level 3, in contrast, involve 
intermediate scanning or filtering processes in which all retrieved information is 
evaluated with regard to the appropriateness of being verbalized. The processes of 
scanning and filtering are activated if selected information needs to be verbalized. 
Therefore, Ericsson and Simon (1993:18) argued that level 3 verbalizations represent 
changed sequences of heeded information. 
Based on this distinction, Ericsson and Simon (1993) characterized different kinds 
of verbal reports in terms of the time of verbalization and the relation between 
heeded and verbalized information. In their model of verbalization of thinking they 
distinguished between concurrent verbalization, retrospective reports, and 
probing. Concurrent verbalization is defined as “verbalization of task-relevant 
thoughts generated between the start of a primary task and the completion of the 
associated task” (Fox et al. 2011:321). Ericsson and Simon’s (1980 (1993)) model 
                                                        
46 For a later discussion on Ericsson’s concept of working memory see Ericsson and Kintsch 
1995. 
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predicted that for verbalizations which are recorded while the information is 
attended to, a one-to-one mapping between heeded and verbalized information 
can be assumed. The framework predicted that this is the case in think aloud 
reports and recordings of talk aloud. Talk aloud represents level 1 verbalizations, 
whereas think aloud protocols represent level 2 verbalizations. Importantly, 
Ericsson and Simon’s (1984 (1993)) model assumed that verbalization may be in-
complete because verbalization is secondary to task performance. They stressed 
that  
“these verbalizations reflect states of heeded information and do not 
describe the details of information nor why that particular information was 
heeded. Only the end product of perception and retrieval from long-term 
memory, those that reach attention are verbalized.” (Ericsson & Simon 
1993:xxxv) 
Ericsson and Simon (1993:252) assumed that concurrent verbalizations are 
specifically likely to be incomplete in situations in which participants read texts or 
attempt to understand problem descriptions and in situations in which extensive 
cognitive ability is needed to perform the primary task. 
Besides eliciting verbalization during performance, verbal reports can also be 
elicited after the task-directed processes are completed, i.e. in retrospective reports. 
If participants are asked to state whatever they remember about their task 
performance, Ericsson and Simon’s model (1980; 1993) predicted a one-to-one 
mapping between information that is still active in STM and verbalized 
information. The model predicts that this is only the case if retrospective reports 
that are elicited immediately after the task is completed and the instructions are 
phrased as proposed. However, the framework also predicted that some 
information may need to be heeded from LTM as well because of the limited 
storage capacity of STM. Ericsson and Simon (1993) cautioned that this retrieval 
from LTM may cause potential problems of fallibility and separating information. 
They argued that this problem may especially arise in reports in which participants 
have completed a number of similar problems. In these cases, participants may 
have adapted a general procedure across consecutive trials and report this 
information instead of information on the different trials. Furthermore, 
participants may not remember which strategy they used in which trial. Ericsson 
and Simon (1993:19) argued that these limitations could be reduced by instructing 
participants “to report everything you can remember about your thoughts during 
the last problem”. Nonetheless, researchers need to be aware that the information 
that is reported may represent a general strategy rather than the activated 
processes in individual trials. 
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In sum, if researchers are interested in the participants’ mental processes in 
individual trials, they should record participants’ verbalized thoughts during task 
performance, i.e. in think aloud protocols. If researchers are interested in general 
procedures that participants adopted across a number of trials, this information 
can be elicited in retrospective reports. However, observing the application and 
discussion of their framework over the past 30 years, Ericsson (2006) cloncludes 
that these verbal reports  
“frequently do not contain sufficient detail about the mediating cognitive 
processes and the associated knowledge to satisfy many scientists. For 
example, these reports may not contain the detailed procedure that would 
allow cognitive scientists to build complete computer models that are 
capable of regenerating the observed performance on the studied task.” 
(Ericsson 2006:224) 
Therefore, in a number of studies, in which researchers were interested in specific 
aspects of task performance, they asked participants to provide reasons instead of 
reporting whatever they remember. Different kinds of such directed questioning, 
also referred to as probing (Ericsson & Simon 1993:21), are reported in the 
literature. Some researchers asked directed questions regarding specific aspects of 
the task performance (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson 1977; Schooler et al. 1993). Other 
researchers interrupted participants at specific times during task performance and 
asked them to provide reasons and explanations (e.g. Bartl & Dörner 1998). 
Ericsson and Simon’s (1993) model predicted that the request for specific 
information activates intermediate processes, such as filtering. These processes are 
assumed to change the initially heeded sequence of information (level 3 verbalizat-
ions). Therefore, Ericsson and Simon (1993) repeatedly stressed that the pre-
dictions that their framework makes about the relation between verbalized 
thoughts and mental processes are only valid for the elicitation of undirected 
thought. 
In summary, it is important that researchers are very clear about which 
information they want to elicit, i.e. information that is currently in attention or 
general information. Furthermore, they need to be aware of the kind of 
information that can be elicited by the different kinds of verbal reports and 
potential errors of reporting. The issue of adequacy of elicited information will be 
critically discussed in the next subsection. Additionally, the controversial discus-
sion on reactivity of concurrent verbalization and performance on the primary task 
is addressed. 
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3.2.2 Critical discussion: adequacy and reactivity of verbal 
reports 
Regarding potential protocol invalidity, two different types can be distinguished, 
namely reactivity and nonveridicality (Russo et al. 1989). According to Russo et al. 
(1989)  
“a protocol is reactive if verbalization changes the primary process (…) 
(and) a protocol is nonveridical if it does not accurately reflect the 
underlying primary processes.” (Russo et al. 1989:760) 
Russo et al. (1989) argued that errors of omission, i.e. forgetting, and errors of 
commission, i.e. fabricating information, are frequent types of nonveridicality. In 
order to test the nonveridicality of different kinds of verbal reports, Russo et al. 
(1989) tested four groups of participants on their performance on different tasks47. 
Three different kinds of retrospective verbal reports were elicited to evaluate 
which kind of information was reported and how this information related to 
objective performance measures, i.e. solution accuracy and response times. In 
‘response cued retrospective reports’, on the one hand, participants were allowed 
to look at the solution. In ‘stimulus cued retrospective reports’, on the other hand, 
participants were given the original problem only. In ‘prompted retrospective 
reports’ participants saw their eye-movement superimposed on the original 
problem and were asked to provide reasons for fixating on the specific spot and 
report what they thought while looking there. The elicited verbal reports were 
analyzed with regard to forgetting and fabrication of information. 
The analysis revealed that forgetting was a commonly observed phenomenon in 
the analysis of retrospective reports. Participants mainly forgot to report 
perception of stimuli and information about initially drawn inferences regarding 
relations between task components (Russo et al. 1989:766). Fabrication of infor-
mation was specific to algorithmic tasks, i.e. numerical and mental addition tasks. 
The comparison between the different kinds of verbal reports highlighted that 
fabrication was specifically frequent in retrospective reports in which participants 
saw the initial problem. Therefore, Russo et al. (1989:766) caution researchers 
against eliciting retrospective reports by cuing participants with the original 
problem.  
It needs to be stressed that Russo et al. (1989) did not test their measures of 
nonveridicality with regard to the elicitation of retrospective reports as proposed 
                                                        
47 These tasks were verbal tasks, numerical tasks, pictorial tasks, and mental addition of 3-
digit numbers. 
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by Ericsson and Simon’s (1980; 1993) framework. Nonetheless, the reported 
findings confirmed that retrospective reports may miss information on inferences 
that are made at different times during the process of solving a problem, as 
pointed out by Ericsson and Simon (1980). A study by Siegler and Stern (1998) 
suggests an alternative interpretation of these findings. In their study, they were 
interested in the conceptual change of thinking in children. They tested children 
on mathematical inversion problems and asked them for explanations on how they 
solved the problem immediately after the solution was given (Siegler & Stern 
1998:382). The analysis of these reports revealed that children did not report using 
a shortcut strategy although they already applied it efficiently. Siegler and Stern 
(1998) interpreted these findings as evidence for the assumption that strategy 
discovery was unconscious and that the strategy could be reported only later. This 
finding highlights the strength of concurrent verbal reports because at the time at 
which the strategy discovery reaches consciousness it is likely to be verbalized 
although it might not be understood as a generalized strategy yet. Furthermore, 
participants do not need to be interrupted in their performance to provide 
explanations, an activity that focuses attention on the thought processes and takes 
it away from the primary task performance. 
Different studies suggested that asking participants to provide explanations for 
their actions and solution strategies during task performance facilitates problem 
solving and results in better performance (e.g. Chi et al. 1989; Chi 1996; Neuman & 
Schwarz 1998; Ainsworth & Loizou 2003). The effect of concurrent verbalization, 
i.e. the task to think aloud, on performance of the primary task is not as clear. As 
studies revealed different effects, the question of reactivity is still controversially 
debated. Ericsson and Simon (1993) argued that verbalization, if elicited as 
proposed in their framework, has no effect on basic performance (Ericsson & 
Simon 1993:85) or the internal structure of the thought processes (Ericsson & 
Simon 1993:89). 
There are a number of studies that focus specifically on the influence of 
verbalization on task performance. Most of them addressed the diverging findings 
from previous studies, i.e. verbalization facilitates performance vs. verbalization 
hinders successful performance, in their introductory section. Three alternative 
explanations for those findings are mentioned, namely the different nature of the 
investigated tasks (McGeorge & Burton 1989; Knoblich & Rhenius 1995; Bartl & 
Dörner 1998), evaluation of different cognitive processes (Schooler et al. 1993), and 
different instructions of verbalization (Ericsson & Simon 1993; Bartl & Dörner 
1998). Based on the differences in tasks as well as instructions for verbalization, 
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which the different studies report, Wilson (1994) stated that “this area is in sore 
need of a systematic meta-analysis” (Wilson 1994:251). Only recently, Fox et al. 
(2011) presented such a meta-analysis of 64 articles that reported 94 studies 
featuring 3,462 participants. They motivate their analysis by the observation that 
“despite widespread use, concurrent verbalization remains controversial 
because of concerns that it changes the cognitive processes mediating the 
performance of tasks in comparison to the traditional silent conditions 
under which psychological phenomena are typically studied in the 
laboratory.” (Fox et al. 2011:317) 
To address the potential reactivity of concurrent verbalization, Fox et al. (2011:322) 
selected studies that reported objective performance measures, such as accuracy of 
performance and solution time, and included a think aloud group as well as a 
silent control group. Furthermore, they included only studies that provided 
information that was needed to extract an effect size. They operationalized their 
analysis by categorizing four kinds of procedures, two kinds of task types, and 
three dependent variables. The reviewed papers included reports on explanatory 
verbal data, think aloud as proposed by Ericsson and Simon’s (1980, 1993) model, 
and directed questions. In some cases, the instructions for verbalization were only 
insufficiently reported so they could not be categorized. Fox et al. (2011) 
distinguished between visual tasks, i.e. those tasks in which “the spatial 
organization of the stimuli was inherent to accomplish the task” (Fox et al. 
2011:324), and nonvisual tasks, such as mental multiplication. With regard to the 
dependent variables, they classified if a study used time limits and cited the 
reported accuracy and solution times. 
The meta-analysis confirmed their expectation that  
“think-aloud procedures resulted in performance that was 
indistinguishable from that of silent groups, whereas explanatory 
procedures were associated with higher performance in verbalization 
conditions.” (Fox et al. 2011:329) 
No effects of verbalization were revealed with regard to task type (Fox et al. 
2011:330). The expected effect of verbalization on performance time was confirmed; 
if participants verbalized their thought during task performance, they needed 
more time to complete the task (Fox et al. 2011:331). Fox et al. (2011) summarize 
their findings by stating that the analysis revealed the effects predicted by Ericsson 
and Simon’s (1980; 1993) model. They conclude their meta-analysis by observing 
that  
“although the think-aloud procedure has limits and does not assure a 
complete record of participants’ thoughts, it is at present the only 
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nonreactive method of collecting the verbalized contents of thoughts while 
participants focus on completing challenging tasks.” (Fox et al. 2011:338) 
In sum, Fox et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis supported the predictions made by 
Ericsson and Simon’s (1980; 1984 (1993)) model of verbalization of thinking. Thus it 
can be assumed that the task to verbalize all thoughts that pass through the 
participant’s mind does not have an effect on performance except for longer times 
to complete the task.  
Although Schooler (2011) acknowledged the approach by Fox et al. (2011), he 
criticized their study and their findings for three reasons. First, Schooler (2011:347) 
criticized the selection of the analyzed studies. He argued that the selected studies 
were not specifically designed for the purpose of testing reactivity of verbalization 
on task performance. Second, Schooler (2011:347) pointed out that findings which 
revealed a significant effect of concurrent verbalization on performance were not 
sufficiently assessed to contribute adequately to the results of the meta-analysis. 
Third, Schooler (2011:346) argued that Fox et al. (2011) did not discuss the 
limitations of concurrent verbalization “to capture the ineffable mental processes 
that span between one thought and the next”. 
In a reply to Schooler’s (2011) comment, Ericsson and Fox (2011) stressed the 
difference between introspections, as discussed by Schooler, and think aloud 
reports, as proposed by Ericsson and Simon (1993). They point out that the analysis 
of think aloud protocols “does not involve attempts to arrest transient pheno-
menological experiences or decompose thoughts into their smallest elements” 
(Ericsson and Fox 2011:352). Furthermore, they emphasize that Ericsson and 
Simon’s (1984 (1993)) framework assumed that verbal reports may be incomplete 
(for more detail see 3.2.1). Ericsson and Fox (2011) also addressed Schooler’s (2011) 
critique concerning their selection of studies with regard to studies that suggest 
reactivity of concurrent verbalization and task performance. They argued that the 
studies referred to by Schooler (2011) were conducted in the framework of ‘verbal 
overshadowing’. In reference to a meta-analysis of studies conducted in this 
framework that did not reveal any significant reactivity with regard to concurrent 
verbal reports, Ericsson and Fox (2011) did not find their results to be contradicted 
by these studies. 
Addressing Schooler’s (2011) critique on the selection of studies, it needs to be 
noted that only few studies focus on the investigation of reactivity of concurrent 
verbal reports. A meta-analysis of this restricted sample would not be sound 
because the sample size would be much too small to draw valid conclusions. 
Furthermore, the findings of these studies can only be compared if they used the 
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same instructions for verbalization and investigated and reported the same 
performance measures on comparable tasks. The comparison of some studies that 
were specifically designed to investigate reactivity of concurrent verbalization 
highlights that this prerequisite is seldom met. These studies investigated different 
tasks, such as the Tower of Hanoi48 (Ahlum-Heath & Di Vesta 1986), dynamic 
decision tasks (McGeorg & Burton 1989; Knoblich & Rhenius 1995; Dickson et al. 
2000), analogical problems (Short et al. 1991), insight problems (Schooler et al. 
1993; Gilhooly et al. 2010), analytical tasks (Deffner 1989), or various different tasks 
(Merz 1969; Franzen & Merz 1976; Russo et al. 1989) (for more detail see Table 3.2 
in the appendix). This comparison, that is restricted to only one of the measures 
that were compared by Fox et al. (2011), highlights the difficulties to compare the 
reported findings to resolve the controversial discussion. Only one of these studies 
was specifically designed to test the findings reported in a previous one, i.e. the 
study designed by Gilhooly et al. (2010) tested findings that were reported by 
Schooler et al. (1993).  
In their study, Schooler et al. (1993) investigated the effect of verbalization on 
performance in insight and non-insight problems. Insight problems were defined as 
“problem situations that occur unexpectedly following an impasse” (Schooler et al. 
1993:166) whereas non-insight problems “can be solved in a logical, incremental 
fashion and do not require any nonobvious approaches to reach the correct 
solution” (Schooler et al. 1993:174).  
Schooler et al. (1993) reported two experiments that investigated the influence of 
verbalization on insight and non-insight problems. Think aloud was the only kind 
of verbalization that was tested in these experiments. The results highlighted that 
participants thinking aloud were less successful on insight problems but equally 
successful on non-insight problems. There was no difference with regard to 
performance time. Schooler et al. (1993) concluded that their findings “support our 
hypothesis that verbalization disrupts critical nonreportable processes” (Schooler 
et al. 1993:175). Schooler et al. (1993) assumed that spreading activation was among 
these nonreportable processes and they argued that this process was important in 
solving insight problems. 
Addressing Schooler at al.’s (1993) report, Gilhooly et al. (2010) provided a critical 
review of their procedure. They pointed out that the difference between the 
investigated tasks was not only on the nature of insight or non-insight, as defined 
above, but also between verbal and spatial form; all non-insight problems were 
                                                        
48 For more detail on the task of the Tower of Hanoi see chapter 2. 
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verbal in nature whereas at least two out of three insight problems were spatial in 
nature. Gilhooly et al (2010) proposed that performance on spatial problems might 
possibly show a stronger effect because of the necessary re-coding from spatial to 
verbal code. Additionally, Gilhooly et al. (2010:83) pointed out that the wording of 
the instruction for verbalization might have encouraged reading the instructions 
more frequently possibly resulting in a more persistent interpretation. 
Furthermore, participants trained to think aloud were asked to solve a non-insight 
problem. Gilhooly et al. (2010) speculated that this encounter might have biased 
those participants towards assuming all other problems to be of the same kind. 
In order to address all of these potential confounding factors, Gilhooly et al. (2010) 
balanced their design by including insight and non-insight problems that were 
spatial as well as verbal in nature. The test group was instructed to think aloud 
while solving the task49 whereas the control group was instructed to solve the task 
silently. The results revealed a significant effect of verbalization on performance on 
spatial tasks. Participants who thought aloud performed worse on spatial tasks 
than participants who worked silently. Contrary to Schooler et al. (1993), Gilhooly 
et al. (2010:88) did not find an effect of verbalization on success on insight or non-
insight problems. Therefore, Gilhooly et al. (2010:92) conclude that “insight 
problem solving does not depend on processes that are disrupted by verbalization”. 
They argue that their findings rather suggest that the nature of the task results in 
observable differences between participants thinking aloud and those who solve 
the problem silently. This effect of verbalization on task performance is in line 
with predictions made by Ericsson and Simon’s model of verbalization of thinking 
(1993:88). 
To summarize, Fox et al. (2011) presented the first approach to assess reactivity of 
concurrent verbalization on the basis of a large data set and across a variety of 
tasks. Their analysis highlighted that instructions for verbalization as well as task 
type resulted in different findings concerning the instruction to think aloud. The 
conclusions that they draw from their findings, support assumptions made in 
Ericsson and Simon’s model of verbalization of thinking (1980; 1993). In line with 
these findings, Gilhooly et al. (2010) presented evidence that effects of reactivity, as 
reported by Schooler et al. (1993), can be attributed to the nature of the task rather 
than to reactivity. These findings stress the importance of careful wording in task 
instructions and suggest that a silent condition should be included in the analysis. 
                                                        
49 Examples for the training phase were similar to those proposed by Ericsson and Simon 
(1993) and did not represent either insight or non-insight problems (for exact wording see 
Gilhooly et al. 2010:86). 
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Based on these considerations, a silent condition is included in the experimental 
design in this thesis. 
The presented findings on potential invalidity of verbal protocols can be sum-
marized by assessing the possibility of reactivity and nonveridicality. Techniques 
that elicit verbal reports after task completion are generally assumed to be 
nonreactive, i.e. introspection and retrospective reports. Asking guided questions, 
i.e. probing, is predicted to be reactive whereas concurrent verbalization is 
assumed to be nonreactive if the instructions are based on Ericsson and Simon’s 
(1984 (1993)) model. Whereas introspection and retrospective reports may contain 
memory errors and fabrication, probing and concurrent verbalization are assumed 
to be nonveridical (see Table 3.1). 
Assuming that both, think aloud protocols and retrospective reports, are non 
reactive, both kinds of verbal protocols were elicited in the experimental studies 
reported in this thesis. The combination of think aloud protocols and retrospective 
reports is adopted in this thesis for two reasons. First, think aloud protocols allow 
for a sequential observation over time whereas changes in conceptualization or 
strategy may not be completely remembered and reported in retrospective reports. 
Second, retrospective reports are likely to include generalizations based on the 
individual processes during task performance (Ericsson & Simon 1993). More 
generally, a second verbal report is likely to contain aspects that are not mentioned 
in the other kind of report. 
data elicitation method reactivity nonveridicality 
introspection no yes 
probing yes no 
retrospective report no yes 
concurrent verbalization (talk aloud and think aloud) no no 
Table 3.1: Overview on measures of adequacy regarding verbal reports in relation to the presented 
elicitation techniques. 
3.2.3 Protocol analysis 
Whereas the previous section introduced the general framework proposed by 
Ericsson and Simon (1984 (1993)) this section describes the methodology of 
protocol analysis which they suggested for the analysis of verbal data collected in 
their framework. In a later paper, Fox et al. (2011) explicitly state that “the protocol 
analysis approach should be seen as an accessory of the Ericsson-Simon model of 
verbalization of thinking” (Fox et al. 2011:337). The scope of the application of the 
proposed theoretical framework will be illustrated by examples of how the analysis 
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of verbal protocols contributed novel insights on problem solving processes and 
strategies (see section 3.2.3.3). 
3.2.3.1 Instructions for eliciting think aloud protocols 
Ericsson and Simon (1993) repeatedly stress that the phrasing of instructions is 
crucial to ensure the elicitation of level 1 and level 2 verbalizations, i.e. information 
about the sequences of mental processes that is not changed by intermediate 
processes (see 3.2.1). Previous studies revealed that the instructions for ver-
balization determine if unaltered information is verbalized, i.e. representing the 
trace of thoughts, or if the information is selected and thereby altered (see 3.2.2). 
Ericsson and Simon’s (1993:18) model of verbalization of thinking predicted that the 
instruction to say out loud everything that passes through the participants’ mind 
does not change the sequence of heeded information. However, if participants are 
asked to provide explanations regarding what kind of information is being 
retrieved, additional processing time is required. The model predicts that in order 
to provide explanations, participants link information that is currently in attention 
to information and thoughts that were in attention previously (Ericsson & Simon 
1993:79). This retrieval of selected information is expected to result in the 
activation of additional interpretation processes. The framework predicts that this 
procedure changes the structure of the cognitive processes in two ways. First, it 
involves additional interpretation processes that may not be activated otherwise. 
Second, the reflective behavior might direct the participant’s attention directly on 
his/her performance possibly highlighting aspects that would not be noticed 
otherwise. Therefore, Ericsson and Simon (1993) proposed the following 
instruction to elicit level 2 verbalizations: 
“In this experiment we are interested in what you think about when you 
find answers to some questions that I am going to ask you to answer. In 
order to do this I am going to ask you to THINK ALOUD as you work on 
the problem given. What I mean by think aloud is that I want you to tell 
me EVERYTHING you are thinking from the time you first see the question 
until you give an answer.” (Ericsson & Simon 1993:378) 
After providing this general instruction to the task of thinking aloud, Ericsson and 
Simon (1993:378) strongly suggested practicing thinking aloud with participants 
prior to the experimental session. They argue that practice tasks help to point out 
the difference between concurrent verbalization and retrospective or explanatory 
reports. The practice task that is widely used is that of multiplication. Participants 
are asked “What is the result of multiplying 24×36?”. If participants need more 
than one task to understand the difference between explanations and think aloud, 
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Ericsson and Simon (1993) provide two additional tasks. These tasks ask 
participants to provide information held in LTM because they are also recom-
mended for training participants to provide retrospective reports (see Ericsson & 
Simon 1993:378). If the experimenter is content that the participant verbalizes 
his/her thoughts during the practice task instead of providing explanations, the 
experimental session and the recordings start. 
3.2.3.2 Coding verbal reports 
The recorded speech needs to be transcribed to make it durable and subject to 
further coding on which analyses can be performed, such as content analysis as 
well as statistical analysis. Ericsson and Simon (1993:278) defined the following 
desired characteristics of transcripts: a) usability by investigators with different 
theories and research foci, b) no reliance on theoretical assumptions that are 
controversial, and c) all information that is necessary for investigating different 
theories need to be retained. These characteristics illustrate that Ericsson and 
Simon (1993) propose that the transcription process should not be theory-driven.  
However, it stands to reason that transcriptions are necessarily subjective because 
of the level of detail that is transcribed, e.g. phonetic vs. orthographic tran-
scriptions. Ochs (1979:44) already stated that “transcription is a selective process 
reflecting theoretical goals and definitions.” Contrary to Ericsson and Simon’s 
(1993) view, Ochs (1979) proposed that transcripts should not contain too much 
information. She rather argued that “transcripts should reflect the particular 
interests – the hypotheses to be examined – of the researcher” (Ochs 1979:44). 
Ochs (1979) repeatedly stressed that researchers need to be aware of the filtering 
process from which transcripts emerge as these transcriptions are the basis for 
their analysis and thus influence generalizations that are based on them. These 
considerations stress that the researcher’s theory necessarily has an influence on 
the transcription process starting with the selection of detail that is transcribed. In 
this thesis, the orthographic level is chosen in the transcriptions including 
hesitation markers, pauses, as well as elliptic sentences or words to capture the 
stream of thought as verbalized by participants. 
Information that is transcribed in protocols is coded with regard to specific 
categories. These categories are defined based on the theoretical framework that is 
adopted in the investigation (Ericsson & Simon 1993:286). These categories are 
either defined prior to the analysis based on the theoretical framework that is 
investigated or they are defined post-hoc during the coding procedure. Ericsson 
and Simon’s (1984 (1993)) primary motivation for describing protocol analysis was 
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the matching of the recorded verbal behavior to the output of a computer program 
that performed the same task. Through this matching the assumptions that were 
made about the mental processes and defined in theoretical terms in the computer 
program could be evaluated. Similarly, van Someren et al. (1994) proposed that the 
coding scheme is derived from the proposed model and a theory of verbalization, 
i.e. “our knowledge of the way in which cognitive processes will be verbalized” (van 
Someren et al. 1994:123). The coding scheme specifies the processes that are 
proposed in the model and possible representations of them (van Someren et al. 
1994:121). Additionally, van Someren et al (1994) proposed that there are some 
processes that are not specified in the model but that need to be anticipated in 
think aloud protocols. These processes are talking about non-task related issues, 
evaluation of the task or task-situation at a meta-level, comment on self, silent 
periods, and actions50 (van Someren et al. 1994:122). Van Someren et al. (1994) 
remark that these categories “might be an indication of the level of difficulty of a 
sub-task or the cognitive load of the subject” in some cases (van Someren et al. 
1994:122).  
For assigning the coding categories, the transcribed protocol is divided into 
segments. These segments may correspond to a statement each (Ericsson & Simon 
1993:266) or are well defined coding units of a different type (Krippendorff 2004). 
In most cases, a category is assigned based on the information that is contained in 
one unit. If this is not possible, Ericsson and Simon (1993:291) suggested that the 
previous and subsequent segments may also be consulted. However, they stressed 
that the amount of information that needs to be inferred from previous to 
subsequent segments influences the subjectivity of the coding; more inferences 
lead to increased subjectivity. Ericsson and Simon (1993) argued that the greatest 
possible objectivity is ensured when the coding can be done automatically by a 
computer because in these cases all underlying assumptions and inference rules 
need to be explicitly defined in the computer script. Furthermore, the 
computerized analysis ensures that the defined rules are consistently applied 
(Ericsson & Simon 1993:270).  
If no automatic coding is possible, the training of coders is essential. Ericsson and 
Simon (1993:291) as well as the other researchers discussing intercoder reliability 
assessment, point out that coders should be uninformed with regard to the 
experimental design and the hypotheses that are tested by the analysis. Moreover, 
                                                        
50 Actions may be a category that is part of the initial model if an action based task is 
modeled. Possibly the category ‘action’ was not part of the models tested by van Someren 
et al. (1994) as they were specifically interested in knowledge acquisition. 
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the coding scheme should be defined in a way that does not call for many 
inferences in cases of ambiguity because the extent of necessary inferences 
influences intercoder agreement (Ericsson & Simon 1993:294). Concerning the 
importance of training coders, Krippendorff (2004) points out that during training 
sessions  
“they51 refined categories, altered instructions, and revised data sheets until 
the coder felt comfortable with what was expected of them and the analysts 
were convinced they were getting the data they needed.” (Krippendorff 
2004:129) 
The importance of a close interaction between the researcher and the coders is 
specifically important in the light of Och’s (1979) observation that transcripts and 
specifically coded transcripts are the basis for later interpretations and 
generalizations. Therefore, coding validity needs to be assessed in a separate step 
of the procedure if coding is done manually. Coding validity is assessed by tests of 
reliability in which the agreement between two or more persons coding parts of 
the segmented protocols independently from each other is assessed. This 
assessment may either be based on percent agreement (Ericsson & Simon 1993; van 
Someren et al. 1994) or other inferential statistics measures such as Cohen’s Kappa 
(van Someren et al. 1994) or Krippendorff’s Alpha (Hayes & Krippendorff 2007).  
Van Someren et al. (1994:132) showed that percent agreement between coders 
represents “a more optimistic estimate” than Cohen’s Kappa. Lombard et al. 
(2002:590) agreed that percent agreement is a “simple, intuitive, and easy to 
calculate” estimate of intercoder reliability but they stressed that it does not 
account for chance agreement. This is a fact that weakens the informative value of 
this measure. Cohen’s Kappa accounts for chance agreement but it is limited to 
nominal data. Nonetheless, Lombard et al. (2002:592) observed that it is a widely 
reported coefficient in psychological science. However, Hayes and Krippendorff 
(2007) argued that only Krippendorff’s Alpha is appropriate to calculate reliability 
for numerous observers that are freely permutable and in which only data is 
considered that is generated by all observers. Additionally, they pointed out that 
Krippendorff’s Alpha can be used to calculate reliability for nominal, ordinal, 
interval, and ratio data (Hayes & Krippendorff 2007:82). Since there is no 
agreement on one standard index of intercoder reliability, Lombard et al al. 
(2002:600) proposed to report more than one index. 
If one or more appropriate indexes were selected and calculated, the acceptable 
level of reliability needs to be defined. Regarding the interpretation of Cohen’s 
                                                        
51 Here Krippendorf refers to content analysts and coders. 
66 VERBAL PROTOCOL ANALYSIS AND COGNITIVE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
 
Kappa values, van Someren et al. (1994:133) stated that “we would, generally 
speaking, say a Kappa should be above 0.70 in order to have an intercoder 
reliability that is acceptable”. Based on a literature review of reported intercoder 
agreement measures, Neuendorf (2002:143), in contrast, concluded more generally 
that “reliability coefficients of .90 or greater would be acceptable to all, .80 or 
greater would be acceptable in most situations, and below that there exists great 
disagreement”. Lombard et al. (2002:593) extend this statement by observing that 
“the criterion of .70 is often used for explorative research”. 
In sum, the presented overview stresses that the coding process needs to be very 
transparent, i.e. researchers need to be aware that their theoretical assumptions 
influence choices at the transcription level as well as on the coding level. Further-
more, researchers need to define these assumptions precisely at the beginning of 
the coding procedure to ensure that they are consistently applied throughout the 
analysis. If assumptions change or new information needs to be incorporated, e.g. 
by defining new coding categories, these changes need to be re-integrated into the 
coding of the entire data sample (e.g. Taylor & Gibbs 2010). 
By applying the coding scheme, a coded protocol is generated. In traditional 
protocol analysis as described by Ericsson and Simon (1993) and van Someren et al 
(1994), the content and structure of the coded protocol is then compared to the 
proposed model. The a priori proposed model simulates the assumed cognitive 
processes to perform the task and the simulated traces of mental processes are 
recorded. This record is then compared to the traces of mental processes in human 
problem solvers as specified in the coded protocol. Ericsson and Simon (1993) 
pointed out that much of their work focused on a small number of protocols, 
sometimes being single case studies, with the aim to “demonstrate that the 
information in the protocol could be regenerated, approximately, by the 
simulation model operating on the same task” (Ericsson & Simon 1993:262).  
Similarly to Ericsson and Simon (1993), van Someren et al. (1994:117) apply protocol 
analysis with the aim to construct a matching between the elicited protocols and 
the proposed model. Concerning the evaluation of the matching process, van 
Someren et al. (1994:134) specified three possible mismatches. First, the coded 
protocol contains processes that are not specified in the model and that are not 
part of the processes mentioned above. Second, the model may specify processes 
that cannot be identified in the protocols. And third, in cases of procedural models 
the observed structure of the coded protocol does not correspond to those 
specified in the model. All of these deviations have certain implications for the 
model as described in more detail in van Someren et al. (1994:135-139). 
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Although Ericsson and Simon (1984, 1993) described protocol analysis for a specific 
kind of task, the methodology has not only been used to compare human problem 
solving behavior to the behavior simulated by a computer script. Rather the 
elicitation of think aloud protocols and their analysis has been applied in studies 
conducted in various disciplines, such as psychology (e.g. Chi et al. 1989; Knoblich 
& Rhenius 1995; Siegler & Stern 1998; Bise 2008; deSouza et al. 2008), linguistics 
(e.g. Farrington-Flint & Wood 2007), document design (e.g. Krahmer & Umelen 
2004), or pedagogy (e.g. Kucan & Beck 1997; Green 1998; Leow 2005). In these 
studies, protocol analysis has either been used for testing hypotheses and 
establishing evidence for models and theories of mental processes as described so 
far or they have been used to generate explorative hypotheses (Crutcher 1994). To 
illustrate the variety of findings that have been generated by the application of 
protocol analysis, a selection of studies in the field of problem solving is presented 
in the next section. 
3.2.3.3 Application of protocol analysis in problem solving 
research 
Researchers have investigated various aspects of human problem solving, such as 
the kinds and causes of errors (e.g. Schoenfeld 1985), mechanisms underlying 
human reasoning, and understanding processes driving human performance on 
specific tasks (e.g. Ericsson et al. 2004; Bilalić et al. 2008). This thesis aims at 
identifying and describing the structure of problem solving processes involved in 
solving an assembly task. There are only few studies investigating problem solving 
in this kind of real life task. Therefore, the focus in this section is on studies that 
investigated the structure and nature of problem solving processes in a variety of 
tasks by means of protocol analysis. 
In the early years of the application of protocol analysis, it was mainly used in the 
way proposed by Ericsson and Simon (1980; 1984 (1993)), i.e. for informing and 
testing models of problem solving (e.g. Newell & Simon 1972; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-
Roth 1979; Hayes-Roth 1980; Kintsch & Greeno 1985; Dörner 1987; Blackman 1988; 
Habel 1988). The content analyses provided information about the use of heuristics 
and strategies, correct and false associations as well as on actions. These insights 
contributed to a better understanding of human problem solving behavior. 
Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth (1979), for example, investigated the strategies that were 
used by participants in a task in which errands needed to be scheduled given 
temporal and spatial constraints; this task is similar to the ‘plan a day’ task (e.g. 
Funke & Spering 2006:681). They distinguished between top-down and bottom-up 
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planning. Top-down planning processes were defined as those in which 
participants planned on a general level, i.e. which areas need to be covered, before 
they made considerations at a more detailed level, i.e. the exact sequence of 
errands. Bottom-up planning was defined when planning at the detailed level 
preceded planning at a general level or alternated with it (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-
Roth 1979:303). The analysis of think aloud reports highlighted that, against their 
expectations, participants did not engage in bottom-up planning. The protocol 
analysis rather revealed a ‘heterarchical plan structure’. In this structure 
participants made different decisions about their plans, such as how to approach a 
problem, how to evaluate the derived plans, and which mental resources to con-
tribute to the execution of these plans (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth 1979:305). A 
later study (Hayes-Roth 1980) confirmed these results and further suggested that 
problem solvers adapted their behavior to the problem structure. If the instruc-
tions posed strict time constraints, participants tended to use a bottom-up 
planning procedure. But if only minimal time constraints were imposed, 
participants used top-down and bottom-up approaches to solve the given task. 
Kaplan and Simon (1990) used protocol analysis to study the nature of insights. 
They assumed that insights were gained if the problem solvers searched for a new 
representation of the problem space. The results supported their assumption that 
problem difficulty could be attributed to search in the wrong problem space and 
the inability to notice the need to restructure the problem space (Kaplan & Simon 
1990:393). Additionally, the analysis revealed individual differences regarding the 
number of things that were noticed and the nature of these cues. Furthermore, 
recent studies employed protocol analysis to study decision-making (e.g. Cokely & 
Kelley 2009), transfer (e.g. Chrysikou & Weisberg 2005), and generation of new 
solutions (e.g. Gilhooly et al. 2007) in the area of problem solving.  
In a very recent study, Steffensen (2013) took an explorative approach to 
investigate the strategies employed by people working on a real-life problem 
within their natural environment, i.e. an office in this specific case study. 
Steffensen (2013) reported that he used think aloud protocols to explore  
“how human beings engage in collective and socio-culturally enhanced 
problem-searching, problem-finding and problem-solving activities in a 
self-organised problem space.” (Steffensen 2013:196) 
In order to analyze this data systematically, Steffensen (2013) proposed the 
methodology of Cognitive Event Analysis that extends protocol analysis by 
identifying cognitive events and analyzing their structure along an event 
trajectory. Steffensen (2013:201) defined an event trajectory as “the path taken by 
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the DCS52 as it moves through an infinite problem space in a way that yields 
results”. Therefore, Steffensen (2013) proposed that the path of mental processes 
that yield the final observable result can be visualized by means of such a 
trajectory. The reported results highlighted that the trajectory of the case study 
involved processes of reframing the problem representation and highlighted the 
moment of insight. Although Steffensen (2013) did not refer to traditional theories 
on insight problem solving, he stressed that the moment of insight was the turning 
point in the search for an acceptable solution. The analysis revealed that the 
observed problem solvers engaged in a problem solving cycle consisting of 
problem-finding, problem-solving, and cognitive events, such as reframing the 
problem representation (Steffensen 2013:204). This finding was similar to Kaplan 
and Simon’s (1990) observation that the process of restructuring the problem 
representation was an important component for gaining necessary insights to 
derive the correct solution. However, in contrast to Kaplan and Simon (1990), 
Steffensen (2013) described a chaotic behavior that was characterized by changing 
hypotheses about actions that could be taken and potential solutions. The 
trajectory revealed that the generation of these hypotheses did not follow a 
predictable structure but occurred at various times along the trajectory. Based on 
these new observations, Steffensen (2013:218) concluded that “the method (…) 
allows for detailed scrutiny of what happens as cognitive results are brought forth”.  
These examples were selected to illustrate how content-based protocol analysis has 
contributed to the description of mental processes that result in differences in 
observable and recordable problem solving behavior. The differences with regard 
to strategies, as revealed by Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979) and Kaplan and 
Simon (1990), could arguably not have been revealed by performance measures 
alone. To gain further insights on the nature of the activated and reported mental 
processes, some researchers have extended content-based analyses by investigating 
the linguistic structure of recorded problem solving processes. 
3.3 Linguistic analysis of verbal protocols 
There is no publication to date that summarizes different studies focusing on the 
analysis of linguistic features in think aloud protocols as expressions of mental 
processes. Therefore, the first section provides an overview introducing pub-
                                                        
52 DCS stands for Distributed Cognitive System and denotes the human problem solver 
who interacts with the environment. 
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lications in German by Roth (1985; 1987) and Bartl and Dörner (1998) as well as 
publications in English by Caron-Pargue and colleagues (e.g. Caron & Caron-
Pargue 1987; Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue 2009). The second section 
focuses on the presentation of the methodology of Cognitive Discourse Analysis 
that is applied and refined in this thesis. 
3.3.1 Linguistic representation of cognitive style and 
mental processes in think aloud protocols 
3.3.1.1 Linguistic representation of cognitive style in think aloud 
protocols 
Dörner et al. (1983) presented a comprehensive analysis of participants’ 
performance and the content of their think aloud protocols elicited while working 
on a complex decision task. In the ‘Lohhausen task’ participants needed to adapt 
the role of the mayor of a small city and their task was to ensure that the city 
prospered. All information that the participant considered necessary to make 
decisions, such as the number of people working in industry, was provided by the 
experimenter who was present during the experimental session (Dörner et al. 
1983:107). The analyses revealed systematic differences between successful and 
unsuccessful participants, for example with regard to the number of decisions and 
the scope of these decisions, i.e. which factors were manipulated (Dörner et al. 
1983:231).  
Based on these findings, Roth (1985) argued that problem solving performance was 
influenced by participants’ cognitive styles. The term cognitive style refers to the 
selection of information that is considered and how this information influences 
decision processes. Furthermore, he assumed that these differences could be 
observed in the linguistic structure of think aloud protocols (Roth 1985:183). Thus, 
Roth (1985) used a similar dynamic decision task, namely the ‘tailorshop’ problem 
to elicit think aloud protocols. In this task, participants were told that they were 
running a tailorshop for 15 months. Their task was to maximize the profit of the 
business and to make sure that the workers were motivated. The participants 
could change the current state of the system by taking various actions, such as 
buying raw material, hiring or firing workers, or increasing or cutting costs for 
advertisement (Roth 1985:183). The participant’s success was evaluated based on 
the number of months in which the business generated profit. 
In the explorative study, Roth (1985) based the linguistic analysis of the elicited 
think aloud protocols on a large number of linguistic markers identified in various 
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previous studies by other scholars (see Table 3.3 in the appendix for a summary). 
According to Roth (1985), previous studies revealed that these linguistic markers 
were correlated with abstractness, negation, and egocentrism; characteristics that 
he assumed to be indicators of cognitive style. Roth (1985) specifically referred to 
Ertel’s (1971)53 scheme for rating texts based on the dogmatic content54 that was 
expressed by their authors because Ertel’s findings had been confirmed in a 
number of studies. Ertel (1971:251-252) outlined that lexical expressions of 
frequency, amount, scope, and certainty as well as conjunctions and auxiliaries are 
indicative of a more dogmatic text or suggest an open-minded non-dogmatic text. 
In addition to markers previously described, Roth (1985:182-189) proposed that 
indicative mood and conjunctions might be further indicators of cognitive style.  
Roth’s (1985) analysis revealed that unsuccessful problem solvers used more 
linguistic features belonging to the category ‘dogmatic writing/thinking’. 
Furthermore, their protocols contained adversative conjunctions, negations, and 
modal verbs in the subjunctive mood at a statistically significant higher frequency 
than those by successful participants (Roth 1985:185-186). Contrary to prior 
expectations, Roth (1985) did not observe statistical differences at the level of 
nominal abstractness, causative conjunctions, and modal verbs in the indicative 
mood (Roth 1985:186). In the discussion, Roth (1985) argued that these findings 
illustrated different strategies of coping with missing information at the beginning 
of the task. Besides information that was provided in the instructions, additional 
information could be gained by close observation of the ‘tailorshop’ system while 
working on it. Roth’s (1985) analysis revealed that unsuccessful problem solvers 
had the tendency to consider inferred information about the structure of a real 
tailorshop and possible influencing factors as statements representing 
unchangeable background for their actions (Roth 1985:188). According to Roth 
(1985), this tendency to fill in missing information by inferences from the real 
world and label it as definite was expressed in the high frequency of features of 
dogmatic thinking. Furthermore, he argued that the repeated use of negations, 
                                                        
53 Importantly, Ertel (1971:262) points out that dogmatic features may be bound to the text 
genre that is analyzed. Thus he stresses that the frequency of the analyzed lexical 
expressions does not allow conclusions about the writer’s personality. These far reaching 
conclusions can only be drawn after analyzing different texts by the same author. If think 
aloud protocols are analyzed, as proposed by Roth (1985), it may be possible to draw 
tentative conclusions about the speaker’s personality or at least about the verbalized 
mental problem solving structure because this text represents the speaker’s thoughts. 
54 Ertel (1972:242) defines dogmatic to be a closed system of beliefs that is markedly 
different from a system of disbeliefs. People operating within a non-dogmatic system are 
open for new and unexpected information and incorporate those into their existing system. 
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indicating the boundaries between options, illustrated that unsuccessful 
participants felt the need to decide on one alternative (Roth 1985:189).  
Think aloud protocols by successful participants, in contrast, suggested that these 
participants considered first associations and background knowledge about the 
structure of a real tailorshop as explorative hypotheses and analogies for the 
respective problem that they were asked to work on (Roth 1985:188). Roth (1985) 
argued that the infrequent use of subjunctive mood indicated that successful 
problem solvers were working in the respective workspace, continuously 
incorporating new information that was created during interaction with the 
system. This latter interpretation was supported by the observed low frequency of 
linguistic features associated with the language style labeled ‘dogmatic thinking’ by 
Ertel (1971).  
In a second study, Roth (1987) analyzed the linguistic structure of think aloud 
protocols elicited while participants worked on another complex problem, namely 
DORI. In this problem, participants were asked to work out a plan for nomads to 
raise cattle successfully. In order to change the current state of the system, 
participants could, for example, buy new pasture or cattle. Success was evaluated 
based on obtained results on the variables of ‘number of nomads’, ‘number of 
cattle’, and ‘quantity of fodder’ (Roth 1987:209). The quantitative analysis of 
linguistic markers, as described in Roth (1985), confirmed the results obtained in 
the previous study. By combining a content-based analysis with a linguistic 
analysis, Roth (1987:213) suggested that successful problem solvers considered data 
provided by the system and continuously integrated this feedback. According to 
Roth (1987), this tendency was reflected in the frequent use of adverbs expressing 
limitations, such as ‘some’ and ‘frequently’, which was constant throughout the 
trials. Unsuccessful participants tended to use adverbs indicating generalizations, 
such as ‘absolutely’, ‘all’, or ‘always’. At the same time, the use of negation 
increased in think aloud protocols of unsuccessful participants (Roth 1987:212). 
According to Roth (1987), these findings suggested that unsuccessful participants 
were increasingly puzzled by the system and thus they repeatedly rejected new 
information (Roth 1987:214). Roth (1987) argued that these findings, along with 
those from his previous study, reflected different cognitive styles, i.e. integration of 
new information and formulation of hypotheses about them as opposed to 
focusing on initial inferences and generalizing them along with rejection of new 
information. 
Adopting a similar approach, Bartl and Dörner (1998) investigated the linguistic 
structure of think aloud protocols recorded while participants solved the ‘öko-bug’ 
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problem. In this task, participants were shown the insects initial appearance and 
were instructed to change it into the provided desired appearance. They were told 
which features could be changed by which actions (Bartl & Dörner 1998:227). 
Success was evaluated based on the number of problems that were solved and the 
number of actions, i.e. manipulations, that were needed. Furthermore, the authors 
assessed participants’ memory by asking them to recall the influence of specific 
operators.  
In their linguistic analysis, Bartl and Dörner (1998) compared the think aloud 
protocol of one successful participant with that of one unsuccessful participant. 
The successful participant needed fewer manipulations and referred to the 
provided information about operators less often than the participant who did not 
solve the problem (Bartl & Dörner 1998:234). Bartl and Dörner (1998:235) focused 
on the analysis of conjunctions since those highlight the relations that the speaker 
assumes to hold between the connected statements. In their analysis, they studied 
the frequency of adversative, consecutive, instrumental, conditional, causal, and 
temporal conjunctions. The analysis revealed that the successful participant used 
all of these conjunctions whereas the unsuccessful participant mainly used 
adversative conjunctions. Bartl and Dörner (1998:235) argued that this difference 
highlighted the successful participant’s tendency to draw different connections 
between information, such as temporal sequences of operators or causal relations 
between perceived states and operators. Furthermore, the analysis of verb tense 
highlighted that the successful problem solver formulated hypotheses that were 
marked by the use of subjunctive mood and the phrase “I think” (Bartl & Dörner 
1998:236). Based on these findings, Bartl and Dörner (1998) conclude that the 
analysis of conjunctions in think aloud protocols suggested that successful 
participants were capable of connecting given and generated information by 
means of different relations and to formulate tentative conclusions, i.e. 
hypotheses. These findings support those results reported by Roth (1985). 
In sum, these studies provide an overview of linguistic markers that were used to 
identify different ways of integrating information to make decisions. The findings 
are comparable because all three studies investigated similar dynamic decision 
tasks. The observation that all of them highlight the same differences between 
successful and unsuccessful participants with regard to the kind of information 
that is considered and how it is used to guide the problem solving process, 
strengthens the individual conclusions. Nonetheless, these conclusions could be 
further supported by studies that elicit additional behavioral measures, such as 
eye-tracking data, along with think aloud reports. 
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3.3.1.2 Linguistic representation of mental processes in think 
aloud protocols 
Whereas Roth (1985; 1987) and Bartl and Dörner (1998) investigated cognitive style 
in think aloud protocols, another research group focused on the description of the 
linguistic structure of individual problem solving processes. In a number of pub-
lications, Caron-Pargue and her collaborators reported analyses based on think 
aloud protocols elicited while participants solved the Tower of Hanoi task or the 
problem of the Chinese rings55. 
In 1987, Caron and Caron-Pargue described their research approach for the first 
time. They started out by proposing four basic operations of argumentative 
discourse, namely lexical selection, thematic structure, ‘prise en charge’56, and 
connectives. Caron and Caron-Pargue (1987:171) argued that these phenomena had 
previously been studied in terms of the referential use of language exclusively. In 
contrast, they wanted to study these basic operations in relation to “the production 
of speech while the speaker is himself constructing and transforming a represen-
tation of a given situation” (Caron & Caron-Pargue 1987:172). Based on the assump-
tion that the linguistic devices used in argumentative discourse and concurrent 
verbalizations during problem solving were general in nature, they argued that 
findings on argumentative discourse were a reasonable starting point for their 
analyses. In this paper, Caron and Caron-Pargue (1987) cited examples from 
protocols to illustrate their theoretical considerations but they did not provide 
details about the experiment(s) in which those protocols were elicited. In their 
concluding statement, they admitted that their paper provided only a “sketchy 
presentation of our results” (Caron & Caron-Pargue 1987:176). However, they tested 
their theoretical considerations in a number of studies in subsequent years and 
refined their theoretical framework (e.g. Caron-Pargue & Caron 1991; Bégoin-
Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2003; Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2010). Two of 
these studies will be described in the following paragraphs to illustrate how 
Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue combined performance measures and the 
presentation of the current state with linguistic analyses to provide evidence for 
their proposal that specific linguistic features can be interpreted as markers of 
mental processes. 
                                                        
55 For more information on the Tower of Hanoi see chapter 2. The Chinese rings task is 
structurally similar.  
56 ‘Prise en charge’ refers to the marking of the speaker’s attitude towards the propositional 
content (Caron & Caron-Pargue 1987:171). 
LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF VERBAL PROTOCOLS 75 
 
 
Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue based their theoretical framework on Culioli’s 
(e.g. 1995) enunciative model. In one of their earlier papers, Bégoin-Augereau and 
Caron-Pargue (2003) proposed that  
“on the basis of linguistic markers, cuts into episodes will lead to a 
demarcation of the units of cognitive processing; the links and boundaries 
between utterances will define the elementary actions made by the 
subjects.” (Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2003:81) 
They tested their proposal experimentally by eliciting think aloud protocols of 60 
participants57 while they solved the Tower of Hanoi task. They collected verbal 
reports of four trials for each participant in order to investigate effects of learning. 
For the analysis, each verbalization in the think aloud protocols was 
complemented by the description of the scene, i.e. which ring was on each of the 
three pegs (see table 1a in Bégion-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2003:83). The analysis 
of the linguistic features of the elicited protocols revealed, for example, that the 
frequency of changes in naming or double naming, i.e. repetition, was constant 
throughout the four trials. Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue (2003:86) 
interpreted these findings as evidence that these linguistic features characterized 
“the simplest and automatic representation constructed through expertise”. Based 
on the changes that were executed by manipulating the rings and the 
corresponding linguistic description of this action, Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-
Pargue (2003:87) proposed that the investigated linguistic markers expressed 
different levels of ‘structurations and reorganizations of the representation’. They 
argued that starting terms58, constituent locators59, and connectives represented 
main changes in representations. Interjections were proposed to express 
resolutions at critical points during the task. The categories change of naming and 
double naming were proposed to signal local reorganization. 
In a later study, these findings were extended by an analysis of spaces that were 
assumed to be involved in problem solving. Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue 
(2009) proposed that an external space could be distinguished from an internal 
space based on linguistic features in think aloud protocols. They elicited think 
aloud protocols from 20 children working on the Tower of Hanoi task throughout 
four consecutive trials. Performance was evaluated with regard to time and moves 
that were needed. The linguistic analysis focused on the distribution of starting 
                                                        
57 These participants were 7, 10, and 14 year-old children; 20 participants in each age group. 
58  ‘Starting terms’ were defined as “terms around which the predicative relation is 
organized” (Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2003:82). 
59 ‘Constituent locators’ were defined to correspond “to the construction of the locator 
around which the utterance is organized” (Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2003:82). 
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terms, as defined in Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue (2003), and 
interpropositional locations. The latter linguistic category was defined, in reference 
to Culioli’s (e.g. 1995) theory, as verbalizations of actions in which the items were 
individually referred to, i.e. the peg was referred to as such in repeated references 
instead of being replaced by an anaphora in the consecutive reference (Bégoin-
Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2009:103). The distribution of these two linguistic 
markers was analyzed with regard to their ‘ratio to moves’60 and their ‘ratio to 
words’ (Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2009:108). Adopting the approach of 
combining transcriptions of the think aloud protocols with the scene description 
(see Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2003), the authors proposed that the ver-
balization of starting terms marked abstract representations in the internal space 
whereas interpropositional locations marked representations in the external space. 
Furthermore, they proposed that an interaction between these two spaces was 
expressed by the co-occurrence of both markers in the verbalization of one move 
(Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2009:109). In a technical process that was not 
comprehensively described in their paper, they proposed to categorize all possible 
sub-goals on a graph of states. As a main conclusion from their analyses, Bégoin-
Augereau and Caron-Pargue (2009:118) proposed that “two distinct decision 
processes were characterized from a cognitive interpretation of linguistic markers”.  
In sum, these studies by Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue highlighted 
correlations between physical actions, i.e. beginning of an action, mental processes 
that were involved in these actions, such as decision-making, and linguistic 
choices. Furthermore, this brief introduction illustrates that hypotheses about the 
relation between linguistic expressions and mental processes need to be well 
grounded in theoretical frameworks, such as Culioli’s (e.g. 1995) theory in Bégoin-
Augereau and Caron-Pargue’s research. As most theoretical frameworks on 
language use focus on interactive settings in which language is used to 
communicate, the proposed applicability of these theories for the specific setting 
of think aloud protocols needs to be theoretically well motivated. Furthermore, the 
work reported by Caron-Pargue and collaborators, most notably with Bégoin-
Augereau, highlights that evidence needs to be accumulated across different 
studies and a large number of participants. 
Although the work by Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue appears sound with 
regard to its theoretical assumptions based on Culioli’s framework and the general 
procedure of analyses, it needs to be noted that the technical details are difficult to 
                                                        
60 This measure was defined as “100×ratio of the total number of moves in the section” 
(Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2009:108). 
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grasp at times. Additionally, their approach is limited to the Tower of Hanoi 
problem and the structurally very similar problem of the Chinese rings. A different 
approach to the analysis of linguistic features in think aloud protocols and the 
question of how they are related to mental processes is introduced in section 3.2, 
namely the methodology of Cognitive Discourse Analysis that is adopted in this 
thesis. 
3.3.2 Cognitive Discourse Analysis 
The term Cognitive Discourse Analysis is used by three researchers denoting 
different perspectives. Van Dijk (2000) outlines a general approach to discourse 
analysis that focuses on discourse properties that are based on cognitive concepts 
and that need to be interpreted in these terms, e.g. mental models of a text that are 
expressed by local coherence. Taking up van Dijk’s proposition, Kibrik (2001; 2011) 
introduced Cognitive Discourse Analysis as a discipline building links to 
neighboring disciplines such as psychology and cognitive science. 
Thora Tenbrink introduces Cognitive Discourse Analysis (CODA in short) as a 
methodology that highlights the representation of mental processes in discourse, 
e.g. how planning activities can be distinguished from travelling activities 
(Tenbrink & Seifert 2011). In this methodology, a content based linguistic analysis 
in Ericsson and Simon’s (1984 (1993)) tradition is combined with an in-depth 
linguistic analysis of verbal protocols. Ideally, the linguistic analysis is combined 
with the analysis of performance measures. This section provides an introduction 
to the method’s theoretical assumptions and the proposed procedure. 
Additionally, with regard to the focus of this thesis, a review of selected studies 
highlights the insights that have been gained by analyzing verbal reports on 
problem solving with this method to date. The studies are selected to illustrate the 
diverse research questions that have been investigated by applying CODA 
addressing wayfinding tasks in real-life scenarios as well as in experimental 
settings, and analogical problem solving. 
3.3.2.1 Theoretical assumptions 
Tenbrink (2010) argued that analyses by means of CODA combine insights on 
mental processes as obtained in verbal protocols with experimental designs as 
traditionally used in psycholinguistics. In psycholinguistics, studies are strictly 
controlled to investigate processes involved in language production and language 
comprehension. As a consequence, verbal data is highly constrained with regard to 
the linguistic options that can be chosen by speakers. Tenbrink calls for a more 
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unconstrained elicitation by allowing participants to state what they think in the 
way that they would normally express it. Furthermore, CODA is intended to ana-
lyze unconstrained verbal production data that is elicited in natural environments 
as well as in laboratory settings. Tenbrink (2010) argued that this approach to the 
elicitation of verbal data is similar to research in the field of Discourse Analysis and 
linguistics. Therefore, the theoretical framework draws on concepts and findings in 
these areas and refines them to highlight mental processes expressed in 
spontaneous verbalizations. 
The basic assumption in the theory of CODA is that spontaneous verbal reports 
highlight systematic linguistic patterns that are not consciously selected by the 
speaker. This proposal is based on Ericsson and Simon’s (1984 (1993)) model of 
verbalization of thinking that predicted that verbalizations of thoughts, that do 
not involve any intermediate processes, represent traces of mental processes.61 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the linguistic structure of such verbalizations 
expresses the involved mental processes. However, Tenbrink (2008) points out 
that not all observed differences in linguistic expressions reflect mental processes 
because verbalization is also influenced by an assumed addressee and the nature of 
the discourse task. Tenbrink (2008) argued that different kinds of discourse tasks 
(e.g. describe the shortest route vs. walk the shortest route while thinking aloud) 
and communicative goals (e.g. plan for yourself vs. plan for an uninformed 
partner) result in different conceptual perspectives on that task. These 
perspectives need to be identified in the recorded verbalizations of the discourse 
task (Tenbrink 2008). Tenbrink (2010:122) described this process of identification 
of influencing factors to be a challenge. One possibility to tackle this potential 
difficulty is the elicitation of verbalizations on different discourse tasks on the 
same problem by one participant (Tenbrink & Gralla 2009:5).  
To highlight the differences of information that can be elicited by different 
discourse tasks, Tenbrink (2008) provided an overview on the characteristics of 
different discourse tasks solved by one participant when working on the Traveling 
Salesperson Problem (abbreviated TSP)62. In this paper, she compared information 
elicited in a think aloud protocol, in a retrospective report on how the task was 
solved, and in an instruction for an imagined friend. In line with Ericsson and 
Simon’s (1993) model, these tasks were assumed to contain information on 
                                                        
61 For more detail see distinction between level 2 verbalization and level 3 verbalization in 
section 3.2.1. 
62 In the traveling salesman problem participants were instructed to visit a number of 
spatial goals before returning to the start point following the shortest possible path 
(Tenbrink 2008:126). 
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different mental processes. Whereas think aloud protocols were assumed to con-
tain traces of mental processes when they are attended to, retrospective reports 
were assumed to contain information on “mental processes associated with the 
spatial task from memory” (Tenbrink 2008:127). The instructions, in contrast, were 
expected to include generalizations of the procedure specifying only those actions 
that were successful. In each of these reports, Tenbrink (2008) analyzed the 
distribution of linguistic markers indicating topic shifts, conceptual complexity, 
structure, and coherence. Drawing on Functional Grammar, Tenbrink (2008:129) 
used Halliday’s terminology to identify explicit structural markers.  
The analysis revealed that temporal markers, such as ‘first’, ‘now’, and ‘then’, were 
very frequent in the think aloud protocols. In most cases, those markers were 
accompanied by a reference to a particular symbol. The mention of specific 
symbols changed to references to regions over consecutive trials. Furthermore, the 
data highlighted that the discourse marker ‘okay’ was used when new trials started 
but also when a trial was ended. The discourse marker ‘so’ frequently occurred 
after one or several objects were visited. Tenbrink (2008:130) argued that this 
specific pattern suggested that ‘so’ marked the completion of subtasks. Similarly, 
the location of the particle ‘ja’ (well) suggested that it marked immediate, 
perceptual processes because it was most frequently verbalized when “the presence 
of a symbol directly close by” (Tenbrink 2008:130) was reported.  
Tenbrink (2008:130) observed that most information units exhibited the following 
structure: temporal marker + action verb + next target symbol/region. The action 
verb was in the present tense in the majority of cases. Drawing on Ericsson and 
Simon (1984) she argued that this structure  
“provided evidence that the participant was truly focused on the task and 
did not produce irrelevant or long-term memory based utterance (Ericsson 
& Simon 1984).” (Tenbrink 2008:131) 
If generalizations were identified in the data, those were marked by the adverb 
‘again’ and were related to the region-based perspective, i.e. referring to “the other 
side” or “the left” (Tenbrink 2008:131) rather than to specific symbols. This strategy 
was explicitly stated in instructions to a friend. Tenbrink (2008:132) argued that the 
discovery and repeated use of this strategy marked high-level mental processes. 
Additionally, she identified expressions of search and control processes. In the 
think aloud protocol, the participant verbalized searching for symbols and 
repeatedly controlling the “shopping list”63 (Tenbrink 2008:132). These two pro-
                                                        
63 The shopping list contained all symbols that needed to be visited to complete the task 
and the start symbol which also resembled the goal symbol.  
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cesses were reported in more general terms, i.e. not related to specific symbols and 
instances, in both written reports. 
In her analysis of the think aloud protocol, Tenbrink (2008) highlighted that the 
participant did not only use the region-based strategy but the participant also 
mentioned the “nearest-neighbor” heuristic64; both strategies are described as 
possible strategies to solve the TSP problem in the literature. The comparison 
between the information verbalized during task performance and the information 
that was recalled immediately after the task was completed, i.e. in the 
retrospective report, revealed that the participant did not refer to the “nearest-
neighbor” heuristic. This finding suggested that think aloud protocols provided 
insights that were not recalled by the participant herself after consecutive trials. In 
sum, these findings revealed that differences in linguistic features correlated well 
with differences in presumed mental processes motivated by the distinctions 
proposed by Ericsson and Simon (1993) and other researchers, thus supporting the 
validity of the approach.  
In the concluding remarks, Tenbrink (2008:134) pointed out that these first 
insights needed “to be quantified and validated across a larger set of participants 
and different task variations”. Only validation across a larger data-base would 
allow for insights about the relationship between linguistic representations and 
mental processes and highlight mental processes that are relevant for specific 
problem solving tasks (Tenbrink 2008:134). Tenbrink and collaborators pursued 
this aim by eliciting different kinds of verbal reports along with performance 
measures on different problem solving tasks, such as the TSP (e.g. Tenbrink & 
Wiener 2009), holiday planning (Tenbrink & Seifert 2010), navigating through real-
world and simulated environments (e.g. Tenbrink et al. 2011; Klippel et al. 2013), or 
analogical problem solving (Gralla et al. 2012). A selection of these studies will be 
presented to highlight the accumulating evidence for Tenbrink’s (2008) theoretical 
assumptions. 
Besides applying CODA to study mental processes in problem solving, Tenbrink 
and collaborators used the methodology to investigate mental representations 
expressed in spatial referential identification and location tasks, either with a 
specific addressee (e.g. Moratz & Tenbrink 2006; Tenbrink & Shi 2007; Andonova 
et al. 2008; Tenbrink et al. 2008; Andonova et al. 2010) or without (e.g. Tenbrink 
2005; Vorwerg & Tenbrink 2007; Tenbrink 2009). Since this thesis focuses on the 
application of CODA for analyzing verbal reports elicited in a problem solving 
                                                        
64 In the nearest-neighbor heuristic, participants select routes that connect items that are 
close to each other. 
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scenario, only findings in the domain of problem solving will be reviewed in the 
next sections. 
3.3.2.2 Application: Studying problem solving in navigation tasks 
Based on theoretical considerations regarding previously identified and described 
strategies for solving TSP problems as well as the influence of goals, distractors, 
and the actual setting on performance (for a theoretical discussion see Wiener & 
Tenbrink 2008), Tenbrink and Wiener (2009) conducted two studies that 
investigated performance and linguistic structure of verbal reports in a version of 
the TSP problem involving distractors and feature information. The focus in the 
experiment was on a task that was shown to highlight usage of three well-
described strategies, namely the cluster strategy, the region-based strategy, and the 
nearest-neighbor strategy. Participants were shown lists of symbols that they 
needed to collect (‘shopping lists’) that contained between four to nine target 
symbols. Performance was evaluated by comparing the length of the chosen path 
to the length of the optimal path. Furthermore, the number of trials in which the 
optimal path was found was evaluated. The analysis revealed that participants’ 
performance was better in tasks with fewer target symbols and participants 
performed better in tasks in which the nearest-neighbor strategy could be adopted 
(Tenbrink & Wiener 2009:149).  
In addition to performance measures, Tenbrink and Wiener (2009) elicited written 
retrospective reports immediately after all trials were completed and instructed 
participants to write an instruction for a friend. In the retrospective reports, 
participants reported having used two strategies, namely a group-clustering 
strategy and a strategy of focusing on trajectory features. Additionally, the analysis 
revealed that participants mentioned color much more frequently than shape of 
symbols. According to Tenbrink and Wiener (2009:153), this finding indicated that 
color was not only perceived as a feature but that the focus on color rather 
suggested “a conscious decision to simplify the problem space by focusing on it”. 
This conclusion was supported by findings in the second study in which color 
facilitated finding the correct path in one condition65. The frequency of mention of 
color increased significantly in the second experiment as compared to the first one 
(Tenbrink & Wiener 2009:155).  
Common trajectory features, that were mentioned in retrospective reports in the 
first study, were circles or patterns. The analysis of verb types used revealed that 
                                                        
65 The second experiment was run with participants who did not participate in the first 
study (Tenbrink & Wiener 2009:153). 
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participants frequently mentioned searching for patterns and paths and thinking 
about them (Tenbrink & Wiener 2009:160). These results are similar to those 
described in Tenbrink (2008). Furthermore, Tenbrink and Wiener (2009) iden-
tified the same structuring devices as in Tenbrink’s (2008) previous study. 
Retrospective reports, for example, were frequently structured by temporal 
markers, such as ‘first’ and ‘then’. Tenbrink and Wiener (2009:151) argued that this 
highlights how participants imposed a temporal structure on a complex and 
previously unstructured task. Additionally, the analysis revealed frequent use of 
markers of extension and matter enhancement, such as ‘and’, ‘also’, and ‘in 
addition’. In line with Tenbrink (2008), Tenbrink and Wiener (2009) argued that 
these connectors reflected the large number of subtasks that needed to be per-
formed. This comparison highlights that the second study conducted on a refined 
version of the TSP problem and with more participants supported results that were 
obtained in Tenbrink’s (2008) earlier case study. 
Tenbrink and Wiener (2009:141) argued that the TSP is structurally similar to 
navigation tasks that involve finding the route from a start location to a target 
location. Hölscher et al. (2011), for example, investigated the influence of situated 
and prospective planning processes on route choice and their linguistic 
representation in different verbal reports. They reported two experiments that 
were very similar, i.e. both involved real-world navigation through downtown 
Freiburg eliciting data on prospective planning and situated planning. In the first 
experiment, participants were asked to plan how they would walk from a 
predefined start to a given goal location and provide a verbal route direction 
(prospective planning). Afterwards participants were asked to walk from the same 
start to the same goal location and think aloud along the way as just described 
(situated planning). Participants were not constrained to walk the same way. 
Hölscher et al. (2011:229) argued that prospective planning required that a 
complete route was planned in advance in which “detailed spatial information 
about streets and intersections needs to be derived from memory”. Situated 
planning, in contrast, “allows for an incremental optimization of the overall plan 
by adding in local direction information” (Hölscher et al. 2011:230). In the second 
experiment, participants were instructed to write down a route that they would 
walk themselves from a pre-defined start to an indicated goal location (prospective 
planning for self). Additionally, they were instructed to write a route direction for 
an informed addressee (prospective planning for other). As a third task, participants 
were instructed to walk from the start to the goal location while thinking aloud 
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(situated planning). In this condition participants needed to walk the planned way 
and were encouraged to mark corrections on their written descriptions. 
Performance was evaluated with regard to efficiency of the selected route in 
comparison to the optimal route, route complexity, i.e. number of turns and 
number of streets walked on, and its characteristics, such as side street or main 
road (Hölscher et al. 2011:238). Furthermore, participants completed spatial ability 
tests in the second experiment. The findings on performance measures were the 
same in both experiments. The analysis highlighted a significant difference 
between routes described in prospective planning and those walked in the situated 
planning task. The actual routes that participants walked in the situated planning 
task were more efficient including more turns and streets. Moreover, an influence 
of planning for oneself and planning for someone else was observed with regard to 
street characteristics. When participants described a route for an uninformed 
addressee they choose prominent streets and offered more local guides for 
orientation (Hölscher et al. 2011:241). No influence of spatial ability on route choice 
was observed in the second experiment. 
The content based analysis of think aloud protocols collected in the second 
experiment66  highlighted that participants selected routes based on personal 
preferences, opportunity, e.g. a green stop light, route length, and orientation 
towards the intended goal location in situated planning conditions (Hölscher et al. 
2011:241). Hölscher et al. (2011:241) argued that the linguistic analysis revealed that 
intentions, decisions, and current planning processes were frequently expressed by 
modal verbs (e.g. should, could, might), verbs of thinking (e.g. consider, think, 
decide), conjunctions signaling elaborations and reasons (e.g. whether, or, if), and 
adverbs expressing uncertainty (e.g. maybe). One quoted example further 
highlights that participants used temporal markers, such as ‘jetzt’ (now) (Hölscher 
et al. 2011:242). Hölscher et al. (2011) suggested that  
“together these verbalizations indicate that the participants failed to 
produce a complete mental representation of the spatial array or the 
planned path prior to navigation, and that the route plan was constantly 
updated during navigation.” (Hölscher et al. 2011:242) 
This interpretation was supported by the observation that participants corrected 
place or street names, details for orientation, such as salient landmarks, and 
information about turns or segments in their written directions when they actually 
                                                        
66 The paper reports more findings concerning the linguistic analysis for the second 
experiment thus the focus is on these findings. 
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walked the route. Differences between directions for oneself and for an 
uninformed addressee were observed with regard to number of words. 
The linguistic analysis confirmed previous findings reported on the TSP problem 
by Tenbrink (2008) and Tenbrink and Wiener (2009). In line with findings by 
Hölscher et al. (2011), Tenbrink and Wiener (2009:151) reported that retrospective 
reports frequently contained verbs of thinking, conditional enhancement and 
elaboration, as well as temporal markers. Furthermore, Tenbrink’s (2008) analysis 
of think aloud protocols revealed the frequent use of the temporal marker ‘jetzt’ 
(now) that was also observed in think aloud reports elicited by Hölscher et al. 
(2011). This finding supports Tenbrink’s (2008:129) assumption that ‘now’ 
accompanies action and signals the participant’s focus on the current situation. 
Whereas the studies by Hölscher et al. (2011) analyzed route descriptions and 
verbal reports in a natural outdoor environment, Tenbrink et al. (2011) studied 
these two kinds of verbalization in an indoor environment. Tenbrink et al. (2011) 
asked participants who were unfamiliar with the building to describe the shortest 
route from a pre-defined start to an indicated goal location in a complex building 
(novice). Additionally, they asked employees, who were very familiar with the 
building, to describe their route choice (expert). This condition resembles 
prospective planning. Afterwards, participants were asked to walk from the start 
location to the destination while thinking aloud, which resembles situated 
planning. Participants were not constrained to walk the route that they had just 
described. This study was explorative as no previous studies investigated navi-
gation in indoor real-world environments (Tenbrink et al. 2011:1263). 
There were two independent variables, namely knowledge about the environment, 
i.e. expertise, and the pre-defined start location. As in Hölscher et al. (2011) and 
Tenbrink and Wiener (2009), behavioral performance was evaluated in terms of 
route efficiency in relation to the shortest route. The linguistic analysis focused on 
route characteristics, markers of orientation, and uncertainty. Inspired by previous 
work in outdoor scenarios, route characteristics were analyzed with regard to 
information on start and end location, segments, change in direction, landmarks, 
regions, and distance (Tenbrink et al. 2011:1264). As expected, the analysis revealed 
that experts found more efficient routes than novices. This finding was mirrored in 
the observation that novices mentioned significantly fewer concrete spatial 
elements but more markers of uncertainty, such as ‘maybe’, and more orientation 
markers, such as references to public orientation aids (Tenbrink et al. 2011:1264). 
Based on these findings, Tenbrink et al. (2011) argued that  
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“linguistic markers such as vagueness particles, hedges, modals, and 
perception and orientation verbs to some extent indicate the lack of 
expertise on the part of the speaker, whereas references to concrete spatial 
entities convey spatial certainty.” (Tenbrink et al. 2011:1267) 
Comparability of results between these findings and those reported by Tenbrink 
and colleagues for previous studies is limited for two reasons. First, this study was 
conducted in an indoor environment whereas previous studies were conducted 
outdoors (e.g. Tenbrink & Wiener 2009; Hölscher et al. 2011). Second, previous 
studies elicited verbal reports from participants who were very familiar with the 
area, i.e. corresponding to the expert status in this study. Therefore, the main 
findings of this study cannot be compared to previous studies but they suggest 
trends that should be tested in follow-up studies, specifically with regard to 
markers of uncertainty. Furthermore, the analysis highlighted that participants’ 
verbal reports could be analyzed by applying the same categories, such as 
references to landmarks, information on turns and segments, and change of 
direction. 
In contrast to these previous studies, Tenbrink and Seifert (2011) investigated 
participants’ planning behavior in a task that did not involve actual navigation but 
rather planning on a map. This task involves two layers of conceptualization, i.e. 
the information that is displayed on the map and their real-world correspondence. 
They investigated participants’ planning activity in written tour plans for holiday 
trips around Crete (a real island) or Cretopia (a fictional island). Whereas Crete 
has an oblong shape, Cretopia was designed as a round shaped island. The 
performance analysis focused on the shape of the selected route, i.e. its trajectory, 
and the content based analysis investigated the strategies that were chosen to 
satisfy the task constraints, i.e. either visit 13 predefined cities or to ensure that 
different activities are included. The linguistic analysis focused on the re-
presentation of the two layers of conceptualization, i.e. “planning with respect to 
the map, versus traveling in the real world” (Tenbrink & Seifert 2011:111).  
Similarly to previous studies on the TSP (e.g. Tenbrink & Wiener 2009), Tenbrink 
and Seifert (2011) analyzed performance based on the trajectory of the route that 
was drawn on the map and the verbal description of the applied strategies. The 
linguistic analysis of retrospective reports focused on the representation of the two 
conceptual layers. To identify these layers, Tenbrink and Seifert (2011:113) coded the 
semantic content of nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and temporal markers. They 
categorized each annotated item as indicator for the conceptual domain of 
planning (e.g. ‘map’ (noun), ‘helpful’ (adjective), and ‘plot’ (verb)) or travelling 
activity (e.g. ‘trip’ (noun), ‘boring’ (adjective), and ‘2 days’ (temporal markers)) 
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(Tenbrink & Seifert 2011:115). Cases in which this binary categorization was not 
possible were also indicated.  
The analysis of the shape of selected routes revealed that participants preferred 
round routes for both islands. Furthermore, different strategies, such as nearest-
neighbor, regionalization, and grouping, were reported. Out of those, the first two 
strategies were most frequently mentioned. The linguistic analysis highlighted that 
participants referred to the travel domain almost as frequently as to the planning 
domain. The analysis of informational units that contained references to both 
domains revealed different ways of connecting these domains. Tenbrink and 
Seifert (2011:116) reported that modal verbs (i.e. ‘could’ and ‘should’), the discourse 
marker ‘in order to’ as well as the preposition ‘as’ frequently occurred when the 
two domains were mentioned in one informational unit. 
The reported analysis suggests that participants who are planning a holiday trip 
rely on the same strategies that are employed when solving a less naturalistic 
problem, e.g. the TSP. Furthermore, the comparison between the findings reported 
by Tenbrink and Wiener (2009) and those reported by Tenbrink and Seifert (2011) 
highlight that these strategies can be identified based on their linguistic 
representation in retrospective verbal reports. The study by Tenbrink and Seifert 
(2011) also highlighted one specific aspect of planning activities that involve maps, 
namely that of distinguishing between the visually present domain of the map and 
the conceptual domain of the environment that is displayed on the map. Their 
analysis highlighted the linguistic repertoire with regard to nouns, verbs, and 
adjectives by which these domains are referred to. Additionally, the analysis 
revealed patterns by which these domains are linguistically connected, i.e. 
conceptually mapped.  
In sum, the reviewed studies individually highlighted how linguistic patterns 
correlated to differences in performance, e.g. in situated planning vs. prospective 
planning. By comparing the results between studies, individual findings are 
strengthened as pointed out throughout this section. The reviewed studies 
explored new areas of application (e.g. Tenbrink et al. 2011) while consistently 
establishing connections to well-researched paradigms such as navigation and 
solving the TSP. However, as the approach of Cognitive Discourse Analysis is a 
fairly recent one, comparability is still limited; a fact that encourages further 
studies investigating similar aspects. 
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3.3.2.3 Application: Studying analogical problem solving 
Based on the finding that CODA was well suited to distinguish between different 
navigation strategies, it was recently applied to investigate strategies in analogical 
problem solving. Gralla et al. (2012) studied participants’ spontaneous strategies 
and verbalizations on solving the Eulerian trail problem, a well-known path-
finding problem. In previous work, Schelhorn et al. (2007) investigated the 
influence of saliency of analogous elements on strategy selection based on 
performance measures. Their theoretical framework was based on Carbonell’s 
(1983; 1986) theory on derivational and transformational analogy. Schelhorn et al.’s 
(2007) analysis was based on reaction times as well as mapping times and accuracy 
between source and target entities. Gralla et al. (2012) extended this study by 
eliciting different kinds of verbal reports during and after performance. One aim 
was the identification of the applied strategies and their comparison with the 
theoretically presumed ones. Additionally, the study aimed at identifying 
systematic linguistic differences characterizing the two expected strategies.  
The independent variables were saliency of analogy and kinds of verbal reports. In 
the ‘planning condition’, participants were shown an exemplary problem with the 
solution. Then they were asked to plan how they will solve the presented target 
problem before actually solving the problem. In the ‘retrospective report condition’ 
participants worked their way through the exemplary problem with the solution 
and provided an answer to the target problem without interruption. Afterwards 
they were asked to report how they solved the problem and to provide an 
instruction for a friend describing how this problem should be solved. 
In order to compare the observed performance measures to those reported in 
Schelhorn et al. (2007), solution times, solution correctness, and mapping perfor-
mance were assessed. Additionally, linguistic categories were identified that were 
defined based on theoretical considerations relating to the assumed strategies of 
analogical transfer as outlined in detail by Carbonell (1983; 1986) and addressed in 
explorative work by Schmid and Carbonell (1999). Further markers were identified 
iteratively during the analysis. The analysis of performance measures confirmed 
the results reported by Schelhorn et al. (2007) and no interaction between 
elicitation of verbal reports and mapping times was observed (Gralla et al. 
2012:399).  
The content based analysis of retrospective reports revealed that some participants 
did not work through the example problem as suggested by the instructions but 
rather solved it on their own. When providing an answer to the target problem, 
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they reused their solution after discovering the analogical nature of the example 
and target problem. If the initial solution was wrong, the solution to the target 
problem was also wrong despite the fact that the participant discovered and 
strategically used the analogous nature of the problems. Considering solution 
correctness only, the discovery and application of analogy could not be detected in 
these cases. 
The linguistic analysis revealed systematic differences between verbalizations 
depending on the saliency of the analogy. The analysis further revealed that the 
theoretically proposed strategies of analogical transfer differed in their linguistic 
representation (Gralla et al. 2012:400). The analysis emphasized differences in the 
linguistic repertoire with regard to verbs, nouns, temporal order, and markers of 
generalization (‘again’) and similarity (‘same’). Additionally, the analysis revealed 
two strategies that were not previously described highlighting the diversity of 
strategies applied in analogical problem solving. Based on these findings, Gralla et 
al. (2012) concluded that 
“the analysis of verbal data contributes to a more detailed understanding of 
the processes at work during analogical transfer.” (Gralla et al. 2012:401) 
The results of this study suggested that analyses of performance measures alone 
might not capture the whole picture of people’s problem solving behavior because 
the same observable performance might result from the use of different strategies. 
This finding is in line with those reported in the reviewed studies on navigation 
highlighting the gain of supplementing the analysis of performance measures by 
an in-depth verbal protocol analysis. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined one methodology that has a long tradition of being used to 
study human problem solving, i.e. verbal protocol analysis. In reference to the 
second chapter that focused on problem solving, it has been outlined that verbal 
protocol analysis was used long before more recent technologies such as eye-
tracking and brain imaging were invented and available to a large group of 
researchers. The reviewed literature illustrated that it is widely acknowledge that 
concurrent verbal reports provide rich information on the content of working 
memory and allows for a sequential observation over time. However, the literature 
review clearly highlighted the importance of the wording of the instructions that 
are given to the participants, i.e. the instruction to say whatever comes to mind vs. 
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the instruction to explain and describe the behavior. A recent meta-analysis of a 
large number of studies (Fox et al. 2011) that conducted performance measures 
under conditions of concurrent verbalization as well as in a silent condition 
supported previous findings that the observable influence of verbalization on 
performance additionally depends on the task that is solved. 
One of the acknowledged and discussed limitations of verbal protocol analysis is 
the fact that only processes that reach awareness can be verbalized. Therefore, 
each researcher using verbal protocols needs to be aware that verbal protocols can 
never be complete. However, it has been argued that further insights about mental 
processes can be gained by supplementing the content-based analysis with in-
depth linguistic analyses highlighting systematic patterns of unconscious linguistic 
choices. The methodology that aims at revealing these patterns across a range of 
discourse tasks, i.e. concurrent verbalization vs. description vs. instructions, and 
problem solving tasks was introduced. Cognitive Discourse Analysis will be applied 
in this thesis and refined because it has not been applied to an assembly task 
before. Moreover, this thesis combines different kinds of verbal protocols, i.e. 
think aloud reports, retrospective reports, instructions, and guided questions, to 
elicit different kinds of information. It is proposed that these different sources of 
information allow for a more complete picture of the processes involved in 
unaided object assembly. 
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3.5 Appendix 
Reference 
(abbreviated) 
Investigated 
tasks 
Independent 
measure:  
kind of 
verbalization 
Dependent 
measure 
Finding 
Merz (1969)67 Figure-reasoning 
task, matrices 
tests, parts of the 
‘Intelligenztest’ 
silent, think 
aloud (with/ 
without hearing 
ones own 
speech)  
1st: number of 
correct solutions 
2nd: time 
Significant effect of 
verbalization on 1st 
and 2nd measure. 
Verbalization 
improved 
performance but 
those participants 
needed more time. 
Franzen & 
Merz (1976)68 
Parts of the 
‘Intelligenztest’, 
specifically 
analogy, 
sentence 
completion, 
math, similarities 
silent and think 
aloud 
1st: number of 
correct solutions 
2nd: eye 
movement: 
fixation rates 
3rd: time 
Significant effect of 
verbalization on 1st 
and 3rd measure. 
Verbalization 
improved 
performance but 
those participants 
needed more time. 
Fixation rates were 
different. 
Ahlum-Heath & 
Di Vesta (1986) 
Tower of Hanoi silent and 
constrained 
concurrent 
verbalization69 
1st: number of 
moves 
2nd: performance 
time 
Significant effect of 
verbalization on 1st 
and 2nd dependent 
measure.  
McGeorge & 
Burton (1989) 
“Sugar factory” – 
dynamic decision 
task 
constrained 
concurrent 
verbalization70 
and silent 
1st: output de-
pendent measure 
of success 
2nd: number of 
outputs for each 
task  
Better performance 
by group with 
verbalization on 2nd 
dependent measure. 
                                                        
67 Merz (1969) reports results of numerous studies that he conducted with his students. All 
of them investigated the performance of school children on selected parts of the 
‘Intelligenztest’ as well as the figure-reasoning-test, and matrices tests. The great majority 
of experiments showed the same results thus this result is summarized for all experiments 
in the 5th column of this table. 
68  Franzen and Merz (1976) also report numerous studies thus the finding will be 
summarized as outlined in the previous footnote. 
69 Ahlum-Heath and Di Vesta (1986) instructed their participants to state where a peg will 
be placed (location) and why (reason) prior to the move thus this verbalization is highly 
constrained with regard to the information that is being asked for. To distinguish this type 
form free concurrent verbalization the label constrained concurrent verbalization was 
chosen. 
70 McGeorge and Burton (1989) refer to their method of elicitation as think aloud but they 
instructed their participants to describe what they are doing and mention all heuristics that 
they employ (1989:459). This instruction calls for selective information, i.e. description of 
action and reflections on the meta-level, i.e. heuristics that are used. Since this is not 
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Deffner (1989) n-term series 
tasks – analytical 
thinking 
silent thinking71 
and thinking 
aloud 
1st: performance 
time 
2nd: strategy 
 
No significant 
difference on 1st 
measure. Significant 
difference with 
regard to 2nd 
measure.  
Russo, Johnson 
& Stephens 
(1989) 
Verbal, numerical, 
pictorial, and 
mental addition 
task 
silent, think 
aloud, 3 kinds of 
retrospective 
report72 
1st: accuracy 
2nd: response 
time 
3rd: forgetting  
4th: fabricating 
Significant effect of 
think aloud on 1st 
measure with regard 
to numerical and 
mental addition 
tasks. Significant 
effect of think aloud 
on 2nd measure. 
Significant 
differences for 3rd 
and 4th measure 
between kinds of 
retrospective 
reports. 
Short, Evans & 
Friebert (1991) 
Analogies (verbal 
and spatial) 
silent and think 
aloud73 
improvement in 
success rates 
from 1st to 2nd 
trial 
Significant effect of 
verbalization for 5th 
graders but not for 
adults. 
Schooler, 
Ohlsson & 
Brooks (1993) 
Insight & non-
insight problems 
4 experiments 
with different 
verbalizations, 
i.e. interruption 
for reflection, no 
interruption, 
interruption for 
an unrelated 
task, and think 
aloud 
1st: time 
2nd: number of 
correct solutions 
Significant difference 
between those 
providing reasons 
and those with 
unrelated 
interruption. No 
effect on 1st measure 
in all 3 experiments. 
Different 
performance on 
insight and non-
insight problems. 
                                                                                                                                                       
unconstrained verbalization as proposed by Ericsson and Simon (1993) this type is referred 
to as constrained concurrent verbalization. 
71 Deffner (1989) points out that participants may as well verbalize their thoughts when 
working silently thus he calls the group in which there is no instruction to verbalize all 
thoughts ‘silent thinking’. 
72 Russo et al. (1989) distinguished between retrospective report in which the solution was 
available (response cued), retrospective report in which the original problem was available 
(stimulus cued), and retrospective report in which eye fixations were superimposed on 
original problem (prompted retrospective report). 
73  Besides the independent variable verbalization, Short et al. (1991) introduced the 
independent variable ‘normally achieving children’, ‘learning disabled children’, 
‘developmentally disabled children’, ‘normally achieving adults’, and ‘learning disabled 
adults’. 
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Knoblich & 
Rhenius (1995) 
“Kühlhaus-
Problem” (cold 
store problem) – 
complex systems 
task 
think aloud and 
silent 
1st: eye 
movements 
2nd: solution 
accuracy74  
3rd: variation 
between input 
values 
4th: response 
time 
No significant effect 
on 2nd and 4th 
dependent measure. 
Significant effect of 
verbalization on 3rd 
measure. Significant 
effect on duration of 
fixation (1st 
measure). 
Bartl & Dörner 
(1998) 
‘Käferproblem’ 
(bug problem) – 
analytical 
problem 
think aloud, 
interrupted for 
self-reflection, 
thinking without 
speaking, 
concurrent 
repeating of 
numbers, 
concurrent 
repeating of 
clapping, silent 
1st: solution 
accuracy 
2nd: memory 
Significant 
differences with 
regard to 1st and 2nd 
dependent measure.  
Dickson, 
McLennan, & 
Omodei (2000) 
“Fire Chief” – 
complex systems 
task 
procedural 
verbalization75, 
associative 
verbalization, 
and silent 
1st: percentage of 
saved landscape 
2nd: number of 
decision actions 
in each trial 
Significant effect on 
1st measure but none 
on 2nd. Silent group 
better than pro-
cedural verbalization 
group. 
Gilhooly, 
Fioratou, & 
Henretty (2010) 
insight and non-
insight problems 
(spatial and 
verbal) 
think aloud and 
silent76 
1st: solution rates 
2nd: latency 
Significant effect of 
verbalization on 1st 
and 2nd measure in 
spatial task. No 
effect on 1st measure 
with regard to 
insight and non-
insight problems.  
Table 3.2: Summary of studies that investigated the reactivity of concurrent verbalization on 
performance, highlighting the investigated tasks, the kind of verbalization, the dependent measures, 
and the findings (ordered by date of publication). 
Grammatical feature Example Author from whom Roth 
(1985) adapted it 
dogmatic writing/thinking all, always, without any 
doubts … 
Ertel (1972) 
                                                        
74 In German papers, authors either refer to “Lösungsgüte“ or “Güte der Systemsteuerung“ 
(Knoblich & Rhenius 1995). Both of these measures are translated by solution accuracy, 
abbreviated as accuracy. 
75 In the procedural verbalization Dickson et al. (2000:222) instructed their participants to 
put into words the basis of each decision for the use of a fire appliance. In the associative 
verbalization condition, on the other hand, Dickson et al. (2000) instructed the participants 
to verbalize whatever came to their minds during the decision action. 
76 Gilhooly et al. (2010) recorded the session of the experimental as well as the silent control 
group on audio tape. This procedure is unique to this study. 
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non-dogmatic 
writing/thinking 
some, sometimes, maybe, 
possibly … 
Ertel (1972) 
abstractness suffixes: ‘-heit’, ‘-keit’, ‘ung’ 
… 
Güther & Groeben (1978) 
negation none, no, never, nothing … Ertel & Bloemer (1975)77 
egocentrism I, mine … Schwibbe (1981) 
subjunctive mood ‘hätte’, ‘könnte’, ‘müsste’ … Schöne (1982) 
indicative mood  Roth (1985) 
causative conjunction hence, thus, if … Roth (1985) 
adversative conjunction but, besides, either … or … Roth (1985) 
Table 3.3: Grammatical features analyzed by Roth (1985) in think aloud protocols with examples78 and 
their sources. 
                                                        
77 In their experiment, Ertel and Bloemer (1975:336) test their hypothesis that “a sentence is 
basically a unit of cognitive action”. Thus construction and understanding of a sentence is 
basically a constructive cognitive action. They postulate that a sentence is decomposed into 
two cognitive units that are related to each other. In affirmative sentences the cognitive 
units are joined and in negative sentences they are separated. Roth (1985) does not give any 
explanation for choosing this study as a reference for the feature of negation. But it can be 
assumed that he refers to Ertel and Bloemer (1975) because they are investigating the 
mental representation of a grammatical structure and Roth (1985) is interested in this 
combination. Following Ertel and Bloemer’s (1975) argument, the use of negation indicates 
that the speaker separates information (hypotheses, facts etc.) into two distinct cognitive 
units. 
78 Note that the examples as well as the studies that are referred to are in German. Most 
examples in the table are translated for the reader. 

 4 Experimental Studies: 
Methodology and design 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces the methodological background and the design of the two 
experimental studies that are central to the analysis presented in this thesis. 
Besides providing an overview on the number of participants that were tested in 
the experiments (section 3), the procedure of each experiment is described 
including the exact instructions, a description of the equipment that was used, and 
the technical problems that were faced (section 4). The chapter concludes by 
providing a general overview on the qualitative and quantitative analyses that were 
performed in the different chapters of analysis. 
Imagine you want to buy a dollhouse for your child for Christmas. You find one at 
a virtual auction place and you buy it. But when the package arrives you find the 
parts to be without an assembly manual. What to do next? If you are lucky, you 
remember the picture, which was displayed during the auction and if you are even 
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more fortunate, you still have the picture on your pc. The task at hand now is to 
assemble the parts in a way, which matches the picture in the end. The process of 
matching physically present objects to their function in the goal structure can be 
classified as problem solving. 
Assembling furniture or toys by yourself is not uncommon in times in which 
warehouses such as IKEA are very popular. The sustained popularity of stores that 
sell self-assembly79 products and a study by Richardson (2007) suggest that people 
are willing to assemble their furniture on their own. As stated in Richardson’s 
(2007) definition, they are generally aided in their effort by a manual that is 
supplied by the manufacturer. Therefore, considerable time and effort has been 
invested in research concerning manual design (e.g. Marcus et al. 1996; Maes and 
Lenting 1999; Norvick & Morse 2000; Agrawala et al. 2003; Ganier 2004) but few 
researchers focused on how people actually assemble an object (Rieser 1996; 
Tversky et al. 2009; Daniel and Tversky 2012). In the area of problem solving the 
majority of studies investigated the performance on logic-based problems (e.g. de 
Groot 1969; Newell & Simon 1972) or the specific type of insight problems (e.g. 
Knoblich & Ohlsson 1999; Knoblich et al. 2001). However, considering the com-
plexity of many objects (e.g. furniture, toys) and the popularity of self-assembly 
products, it is also necessary to study how people solve complex tasks that they 
face in their daily lives. The task to assemble an object from scratch given different 
levels of complexity, i.e. with or without external support, represents one of these 
cases. 
As outlined in the general introduction to this thesis, the aim of this investigation 
is three-fold. The first aim is the investigation of the representation of problem 
solving processes involved in an everyday task. As furniture assembly is a common 
phenomenon, it resembles a recurring activity although people do not assemble 
furniture on a daily basis, except for those who do it professionally. Importantly, 
people can be assumed to have general knowledge about furniture assembly but 
will probably not have a mental plan as how to proceed exactly. Research showed 
that manual-assisted assembly might result in problem solving activities 
(Richardson 2007). In order to make problem solving activity very likely in the 
experiments that are analyzed in this thesis participants are not provided with any 
external help to assist the assembly. This is motivated by the assumption that the 
lack of visual or textual aid will foster problem solving activity. The second and 
                                                        
79 The terminology self-assembly is used in the sense defined by Richardson (2007:307) who 
states that self-assembly furniture are “furniture that are sold ‘ready to assemble’. [More 
specifically,] the purchaser must follow supplied instructions and assemble the item before 
it can be used.” 
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third aims concern the influence of two factors on the assembly process, i.e. 
amount of prior information and communicative intention.  
This chapter focuses on the presentation and motivation of the experimental 
design of the two studies that were conducted. First, a brief summary of problem 
solving in assembly will be provided to establish the general background; for a 
description of the theoretical framework see chapter 6. Second, the theoretical 
motivation for choosing prior information and communicative intention as 
independent variables is outlined. This general introduction to the topic is 
provided here to motivate the design of the two experiments. However, each of the 
areas will be re-addressed in the light of different foci of investigation in the 
individual chapters on features of analysis. The methodological background of the 
analysis of verbal reports is not restated here because it has been outlined and 
discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, only the selection of the specific 
kinds of verbal reports will be motivated in 4.2.2. 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Theoretical background 
4.2.1.1 Problem solving task: object assembly 
Intuitively, assembling an object involves numerous sub-tasks. First, a mental 
representation of the goal structure needs to be constructed. Second, an action 
plan is derived, i.e. which objects need to be manipulated and in which way. Third, 
the action plan needs to be executed and resulting states need to be constantly 
evaluated. The first step in the assembly procedure is based on perception because 
the assembler combines information from the equipment with prior knowledge. 
Additionally, information from the manual can assist the creation process if it is 
provided (Ganier 2004). The second step of deriving an action plan is based on the 
human ability of decision making (Helander & Willén 2003). Generally, action 
plans are hierarchically structured (Dixon 1982; Tversky et al. 2009). More 
specifically, they specify which objects are manipulated, in which sequential order, 
and in which fashion. In assembly tasks these manipulations are based on 
elemental tasks such as grasp, reach, move, position part, and insert (Helander & 
Willén 2003). On a more general level these manual operations can be described 
by the following activities: select, orientate, position, and fasten components 
(Richardson et al. 2004). Concerning the activity of monitoring, Ganier (2004) 
98 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES: METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
distinguishes between a global and a local level of monitoring and regulation. On 
the global level, the reference point for monitoring is the mental task 
representation whereas the currently performed instructions are the point of 
reference on the local level. In the context of the experimental studies in this 
thesis, the goal representation, i.e. the dollhouse, corresponds to the global level. 
Whereas the individual object parts correspond to the local level. 
This brief description of the general processes involved in assembly highlights that 
manuals can facilitate the assembly process at different levels. Manuals can help 
the creation of a mental representation, provide an appropriate action plan, and 
serve as a point of reference in monitoring activities. However, research shows that 
following instructions does not always result in success (e.g. Mani & Johnson-Laird 
1982; Gentner & Stevens 1983; Novick & Morse 2000). In cases in which the manual 
fails to provide support, the assembler is faced with a problem. Problem solving 
situations are generally characterized by the desire or need to change the current 
state in order to reach a different goal state. In these situations the procedure to 
change the current state into the goal state is not known but needs to be 
constructed. The appropriate procedure can be derived by one of two strategies. 
On the one hand, known operations can be rearranged and combined in a creative 
process (e.g. de Groot 1969; Dörner 1987). On the other hand, known procedures 
and sequences of actions can be applied by means of analogical problem solving 
(e.g. Greeno 1978; Anderson 2005).  
Based on this general description of problem solving situations, it is proposed that 
object assembly may result in problem solving activities. This is specifically likely if 
assemblers have no manual and the assembly procedure is not known to them. 
Then the assembler needs to devise an appropriate sequence of actions to 
manipulate the given objects in a way that results in the desired goal structure. 
Although the basic ways of manipulating objects are known to assemblers, the 
correct sequence of these actions and the appropriate objects need to be selected 
and combined by the assembler himself/herself. The selection of appropriate 
objects is based on knowledge about their potential function. This knowledge can 
to be acquired by the assembler by close inspection of objects for example or by 
remembering the function of similar objects in other tasks. 
4.2.1.2 Influence of prior information on understanding 
The description of the basic steps in the assembly highlighted that the assembler 
needs to conceptualize objects within the given context. This context is normally 
provided by the knowledge about the goal structure. It is reasonable to assume 
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that different amounts of information about the nature of the goal representation 
influences the process of conceptualization and thereby the overall assembly 
performance. 
The influence of prior knowledge on performance has been addressed in a number 
of studies in linguistics. Research in the field of comprehension, for example, 
highlights the influence of prior knowledge on comprehension as well as recall of 
information. In experimental studies on text comprehension, Bransford and 
Johnson (1972:718) showed that “Ss [subjects] create semantic products that are a 
joint function of input information and prior knowledge”. They observed that 
participants who were presented with a picture that was related to the meaning 
expressed in the test passage performed better on comprehension and recall tests 
than participants who were given only partial or no semantic context. In follow up 
studies they also showed that  
“prior knowledge of a situation does not guarantee its usefulness for 
comprehension. In order for prior knowledge to aid comprehension, it 
must become an activated semantic context (… and) for maximum benefit 
the appropriate information must be present during the ongoing process of 
comprehension.” (Bransford & Johnson 1972:724) 
This research highlights that activated prior knowledge may help to create 
contextual structures that facilitate understanding and recall of immediate input. 
Bransford and Johnson (1972) suggest that their findings are not limited to 
sentence processing but may also hold for other kinds of “present input events” 
(Bransford & Johnson 1972:725). Kintsch’s (1988) construction-integration model 
supports this hypothesis. The model proposes that first associations that are 
activated by linguistic clues activate associated concepts in turn. These 
associations are rated and integrated into a consistent model representing the 
current context. As already pointed out by Bransford and Johnson (1972), the 
activated mental concepts may facilitate or deteriorate task conceptualization, i.e. 
the task specific mental representation, and performance. 
In a different series of experiments on text comprehension, Dixon investigated the 
structure of action plans derived from instructions. Dixon (1972; 1987a) proposed 
that mental plans are hierarchically structured by action information, i.e. which 
action to perform, at the top level and condition information, i.e. description of the 
current state, on the lower level. Furthermore, Dixon (1987b) showed that prior 
knowledge about the current state had a significant effect on reading time. If 
participants were provided with information about the current state prior to 
reading the instruction, they were faster in reading than when no such information 
was provided. Thus he concludes that prior knowledge crucially influences the 
100 EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES: METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
construction of mental plans. According to Dixon, information about the current 
state is needed to select the appropriate schema80 and precise actions are only 
subsequently incorporated. If condition information is provided before the actions 
are specified, these actions can be integrated during reading whereas rereading is 
necessary if the information is provided in the instruction only and needs to be 
extracted while reading. 
The findings in these studies suggest that performance, such as comprehension 
and recall of information as well as reading time, is influenced by prior knowledge. 
Prior knowledge can be different in nature; it may be semantic knowledge as 
described so far, knowledge about procedures, or perceptual information. 
Procedural knowledge consists of sequences of actions that need to be performed 
to reach a specific goal. Making coffee will probably be a routine action for most 
people who enjoy to start their day with a mug of fresh coffee. Dixon et al. (1997) 
observed that participants tend to apply routine81 procedures when new tasks show 
some similarity to previously encountered tasks. This is in line with analogical 
problem solving. 
Perceptual information can also activate prior knowledge in terms of cognitive 
categories. It is generally assumed that objects are mentally organized in categories 
of similar objects. Ungerer and Schmid (2006) argue that this categorization is 
either culturally determined or based on obvious ways of grouping objects based 
on their apparent relation to each other (e.g. similarity in shape, function, color). It 
is proposed that these cognitive concepts82 and the different contexts83 in which 
they are activated are stored as cognitive models in the human mind (Ungerer & 
Schmid 2006:49). Thereby a network of categories and cognitive models evolves 
which is constantly activated and extended when new objects are encountered. It 
is further argued that each interaction between objects in the real world activates 
the mental concepts of the present objects (Ungerer & Schmid 2006:48). The 
activation of cognitive concepts and associated features also resembles a 
knowledge base that can be defined in terms of prior knowledge. This effect, 
                                                        
80 In his experiments, Dixon investigated reading time and performance on tasks that 
followed a basic schema. Devices that needed to be manipulated were either on or off in 
the current situation, i.e. prior to the participant’s manipulation. 
81  Routine is defined as the memory of “sequences of steps that accomplish task 
subprocedures.” (Dixon et al. 1997:392) 
82 Ungerer and Schmid (2006:40) argue that categorization as well as producing and 
understanding language involves cognitive processes thus they refer to the emerging 
conceptual categories as cognitive concepts. 
83 Context is defined as “the cognitive representation of the interaction between cognitive 
categories.” (Ungerer & Schmid 2006:58) 
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commonly referred to as priming, is well known and studied in experimental 
psychology (e.g. Rosch 1975). 
The reported findings suggest that prior knowledge influences mental plan 
construction as well as the general categories that are activated. Plan construction 
is assumed to be influenced on the temporal, i.e. duration of plan construction, as 
well as on the structural level, i.e. which actions to perform in which order. The 
activation of associated cognitive categories may facilitate the conceptualization 
process because it raises expectations regarding the function of specific parts. 
However, in the same line of thought, activation of associated concepts may hinder 
the assembly process if misleading expectations are raised. 
4.2.1.3 Influence of communicative intention on verbalization 
Besides a manual, other people may also serve as a source of background 
information. In cases in which two people work on an assembly task collectively, 
the solution is worked out in a joint effort. Normally, people would use language to 
exchange ideas about possible functions of objects and they may also manipulate 
objects collectively. A research group from MIT headed by Kneeper presented a 
very interesting project at this years’ IEEE International Conference on Robotics 
and Automation. They introduced their KUKA youBots, i.e. two autonomous 
robots that collectively assembled an IKEA coffee table without being shown the 
instructions in advance (for more detail see Knepper et al. 2013). In this scenario, 
the robots were coordinated by software (see Knepper 2013:5) but if two humans 
work on a problem collectively, they are very likely to use language to 
communicate. Since verbal as well as physical interaction is a fundamental part of 
daily life, researchers have been interested in the influence of a partner on 
verbalization for long. Tomasello (1998) proposeses that “people create symbols in 
order to use them as instruments in acts of communication – and these 
communicative acts always involve another person as recipient” (Tomasello 
1998:230; emphasize added).  
An overview on the literature studying the influence of an imagined or physically 
present addressee on referential form is provided in the analysis chapter on object 
reference (chapter 8); thus, only main findings will be highlighted in this overview. 
The influence of communicative intention on discourse structure and content has 
been extensively researched in studies conducted within the referential com-
munication paradigm (e.g. Bavelas et al. 2000; Clark 2004; Clark 2005). Researchers 
found evidence that speakers tailor their utterances for their addressee at different 
levels. Considerations about the addressee’s knowledge state are expressed at the 
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syntactic level (e.g. Arnold 2009), the semantic level (e.g. Garrod & Anderson 1987; 
Gundel et al. 1993; Heller et al. 2012) as well as on the discourse level (e.g. Auer 
1984; Clark & Krych 2004; Tenbrink et al. 2008). This phenomenon is commonly 
referred to as audience design. However, based on a literature overview, Schober 
and Brennan (2003) caution that the results may not be straight forward because  
“people can be shown to adapt under some circumstances and not to adapt 
under others at virtually every level of language use – from higher 
discourse-level functions to articulation” (Schober & Brennan 2003: 155). 
In order to test how and to which degree people tailor their utterances for an 
addressee, researchers devised various experimental designs. In some studies 
researchers investigated this influence in an implicit way by asking participants to 
imagine an addressee or in a direct way, i.e. in real interaction. In studies with an 
imagined addressee, participants were either asked to write instructions (e.g. 
Lovelace et al. 1999; Hölscher et al. 2011) or to speak them out loud while their 
speech was recorded by a tape recorder (e.g. Levelt 1981; Habel 1988). In studies 
investigating interaction, participants either talked to a partner who was physically 
present (e.g. Horton & Gerrig 2002; Clark & Krych 2004) or audible only (e.g. 
Krauss & Weinheimer 1966; Schober & Clark 1989; Fukumura & van Gompel 2012). 
Some studies also analyzed real-life interaction and conversations (Schegloff 1979; 
Steffensen 2012) as opposed to those elicited in experimental settings.  
One integral part of interaction while collectively solving a task is feedback about 
current states, proposed ideas, or future actions. Some studies investigated the 
influence of different kinds of feedback, such as concurrent feedback vs. no 
feedback, on language choices. Krauss and Weinheimer (1966), for example, 
studied the influence of the addressees’ feedback on verbalization, more speci-
fically the length of the reference phrase, in a matching task. They tested 
participants in a non-feedback condition in which there was no interaction 
between instructor and addressee. This data was compared to a set of data collect-
ed in an interactive scenario in which participants were allowed to communicate 
freely. Their results revealed that concurrent feedback has a significant effect on 
participants’ verbalization, i.e. participants who received concurrent feedback used 
significantly fewer words than participants who did not receive feedback.  
Similarly, Schober (1993) compared which perspective participants adapted when 
describing the location of an object for a real addressee or an imagined one. 
Instructions for an imaginary addressee that were recorded on tape were compared 
to descriptions in an interactive situation. His results highlighted that participants 
used different perspectives for an imaginary addressee then with an actual partner. 
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The results revealed the same trend as observed by Krauss and Weinheimer (1966); 
participants who interacted with a partner used significantly fewer words than 
participants describing for an imagined addressee. Moreover, the analysis of 
adapted perspective revealed that participants who interacted with a partner start-
ed off by adapting an egocentric perspective, i.e. “on my left” (Schober 1993:1) and 
negotiated this perspective with their partner. 
Although there may be doubts as to the universal character of audience design, 
numerous studies provided evidence that participants tailor their utterance for 
their addressee, i.e. addressee-oriented speech. This prominent discourse type will 
be compared to language produced without the presence of an addressee and no 
explicit communicative motivation, i.e. self-oriented speech, throughout this 
thesis. As outlined in the theoretical discussion in chapter 8, it is argued that think 
aloud protocols, as introduced in chapter 3, represent self-oriented speech. 
Furthermore, the results reported by Krauss and Weinheimer (1966) and Schober 
(1993) highlight the influence of an imagined or a present addressee on verbal-
ization. 
4.2.2 Data collection: verbal reports 
The analyses in this thesis are based on verbal protocols that were elicited at 
different times during the experimental phase. First, concurrent verbal reports 
were recorded while participants solved the assembly task (think aloud protocols). 
Second, participants were instructed to recall their thoughts immediately after 
they indicated that the task was completed (retrospective reports). Third, these free 
language production tasks were supplemented by a number of guided questions 
regarding specific features of the provided objects (interview questions). 
Think aloud protocols were recorded by instructing participants to say out loud 
everything that comes to their mind while working on the task. According to 
Ericsson and Simon’s (1984 (1993)) model of verbalization of thinking, participants’ 
thoughts that are at the level of awareness and in focus of attention are recorded in 
think aloud protocols. Therefore, think aloud protocols are proposed to contain 
traces of mental processes (for more detail see chapter 3). These records of 
concurrent verbalization are elicited to study the mental processes that are 
involved in unaided object assembly and their linguistic representation. Think 
aloud protocols are specifically suited to study mental processes over time because 
those are continuously verbalized therein. However, think aloud protocols are not 
complete because only those processes that reach awareness are verbalized. There-
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fore, a second type of verbal report is elicited in this study, namely retrospective 
reports. 
Retrospective reports were elicited immediately after participants indicated that 
they finished the task. Participants were asked to say everything that they remem-
bered and to indicate if they were uncertain in their memories. As discussed in 
chapter 3, retrospective reports are assumed to contain more meta-level infor-
mation, such as generalizations about procedures, reasons for specific actions and 
decisions, or conclusions. The recall of information was expected to be facilitated 
by providing the assembled goal structure as a visual cue. Supplementing infor-
mation reflecting processes at the level of current attention with information that 
is generalized from these processes, was expected to yield a comprehensive picture 
of processes involved. 
However, as it is acknowledged that perception might occasionally be too fast to 
reach attention and thus be verbalized in think aloud protocols (e.g. Ericsson & 
Simon 1993), some guided questions were asked at the end of the experimental 
session. These questions asked if participants noticed specific features that were 
either salient but not crucial for a successful assembly, i.e. boreholes, or not salient 
but facilitating for the assembly, i.e. grooves, or non-salient and not crucial for a 
successful assembly, i.e. the manufacturer’s label. The combination of these three 
kinds of verbal reports was assumed to provide a rich amount of information about 
mental processes involved in unaided object assembly and it allowed for the 
analysis of the linguistic representation of these processes across two kinds of 
discourse tasks. 
A third discourse task was included by collecting instructions on the same assemb-
ly task. This discourse task is different from the previous ones because it involves a 
direct addressee. This data was collected in a second experiment with participants 
who did not participate in the self-assembly experiment in which think aloud 
protocols and retrospective reports were collected. 
In the conducted experiment, the addressee was introduced to the participant who 
provided an oral instruction. However, instructor and assembler, i.e. addressee, 
could not communicate with each other; a description of the experimental set-up 
is provided in section 4.4.2. Instructions that are tailored for an addressee were 
expected to contain meta-level information concerning the sequential order of 
actions, descriptions of these actions, and possibly reasons for taking those actions. 
In this experiment, instructors assembled the goal structure themselves prior to 
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the instructions; thus, they were experts on the assembly. It was assumed that 
reflections on the personal assembly might also be verbalized in instructions. 
The information that was contained in the verbal protocols was evaluated in a 
qualitative analysis whereas performance measures, such as assembly time and 
assembly success, were evaluated quantitatively. The qualitative analysis resulted 
in different categories to describe observed linguistic phenomena. The distribution 
of these categories was evaluated by descriptive and inferential statistics; an 
overview on the qualitative and quantitative analyses is provided in section 4.5.2 of 
this chapter. The following section presents information on the participants that 
participated in the two experimental studies before the experimental design is 
described. 
4.3 Participants 
4.3.1 Experiment 1: Unaided object assembly 
56 participants were invited for the experiment. Their age ranged between 19 and 
42 years (M = 24.02, SD = 5.06). They were all students at the University of Bremen 
and received course credit for compensation. 25 of the 56 participants were male 
and 31 participants were female.  
Due to technical problems, two participants’ speech was not recorded (one in the 
underspecified goal and one in the verbal goal condition). Three participants did 
not finish the experiment (one participant in the underspecified goal and two 
participants in the verbal and visual goal condition). One participant knew the 
dollhouse from a previous experiment (verbal goal condition). This left 50 data sets 
to be analyzed. Those 50 participants were between 19 and 42 years (M = 24.22, 
SD = 5.25). There were more female participants (28 women) than male 
participants (22 men) in the final data set for the analysis. Table 4.1 provides an 
overview of the distribution of age and sex between the three experimental 
conditions. 
condition age 
(mean) 
age 
(SD) 
female 
participants 
male 
participants 
sum 
participants 
underspecified goal 24.00 5.70 12 5 17 
verbal goal 24.88 5.58 6 10 16 
verbal and visual goal 23.81 5.81 10 7 17 
Table 4.1: Summary of participants’ age and sex in the three experimental conditions. 
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4.3.2 Experiment 2: Instructions 
20 participants were invited for the experiment. Their age ranged between 21 and 
28 years (M = 22.7, SD = 1.98). They were all students at the University of Bremen 
and received course credit or monetary compensation for their attendance. Nine of 
the 20 participants were male and eleven participants were female. Due to 
technical problems with three data sets84 and one participant who did not reach 
the expert status, thus 16 data sets remained for the analysis. The age of those 16 
participants ranged between 21 and 28 years (M = 22.9, SD = 1.91). There were more 
male (nine men) than female participants (seven women) in the final data set for 
the analysis. 
4.4 Design 
This section provides an overview on the experimental design, procedure, and the 
equipment that was used. Furthermore, problems with the technical equipment 
will be reported. The section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section 
provides information on the first experiment on unaided object assembly and the 
second sub-section presents information about the second experiment on 
instructions. The presentation of both experimental designs follows the same 
structure:  
1) the design is presented,  
2) the instructions are restated,  
3) the material is presented, 
4) a detailed account of the procedure is provided, and 
5) information about equipment and technical challenges is given. 
4.4.1 Experiment 1: Unaided object assembly 
4.4.1.1 Design 
The first experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that problem solving 
processes are involved in an assembly task. In order to create a problem solving 
scenario, an object has been selected that can be assumed to be relatively 
unfamiliar to the participants, i.e. an object with which they do not interact on a 
daily basis. The initial idea to choose a bookshelf sold by the furniture store IKEA 
was inspired by research reported by Tversky and colleagues who asked 
                                                        
84 More detail about the technical problems is provided in 4.4.2.5. 
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participants to assemble a TV stand (e.g. Tversky et al. 2009; Daniel & Tversky 
2012). This idea was not pursued for two reasons. First, each assembly procedure 
leaves marks at the material that might be recognized by the next participants and 
influence their assembly decisions. Second, most bookshelves that consist of more 
than six parts are too big to be assembled by one participant alone. Both of these 
reasons are crucial because the intention was to create a situation in which each 
participant needed to solve the problem from scratch under controlled conditions 
and without a partner. 
Based on these considerations, a wooden dollhouse by the German brand ‘Selecta 
Spielzeug’ was selected. In order to constrain the number of hints and to treat the 
objects with care, no screws were provided. Nevertheless, it was possible to arrange 
the objects in such a way that a stable dollhouse is assembled. In terms of problem 
solving types, this assembly task posses a transformation problem because known 
procedures need to be rearranged in order to create an appropriate solution path 
(Greeno 1978) (for more detail see chapter 2). 
The influence of prior information on performance was studied by testing 
participants in three conditions. In the first condition participants were presented 
with unspecific goal information when they were asked to assemble a sensible 
object. In the second condition, participants were provided with a verbal clue 
about the nature of the goal object (verbal goal condition). In the instructions, they 
were provided with the basic level term describing the goal object, i.e. ‘two-story 
dollhouse’. This decision was based on Tversky and Hemenway’s (1984) finding 
that “the basic level is the highest level of abstraction for which a generalized 
outline form can be recognized and the highest level for which an image can be 
generated” (Tversky & Hemenway 1984:186). Ungerer and Schmid (2006:88) argue 
that ‘house’ is a basic level term that can be activated as a super-ordinate term. 
They argue that this is the case when the term ‘house’ is decomposed into rooms 
serving different functions (e.g. living room, bedroom, kitchen). Although the term 
‘dollhouse’ is more specific, it is still on the basic level and it can be decomposed 
into the same functional structures, i.e. rooms, as any kind of house. In the third 
condition, participants were additionally shown a black-and-white picture of the 
assembled dollhouse for 30 seconds (verbal and visual goal condition).  
The different conditions resembled different kinds of transformation problems and 
participants needed to overcome different barriers in Dörner’s (1987) sense85. 
Problem solvers were faced with a dialectic barrier in situations in which the initial 
                                                        
85 See Table 4.2 for a summary and chapter 2 for more detail. 
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state and the operators were known but the goal state was unknown. The goal 
state needs to be defined during the dialectic process that is characterized by 
hypotheses, antitheses, and syntheses (Dörner 1987). In the presented assembly 
problem, the goal state was known but ill defined since no information about the 
nature of the goal object was provided. If the problem solver knows the initial 
state, the goal state, and the general operations that need to be applied, he/she 
faces an interpolation barrier. This barrier needs to be overcome by creating an 
appropriate combination or hierarchy of necessary operations (Dörner 1987). 
condition Greeno (1978) Dörner (1987) 
underspecified goal transformation problem with an 
ill-defined goal state 
dialectic problem  
verbal goal transformation problem with a 
well-defined goal state (based on 
a verbal cue activating 
background knowledge) 
interpolation barrier 
verbal and visual goal transformation problem with a 
precisely defined goal state 
(based on verbal & visual cues) 
interpolation barrier 
Table 4.2: Kinds of transformation problems and problem barriers that are faced by the participants 
depending on the experimental condition. 
The general procedure was tested in a pilot study. In this study, all objects that 
were needed to assemble the two-story dollhouse were lying on a table. Four 
participants were tested in the condition of the underspecified goal condition. The 
pilot study revealed some limitations of the design. First, it was observed that 
participants needed a large table in order to have enough space to arrange and 
manipulate the objects. Second, the experimenter observed that participants did 
not notice all object parts displayed on the table. Participants, rather, showed a 
tendency to start assembling right away and noticing objects during the assembly 
or not at all. Both limitations have been overcome in the experimental phase. The 
space problem has been addressed by choosing a conference room in which a large 
table could be used and no other distractors, such as bookshelves, were present. In 
order to facilitate object perception, all small objects were placed in a cardboard 
box that was placed on top of the table (see Figure 4.1). This solution is supported 
by Kirsh’s (1995) observation that  
“an agent need not register all the actions feasible in a situation, the action 
set which is perceived as feasible (the perceived action set) is sensitive to 
the situation, particularly arrangement.” (Kirsh 1995:43) 
The solution with the box did not only foster perception of objects but it also 
prevented biasing participants by placing objects into some pattern that might be 
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interpreted as meaningful presorting. The experimenter paid careful attention to 
put the objects into the box in the same order. The order did not suggest any 
obvious grouping. 
 
Figure 4.1: Arrangement of experimental material as encountered by participants entering the 
conference room. 
4.4.1.2 Instruction 
condition German original English translation additional 
material 
underspeci-
fied goal 
„Bauen Sie alle auf dem Tisch 
liegenden und die in der Kiste 
befindlichen Teile sinnvoll 
zusammen ohne zu schrauben. Die 
Kiste soll nicht benutzt werden.“ 
“Assemble a sensible 
object using all parts lying 
on the table and those 
contained in the box 
without using screws. Do 
not use the box.” 
none 
verbal goal „Bauen Sie alle auf dem Tisch 
liegenden und die in der Kiste 
befindlichen Teile sinnvoll zu 
einem zweistöckigen Puppenhaus 
zusammen ohne zu schrauben. Die 
Kiste soll nicht benutzt werden.“ 
“Assemble a two-story 
dollhouse using all parts 
lying on the table and 
those contained in the 
box without using 
screws. Do not use the 
box.” 
none 
verbal and 
visual goal 
„Bauen Sie alle auf dem Tisch lie-
genden und die in der Kiste befind-
lichen Teile sinnvoll zu dem abge-
bildeten Puppenhaus zusammen 
ohne zu schrauben. Die Kiste soll 
nicht benutzt werden.“ 
“Assemble the pictured 
dollhouse using all parts 
lying on the table and 
those contained in the 
box without using 
screws. Do not use the 
box.” 
picture of 
the 
assembled 
dollhouse 
(see 
Figure 
4.2) 
Table 4.3: Original instruction texts in German and its English translation. 
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Figure 4.2: Black and white picture of the two-story dollhouse that was presented to participants in the 
verbal and visual goal condition. 
4.4.1.3 Material 
The goal object that participants were asked to assemble was a two-story 
dollhouse. It is a child’s toy produced by the German brand “Selecta Spielzeug” 
(see Figure 4.3 for an advertisement86). Normally, the object pieces come with a 
manual, as displayed in Figure 4.4, describing how to assemble the pieces. 
However, as motivated above, participants were not given the manual and they did 
not have screws to fasten objects. The schematic drawing will be used on the 
following description to facilitate understanding of the general layout of the 
dollhouse. 
 
Figure 4.3: Advertisements of the dollhouse 4246 by ‘Selecta Spielzeug’87. 
                                                        
86 ‘Selecta Spielzeug’ has been contacted in March 2012 asking for permission to use this 
specific picture. Consent was given by Mrs. Kordula Harting. 
87  (http://www.selecta-spielzeug.de/index.php/selecta_en/produkte/kleine_welt/ puppen-
haeuser/puppenhaus; 20.04.12) 
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Figure 4.4: Screenshot of the assembly instruction for the dollhouse 4246 provided by Selecta 
Spielzeug. 
In the schematic drawing used in the assembly instructions (see Figure 4.4), the 
different parts that need to be assembled are displayed. Nine wooden parts are 
marked in the drawing. In the experimental condition, the roof was already 
assembled. This left five parts that were small (parts 2-6 in the assembly 
instruction corresponding to Figure 4.6 to Figure 4.9), a larger board (marked 1 in 
the instructions corresponding to Figure 4.5), and the ready assembled roof part 
(see Figure 4.10). In addition to this attic, the dollhouse that was assembled in the 
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experiments had a first story as well (see Figure 4.11). This story consisted of the 
same parts labeled 1-6 in the instruction but without bevels (Figure 4.12 to Figure 
4.15 display the original parts). 
 
Figure 4.5: Board corresponding to object 1 in 
the instruction. 
 
Figure 4.6: Wooden objects corresponding to 
objects 2 and 3 in the instruction. 
 
Figure 4.7: Wooden object corresponding to 
object 4 in the instruction. 
 
Figure 4.8: Wooden object corresponding to 
object 5 in the instruction. 
 
Figure 4.9: Wooden object corresponding to 
object 6 in the instruction. 
 
Figure 4.10: Roof part of the two-story doll-
house. 
 
Figure 4.11: Assembled two-story dollhouse.  
 
Figure 4.12: Wooden objects for the first story 
corresponding to objects 2 and 3 in the 
instruction for the attic. 
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Figure 4.13: Wooden object for the first story 
corresponding to object 4 in the instruction 
for the attic. 
 
Figure 4.14: Wooden object for the first story 
corresponding to object 5 in the instruction 
for the attic. 
 
Figure 4.15: Wooden object for the first story 
corresponding to object 6 in the instruction 
for the attic. 
4.4.1.4 Procedure 
The procedure was divided into three parts, namely introductory phase, 
experimental phase, and ending. This structure is used in the description of the 
procedure as well. 
In the introductory phase, the experimenter welcomed the participant in her office. 
She asked the participant to fill out a form of consent first. Then she told the 
participant about the general aim of the experiment by saying “Mit diesem 
Experiment wollen wir wissen, was Sie denken, während Sie die gestellte Aufgabe 
lösen.” (In this experiment, we want to find out what you think while you solve the 
given task.) Then a general introduction was given stating that there were no time 
constraints and asking the participant to indicate when he/she is finished with the 
task.88 It was important that the participant indicated the time at which he/she felt 
that the task was completed. Chi (1997) points out that experimenters may state 
that the task is completed and close the experimental session because they feel 
that the goal state is being reached but the participant may not share this 
evaluation. It is important to recognize that different goal states can be defined 
and in this experiment it was not the aim to reach the experimenter’s goal state 
                                                        
88 Original wording: „Es gibt keine zeitliche Begrenzung zur Ausführung der Aufgabe. 
Wenn Sie mit der Aufgabe fertig sind, sagen Sie das bitte.“ (“There is no time constraint in 
this task. If you are finished with the task please say so.”) 
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but it was rather important to study the participant’s representation of the goal 
state. Furthermore, the experimenter said that there was a video camera but that 
she was mainly interested in the speech recorded with a head set.89  
After these general remarks the participant was instructed to think aloud while 
solving the task. Furthermore, he/she was told that the experimenter would be in 
the room but no interaction was possible.90 As suggested by Ericsson and Simon 
(1993:377), the think aloud procedure was tested with two warm-up tasks. First, 
participants were asked to solve the equation 24×36.91 Although most participants 
did not succeed in solving the equation correctly, the task was well suited to 
illustrate the difference between describing and think aloud. A second task was 
posed for participants who showed a tendency to describe rather than think aloud. 
In this task participants were asked to list as many foreign language teachers from 
their school time as possible. It was important that they mentioned their names as 
well as the subject that they taught.92 If the participant felt content and the 
experimenter had the impression that the participant knew the difference between 
think aloud and describing, the participant was informed about the general 
procedure that was to follow.93 Finally, the experimenter asked if there were any 
remaining questions regarding the experiment. In order to ensure that the content 
as well as the wording of the information provided in the introductory phase was 
                                                        
89 Original wording: „Die Videokamera ist nur zur Sicherheit da, so können wir später 
einordnen, was Sie getan haben während des Sprechens. Uns geht es aber um die Sprache, 
die mit dem Headset aufgezeichnet wird.“ (“The video camera is only there to record what 
you are doing while you talk in case we want to know what you did. But we are mainly 
interested in the speech recorded with the head set.”) 
90 Original wording: „Während Sie die Aufgabe lösen, bitte ich Sie, laut zu denken, das 
heißt Sie sagen alles, was Ihnen durch den Kopf geht. Ich werde nicht mit Ihnen sprechen. 
Ich bin nur als Zuhörer im Raum. Sollten Sie eine Weile nicht laut gedacht haben, werde 
ich Sie kurz erinnern. Ich werde dann sagen ‚Sprechen Sie bitte weiter.’“ (“I ask you to 
think aloud while you are solving the task; this means that you say everything that comes 
to your mind. I will not talk to you. I will be in the room as a listener. If you are not 
thinking aloud for some time I will remind you. I will say ‘Keep talking, please.’”) 
91 This example is suggested by Ericsson and Simon (1993:378). 
92 This example is similar to the one proposed by Ericsson and Simon (1993:378) who 
suggest to ask participants “How many windows are there in your parent’s house?”. Since 
the experiment involves assembling a house, this example cannot be used because of a 
possible priming effect. Therefore, I looked for a question that each participant can relate 
to and which involves retrieval of information from memory. The question about foreign 
language teachers worked very well given the purpose to motivate participants to talk 
freely and verbalize all emerging thoughts. 
93 Original wording: „Wir gehen jetzt in einen anderen Raum, in dem das Experiment 
stattfindet. Ich werde Ihnen die Aufgabe vor der Tür stellen, gehe in den Raum, um die 
Geräte einzuschalten und bitte Sie laut zu denken, sobald Sie den Raum betreten.“ (“We 
will go to another room in which the experiment will take place. I will give the task 
instructions to you in front of the door. Then I will go into the room to start all technical 
devices. Please think aloud as soon as you enter the room.”) 
DESIGN 115 
 
 
the same for each participant, the text was written down and read to the 
participants. 
After the introduction the experimenter and the participant went to a conference 
room that was located on the same floor as the office. The experimenter read out 
the instructions of one of the three conditions in front of the door. The 
instructions were given to the participant before they went into the room to ensure 
that they did not have first associations before the experimental phase started. 
Additionally, this procedure ensured that the starting point of the experiment was 
the same for each participant. In the verbal and visual goal condition the picture 
was given to the participant who was asked to return it after 30 seconds. Then the 
experimenter went into the room, made sure to close the door, and started the 
recording devices (the video camera and the mini disk recorder).  
The experimental phase started when the participant entered the room. During the 
assembly the experimenter was sitting at the back of the room and did not move or 
talk. If the participant kept quiet for longer than approximately 1 minute, the 
experimenter reminded him/her to keep talking. When the participant indicated 
that he/she finished the task, the experimenter walked over to him/her. Then the 
experimenter asked the participant to recall what he/she thought during the task 
and to indicate when he/she was uncertain about these memories. 94  The 
assembled object was still present on the table to assist the participant’s memory. 
After this retrospective report the experimenter posed four guided questions 
addressing specific features of the assembly process. Table 4.4 provides the 
wording of the questions that were asked in the short interview. 
After the participant answered the last interview question, the experimental phase 
was over. Then the experimenter turned off all recording devices and thanked the 
participant. If there were any questions about the experiment, the experimenter 
answered them. Then the participants received their course credit. After 
accompanying the participant to the door, the experimenter closed the 
experimental session by noting down information about the recordings and 
observations that she made during the assembly procedure. Furthermore, she took 
                                                        
94 Original wording: „Nachdem Sie die Aufgabe erfolgreich gelöst haben, bitte ich Sie zu 
berichten, was Sie gedacht haben, während Sie die Aufgabe lösten. Falls Sie sich in Ihren 
Erinnerungen unsicher sind, sagen Sie das bitte. Wenn es Ihnen möglich ist, berichten Sie 
die Gedanken in der Reihenfolge, in der Sie Ihnen während des Zusammenbauens kamen.“ 
(“After you have successfully solved the task I ask you to please recall what you thought 
while solving the task. If you are uncertain about your memories please say so. If possible, 
tell your thoughts in the same order as they came to your mind during the assembly.”) 
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pictures of the assembled house before arranging the objects in the initial order to 
start a new experiment. 
condition questions (original wording) questions (translation) 
all conditions 1) Haben Sie das Stecksystem 
wahrgenommen? Diente es Ihnen 
zur Orientierung? 
2) Haben Sie die Bohrlöcher wahr-
genommen? Dienten sie Ihnen zur 
Orientierung?  
3) Haben Sie das Label “Selecta 
Spielzeug” wahrgenommen und in 
Ihre Überlegungen mit einbezogen? 
1) Did you notice the 
connecting system? Did it 
guide your thoughts? 
2) Did you notice the 
boreholes? Did they guide 
your thoughts? 
3) Did you notice the label 
“Selecta Spielzeug” and did it 
influence your ideas? 
underspecified goal 4) Wie kamen Sie auf die Idee, ein 
Haus zu bauen? 
How did you have the idea to 
assemble a house? 
verbal goal 4) An welche Art Puppenhaus 
dachten Sie als ich die Aufgabe 
stellte? Hat sich dies verändert 
nachdem Sie die Teile gesehen 
haben? 
What kind of dollhouse came 
to your mind when I told you 
about the task? Did it change 
after you saw the given 
objects? 
verbal and visual 
goal 
4) Hatten Sie das gesehene Bild 
während des Aufbaus im Kopf? 
Veränderte es sich während des 
Aufbaus? Wenn ja, inwiefern? 
Did you remember the 
picture during the assembly? 
Did it change during the 
assembly? If so in which way? 
Table 4.4: Questions asked in the short interview in the respective experimental conditions. 
4.4.1.5 Equipment and technical challenges 
A video camera (Panasonic Mini DV, Model No. NV-GS27) was used to record the 
visual scene. It was fastened on a tripod and placed in a corner of the room to 
make sure that it did not constrain the participants in their movements. All audio 
files were recorded with a Sony MZ-RH10 mini disk recorder. For the first audio 
recordings a head-set was used. Participants carried the head-set around their neck 
and the mini disk recorder in their pockets. This arrangement caused some 
difficulties in cases in which participants did not have any pockets. This problem 
was solved by using a microphone that was attached to the mini disk player 
because this allowed to place the mini disk recorder near the table. In this set-up, 
the participants were not constrained by the equipment at all. 
The audio files were transcribed using the free software f495. The video recordings 
were converted into digital format by the Medienstelle at the University of 
Bremen. 
                                                        
95 Available at http://www.audiotranskription.de/f4.htm. 
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The equipment and experimental design posed some challenges. First, some 
recordings could not be properly transcribed because the participants did not 
speak loud enough or the objects were placed in a manner that created much 
background noise. In some cases, the noise could be filtered out to some extent. In 
two cases the video camera did not work and in two additional cases the video tape 
was too short to record the entire experimental phase. 
4.4.2 Experiment 2: Instructions 
4.4.2.1 Design 
The second experiment was designed as a follow up experiment. To study the 
influence of communicative intention it aimed at collecting data in which the 
speaker produced speech for a partner. As outline in sub-section 4.2.1.3, there are 
different levels that need to be distinguished when eliciting speech produced for 
an addressee. First, the researcher needs to decide about the partner’s presence in 
the experiment. The partner may either be physically present or not. Second, the 
participant’s knowledge about the partner’s knowledge state needs to be 
considered. The participant may not know anything about the partner or the 
participants are told that their partner was an expert or has the same background 
knowledge. In the first case, the participant is likely to imagine a generic addressee 
whereas in the second case he/she is likely to imagine a specific addressee. The 
participant’s assumed knowledge state about the partner is very important to the 
researcher if results by different participants are compared. Third, the possibility of 
feedback needs to be considered. Partner and participant may either be allowed to 
talk freely (concurrent feedback), not to talk at all (no feedback), or feedback is 
provided after the task is finished (delayed feedback). To the best of my knowled-
ge, the influence of the later kind of feedback has not been tested empirically so 
far. 
In the present study participants were asked to instruct a partner verbally on the 
assembly of the two-story dollhouse. In order to compare the results from the two 
experiments, it was necessary to devise an experiment in which the conditions are 
not too different from the first experiment. Thus the partner was not physically 
present in the room. However, in order to ensure that each instructor has the same 
addressee in mind, a specific addressee was introduced. Since there was no partner 
involved in the first experiment, the non-feedback scenario was selected for the 
second experiment. In order to motivate participants to provide good instructions, 
a delayed feedback was offered. Although no feedback was intended, preliminary 
analyses of the think aloud protocols revealed that the objects at hand were 
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difficult to describe; therefore visual support was offered providing a shared 
workspace. Based on these considerations, it is proposed that the comparison 
between think aloud protocols and instructions allows to study the influence of 
communicative intention on verbalization. 
In order to instruct the partner on the assembly, the instructors needed to know 
how to assemble the dollhouse themselves. There are two different ways of 
acquiring this knowledge; participants are either shown how to assemble the 
object or they assemble it themselves. In the second case, the assembly can be 
guided by a manual or unaided. Daniel and Tversky (2012) took this approach by 
asking their participants to assemble a TV cart providing them with the 
photograph of the completed TV cart on the box that normally contained all object 
parts. As the first experiment focused on verbalization in unaided assembly 
participants in the second experiment did not receive any external help either. 
Kiefer et al. (1993) distinguish two kinds of prior knowledge, namely action-
oriented prior knowledge and static prior knowledge. In order to investigate the 
influence of the nature of prior-knowledge on reference production in an assembly 
task, they varied the procedure in which the instructors acquired knowledge about 
the assembly object in two conditions. In the first condition, a video of the 
assembly process was shown to the participants before asking them to assemble 
the object themselves96 (action-oriented prior knowledge). In the second condition, 
participants were shown a picture of the assembled object only (static prior 
knowledge)97. In their study, Kiefer et al. (1993:21) report a significant effect of type 
of prior knowledge on nominal specificity used by instructors. Participants who 
assembled the object themselves prior to the instruction, produced more specific 
references than participants who were shown the picture only. Based on these 
findings, Mangold-Allwinn et al. (1995) assume that participants who interacted 
with the objects and assembled it themselves, created a richer representation of 
the different parts and the assembly structure during the assembly phase. This 
additional knowledge about object features, such as grooves in some screws (Kiefer 
et al. 1993:19), is expressed in more specific nominal references in instructions as 
compared to participants who acquired a static representation. 
                                                        
96 The description of the experimental procedure is very short in Kiefer et al. (1993:19). It 
was difficult to find exact information about the study design. Apparently one part of the 
data was collected in an experiment that is described in Mangold-Allwinn et al. (1992). In 
this experiment assembly instructions were collected from participants who were provided 
with action-oriented prior knowledge. 
97 The terminology for the two kinds of prior-knowledge is not mentioned in Kiefer et al. 
(1993:19) but is introduced afterwards in Mangold-Allwinn et al. (1995). 
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Given that participants in the first experiment were recorded while assembling the 
dollhouse, i.e. during the acquisition of action-oriented prior knowledge, 
instructors needed to gain the same expert status in the second study. Although 
the majority of participants, who were provided with few prior information about 
the goal state, succeeded in assembling a house, the frequency of original 
dollhouses was much higher if participants were provided with much prior 
information (for more detail see the results on success reported in chapter 5). 
Based on this finding, instructors were provided with much prior information 
(verbal and visual goal condition) in order to assure that instructors succeeded in 
assembling the original dollhouse within few trials. The knowledge acquisition 
phase was divided into two parts, namely the explorative assembly phase and the 
gaining expert status phase. In the first phase, participants acquired action-based 
knowledge about this specific dollhouse assembly and in the second phase, they 
strengthened this knowledge. The second phase was introduced to make sure that 
instructors knew the individual assembly steps and could thus concentrate on the 
instructions afterwards. Success in the knowledge acquisition phase was the 
prerequisite for proceeding with the second task, i.e. the instruction. Additionally, 
it was assumed that quick success kept participants motivated to solve a second 
task. 
Based on these careful considerations, it can be assumed that the design ensured 
that all instructors were provided with the same knowledge about the exact 
structure of the goal object, about the specific addressee, and about the general 
assembly steps. 
4.4.2.2 Instructions 
As outlined above, the experiment contained two sub-tasks. First, the participants 
were asked to assemble the dollhouse for themselves (referred to as self-assembly 
task). The instructions were identical to the instructions in the verbal and visual 
goal condition in the first experiment on unaided object assembly. However, the 
participant assembled the house silently while the experimenter was waiting 
outside the room. Second, participants were asked to verbally instruct a partner to 
assemble the same dollhouse (referred to as instruction). The partner, who was in 
another room, was able to see and hear the instructor via the Skype interface but 
no interaction was possible. The exact instructions were:  
„Das ist Lena. Wie Sie sehen, liegen hier dieselben Puppenhausteile noch 
einmal bereit. Wenn die Webcam angeschaltet ist, kann Lena Sie auf dem 
Bildschirm sehen. Wir gehen gleich zurück in den Versuchsraum. Dort 
bitte ich Sie, das Puppenhaus noch einmal aufzubauen und Lena dabei 
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mündlich zu erklären, wie sie mit den Teilen hier das Gleiche tun kann. 
Über diese Webcam kann Lena Ihrer Beschreibung folgen. Sie baut also 
dasselbe Puppenhaus zusammen wie Sie. Allerdings kann sie keine 
Rückfragen stellen. Deswegen ist es wichtig, dass Sie alles genau erklären 
und beschreiben. Nach dem Versuch können Sie sehen, wie erfolgreich Ihre 
Beschreibung war, nach der Lena das Haus aufgebaut hat. Weil es uns vor 
allem um die Sprachdaten geht, haben wir einen MD-Spieler in dem Raum 
liegen.“ (“This is Lena. As you can see the same dollhouse parts are lying 
here as well. When the webcam is on Lena can see you on her screen. We 
will go back to the conference room in a minute. When we are back I ask 
you to assemble the dollhouse once more and instruct Lena on how to do 
the same with her object parts. Lena can follow your instructions via this 
webcam. She will assemble the same dollhouse as you do. But she cannot 
give any feedback hence it is important that your instructions and 
descriptions are accurate. After the experiment you can assess your success 
in instructing Lena. We are primarily interested in the verbal data therefore 
we have placed a MD player in the room.”) 
The partner, who was always called Lena, was also addressed with an instruction, 
namely 
„Wir gehen jetzt in den anderen Raum zurück und ich stelle die Webcam 
an. Geben Sie mir ein Zeichen, wenn Sie uns auf dem Bildschirm sehen? 
Dann bauen Sie das Puppenhaus ganz genau so auf, wie es Ihnen von 
[Name des Teilnehmers] erklärt wird. Okay?“ (“We will go back to the 
other room now and I will switch on the webcam. Can you give me a sign 
when you see us on the computer screen? Then you will assemble the 
house exactly how it is described to you by [participant’s name]. Okay?”) 
The partner’s task in the experiment was to follow the instructions and assemble 
the dollhouse. Since this task was not crucial to the experiment, the partner was a 
confederate. It was the same confederate in all experimental sessions. 
4.4.2.3 Material 
The same two-story dollhouse produced by ‘Selecta Spielzeug’ was used in this 
experiment. Therefore, the material was the same as described in section 4.4.1.3 
Material. However, each object part was there twice, i.e. once in the conference 
room in which the instructor worked and once in the laboratory in which the 
partner assembled the dollhouse. The objects for the partner were not contained in 
a box in order to save time for the partner. It was assumed that it was easier for the 
partner to identify the objects when they were lying on the table.  
As described for the verbal and visual goal condition, the black and white picture 
(see Figure 4.2 on page 110) of the ready assembled dollhouse was shown to the 
instructor in the self-assembly task. 
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4.4.2.4 Procedure 
As mentioned above, the experiment consisted of two sub-tasks referred to as self-
assembly task and instruction. The self-assembly task was further divided into an 
explorative assembly phase and the gaining expert status phase. However, before 
the experimental phase started, a general introduction was given. Experimenter 
and participant were in the experimenter’s office for the introductory phase. First, 
the experimenter asked the participant to fill out a form of consent. Then a general 
overview of the procedure was given. Additionally, the participants were informed 
that there were no time constraints and that they needed to open the door to 
indicate that they had finished the task.98 All remaining questions were answered.  
Then the participant started with the self-assembly task. The participant and the 
experimenter walked to the conference room that was the same room as in 
experiment 1 (unaided object assembly). In front of the door the experimenter read 
out the instructions and handed the picture to the participant. Then she started 
the video camera inside the conference room. After 30 seconds the participant 
handed back the picture and entered the room. The experimenter stayed outside 
and started the time recording when the door closed. This was the beginning of 
the explorative assembly phase. After the participant opened the door indicating 
that he/she was finished, the experimenter entered the room as well. She evaluated 
the assembled house and either gave a positive feedback or an encouraging one. 
The positive feedback for participants, who were assigned the advanced status read 
as follows: 
 
„Sehr gut, Sie haben das Puppenhaus original getreu nachgebaut. Bitte 
bauen Sie es noch ein weiteres Mal zusammen, denn als nächstes werden 
Sie eine andere Person bei dem Bau des Puppenhauses mündlich anleiten.“ 
(“Well done. You have assembled the original dollhouse. Please assemble it 
once more since you will instruct another person on the assembly next.”)  
Then, the experimenter and the participant left the room. The experimenter went 
back in and disassembled the house placing all objects back in the box. Entering 
                                                        
98 Original wording: „Das Experiment findet in einem anderen Raum statt. Wir werden Sie 
während der Lösung der Aufgabe mit einer Videokamera aufzeichnen. Bitte verhalten Sie 
sich dennoch so natürlich wie möglich. Ich werde Ihnen die Aufgabe vor Betreten des 
Raumes stellen. Dann gehe ich in den Raum, um die Kamera anzustellen und bitte Sie 
anschließend hinein. Es gibt keine zeitliche Begrenzung. Wenn Sie die Aufgabe gelöst 
haben, öffnen Sie bitte die Tür.“ (“The experiment will take place in another room. We will 
video tape you while you solve the task. Nevertheless, I ask you to behave as natural as 
possible. I will read the task to you in front of the door. Then I will go into the room to 
start the video camera and ask you to come in afterwards. There are no time constraints. 
When you solved the task please open the door.”) 
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the room a second time, the gaining expert status phase started. The experimenter 
started the time recording when the door closed. She waited until the participant 
opened the door once more to indicate that the second assembly was finished as 
well. The encouraging feedback for participants who were assigned the learner 
status read as follows: 
„Ihr Puppenhaus entspricht leider noch nicht dem abgebildeten 
Puppenhaus. Ich zeige Ihnen noch einmal das Bild und stelle Ihnen 
dieselbe Aufgabe.“ (“Unfortunately your dollhouse does not resemble the 
pictured dollhouse yet. I will show the picture to you and read the same 
task to you once more.”)  
Then the experimenter and the participant left the room. The experimenter 
handed the picture to the participant and disassembled the house placing all 
objects back in the box. After 30 seconds the experimenter took the picture back 
and the participant entered the room once more. The experimenter started the 
time recording again. She waited until the participant opened the door once more 
to indicate that the second assembly was finished. If the newly assembled 
dollhouse resembled the pictured one, the participant was assigned the advanced 
status and the procedure with positive feedback started. If the participant was 
assigned learner status again, he/she got one more opportunity with the 
encouraging feedback procedure. If no expert status was reached after a third 
explorative assembly phase, the experimenter did not proceed with the experiment. 
After the expert status was gained, the participant faced the second task, i.e. 
instructing another participant. After positive feedback about the performance in 
the self-assembly phase, the experimenter pointed out that there was a webcam in 
addition to the previously introduced video camera. Then the participant was 
informed that the webcam was connected to a computer in another room in which 
another participant was waiting.99 Then the experimenter and the participant 
walked to the other room that was located in the same hallway. After introducing 
the participant to the partner, the experimenter read out their task that mainly 
addressed the instructor. Then the experimenter read the instructions to Lena. If 
there were no questions concerning the procedure, the experimenter and the 
participant went back to the conference room. The experimenter switched on the 
webcam and connected the laptop to the computer in the laboratory while the 
participant disassembled the dollhouse. While the connection between the two 
                                                        
99 Original wording: „Sie wurden bisher mit dieser Kamera aufgezeichnet. Es gibt hier im 
Raum aber auch noch diese Webcam. Wenn Sie angeschaltet ist, überträgt Sie in unser 
Labor. Dort wartet Lena.“ (“So far it was this camera that recorded your actions. But there 
is also this webcam in this room. If it is turned on, it is transmitting to a computer in our 
laboratory. Lena is waiting over there.”) 
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computers was established, the partner, i.e. the confederate, also started the video 
recording software (more detail in the next sub-section) that recorded the visual 
interface of Skype. When the partner indicated that the connection was fine, the 
experimenter left the room and the participant started the instruction. The 
experimenter waited outside the room until the participant opened the door to 
indicate that the instruction task was finished. The confederate wrote down the 
instruction time and stopped the video recording. After the MD player was turned 
off, the experiment was finished. In the end, participants received their course 
credit or monetary compensation and left the office. 
4.4.2.5 Equipment and technical challenges 
A video camera (Panasonic Mini DV, Model No. NV-GS27) was used to record the 
visual scene. It was fastened on a tripod and placed in a corner of the room to 
make sure that it did not constrain the participants in their movements. All audio 
files were recorded with a Sony MZ-RH10 mini disk recorder and a microphone 
attached to the recorder.  
The program Debut Audio Recording Software 1.42100 was used to record the visual 
Skype interface. The computer that was used by the confederate ran on Windows 
whereas the laptop that was positioned in the instructor’s room ran on Mac OS X 
10.6.8. 
The audio files were transcribed using the free software f4101. The video recordings 
were converted into digital format by the Medienstelle at the University of 
Bremen. 
Although the equipment and the software worked well in most cases, occassionally 
difficulties were faced concerning the recordings. Difficulties were encountered 
with the audio recording in two cases and with the video recording in one case.  
4.5 Analysis 
This section provides a summary of the quantitative and qualitative measures that 
were collected in the experiments and the way in which these are analyzed in the 
                                                        
100  Available at: http://www.zdnet.de/debut_video_recording_software_download-
39002345-63892-1.htm 
101 Available at: http://www.audiotranskription.de/f4.htm 
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different chapters of this thesis. No results or detailed descriptions of the analyses 
will be presented. 
4.5.1 Data sets for analysis 
Due to technical problems and individual difficulties with the task, six data sets 
were lost for the analysis. Furthermore, the data for four participants was not 
complete, i.e. audio and video recording. Table 4.5 provides a summary on the data 
sets in experiment 1 (unaided object assembly) in which some difficulties were 
faced, specifying the reasons. This table serves as a reference that will be pointed 
to when the data sets for the respective analyses are reported. 
reason number of 
participants 
description scope of loss of 
data 
personal 1 The participant knew the doll house from 
a previous experiment. 
complete 
personal 3 They gave up and did not complete the 
task. 
complete 
personal 1 The participant said that he said 
everything he thought during the 
assembly hence he refused to provide a 
retrospective report.  
partial 
(retrospective 
report) 
technical 2 No audio and video recordings. complete 
technical 1 The video tape was too short. partial (video 
data) 
technical 2 The video recording did not work. partial (video 
data) 
Table 4.5: Summary of partial and complete data loss due to technical and personal reasons in 
experiment 1. 
Due to technical and personal difficulties, four data sets were completely lost in 
the second experiment. Additionally, the video recordings of five videos could not 
be analyzed because the DVD was damaged and the original tapes had been re-
used already. Table 4.6 provides a summary on the data sets in experiment 2 
(instructions) in which some difficulties were faced, specifying the reasons. 
 
reason number of 
participants 
description scope of loss of 
data 
personal 1 The participant did not reach the expert 
status. 
complete 
technical 3 The audio and video recording did not complete 
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work. 
technical 5 The DVD that contained the video 
recordings was damaged. 
partial 
Table 4.6: Summary of partial and complete data loss due to technical and personal reasons in 
experiment 2. 
4.5.2 Qualitative and quantitative analysis 
The basis for all of these studies is an in-depth qualitative analysis of the recorded 
verbal reports. In order to analyze the recorded speech, the data needs to be 
properly transcribed. Ericsson and Simon (1993) point out that “the verbalizations 
of adults can generally be transcribed into ordinary words” (Ericsson & Simon 
1993:279). But as language encodes information at different levels (such as content, 
intonation, and pauses), decisions about the level of granularity need to be made 
prior to the transcription process. Generally, these decisions depend on the focus 
of the respective researcher. Nevertheless, Ericsson and Simon (1993) point out 
that transcripts should include as much information as possible so that other 
researchers can use the same data set to investigate new question (for a discussion 
of this view see chapter 3). In the case of the presented experiments the 
transcriptions needed to encode the semantic content expressed by words, pauses, 
and hesitation markers such as ‘uh’, ‘uhm’, ‘well’. Regarding pauses the 
transcription was based on Ericsson and Simon (1993) who state that “only the 
duration of longer pauses need to be recorded, since these may indicate periods 
when the subject is not obeying the instruction to verbalize” (Ericsson & Simon 
1993:279). This was operationalized in the experimental phase by reminding 
participants to keep thinking aloud if they fell silent for longer than one minute. 
In order to analyze the information that is contained in the transcripts, the speech 
needs to be properly coded. The coding of data is subjective because the person 
analyzing the data defines what needs to be annotated and how it is annotated. In 
the present studies, I made the decisions about which categories were annotated 
and how. The annotation was done by one assistant and myself. There was one 
basic annotation scheme from which aspects have been selected and which was 
extended in the chapters focusing on different features of analysis, such as verbs 
and object references. In the basic annotation scheme each discourse unit was 
annotated with regard to nominal reference, more specifically nominal specificity, 
article, deictic references (anaphoric, exophoric, and ellipsis), verbs, and clause ex-
pansions. The categories of clause expansion were based on Halliday and 
Matthiessen (2004). Although the aspect of clause expansion was not analyzed in 
this thesis the intercoder agreement will be reported for completion. More detail 
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on the annotation of features that are analyzed, such as nominal phrases, will be 
outlined in the respective chapter. The annotation scheme for nominal phrases 
including nominal reference, articles, and deictic reference is outlined in more 
detail in chapter 8. More detail about the annotation of verbs is provided in 
chapter 7.  
The intercoder agreement for the general scheme was tested between two coders, 
who annotated six protocols each. These six protocols resemble 12.0% of the cor-
pus and they contain 627 discourse units; this represents 13.7% of all annotated 
discourse units. During the training, also referred to as pilot test (Lombard et al. 
2002:601), the greatest challenge was the segmentation of protocols into discourse 
units. After feedback and further training, this difficulty was overcome.  
After the training the percent agreement for this basic scheme was very high, i.e. 
98.8%. Krippendorff’s alpha for the individual annotation categories was very high 
in most cases.102 The lowest Krippendorff’s alpha value was 0.84 (see Table 4.7). 
According to Neuendorf (2002:143) “coefficients of .90 or greater would be 
acceptable to all, .80 or greater would be acceptable to most situations, and below 
that there exists disagreement”. Thus the obtained coefficients indicate that there 
was no significant disagreement between the coders.  
annotation category percent 
agreement 
Krippendorff’s 
Alpha 
nouns unspecific 99.0% 0.958 
nouns specific 100.0% 1 
nouns constraints 99.0% 0.837 
personal pronoun 99.8% 0.996 
ellipsis of nouns 100.0% 1 
articles definite 100.0% 1 
articles demonstrative 100.0% 1 
articles indefinite 100.0% 1 
verbs all 100.0% 1 
verbs modal 100.0% 1 
ellipsis of verbs 100.0% 1 
ellipsis of articles 100.0% 1 
reference exophoric 99.8% 0.996 
                                                        
102 Krippendorff’s Alpha has been calculated using the tool ReCal which is available on the 
internet. (http://dfreelon.org/utils/recalfront/; last access 29.03.2013). 
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reference anaphoric 100.0% 1 
ellipsis of reference 100.0% 1 
elaboration: exposition 100.0% 1 
elaboration: exemplification 100.0% 1 
elaboration: clarification 100.0% 1 
extension: addition 100.0% 1 
extension: variation 100.0% 1 
extension: alternation 100.0% 1 
enhancement: temporal 100.0% 1 
enhancement: spatial 100.0% 1 
enhancement: manner 100.0% 1 
enhancement: causal 100.0% 1 
Table 4.7: Percent agreement and Krippendorff’s Alpha for annotation categories within the general 
annotation scheme. 
Insights on the general nature and structure of problem solving processes in 
unaided object assembly can be gained in a qualitative analysis of the general 
structure of think aloud protocols. On the most general level these protocols can 
be assumed to consist of an introductory sequence, a middle part, and a con-
cluding statement. The content of each of these structural parts will be described, 
categorized, and analyzed. The middle part is assumed to contain the actual 
assembly activity and this part will be studied in terms of problem solving 
processes, i.e. known problem solving processes will be identified and new pro-
cesses will be described. By means of the general frequency of the individual 
processes as well as recurring sequences of these processes, a general structure of 
problem solving in unaided object assembly will be described (see chapter 6). In a 
more fine-grained analysis the linguistic representation that is characteristic of the 
individual problem solving processes will be highlighted. In the analysis, the focus 
will be on the verb phrase, specifically modality and verb type, but general patterns 
of discourse markers will be highlighted as well.  
The influence of prior information on the development of the mental represen-
tation of the goal object can be studied by analyzing object references. Object 
references reflect the speaker’s object conceptualization, thus referential change 
throughout the assembly recorded in think aloud protocols will be analyzed 
(chapter 8). The influence of prior information on the problem solving process 
itself is investigated by analyzing the use and assigned function of task specific 
constraints, such as physical properties of objects, in think aloud protocols 
(chapter 9). In both chapters these findings will be contrasted with results 
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obtained in instructions. This comparison highlights the influence of 
communicative intention on the development of the mental representation and 
the nature and function of constraints in unaided object assembly. 
Additionally, the design offered a number of quantitative measures such as time, 
success, and length of verbal reports. More specifically assembly times were 
recorded in different conditions. First, experiment 2 (instruction) provided a 
baseline condition because participants did not think aloud while assembling the 
dollhouse. The task encountered by participants during the explorative assembly 
phase in experiment 2 and by participants in the verbal and visual goal condition 
was the same. The only difference was that participants in experiment 1 (unaided 
object assembly) were posed the additional task to think aloud. Second, times were 
recorded for participants who needed to perform the same task, i.e. assemble a 
dollhouse, but with different amounts of prior information about the goal object 
(experiment 1 unaided object assembly). A common measure besides time is length 
of verbal protocols; the weaknesses of protocol length are addressed in the next 
chapter that reports the evaluation of performance measures. 
In addition to these mere quantitative measures, the frequency of the categories 
that are defined in the qualitative analysis will be statistically evaluated, i.e. in 
terms of descriptive and inferential statistics in the individual chapters. 
 5 Features of analysis: 
Performance measures 
5.1 Introduction  
Hussy (1993:23) discusses the advantages and disadvantages of measures that are 
not easily quantifiable, such as information about a person’s feelings, and 
quantitative ones, such as performance time. He summarizes that verbal protocols 
are subjective in nature containing much information about participants’ 
reasoning, their decisions, and other mental processes at work. However, as verbal 
reports are not quantitative103, their content is not easily comparable between 
participants. Therefore, many researchers conclude their theoretical consider-
ations by proposing to study the multifaceted nature of human problem solving by 
combining qualitative and quantitative research methods and measures 
(Schoenfeld 1985; Hussy 1993; Funke & Spering 2006). 
                                                        
103 Quantitative methods are objective in the sense that their truth-value can be assessed 
(Funke 2003:21). 
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Although this thesis focuses on verbal protocol analysis, quantitative measures 
were collected as well. First, assembly and instruction times were recorded. 
Second, the assembled dollhouse could be evaluated in terms of success and the 
verbal protocols allowed assessing the experimenter’s reminders in the task. 
Furthermore, the comparison between performance times and assembly success in 
a condition in which participants assembled the dollhouse silently and the same 
measures in a comparable condition in which participants thought aloud 
highlights whether verbalization has an effect or not. Additionally, it is investigat-
ed if the action-oriented assembly task encourages participants’ spontaneous 
verbalization. Although there is no substantial body of evidence for self-talk104, 
Merz (1969:131) reports that students tended to speak to themselves while solving 
math problems. This observation is supported by Goffman (1981) who proposes 
that we “speak to ourselves judgmentally about our own doings (...), and verbally 
mark junctures in our physical doings.” (Goffman 1981:79) Goffman’s (1981) 
assumption is based on self-observation and hearsay. Given that the investigated 
task involves much physical action, it may encourage spontaneous self-talk. In 
addition to recording the experimental conditions in which participants were in-
structed to think aloud, Dickson et al. (2000) audio taped the experimental session 
in which participants worked silently as well. This approach is unique, at least to 
my knowledge. The analysis of the tapes revealed that no participant spoke during 
the experiment when they were instructed to work silently (Dickson et al. 
2000:222).  
A different observation is reported in Cowley and Nash (2013). They report that a 
number of participants working on the river problem, which is also known as 
Hobbits and Orcs problem, started talking aloud without the instruction to do so. 
It is important to note that these participants were soldiers and their officer was 
also present during the trial. Cowley and Nash (2013) analyzed the transcript of one 
participant in detail and the extracts that are reported show that this specific talk 
aloud protocol resembles a think aloud protocol. It can be assumed that the 
occurrence of this very unique case of informative talk aloud is due to the fact that 
the officer was present which motivated the soldier to perform well and hope for 
encouragement along the way105. Additionally, this specific soldier is very likely to 
be highly fluent in verbalizing his thoughts and he apparently does not feel 
constrained by the test situation. 
                                                        
104 Goffman (1981:79) defines self-talk as speaking to oneself in cases in which no other 
person is present either addressing oneself or an imaginary addressee. 
105 Cowley and Nash (2013) report that the soldier glanced at the officer after he made a 
suggestion about a possible solution. 
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Each of these performance measures (performance time and individual success) 
and possible influencing factors (the experimenter’s reminders and the additional 
task to think aloud) will be discussed from a theoretical point of view in the 
following paragraphs. Based on this literature overview, research questions and 
expectations will be stated before the analysis procedure is described. After 
presenting the results, those will be discussed in the final section. 
Funke (2003:20-21) differentiates between qualitative and quantitative methods 
and measures in problem solving research. Quantitative measures of behavior are 
objective when their truth-value can be assessed. Common quantitative perform-
ance measures are solution times (e.g. Knoblich et al. 1999; Funke & Spering 2006; 
Schelhorn et al. 2007) and individual success, either in the form of appropriate 
solutions (e.g. Merz 1969; Roth 1985; Gralla et al. 2012) or solution frequencies (e.g. 
Knoblich et al. 1999; Knoblich et al. 2001). Funke and Spering (2006:689) point out 
that solution times are the sum of durations of different subprocesses such as 
perceiving, decisions to act, and acting. Therefore, solution time encodes the 
overall performance time but it does not provide any information about individual 
processes that are involved in performing the task. In order to gain insights on the 
underlying cognitive processes, additional information such as verbal protocols or 
eye-movement needs to be considered as well. In eye-tracking studies, fixation 
rates and sequences, as well as pupil diameter are recorded that can provide 
insights about where attention is focused and for how long. Focus and duration of 
attention can be analyzed in terms of information processing, i.e. which inform-
ation is processed and how (Funke & Spering 2006:691). In a similar fashion cursor 
movements and clicks on the keyboard (e.g. Ritter & Larkin 1994) can be analyzed.  
Qualitative measures, in contrast, are subjective because their truth-value cannot 
easily be assessed. Funke (2003) argues that verbal reports are subjective because 
participants may consciously or sub-consciously change their thoughts before 
verbalizing them. Schoenfeld (1985:282) summarizes that participants may be 
influenced by different aspects of the experimental setting, such as the pressure of 
being recorded leading to the strain to say something regardless of whether it is 
true or not, the participant’s belief about the nature of the experiment, and beliefs 
about the discipline itself. Concerning problem solving research, Schoenfeld (1985) 
points out that the participant’s assumptions about the nature of the experiment 
may guide his/her choice of solution methods because “certain methods are 
considered ‘legitimate’ for solving problems in a formal setting, others not” 
(Schoenfeld 1985:282). 
132 FEATURES OF ANALYSIS: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
If quantitative measures are considered, the general question regarding the 
influence of think aloud on task performance needs to be raised and discussed. 
There are two levels that may be influenced by the task to verbalize everything that 
comes to the participants’ mind, namely the processing level and the performance 
level. Summarizing the literature review offered in chapter 3, it can be assumed 
that think aloud does not influence mental processes at the processing level if par-
ticipants are instructed to say out loud everything that comes to their mind. If par-
ticipants are instructed to verbalize specific information, such as reasons for 
actions or choices, an influence on mental processing is assumed because inform-
ation needs to be selected.  
Studies focusing on the influence of think aloud on the performance level yield 
different results. Merz (1969) and Franz and Merz (1976) report several studies in 
which solution correctness was significantly facilitated by concurrent verbalization 
whereas solution times were longer than in the silent condition. Short et al.’s (1991) 
studies revealed that verbalization facilitated performance on spatial and verbal 
analogy tasks for fifth graders. However, no such effect was observed in their adult 
test group. Schooler et al. (1993) investigated the influence of concurrent verbaliz-
ation on performance on insight and non-insight problems. An insight problem, 
according to Schooler et al. (1993), is characterized by three features, namely  
“(a) is well within the competence of the average subject; (b) has a high 
probability of leading to an impass (…); and (c) has a high probability of 
rewarding sustained effort with an “Aha” experience.” (Schooler et al. 
1993:168)  
In their study no effect of verbalization on performance on non-insight problems 
was observed but a negative effect on performance on insight problems (for a 
discussion of these results see chapter 3). Another study revealed effects of think 
aloud on parts of the problem solving process as recorded in patterns of eye 
movement and fixation rates (Knoblich & Rhenius 1995). However, no significant 
effect of verbalization was observed on performance time. In sum, most studies 
report that participants thinking aloud took longer to solve the task than the silent 
control group. Success was influenced positively in some tasks but hindered in 
others. To date, only mental manipulation tasks have been studied but no 
investigation of performance in physical manipulation tasks was reported. 
It is well known that people speak at different rates depending on speech context, 
i.e. if participants are nervous they tend to speak more and faster, but also on 
personal preferences, i.e. some people speak before they think whereas other 
people think about what they want to say for quite some time before actually 
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saying it out loud. Additionally, people differ in the quantity of verbalization 
(Dominowski 1998:30). Thus van Someren et al. (1994) stress that “two protocols 
may differ in length not because of differences in thought processes, but because of 
different styles of verbalization” (van Someren et al. 1994:135). Ericsson and Simon 
(1993) address this effect as well. Reviewing a number of studies they propose that 
“some subjects may transform automatically, whereas others may require a con-
cious effort for this transformation and verbal production” (Ericsson & Simon 
1993:88). They assume that concurrent verbalization is easier for participants who 
think verbally than participants who prefer a visual code. The additional effort of 
transforming the visual code into a verbal one is assumed to result in fewer 
spontaneous verbalizations. At the level of training, Ericsson and Simon (1993:250) 
argue that those warm-up tasks that are based on oral information for which all 
participants are likely to produce concurrent reports106 can help to reduce individ-
ual differences and foster fluent verbal reports. At the level of analysis, Chi (1997) 
proposes that the effect can be overcome by analyzing what people say rather than 
how much they say. More specifically,  
“this means that one would not count the number of words a person has 
spoken as an index of the amount of elaboration, for example, but use a 
more appropriate measure such as the number of independent ideas 
generated.” (Chi 1997:306) 
In the current study, the number of different problem solving processes that are 
generated by each participant would be a more appropriate measure in Chi’s 
terms. However, the focus in this thesis is not on individual performance in terms 
of problem solving behavior but on the overall pattern of problem solving in an 
unaided assembly task. This issue is addressed in much detail in chapter 6. 
Ericsson and Simon (1993) as well as Chi (1997) stress the importance of reminding 
participants to keep thinking aloud. It can be argued that reminders help to reduce 
individual differences because participants are continuously reminded to speak. 
This effect can only be gained if the experimenter has a clear guideline for 
reminding participants, e.g. if the participant remains silent for one minute. 
Importantly, Chi (1997:305) stresses that the problem of individual differences does 
not only exist for verbal protocol analysis but also in different terms for other 
kinds of dependent measures. Concluding this review, protocol length will be re-
ported in this chapter on performance measures for completeness although it does 
not allow for valid conclusions on its own. 
                                                        
106 They propose mental multiplication and anagrams (Ericsson & Simon 1993:250). 
134 FEATURES OF ANALYSIS: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
5.2 Research questions and expectations 
Based on the literature review discussed in the previous section and a more 
detailed review in chapter 3, six research questions can be investigated by analyz-
ing quantitative performance measures, namely assembly time and assembly 
success, and contextual factors, i.e. experimenter’s reminders and additional task 
to think aloud. 
? Research question 1: Does the additional task of verbalization have an 
influence on assembly time? 
Based on the different findings reported in the literature, the additional task of 
verbalization may either have no effect on assembly time or slow assembly down. 
But it needs to be kept in mind that these findings are not based on tasks involving 
physical manipulation but on those requiring mental manipulation, e.g. match or 
reasoning. 
? Research question 2: Does verbalization have an influence on individual 
assembly success? 
In studies investigating mental problems, such as math equations, verbalization 
has been observed to have a positive effect. However, as pointed out before, there 
are no previous studies investigating problems involving physical manipulation. 
Thus, no specific expectations concerning the influence of verbalization on object 
assembly were formulated. 
? Research question 3: Does prior information have an influence on 
assembly time? 
As described in detail in chapter 4, Bransford and Johnson (1972) investigated the 
influence of prior knowledge on comprehension and recall. Their results revealed a 
positive effect of prior knowledge on accuracy of recall. Additionally, Dixon 
(1987b), who studied the influence of prior knowledge on reading time, reported 
that participants who were provided with prior knowledge were significantly faster 
in reading and understanding instructions on a physics problem. He assumes that 
prior knowledge fosters the creation of a mental representation of the problem 
state as newly encountered information can be structured faster if a preliminary 
representation exists already. 
Based on these findings, it was expected that prior information had a positive 
influence on assembly time. In line with Dixon’s (1987b) findings, participants who 
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were provided with much prior information were expected to solve the task faster 
than participants who needed to create the goal structure from scratch, i.e. 
without a preliminary mental representation. 
? Research question 4: Does prior information have an influence on 
individual assembly success? 
There were two ways of defining success in the investigated assembly task. On the 
one hand, success could be defined differently for each of the three conditions. In 
all three conditions the goal state was the measure of success but the goal state 
was defined differently in the instructions.  
For participants in the underspecified goal condition, the goal state was a sensible 
object in which all objects were included. In the verbal goal condition, participants 
needed to assemble a two-story dollhouse using all object parts. And in the verbal 
and visual goal condition, participants were successful when the assembled house 
matched the pictured two-story dollhouse. Following this argumentation the 
condition-specific success rate needed to be evaluated and compared to the 
success rates in the other conditions. This evaluation will be referred to as 
condition specific success. On the other hand, the same goal state could be reached 
in all three conditions. If participants used the boreholes (see Figure 5.1) and other 
physical constraints such as bevels (see Figure 5.2) and grooves (see Figure 5.3), 
they were guided to assemble the original two-story dollhouse. Following this 
argumentation, success could be evaluated at the same scale in all three 
conditions. This view will be referred to as condition unspecific success. 
 
Figure 5.1: One of the boards clearly displaying the boreholes. 
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Figure 5.2: Two of the four objects with a bevel. Those objects need to be placed on the second story in 
order to position the roof part on top of them. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: One of the two objects that have a notch on both sides. Other objects can be slid into these 
notches in order to be fastened. 
On the other hand, evaluating the condition specific success, each participant had 
the same chance to succeed regardless of the specificity of prior information that 
was provided. However, evaluating the condition unspecific success, prior inform-
ation was assumed to have a clear effect. Participants who saw the picture of the 
assembled dollhouse (verbal and visual goal condition) could be expected to 
succeed in assembling the original dollhouse more often than participants who 
were not provided with an external model. Participants who saw the picture were 
more likely to succeed because they could use either one or both of the following 
strategies: either matching the given objects to the memorized dollhouse or notic-
ing and using the physical clues that were provided by the objects. Participants 
who did not know the exact nature of the dollhouse, in comparison, could only 
rely on the second strategy and were thus expected to be less likely to succeed. 
? Research question 5: How often does the experimenter need to remind 
participants to keep thinking aloud? 
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Normally, reports about studies using think aloud protocols do not provide 
information on the number of reminders. Therefore, no literature based expectat-
ions could be formulated for this question. However, two alternative expectations 
were formulated based on general assumption about the influence of think aloud 
on task performance and the naturalness to think aloud. 
First, based on Ericsson and Simon’s (1993:85) postulate that verbalization does not 
influence basic performance measures and thought processes, it was assumed that 
the task to think aloud did not pose any extra effort on participants. Thus there 
should be no systematic differences in the number of reminders between 
conditions. Differences might rather be observed between participants because as 
Chi (1997:305) points out “some people are more verbose than others”.  
Second, an alternative expectation was also formulated. As “spontaneous thinking 
aloud is rare in everyday life” (Ericsson & Simon 1993:xiv) participants might forget 
verbalizing their thoughts when they were very engaged in the task or when they 
faced difficulties. If this was the case, participants in the underspecified goal and 
the verbal goal condition might need to be reminded more often assuming that 
their task of building a mental representation from scratch or matching the objects 
to an unspecific mental representation was more demanding than matching the 
given objects to an existing specific mental representation. Assuming that these 
participants were highly absorbed in performing the task and that they might 
encounter difficulties more frequently, they might forget to think aloud more 
frequently than participants in the verbal and visual goal condition. 
? Research question 6: Does the action-oriented nature of the assembly 
encourage spontaneous self-talk? 
As quoted above, Ericsson and Simon (1993) point out that spontaneous talk aloud 
can hardly be observed in everyday life. If people verbalize thought processes, this 
is often done in “social motivated verbalizations”, for example by providing ex-
planations (Ericsson & Simon 1993:xiv). However, based on personal experiences 
and hearsay as well as on Goffman’s (1981) report, it is assumed that spontaneous 
self-talk can be witnessed in the investigated task. Goffman (1981:79) defines self-
talk as speaking to oneself when no other person is present. This definition does 
not say anything about the form of self-talk, i.e. what is verbalized. The term self-
talk seems to refer to verbalizations that are only sporadic and even less coherent 
than verbalizations when thinking aloud thus the analysis in this thesis focuses on 
instances of self-talk rather than think aloud, i.e. verbalization of trains of thought. 
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5.3 Analysis 
5.3.1 Assembly time, instruction time, and protocol length 
As noted above, there are different measures to assess performance. In the first 
experiment, performance time was recorded at different points. In the unaided 
assembly task assembly time was recorded, i.e. the time recording started when 
participants started the assembly and it ended when they indicated that they are 
done. In the second experiment, the main interest was in the instructions but the 
assembly time was recorded as well. The time recording started when the door 
closed behind the participant and it stopped when the participant opened the door 
to indicate that he/she was done (for more detail see section 4.4.1). Some partici-
pants needed more than one attempt to assemble the pictured dollhouse. Then 
more than one assembly time was recorded for that participant. Assembly time 
was also recorded for the last assembly prior to the instruction, referred to as 
gaining expert status phase (see section 4.4.2). Additionally, the time that 
participants took to instruct their partner was recorded. This temporal measure 
was referred to as instruction time. The time difference or similarity between 
participants in the silent assembly condition, i.e. without the task to think aloud, 
and in the equivalent think aloud condition can be assessed by comparing mean 
assembly times in both conditions. In order to ensure a high degree of compara-
bility, the time recording for the first explorative assembly in the instruction 
scenario was compared to the assembly time recorded during unaided assembly. In 
both cases participants were provided with much prior information, i.e. the picture 
of the assembled dollhouse, they were given the same instructions, and they were 
presented with the same experimental setting. The only difference was in the task 
to think aloud during the assembly. 
Altogether, 17 assembly times were analyzed in the verbal and visual goal condition 
(for more detail on participants in experiment 1 see section 4.3.1). For the instruct-
ion experiment all recorded assembly times were analyzed including those 
participants whose instructions could not be analyzed due to technical problems. 
This allowed for the analysis of 19 assembly times in experiment 2. 
The number of words that were spoken during the assembly task might also 
highlight differences between conditions. Therefore, mean protocol length as well 
as the range of words that were recorded in the think aloud protocols was 
compared to investigate the influence of prior information on verbalization. 
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Protocol length was defined as the number of words that were recorded in the 
transcript. The length of all 50 think aloud protocols was assessed. 
5.3.2 Assembly success 
Whereas time and number of words are quantitative measures, participant’s 
success is a qualitative performance measure. As such this measure can be 
quantified by rating the individual success of the assembled objects. For these 
means a 4-point scale was defined in the analysis. If participants assembled the 
original dollhouse, their assembled dollhouse was rated ‘3’ (see Figure 5.4 and 
Figure 5.5). Participants who assembled a house which had two-stories (see Figure 
5.6 and Figure 5.7) were rated ‘2’. Participants who assembled a one-story house 
(see Figure 5.8) were rated ‘1’ in their success. Only those who built a one-story 
dollhouse by using all objects and arranging them in a meaningful way (see Figure 
5.9) were rated ‘1’. Participants who failed to use all object parts were rated ‘0’ 
which was equivalent to ‘no success’. The participant who built the house 
displayed in Figure 5.10, for example, did not use the second board. 
 
Figure 5.4: Assembled dollhouse that 
represents the original dollhouse [14]. 107 
                                                        
107 The number in brackets refers to the 
participant’s ID within the corpus. All of 
the pictures show houses assembled in 
experiment 1 (Unaided object assembly). 
 
Figure 5.5: Assembled dollhouse that 
represents the original dollhouse [17]. 
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Figure 5.6: Assembled two-story house [16]. 
 
Figure 5.7: Assembled two-story house [12]. 
 
Figure 5.8: Assembled one-story house [52]. 
 
Figure 5.9: Configuration of objects in the 
assembled one-story house displayed in the 
previous picture [52]. 
 
Figure 5.10: Assembled house in which one 
board is missing [10]. 
5.3.3 Spontaneous verbalization and experimenter’s 
reminder 
Spontaneous instances of think aloud were annotated by watching the videos 
recorded during the silent assembly phase in the second experiment. The first 
explorative assembly (abbreviated by EA) was comparable to the condition faced by 
participants who were instructed to think aloud. These recordings were annotated 
by taking down all spontaneous utterances. Due to technical problems only eleven 
videos could be annotated (for more detail see chapter 4). 
In order to capture the experimenter’s involvement in the first experiment, the 
number of reminders was counted in the transcripts. For each participant the sum 
of reminders was taken down. Reminders could be easily extracted from the 
protocols since they were always phrased the same way, i.e. „Bitte sprechen Sie 
weiter.“ (“Please keep talking.”) This phrase was introduced to the participants in 
the introductory phase of the first experiment (for more detail see section 4.4.1). 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Assembly time and protocol length 
5.4.1.1 Assembly time 
Participants who did not think aloud during the explorative assembly (EA) took between 
3.11 minutes (fastest participant) and 20.17 minutes (longest assembly time) to finish their 
assembly; M = 8.72 minutes (SD = 4.42) (see Table 5.1). Participants who were instructed 
to think aloud during the assembly in the verbal and visual goal condition took between 
3.04 minutes and 12.30 minutes; M = 6.22 minutes (SD = 2.15). The results revealed that 
participants who verbalized their thoughts during the assembly were significantly faster 
than participants who were silent, t (26.67) = 2.20, p < .05. 
condition minimum 
(minutes) 
maximum 
(minutes) 
mean 
(minutes) 
standard 
deviation 
range N 
underspecified 
goal 
3.15  29.17 10.28 5.10 26.02 17 
verbal goal 2.45 15.25 7.26 3.23 12.80 16 
verbal and 
visual goal 
3.04 12.30 6.22 2.15 9.26 17 
1st explorative 
assembly 
3.11 20.17 9.12 4.42 17.06 19 
Table 5.1: Mean assembly time with maximum, minimum, standard deviation, and range; differentiated 
by condition (minutes). 
Additionally, the results in experiment 1 revealed that prior information had a 
significant influence on assembly time. Participants who were provided with least 
specific goal information (underspecified goal condition) needed significantly 
longer to assemble the dollhouse (M = 10.28 minutes, SD = 5.10) than participants 
who were provided with specific background information (verbal and visual goal 
condition) (M = 6.22 minutes, SD = 2.15), t (21.52) = 3.03, p < .01. Participants who 
were told about the nature of the goal object (verbal goal condition) (M = 7.26, 
SD = 3.23) needed significantly less time for their assembly than participants who 
were provided no information about the goal object, t (27.26) = 2.32, p < .05. There 
was one outlier in each condition (see Figure 5.11). 
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Figure 5.11: Assembly time (in minutes) with think aloud. 
5.4.1.2 Protocol length and instruction time 
5.4.1.2.1 Unaided object assembly 
The shortest think aloud protocol was 104 words long and the longest one 
amounted to 2655 words. This was a clear outlier because it was 1490 words longer 
than the second longest protocol. Therefore, this protocol was excluded from the 
statistical analysis. Thus the longest protocol was 1165 words long; this resulted in a 
range of 1061 words between the shortest and longest think aloud protocol. The 
mean protocol length was 454.42 words (SD = 250.45).  
The analysis revealed marked differences between conditions. Think aloud 
protocols by participants who were provided with underspecified goal information 
were longer than those by participants in the two conditions in which goal 
information was provided (see Table 5.2). Participants in the verbal goal and the 
verbal and visual goal condition used the same amount of words in their reports on 
average. The difference within condition, as expressed in the statistical measure 
range, was most pronounced in the two conditions in which participants were 
provided with little goal information, i.e. underspecified goal and verbal goal 
condition. 
 
condition minimum 
(words) 
maximum 
(words) 
mean 
(words) 
standard 
deviation 
range N 
underspecified 
goal 
197  1165 548.35 296.98 968 17 
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verbal goal 104 1126 405.81 245.34 1022 16 
verbal and 
visual goal 
189 883 406.24 182.39 694 17 
Table 5.2: Length of think aloud protocols by words with maximum, minimum, mean, standard 
deviation, and range differentiated by condition. 
5.4.1.2.2 Instructions (protocol length and time) 
The shortest instruction was 3 minutes long whereas the longest one took almost 
10 minutes (9:53 minutes). On average, an instruction lasted 6:13 minutes 
(SD = 1.80). The transcripts of the instructions were between 319 and 984 words 
long, i.e. resulting in a range of 665 words. The mean length of the 16 protocols was 
614.82 words (SD = 214.86). 
5.4.2 Assembly success 
5.4.2.1 Unaided assembly 
Overall, only four participants did not succeed in solving the assembly task (8%). 
The majority of participants assembled a house (24 participants, 49%) or the 
original dollhouse (22 participants, 45%). Neither a picture of the assembled object 
nor a video is recorded for one participant (for an overview on missing data see 
sub-section 4.5.1). 
Considering condition specific success108, participants in the underspecified goal 
condition succeeded when they assembled an object using all objects. In terms of 
the rating scale this meant that either the assembly of a house or the original 
dollhouse expressed success. Participants in the verbal goal condition succeeded 
when they assembled a two-story dollhouse using all objects. In terms of the rating 
scale this meant that they succeeded when assembling a two-story house or the 
original dollhouse. Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition succeeded 
when they assembled the pictured dollhouse using all objects. In terms of the 
rating scale this meant that only the original dollhouse expressed success. Table 5.3 
summarizes the raw frequency of each rating within conditions. Success rates (last 
column in Table 5.3) revealed that participants who were provided with most prior 
information were least successful. 
condition no 
success 
one-story 
house 
two-story 
house 
original 
dollhouse 
N success (%) 
                                                        
108 As described in the section on analysis this measure of success is rated in relation to the 
definition of the goal object as defined in the task instruction. 
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underspecified 
goal 
3 3 7 4 17 82.35% 
verbal goal 0 1 8 6 15 93.33% 
verbal and visual 
goal 
1 0 4 12 17 70.59% 
Table 5.3: Assembled objects rated by success distribution within conditions (raw frequency). 
Evaluating the condition unspecific success109 the reverse trend showed. From this 
perspective prior information had a significant influence on assembly success, 
L?2 (6, N = 49) = 11.68, p = .02. Participants who saw the picture of the assembled 
dollhouse (verbal and visual goal condition) succeed in assembling the original 
dollhouse more frequently than participants without this specific information (12 
cases as compared to 4 cases) (see Figure 5.12). Participants who were provided 
with unspecific goal information assembled a house more often than participants 
who were provided with an external model (10 cases as compared to 4 cases) (see 
Figure 5.12). In this analysis standardized residuals did not reveal which dependent 
variable contributed most to the effect. Nevertheless, the effect was most evident 
in the frequency of original dollhouse assemblies in the verbal and visual goal 
condition with z = 1.6 (for more detail see Table 5.6 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 5.12: Distribution of categories of assembled products between conditions (raw frequency). 
5.4.2.2 Instructions 
Assembly success in first explorative assembly could be annotated for 15 
participants. The majority of participants succeeded in assembling the original 
                                                        
109 As outlined in the section on analysis this measure of success is rated in relation to the 
possibility to assemble the original dollhouse for all participants who paid attention to 
clues such as boreholes and physical constraints. 
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dollhouse (80.00%, 12 cases). Two participants did not to use all object parts and 
one participant assembled a one-story house. 
Comparing the results in the silent condition to those in the corresponding think 
aloud condition, i.e. verbal and visual goal condition, no difference in assembly 
success could be observed (see Table 5.4). This finding was confirmed by a non 
significant likelihood ratio; L?2 (2, N = 32) = 2.14, p = .34. All instructors succeeded 
in instructing their partner to assemble the original dollhouse. 
condition no success house original 
dollhouse 
N 
think aloud (Verbal and visual goal) 1 4 12 17 
silent (1st explorative assembly) 2 1 12 15 
Table 5.4: Assembled objects rated by success distribution within the think aloud and the silent 
assembly condition (raw frequency). 
5.4.3 Spontaneous verbalization and experimenter’s 
engagement 
5.4.3.1 Spontaneous instances of verbalization 
Spontaneous instances of verbalization were rarely observed, i.e. six participants 
(54.55%) did not say anything at all during the assembly, three participants 
(27.27%) used hesitation markers, such as ‘uhm’ and ‘tja’, and two participants 
(18.18%) uttered the discourse particles ‘also’ (so) and ‘so’ once. 
5.4.3.2 Experimenter’s engagement 
In the majority of cases, the experimenter did not need to remind the participant 
to think aloud (32 cases, 64%) (see Figure 5.13 and Table 5.7 in the appendix). If 
participants needed to be reminded, it was once in twelve cases (24%), twice in 
three cases (6%), three times, four times, and five times once each (2% 
respectively). 
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Figure 5.13: Number of experimenter’s reminder (raw frequency). 
Differences could be observed between conditions (see Figure 5.14). Participants in 
the underspecified goal condition needed to be reminded more frequently (M = 1.06 
reminders, SD = 1.60) than participants in the verbal and visual goal condition 
(M = 0.29 reminders, SD = 0.47). Participants in the verbal goal condition were in 
between (M = 0.44, SD = 0.63). A more detailed look revealed that 58.82% of the 
participants in the underspecified goal condition did not need to be reminded (ten 
cases). However, participants who needed to be reminded three, four, and five 
times were also to be found in this condition (for more detail see Table 5.7 in the 
appendix). The greater range of experimenter’s reminders in the underspecified 
goal condition shows well in Figure 5.14. Participants in the verbal goal condition 
needed to be reminded once or twice in 37.5% of the cases (six participants) 
whereas participants in the verbal and visual goal condition needed to be reminded 
least often, i.e. once in 29.41% of the cases (five participants). 
 
Figure 5.14: Raw frequency of experimenter’s reminder by condition 
DISCUSSION 147 
 
 
In order to run a Chi-square test, the number of reminders was divided into three 
categories, i.e. none, once, twice or more (see Table 5.5). The observed differences 
between conditions reached statistical significance, L?2 (4, N = 50) = 9.27, p = .05. 
Participants in the underspecified goal condition were reminded significantly more 
frequently than participants in the other conditions. 
condition none once twice or more 
underspecified goal 10 2 5 
verbal goal 10 5 1 
verbal and visual goal 12 5 0 
Table 5.5: Frequency of experimenter’s reminders categorized in three groups. 
5.5 Discussion 
As pointed out in the general introduction (chapter 1), the aim of this thesis is two-
fold. The first interest lies in the analysis of the structure and linguistic 
representation of the problem solving activity verbalized during unaided object 
assembly. The second interest lies in studying the influence of prior information 
on assembly performance and the development of the mental representation of the 
goal structure. 
This chapter does not provide any insights on the processes involved in assembling 
the two-story dollhouse without help but it offers insights on the influence of prior 
information and communicative intention on assembly performance. First, the 
effect of those two independent variables on performance measures, i.e. assembly 
time and individual assembly success, will be discussed. By comparing the mean 
assembly time for assembly while thinking aloud to the mean assembly time in the 
silent condition significant differences were revealed. Participants in the verbal and 
visual goal condition needed 6.22 minutes which was almost 3 minutes faster than 
participants in the silent conditions. This result was unexpected as it suggests that 
verbalization facilitates assembly in the given task – a finding that has not been 
reported in the literature so far. It is important to note that prior studies 
investigating the effect of verbalization on task performance focused on mental 
problems, such as math or analogical reasoning, as opposed to problems involving 
physical manipulation such as the one investigated here. Thus, the facilitation 
effect might be specific to the task. This should be tested in further studies.  
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Surprisingly, no significant effect of verbalization could be observed on the 
dependent variable of assembly success. This finding suggests that verbalization 
facilitates understanding of structural relations between objects regarding their 
position within the goal structure. However, the same conclusions can be drawn 
without saying words out loud. Thus it seems that verbalization does not foster 
different conceptualizations and insights. 
The second independent variable that was investigated was prior information. 
Prior information showed the expected effect on performance time. Participants 
who were provided with least specific prior information (underspecified goal 
condition) needed significantly more time than participants who were provided 
with more specific information. Participants who were shown the picture were 
fastest in their assembly. This trend was mirrored in the average number of words 
in the think aloud protocols. One possible explanation for these results can be 
found in Dixon’s (1987b) observation that comprehension was fostered by a pre-
existing situational representation. As pointed out in the introductory section, 
performance time does not allow for any insights on the nature of the facilitation 
effect. However, supported by Dixon’s (1987b) findings it can be assumed that the 
specificity of the representation causes the observable effect. The findings suggest 
that if the structural representation is very detailed, i.e. the picture of the 
assembled dollhouse, newly encountered information can be integrated faster than 
when no such structure is available. In this case, the pre-existing specific in-
formation seems to foster the conceptualization of objects, thus revealing the 
structural relations and functions of individual parts faster.  
Prior information also showed an effect on individual assembly success. The results 
were surprising because they revealed that participants who were shown the 
picture were least successful comparing the success rates within each condition, 
i.e. condition specific success. Participants who were provided with general domain 
information were most successful in achieving the goal state as stated in the 
instruction. These findings are unexpected because, theoretically, participants in 
the verbal and visual goal condition could have used two strategies to be successful. 
They may have matched the encountered objects to the remembered picture or 
they may have used the physical and logical constraints as outlined in section 3. 
The findings suggest that participants who did not remember the picture did not 
notice the different physical clues and vice versa, thus they had little chance to be 
successful. The observed results suggest that participants in the verbal and visual 
goal condition were too restricted by the very detailed goal state that they could 
not apply the second strategy. 
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If the amount of original dollhouse that was built in each condition is compared, 
all participants have the same chances to succeed. Participants who saw the ready 
assembled dollhouse were significantly more successful than all other participants. 
They succeeded more often in assembling the original dollhouse than participants 
who did not see the picture. This finding suggests that an external representation 
provides better and more reliable clues about objects than the objects themselves. 
It further suggests that the physical features of the objects were not as salient 
and/or informative to participants as expected. If they were salient, more 
participants in the two conditions without an external model would have built the 
original dollhouse as well. This observation rejects the assumption that has been 
discussed in the previous paragraph because it highlights that the second strategy 
has not only been rarely used by participants in the verbal and visual goal 
condition but it has been seldom used by all participants. A closer investigation of 
the nature and function of these task specific constraints will follow in chapter 9.  
The frequency counts of the experimenter’s reminders revealed that participants 
needed to be reminded up to five times during their assembly. Those participants 
that needed to be reminded three, four, or five times were all tested in the 
underspecified goal condition. Participants who were given most information, i.e. 
verbal and visual goal condition, needed to be reminded only once if at all. Overall 
only 46% of the participants needed to be reminded and most of them only once. 
The finding that participants in the underspecified goal condition needed to be 
reminded significantly more often than participants in the other conditions was 
unexpected from the literature point of view because so far it has only been 
assumed that differences are caused by participants’ individual verbosity (e.g. Chi 
1997; van Someren et al. 1994). The reported results, however, support the 
expectation that participants who needed to create the assembly structure from 
scratch faced a more demanding task and thus forgot to think aloud more 
frequently than participants who were provided with a specific structural 
representation. 
Contrary to the expectations outlined prior to the analysis, no instances of spon-
taneous self-talk were observed in the silent assembly condition. However, the 
analysis revealed few cases of occasional verbalizations such as hesitations and 
discourse particles, namely ‘so’ and ‘also’ (so). These can be interpreted as 
externalizations of thought processes (e.g. Caron-Pargue & Caron 1991; Tenbrink 
2008; Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2010). However, as they are not rich in 
content by themselves and no more context information is verbalized, this finding 
does not contribute to any further analysis. This result seemed surprising at first 
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glance given different personal experiences. However, going back to Goffman’s 
(1981:81) observation that self-talk is socially taboo, participants would need to be 
very engaged in their task to speak freely. Furthermore, the experimental situation 
strengthens the social taboo because as Schoenfeld (1985) pointed out participants 
feel that it is inadequate to behave in the laboratory the same way as at home in 
private. Thus, the observed lack of self-talk may be an artifact caused by the ex-
perimental situation. 
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5.6 Appendix 
condition no success house original 
dollhouse 
N 
underspecified goal 1.4 0.7 -1.3 17 
verbal goal -1.1 0.7 -0.3 15 
verbal and visual goal -0.3 -1.4 1.6 17 
Table 5.6: Assembled objects rated by success distribution within conditions (standardized residuals). 
 
number of 
reminders 
underspecified goal 
condition 
verbal goal condition verbal and visual goal 
condition 
none 10 10 12 
one  2 5 5 
two 2 1 0 
tree 1 0 0 
four 1 0 0 
five 1 0 0 
sum 17 16 17 
Table 5.7: Raw frequency of experimenter’s reminder in different conditions. 

 6 Features of analysis:  
Problem solving processes in 
unaided object assembly 
6.1 State of the Art 
On the most general level, human problem solving is defined as a search through a 
problem space. The problem space consists of the present state, the goal state if it 
is known, and all possible intermediate cognitive states that were generated in 
previous problem solving activities or which are generated during the current 
problem solving activity. In order to modify existing states and generate new 
states, operators are used that are generally known to the problem solver or which 
are newly learned. This view summarizes the main assumptions proposed by 
Newell and Simon (1972) in their seminal work on human problem solving; a more 
detailed summary is provided in chapter 2. In experimental settings, the partici-
pant needs to construct a problem space by  
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“defining goals, rules, and other aspects of the situation – in some kind of 
space that represents the initial situation presented to him, the desired goal 
situation, various intermediate states, imagined or experiences, as well as 
any concepts he uses to describe these situations to himself.” (Newell & 
Simon 1972:59)  
The primary aim in this thesis is the identification and description of the exact 
problem solving processes, i.e. the construction of the problem representation and 
the activities there in, involved in object assembly. Most research in the area of 
problem solving has focused on mental problems in which the present state needs 
to be transformed into a well-defined goal state, e.g. in the Tower of Hanoi (for 
more information see chapter 2). However, Newell and Simon’s (1972) theory 
suggests that problem solving activities are to be found in other tasks as well, i.e. 
tasks that do not suggest problem solving at first glance. Palmer (1974), for 
example, identified the characteristics of problem solving when participants solved 
a mental synthesis task. In this task, participants are asked to identify which two 
structural elements need to be combined to form the presented figure. In the 
participants’ activities, Palmer (1977:466) observed explorative hypotheses, false 
leads, dead ends, backtracking, and fresh starts; processes that cover with the term 
problem solving.  
As will be outlined in detail in the following sections, first time assembly is another 
domain in which problem solving activities are likely to be observed. Those may be 
first time assemblies of what Richardson (2007) calls “self-assembly” of furniture as 
well as toys. In many cases, manuals facilitate the assembly. A survey conducted in 
the United Kingdom by the Office for National Statistics110 showed that  
“52% of the adults in the UK have assembled self-assembly furniture in the 
last 2 years. Of these, it was estimated that 3 million UK adults have 
damaged the item being assembled and 1.8 million received minor injury.” 
(Richardson 2007:305) 
These figures illustrate that self-assembly is part of many people’s everyday live 
and that success is not always guaranteed. The observation that the goal object was 
damaged suggests that self-assembly might result in problem solving activities 
possibly because of misleading, erroneous, or missing manuals. In order to test this 
hypothesis, the structure of the problem solving processes reported during 
unaided self-assembly will be studied and described in detail in this chapter. After 
providing an overview on research about mental processes involved in assembly 
                                                        
110 The results are based on 1295 face-to-face interviews in private households in Great 
Britain. The aim of the survey was “to identify any consumer issues that there may be with 
self-assembly furniture” (Richardson 2007:307). For more detail about the Omnibus Survey 
see Richardson (2007). 
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tasks (unaided as well as aided by manuals), research questions and expectations 
will be outlined. Then a detailed account of the procedure of analysis is provided. 
In the presentation of the results the focus will be on the overall structure of the 
assembly process in general and the description of the problem solving processes 
specifically. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the results against the 
backdrop of a general structure of mental processes involved in assembly that is 
proposed based on the literature on mental and physical processes involved in 
assembly. 
6.1.1 Introduction 
Every task consists of a certain pattern of actions taken with the aim to change the 
current state of the environment in order to achieve an intended state, such as 
brewing coffee in the morning as an everyday task. Zacks et al. (2001) studied 
participants’ perception of tasks involved in daily routines (making the bed and 
washing dishes) or less frequently performed ones (assembling a saxophone and 
fertilizing houseplants). In order to record participants’ perception of these tasks, 
they asked them to segment continuous videos of these actions into the smallest or 
largest meaningful units. Their analysis showed that these activities are perceived 
of as hierarchically ordered sequences of actions on objects. Furthermore, they 
found that descriptions about these individual sequences, also termed events111, 
“referred to accomplishments or achievements, activities that culminate in natural 
endings” (Zacks et al. 2001:41). Therefore, they conclude that “perception of 
unfolding events entails thinking about function, causes, goals, and ends” (Zacks et 
al. 2001:41). This was the same for familiar tasks as well as for less frequently 
performed ones.  
Prior to Zacks et al.’s study, Norman (2002)112 addressed the process of action 
planning and taking from another perspective. He evaluated the design and 
usability of everyday objects in order to study people’s routine performance with 
them. He specifically looked at technical devices that are used on a daily basis such 
as computers, VCRs, or film projectors. His focus was on their design and ways to 
improve it in order to make the usage of everyday devices easier and more 
intuitive. In his popular book “The design of everyday things” Norman proposed a 
model of action planning and taking consisting of seven steps (Norman 2002:48), 
namely  
                                                        
111 “An event is defined to be a segment of time at a given location that is perceived by an 
observer to have a beginning and an end” (Zacks, Tversky, & Iyer 2001:29). 
112 Norman (2002) is a reprint of his book first published in 1988. 
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a) forming a goal,  
b) forming an intention,  
c) specifying the action,  
d) executing the action,  
e) perceiving the state of the world,  
f) interpreting this state with regard to the intended goal, 
g) evaluating the outcome.  
Norman (2002) stresses that these steps do not resemble discrete entities but may 
overlap and are repeated several times until the final goal is achieved. Thus, he 
calls it the ‘action cycle’. The final goal may be an internal representation of an 
action (e.g. brewing a coffee) or an object (e.g. a chair). In order to achieve the 
intended goal, the current state of the world needs to be modified by taking 
specific actions. These actions have to be ordered in an action plan, which is then 
carried out successively or simultaneously. Planning is a mental process whereas 
the execution involves interaction between the subject and the physical object or 
environment. If the intended result is not achieved by the actions taken, the action 
plan needs to be modified and carried out again. Norman (2002) proposes that this 
revision and action taking is repeated until the goal representation matches the 
state of the external world. Although Norman (2002) took another approach and 
long before Zacks et al. (2001), his model suggests that function, causes, goals, and 
ends are not only important information in the perception of events but they are 
also driving forces in planning and performing events. If people are confronted 
with tasks for which they do not have a learned action plan ready, the formulation 
of goals becomes central and functions need to be conceptualized and defined 
along with the objects that are needed. Thereby the creation of an action plan 
turns into a problem solving activity.  
A thorough and detailed review of the literature on traditional as well as recent 
theories on problem solving, mainly focusing on logic-based problems, is provided 
in the chapter 2. As the aim of this thesis is the identification and description of 
problem solving activities in an everyday task, the following introduction will focus 
specifically on theories and empirical findings in this area. Returning to Palmer’s 
(1977:466) characterization of problem solving involving exploratory hypotheses, 
false leads, dead ends, backtracking, and fresh starts, it is suggested that Norman’s 
model can be used as a reference for classifying the steps taken in solving problems 
posed by a construction task. The following comparisons are proposed: the goal 
might be an explorative hypothesis as well as a mental representation of an object 
or action. The actions taken can be false leads resulting in dead ends, which can be 
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overcome by reorganizing the actions taken or creating a different plan of actions 
(fresh start).  
This structure can be further elaborated by Ganier et al.’s (2000, cited in Ganier 
2004:16-18) findings on cognitive activities involved in processing procedural 
instructions. They identified the following five basic cognitive activities:  
1) setting a goal representation and holding it in working memory,  
2) integrating information provided by the document, the equipment, and 
     the user’s prior information,  
3) planning and executing actions,  
4) monitoring and regulating activity, and  
5) integrating novel information into long-term memory.  
Even though their research focused on aided assembly, their model is very similar 
to the general steps proposed by Norman (2002). Furthermore, it highlights two 
important information resources, namely the activation and integration of prior 
knowledge as an aid, and the integration of new information in long-term 
memory. Those two components are interrelated in the sense that new in-
formation is always integrated into already existing informational networks. This is 
specifically important in construction tasks because “in assembly tasks, the object 
changes shape as it is constructed through execution of a specific sequence of 
steps” (Novick & Morse 2000:1243). In assembly tasks, prior knowledge about 
similar assembly tasks or general construction features as well as first associations 
serve as references and basis for creating a mental representation of an assembly. 
In aided construction tasks, manuals provide mental representations. If the re-
ported findings are combined, the following general structure of problem solving 
in assembly emerges:  
a) a goal is formulated, the problem solver has the intention to achieve the 
goal, and the goal is held active in working memory until the task is 
fulfilled,  
b) the intention is reformulated into an action sequence – this action 
sequence is derived from the mental model that is created as a situational 
representation by integrating information presented in the manual, the 
equipment at hand, and prior knowledge,  
c) the action is executed, 
d) the changed state is perceived and interpreted with regard to the goal state, 
e) the outcome of the interpretation process is evaluated, 
f) newly acquired information is integrated into long-term memory. 
Those processes may arise in a sequential order but they may also interact and new 
structures emerge when components are skipped or repeated consecutively. This 
158 FEATURES OF ANALYSIS: PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESSES IN UNAIDED OBJEKT ASSEMBLY 
 
general structure will be further elaborated by integrating findings obtained in 
experiments on object assembly with the aim of presenting a general model that is 
used as a reference point in the analysis and which can be supported or falsified by 
the results obtained. 
6.1.2 Object assembly 
6.1.2.1 Research on object usage and assembly 
Helander and Willén (2003) were among the first researchers to look at assembly 
tasks from the assemblers’ point of view by considering their mental work during 
assembly. In their paper, they identified three human factor principles involved in 
assembly that are based on the human information processing system, namely 
perception, decision making, and manipulation (Helander & Willén 2003:26-27). In 
product design, it is assumed that manipulation consists of the following elemental 
tasks: reach, grasp, move, position part, and insert. Positioning the part involves 
the tasks of alignment, orientation, and engaging the object into another object or 
a structure of objects (Helander & Willén 2003:26). This brief technical description 
of actions involved in an assembly task illustrates the great complexity inherent in 
such tasks even if the structure is known. This complexity stresses the importance 
of an accurate mental representation of the goal structure and the position of the 
individual parts (Helander & Willén 2003:26-29). The creation of an appropriate 
mental representation can be facilitated by well-designed assembly instructions, 
i.e. manuals.  
Thus, the design of manuals has become a widely researched field in recent years. 
The balanced distribution of pictures and diagrams as visual aid (e.g. Glenberg & 
Langston 1992; Marcus et al. 1996; Norvick & Morse 2000; Heiser et al. 2004) as 
well as the design of diagrams (Heiser et al. 2003; Tversky et al. 2007) are among 
the most widely investigated topics. Based on previous findings by Tversky and 
colleagues (e.g. Zacks et al. 2001), Heiser et al. (2003) assume that people conceive 
assembly tasks as hierarchically organized sequences of actions in which “objects 
or significant object parts separate steps at the higher level and differentiated 
actions on the same object at the finer level” (Heiser et al. 2003:546). This assump-
tion is supported by their subsequent studies on user’s instructions on assembly 
tasks. Therefore, Tversky et al. propose that “the mental model of assembly is a 
hierarchical set of actions and subactions on objects or object parts” (Tversky et al. 
2009:126). This observation is an empirical affirmation of Klix’s (1976) proposal on 
the nature of cognitive processes. In his work, he states that action sequences 
consist of sub-actions that vary in duration and complexity depending on the over-
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all complexity of the action sequence. Klix (1976:28) also postulates that although 
sub-actions may have a different nature, they are arranged in a hierarchical struc-
ture.  
Additionally, Prabhu et al. (1995) identified hierarchical structures not at the task 
level but at the level of object structure. They distinguish between hierarchical and 
vertical product structures: 
“Vertical product structures may be build sequentially, with the placement 
of a new piece on the most recently placed piece. Hierarchical products 
require the construction of several subassemblies. The final product is 
assembled from the subassemblies.” (Prabhu et al. 1995:150) 
Prabhu et al. (1995) propose that the perceived structure guides the assembler’s 
strategy in that “visual perception provides assembly heuristics” (Prabhu et al. 
1995:150). Nevertheless, the aid provided by perceptual information is limited 
because the perceived heuristics do not need to be correct and may result in 
unsuccessful assembly. Although Prabhu et al. (1995) do not specify the strategies 
any further, the following descriptions for assembly strategies emerge. In vertical 
assembly the construction of the structure is perceived as a single unit that can be 
built in a bottom-up manner. In hierarchical assembly several subassemblies need 
to be performed before those are merged to build the final product. The fun-
damental difference according to Prabhu et al. (1995) is to be found in the in-
formation processing involved in perceiving these structures. In remembering 
hierarchical products, all subassemblies need to be maintained in working memo-
ry. This demand on memory capacity is important in the assembly process because 
assembly that is not aided by a manual involves “semiskilled work requiring man-
ual ability, mechanical ability, and visual memory capacity” (Prabhu et al. 1995:151).  
Further interests can be identified in the overall structure of manuals (e.g. Ganier 
2004; Richardson et al. 2004) or the influence of users’ aims on the structure and 
lexical choice in instructions (Maes 1999; Maes et al. 2004). Moreover the evalua-
tion of assembly complexity has started to influence manual design recently 
because “it is the structure of the object to be assembled that ultimately impacts 
on assembly complexity” (Richardson 2011:190). To conclude, it can be noted that 
scanning the literature in search of reports about mental processes involved in 
assembly tasks, a substantial body of research on the design of manuals was 
revealed. However, surprisingly those studies only rarely mention or consider the 
assembler’s mental processes involved in the task. 
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6.1.2.2 Experimental studies on object assembly 
In this section, literature that addresses actual assembly performance will be 
reviewed. Although there is much research on manual design there is hardly any 
research on the actual assembly performed by people. Therefore, mental processes 
involved in assembly performance have not been studied systematically so far.  
First attempts to bridge this gap are reported by Richardson and colleagues. In 
their paper, they present theoretical observations on object assembly before testing 
which task variables influence theoretical as well as actual object assembly. Based 
on the literature, Richardson et al. (2004) identified two phases in construction 
tasks. First, instructions need to be understood and a mental representation of the 
assembly is built. Second, the mental representation is used to facilitate the actual 
assembly process. Richardson et al. (2004) analyzed 40 instructions that came with 
self-assembly products113. In their analysis they identified four fundamental as-
sembly operations, i.e. selection of components required for the next assembly 
procedure, rotation of the object to allow correct positioning, positioning to allow 
fastening, and fastening (Richardson et al. 2004:949). Those are also identified by 
Helander and Willén (2003), which support the contention that those components 
are central to assembly performance.  
In a second step, Richardson and Jones (2005) ran an empirical study on manual 
aided assembly of eight different pieces of ready-to-assemble furniture 
(Richardson & Jones 2005:181). They were interested in different task determinants 
that influence thinking time (i.e. time spent on studying the manual and perform-
ing the first three fundamental assembly operations). Their results revealed that 
qualitative information, such as variety and asymmetry of components, had a 
significant effect on “assembly complexity and impacts on cognitive load” 
(Richardson & Jones 2005:183). Their study highlighted three additional indicators 
of assembly complexity, i.e. fastenings, fastening points, and selection. Richardson 
and Jones (2005) argue that the selection of object parts influences cognitive load 
because a great amount of different objects indicates numerous novel assembly 
steps. Each new assembly step requires the assembler to conceptualize the object 
and create a mental representation of the sub-assembly. If the same assembly steps 
need to be repeated, cognitive load decreases.  
Besides observing people solve assembly tasks in experimental settings, Richardson 
was interested in people’s actual experience with self-assembly furniture including 
                                                        
113 Richardson (2007:307) explicitly defines self-assembly furniture to be “furniture that are 
sold ‘ready to assemble’. [More specifically,] the purchaser must follow supplied 
instructions and assemble the item before it can be used”. 
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problems as well as satisfying moments. Since there was no statistical data to 
answer this question, he conducted a survey in private households in Great Britain 
(Richardson 2007). From the numerous very interesting results only a selection will 
be presented here. The data showed that 52% of the British people (aged 16 and 
older) assembled some kind of furniture in the last two years. About half (i.e. 
49.3%)114 of those reported that they experienced the completion of the assembly to 
be satisfying. Mistakes (38.6%) and pleasure (34.8%) were common phenomena 
during the assembly (Richardson 2007:309). This part of Richardson’s (2007) 
survey highlighted that self-assembly involves numerous obstacles as well as joyful 
moments; results that suggest that people are highly engaged in the assembly 
process. Additionally, Richardson’s study also provided evidence that object as-
sembly may easily result in problem solving activities. His survey revealed that 
13.2% of the interviewees damaged the object they assembled and almost half of all 
interviewees (41.0%) admitted that they got angry with the assembly (Richardson 
2007:309). Interestingly, 5.9% of the interviewees reported that they found the 
assembly too difficult to complete (Richardson 2007:309). 
Tversky et al. (2009) were interested in the overall structure of assembly instruc-
tions given by participants after they had assembled the object for themselves. The 
object in question was a TV cart consisting of five parts (Tversky et al. 2009:122). 
Their analysis revealed a general narrative structure consisting of a beginning, 
middle, and end. In the middle part, the assembly procedure was described 
resembling a hierarchical structure of actions and subtasks (Tversky et al. 
2009:125). This finding was the same for all three communicative modes that they 
investigated, namely gestures, words, and diagrams. All instructions followed the 
same narrative structure consisting of a beginning, middle, and end. In the begin-
ning, some form of introduction to the task or to the object parts was provided. 
The middle parts consisted of step-by-step descriptions of procedures. The tran-
sitions between sub-tasks were either marked by words (e.g. first, next, after that, 
now) or gestures. In the end, all subjects indicated that the task was accomplished 
either by using deictic gestures or words to point at the assembled object or by 
circling the final diagram. Tversky et al. (2009) conclude that beginnings, middles, 
and accomplishments (also called events) are “perceived and conceived to be a 
hierarchical set of actions on objects accomplishing goals and subgoals” (Tversky 
et al. 2009:126). 
In a recent publication, Daniel and Tversky (2012) were interested in the relevance 
of the different events. In order to test which information was considered crucial 
                                                        
114 Interviewees were allowed more than one answer. 
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for the assembly, Daniel and Tversky compared instructions produced without 
time constraints to instructions produced under the constraint of brevity. In a 
qualitative content based analysis Daniel and Tversky (2012:305) identified mini-
mal units of information. They classified those units according to six categories, 
namely general comments, temporal comments, action, extrinsic action, intrinsic 
action, and description. Since the authors were specifically interested in spatial 
information, the three categories containing information on action were 
distinguished based on their spatial content. Some information units contained 
action verbs without information on spatial orientation of objects. According to 
Daniel and Tversky (2012:307), this information about ‘what-to-do’ represented 
higher-level action statements. Extrinsic actions contained action verbs and in-
formation on the spatial reference system of the body or the world. Intrinsic 
actions, in contrast, contained information in which the object was used as a 
spatial reference system. Both action categories that contained information on the 
spatial reference system were considered to encode sub-goal information (Daniel & 
Tversky 2012:307). Any information about physical properties of the object was 
classified as descriptions. 
In addition to this new classification of ‘minimal units of information’, Daniel and 
Tversky (2012) identified the same narrative structure of beginning, middle, and 
end as reported in Tversky et al. (2009). Instructors choose different ways of start-
ing an instruction. They either started the assembly right away or they provided a 
list of the objects and tools that are needed for the assembly or they provided a 
general introduction to the task by explaining the global shape. Daniel and Tversky 
(2012:306) report an effect of the constraint of brevity on the starting section of the 
instructions. If participants were unconstrained in their time, they used all three 
strategies to the same degree. However, participants who were told to be brief 
started the assembly right away in the majority of cases. They also report an in-
fluence of brevity on the information level (higher-level vs. sub-goal action 
information). If participants were told to be brief, they used significantly fewer 
units that included sub-goal action whereas the amount of higher-level action 
information remained the same (Daniel & Tversky 2012:307). 
Whereas Daniel and Tversky (2012) studied the structure of assembly instructions 
that were created for an imagined generic addressee, Rieser (1996) collected as-
sembly instructions in an interactive experimental setting. More specifically, he 
was interested in the use of functional terminology for a physically present object 
in assembly dialogues. He was interested in the way in which instructors created 
and assigned meaning to objects. The data suggested that meaning was created by 
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an ad-hoc concept of the object at hand. In the instructions, participants referred 
to features that are typically assigned to a well-known structure for the description 
and identification of physically present objects. Rieser (1996) called this concept 
representational metonymy. The analysis revealed different representational com-
municative functions of what Rieser called representational metonymy, such as 
identification of object parts and their correct orientation (Rieser 1996:13)115.  
Analyzing the general structure of the assembly dialogues, Rieser (1996) observed 
that instructors used two strategies for starting the dialogue. Instructors either 
used the ‘global strategy’ in which they mentioned the goal structure, i.e. airplane. 
Whereas other instructors chose not to mention the goal structure in the begin-
ning but rather assembled the object in different sub-assemblies (‘local strategy’). 
These sub-assemblies followed the structure ‘identify parts, use parts, cover all 
holes, pay attention to the symmetry of the emerging structure’ (Rieser 1996:11). 
Rieser (1996) reported an influence of introductory strategy on the frequency of 
representational metonymy in the instruction. The results revealed that instructors 
who chose the ‘local structure’ used representational metonymy less frequently 
than instructors who chose the ‘global strategy’.  
So far, literature from two domains has been reviewed, namely problem solving 
and object assembly. In a next step the relations between the reported findings are 
highlighted to propose a theory based structural representation of problem solving 
process in assembly tasks. This theoretical structure will be used as a reference 
point throughout the analysis in this chapter. First, the reported findings are 
summarized in Table 6.1.  
 
problem solving 
process 
reference in the 
literature 
processes identified in 
assembly 
reference in the 
literature 
selection of goal  Newell and Simon 
(1972) 
information on the task and/ 
or the goal structure 
Daniel & Tversky 
(2012); Rieser 
(1996) 
selection of 
method 
Newell and Simon 
(1972) 
activation and integration of 
prior knowledge, 
information provided by a 
manual, and information 
available in the environment 
Ganier (2004) 
execution of 
action 
Miller et al. (1970), 
Newell & Simon 
(1972) 
Execution of extrinsic, 
intrinsic, and higher level 
actions 
Daniel & Tversky 
(2012) 
                                                        
115 For a description of the concept of representational metonymy see chapter 8. 
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4 basic assembly operations: 
select, orientate, position, 
and fasten components 
Richardson et al. 
(2004) 
 manipulation: reach, grasp, 
move, position part, insert 
part 
Helander & 
Willén (2003) 
evaluation of 
results 
Miller et al. (1970), 
Newell & Simon 
(1972) 
closing an instruction, e.g. by 
exemplifying the usability of 
the assembled structure 
Daniel & Tversky 
(2012) 
integration of novel 
information into long-term 
memory 
Ganier (2004) 
exploratory 
hypotheses, false 
lead, dead end, 
backtracking, 
fresh start 
Palmer (1977)   
  perception, decision making, 
and manipulation 
Helander & 
Willén (2003) 
Table 6.1: Summary of problem solving processes and assembly processes described in the literature. 
Second, these findings are combined and integrated into Norman’s (2002) action 
cycle to propose the following general structure of mental processes in assembly. 
The stages are at a general level comprising individual problem solving processes. 
In the final discussion, the adequacy of the proposed structure will be evaluated. 
a) Goal representation: Goals can be formulated with regard to different 
reference points, i.e. either with regard to the overall task where the overall 
structure is already given, e.g. “Use all given objects and assemble a 
cupboard.” Goals can also be formulated with regard to sub-assemblies, e.g. 
“Attach the doors onto the cupboard.” The first example defines the goal on 
a conceptual level (goal concept cupboard) whereas the second example 
defines the goal at the action level (fasten doors on cupboard). Thus, two 
levels of goal information are identified: reference point and nature.  
b) Intention to achieve the goal: Goals are either motivated intrinsically, i.e. 
the motivation to act resides in the problem solver, or extrinsically, i.e. a 
goal is presented by a third party. 
c) Reformulation of the intention into an action sequence: (Explorative) 
hypotheses are formulated about the necessary actions. These hypotheses 
are based on the integration of prior knowledge, information provided in 
the manual and associations activated by the equipment at hand. In order 
to perform the actions, the objects that are needed have to be identified. 
The selection might be based on the mental representation of the object, 
by some external object representation such as a picture or a manual, or by 
general knowledge about assembly, e.g. screws are needed if there are 
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boreholes. Temporal comments may indicate the hierarchical structure of 
the intended actions. 
d) Execution of pre-planned actions: Planned actions are selected to complete 
the four basic operations in assembly procedures, i.e. select, orient, 
position, and fasten components. The execution may result in a sequence 
of sub-assemblies (vertical assembly) or as a bottom-up assembly 
(hierarchical assembly). If an operation does not work as planned, fresh 
starts (e.g. removing the object that has just been placed) might be 
necessary. 
e) Recognition and interpretation of changed state with regard to the goal 
state: The interpretation might be positive leading to new plans of action or 
it might be negative (false lead). 
f) Evaluation of outcome of the interpretation process: if the interpretation is 
positive and the final goal is not yet achieved, this outcome leads to the 
formulation of new plans of action. If the interpretation is negative, there 
are two possible outcomes, i.e. either the assembler has an idea as how to 
proceed and a revised action plan is formulated or the assembler does not 
know how to proceed then a dead end state is reached. Ideally, this dead 
end can be overcome by a fresh start. 
g) Integration of newly acquired information into long-term memory except for 
procedures that are performed only once, such as furniture assembly 
(Ganier 2004:17). 
In the following section, the questions guiding the investigation of verbalized 
mental processes will be stated and expectations will be outlined. All expectations 
build on the proposed general structure of mental processes in object assembly.  
6.2 Research Questions and expectations 
Based on the reviewed literature on assembly task performance and the literature 
on traditional and recent theories on problem solving, three basic research 
questions arise. Each of them is discussed in more detail regarding expectations in 
the following paragraphs. 
? Research question 1: Which assembly strategy is preferred by assemblers 
working by themselves and which one is preferred when instructing 
someone else? 
? Research question 2: Which general structure can be identified in think 
aloud protocols? How do assemblers start their task and how do they 
indicate the end? Is there a difference regarding starting and concluding 
phrases between participants who think aloud and instructors? 
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? Research question 3: Do think aloud protocols of unaided object assembly 
contain verbalizations of problem solving processes? If they do which 
ones are expressed? Are there other processes that are not described in 
the literature so far? 
? Research question 4: Is there a specific recurring pattern of problem 
solving processes? 
Research question 1 addresses the preference for assembly strategies. Prabhu et al. 
(1995) differentiate between hierarchical and vertical assembly proposing that the 
first strategy involves different sub-assemblies. If the selection of the strategy is 
based on perception, hierarchical assembly involves a higher cognitive demand 
because the sub-assemblies need to be remembered during the assembly. In the 
investigated experiment, the goal object is a two-story dollhouse in which the first 
story is identical to the second story. If participants recognize this parallel 
structure, they may choose a hierarchical assembly approach. Based on the as-
sumption that is proposed in the literature stating that action plans are hierarchic-
ally structured, the vertical assembly strategy, i.e. bottom-up, is also likely to be 
frequently observed.  
It can be assumed that prior information has an effect on the selection of the 
assembly strategy. Participants who saw the picture of the dollhouse might observe 
the parallel structure and thus, identify a hierarchical product structure, as 
described by Prabhu et al. (1995). Therefore, they are expected to assemble the 
dollhouse in a hierarchical fashion more frequently than participants who did not 
see the picture. It is further assumed that communicative intention will have an 
effect on selected assembly strategy. Based on the proposal that thinking about 
actions is hierarchically structured (Zacks & Tversky 2001), instructors are assumed 
to use the vertical assembly strategy more often than the hierarchical one to help 
their partners. 
Research question 2 contains a number of sub-questions. The primary interest is in 
the general structure of problem solving in think aloud protocols. It is expected 
that participants will explicitly mark their starting point and indicate when they 
are finished with their task. Furthermore, preliminary analyses (Tenbrink & Gralla 
2009) showed that the main activity of problem solving happened in the middle 
part of the protocols, i.e. between the introductory statement and the concluding 
phrases. Thus, the broader structure of beginning, middle, and end was called 
global structure and the specific structure of the assembly process verbalized in the 
middle was referred to as local structure. Based on this observation, the way in 
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which assemblers start their task and how they indicate the end will be analyzed. 
Generally, it is expected that the formulation of the goal and the motivation to 
achieve it will be verbalized at the beginning of the assembly. These processes 
correspond to the steps a) and b) in the proposed general structure of mental 
processes in assembly. Given the experimental set-up, participants are expected to 
recite the task instructions when entering the room and starting the assembly 
because participants were presented with the task instructions in front of the 
conference room116. Since the instructions were presented orally and only once, it is 
assumed that participants recite the task instructions for themselves as a reminder 
of what to do. Additionally, it is expected that participants will refer to the task 
instructions in the end as well because they are explicitly told to tell the 
experimenter when they are done. Based on Richardson’s (2007) findings, partici-
pants may also express enjoyment about the task in the closing sequence. The 
closing sequence of the task marks the final step of the assembly task. Therefore, 
the closing remark is likely to represent the state in which the current product is 
evaluated against the intended goal structure, i.e. step f) in the general structure of 
mental processes in assembly (see page 165). This evaluation may be verbalized in 
comments on the final product or the assembler’s own performance. 
Besides studying the initial and final comments of an assembler, the influence of 
communicative intention on the global structure was investigated. Based on the 
literature, instructors were expected to choose one of the following three options 
to start their instructions; provide a list of parts, offer a structural model of how 
the parts fit together, or give general advice on the task (Daniel & Tversky 
2012:126). Similarly to Daniel and Tversky’s (2012) second option, Rieser (1996:11) 
describes one strategy, referred to as ‘global structure’, in which the goal structure 
was introduced and used as a reference point in the following assembly117. Ad-
ditionally, Rieser (1996) reports the so-called ‘local structure’ in which instructors 
did not provide any information about the goal structure but worked by sub-
assemblies without an explicit introduction of the assembly goal. Concerning the 
endings of instructions, Daniel and Tversky (2012:126) observed that instructors 
either simply stated that the task was accomplished or they made suggestions 
about how the assembled object could be used. Other instructors closed by 
encouraging the assembler to be proud of their achievements. Similar findings 
were expected in the current study. 
                                                        
116 For more detail on the procedure see chapter 5. 
117 This reference is linguistically expressed by use of functional terminology related to the 
conceptualized goal structure (e.g. airplane in Rieser’s (1996) experimental design). 
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Research question 3 follows from the distinction between global and local 
structure. As the main focus of this thesis is on the representation of problem 
solving processes in unaided object assembly, this research question aims at 
identifying those processes that are specified in the middle section of the think 
aloud protocols. Besides identifying those problem solving processes that are 
described in the literature on problem solving, the interest is in describing and 
identifying processes that are expressed in the protocols but have not been 
identified and described in the literature so far. Think aloud protocols are expected 
to contain problem solving processes for two reasons. First, as outlined in detail in 
the theoretical section of this chapter, Richardson’s (2007) omnibus survey 
suggests that the assembly of furniture can be very demanding and result in trial 
and error behavior. Second, assembly is often based on the guidance by assembly 
instructions but the experimental set-up explicitly poses the task of assembly 
without external help. Thus, participants need to construct a representation of the 
goal structure and integrate all given parts by themselves during the assembly. 
Furthermore, they need to update their mental representation continuously during 
the assembly. These steps are representative for a problem solving sequence.  
The second part of research question 3 focuses on the description of the individual 
processes that are identified in the think aloud data. First, this analysis aims at 
identifying known processes, such as hypotheses, false lead, dead end, 
backtracking, and fresh start (Palmer 1977). The literature review on traditional 
and recent theories on problem solving, presented in chapter 2 of this thesis, 
showed that search and test processes are the driving force of problem solving. 
Thus, it is expected that representations of those processes can be identified. 
Regarding the specific task of assembly, Prabhu et al. (1995) characterize it “as 
semiskilled work requiring manual ability, mechanical ability, and visual memory 
capacity” (Prabhu et al. 1995:151). The mechanical ability is specified by Richardson 
et al.’s (2004) four basic assembly operations. Visual memory capacity is addressed 
in Daniel and Tversky’s (2012) observation that instructors provide descriptions of 
objects. It is expected that object features will be described frequently in think 
aloud protocols.  
Second, the detailed analysis of processes aims at identifying and describing those 
processes that are not reported in traditional literature on problem solving yet but 
that highlight mental processes involved in solving the assembly task. These 
additional processes may either be specific to the discourse genre of think aloud 
protocols or to the task of assembly which has a different structure than logic 
centered tasks such as chess. Given the specific genre of think aloud protocols, it is 
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expected that they include information on participants’ associations with regard to 
the task as well as the objects. These associations do not need to be related to the 
task directly but may refer to general associations, e.g. with a dollhouse. Van 
Someren et al. (1994:122) refer to these comments as ‘talking about not-task related 
issues’; a classification that does not seem to be reasonable because associations 
are activated by the task performance which makes them associated to the task. 
Therefore, these processes are interpreted as processes activated by the problem 
solving activity in this thesis. Think aloud protocols may also contain meta-
information about the task, e.g. about the design, the time it takes etc. as well as 
comments on oneself (e.g. ‘I am not comfortable’ in van Someren et al. 1994:122). 
Research question 4 builds on the findings of research question 3. It investigates if 
specific and recurring patterns of problem solving processes can be identified 
across the majority of protocols. In traditional accounts of problem solving, such as 
the TOTE unit represented by Miller at al. (1970), it is assumed that problem 
solving processes are structured in cycles of hypotheses → execution → evaluating 
→ new hypotheses etc. Preliminary analyses of eleven protocols by Tenbrink and 
Gralla (2009) revealed a comparable structure (see Figure 6.1). The circle between 
hypothesis → action → evaluation → positive → hypothesis represents the most 
frequently observed cycle. The other circles were less frequently observed. 
Instances of dead ends and fresh starts were only rarely identified. 
 
Figure 6.1: Process model derived from eleven think aloud protocols (Tenbrink & Gralla 2009:9). 
6.3 Data Analysis 
As outlined in the description of the different research questions the analysis 
focuses on two levels of description, i.e. qualitative and quantitative descriptions.  
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First, the different processes that are verbalized in the recorded think aloud 
protocols are identified in a qualitative content-based analysis.  
Second, the identified processes are categorized according to categories 
described in the literature and new categories. These new categories will be 
described in detail.  
Third, patterns of these processes are highlighted and investigated in a 
quantitative frequency analysis.  
After this general overview a more detailed description of the respective 
procedures is provided. 
6.3.1 Qualitative analysis 
Based on a content analysis, it was identified and described what was verbalized in 
the think aloud protocols. The final coding scheme that comprised a number of 
general processes was evolved in a number of steps that will be outlined in the 
following paragraphs. 
6.3.1.1 Coding scheme for processes 
Since this analysis focuses on the content and sequential order of problem solving 
processes, it was important to be very precise in their description. In a first step the 
content of each process unit was summarized in few words for five protocols in a 
first run (see Figure 6.2 for an example). The sequences were annotated according 
to the temporal markings provided by the participant’s silences. During this 
analysis, a first impression was gained of the topics that were addressed by 
participants (e.g. object features), of their mental activities (e.g. memory of 
picture, expected vs. encountered objects), and actions (e.g. sort and place 
objects). Van Someren et al. (1994:39) also suggest using pilot protocols to gain an 
impression of the vocabulary and phrasing that is used by participants. 
In a second step, the categories that are described in the literature (hypothesis, 
plan for action, action, evaluation, dead end, false lead, and fresh start) were 
annotated. If there were cases that could not be classified according to those 
categories, those were grouped based on their content. From these groupings, new 
categories emerged based on their function that was linguistically expressed or 
arose from the immediate context. This second step in the analysis resulted in a 
more general coding scheme that was iteratively expanded with the protocols to 
come (see Figure 6.3 on p. 172 for an impression). After approximately 20 protocols 
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the final coding categories were identified118 and a more abstract coding scheme 
was derived (see Figure 6.4 on p.175). 
 
Figure 6.2: Example of an explorative content analysis of one protocol [10]119 containing information on 
the event structure (‘Ablauf’), temporal sequence (‘Zeit’), transcribed verbalization (‘Verbalisierung’), 
and comments (‘Kommentar’). 
                                                        
118 The final list of process categories will be described in detail in 6.4.3. Therefore, no more 
detail is provided here. 
119 The numbers in square brackets always refer to the protocol ID from which the example 
was extracted. 
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Figure 6.3: Screenshot of a more general analysis of one protocol [24] containing information on the 
event structure (first column), temporal sequence (second column), transcribed verbalization (third 
column), and comments (fourth column). 
One important step in the analysis is the segmentation of the protocols. The initial 
analysis showed that segmentation based on naturally occurring pauses120 was not 
convenient because one verbalization might contain more than one thought. The 
analysis in most studies in discourse analysis is based on minimal units of meaning 
referred to as discourse units or figure (e.g. Martin & Rose 2003). Although the 
terminology varies, the content is defined similarly; it contains the process, i.e. the 
action, the participants, and possible circumstances. One information unit can be 
extended by linking it to subsequent information units by means of clause 
expansion as in example (1). In this example, the expansion is introduced by ‘but’ 
hence it is called adversative extension (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004:405). 
                                                        
120 If participants did not think aloud for 30 seconds, the experimenter reminded them to 
keep talking.  
DATA ANALYSIS 173 
 
 
(1) He pointed his arrow || but saw nothing. (Halliday & Matthiessen 
2004:364)121 
For the analysis, the think aloud protocols were segmented into discourse units 
first. These basic units were extended in some cases as in example (2) in which a 
conclusion is drawn as marked by ‘hence’. 
(2) „okay so sieht das schon aus || als würde die hier oben sein || deswegen 
wird das wohl hinten oben unterm Dach sein“ (“okay this already looks || 
as if this is up here || hence this will be above in the back underneath the 
roof”) [8] 
Sometimes more than one discourse unit (including expansions) encoded one 
process. Example (3) illustrates this case. In this example, three discourse units 
encode one hypothesis, i.e. that of not knowing what is up and what is down. 
Newell and Simon (1972) introduce so-called ‘problem-solving episodes’. These are 
categories that combine individual problem solving steps to describe them on a 
general level, such as ‘solving the equation’ (Ericsson & Simon 1993:272). Van 
Someren et al. (1994:20) define ‘episodes’ as a category that combines sequences of 
elements to represent a single element in the model. Although this definition of 
‘episode’ seems adequate to represent the combination of discourse unit into one 
processes, such as hypothesis, it is too close to the term proposed by Newell and 
Simon (1972) to account for the current level of description. Since the analysis in 
this thesis focused on a more fine-grained level of individual processes than Newell 
and Simon (1972), the term process unit is introduced. In cases in which one 
process contained more than one discourse unit one process unit was defined, such 
as in example (4) that encodes one aside.  
(3) „was ist unten || was ist oben || weiß ich noch nicht“ (“what is up || what is 
down || I do not know”) [11] 
(4) „hm das ist schön zu spielen || und bezahlt zu werden || (pause) || das 
würde meinem Sohn auch gefallen damit zu spielen“ (“hm this is nice to 
play || and be paid for it || (pause) my son would also like to play with 
this”) [11] 
All protocols were annotated a second time based on this coding scheme. The 
quantitative analysis was based on this final coding scheme. In this final scheme, 
the global structure of beginning, middle, and end could be annotated as well as 
the fine-grained structure of the individual problem solving processes that were 
verbalized in the middle part of the protocols.  
                                                        
121 The symbol || indicates the ending of one discourse unit. This notation will be adapted 
in the following examples. 
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The coding scheme contained the following categories: beginning, middle, pause, 
end, aside, meta-level comment, and comment on self. The beginning was defined 
as the introductory sequence of the protocol. The end was defined as the closing 
sequence of the protocol analogous to the beginning. The remaining units were 
defined as the middle part. The units in the middle part were annotated by the 
following nine process types that are defined as in the coding guideline for the 
coder:  
a) action: verbs of doing, sometimes verbs are omitted, e.g. „und das dann so 
rum“ (“and then this this way”) [20], 
b) comment on object parts: comment on shape, color, or salient 
characteristics, such as „aha sind das hier so runde Dinger“ (“oh these are 
such round things here”) [22], or comments on object structures „das ist 
jetzt schon irgendwie komisch“ (“now this is weird here somehow”) [22], 
c) dead end: state of frustration or helplessness, i.e. having no further ideas, 
d) description of mental state: comments on the current mental state, such as 
„das weiß ich nicht“ (“I don’t know that”) [36], or rhetoric questions 
addressed to oneself, such as „wieso ist denn da nur eins unten?“ (“why is 
only one down there”) [20], 
e) false lead: this is a negative evaluation of a previous action or hypothesis, 
f) fresh start: objects are disassembled and newly re-assembled, 
g) hypothesis: hypotheses about what might be, 
h) plan for action: future action is either indicated by tense, modal verbs, or 
the semantic sense of the utterance. In the example „also mach ich jetzt am 
besten die zweite Etage“ (“Thus, I build the second story now”) [24] the 
future sense can be inferred knowing that assembling a story involves more 
than one action, 
i) positive evaluation: positive evaluation of a previous action or hypothesis. 
 
Asides were defined as utterances that were not directly related to the task, such as 
references to childhood memories. Comments at the meta-level were defined as 
evaluations or general comments on the instructions, such as „also laut denken“ (I 
alright think aloud) [8], or the experimental setting. The category comment on self 
was exemplified by one example, namely „ich hoffe das hier wird nirgendswo 
gezeigt weil irgendwie ist das gerade richtig peinlich“ (“I hope this will not be 
shown anywhere because somehow this is very embarrassing right now”) [38]. One 
example of the final coding scheme is displayed in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4: Example of the final coding scheme [12] with the transcribed verbalization in the first 
column and all processes categories in columns B to P. 
To observe the precision of the definition of the categories and their applicability, 
two coders annotated according to this final coding scheme and their agreement 
was assessed. Both coders annotated 8 protocols; this represented 16% of the entire 
corpus. Overall, 851 processes were annotated in these eight protocols; this 
represents almost one third (30.8%) of all annotated processes. The percent 
agreement was 75.4% and Krippendorff’s Alpha was 0.71. According to Lombard et 
al. (2002:593) “the criterion of .07 is often used for explorative research.” The 
presented approach can be classified as explorative research because, to my 
knowledge, no research investigating problem solving processes in object assembly 
was reported elsewhere so far. Furthermore, Landis and Koch (1977:165) propose 
that Cohen’s Kappa values of .61 to .80 represent substantial agreement and values 
of .81 to 1.0 represent almost perfect agreement. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the intercoder agreement is sufficient to propose that the coding scheme is 
defined well enough to be used by different coders. 
6.3.1.2 Assembly strategy 
Inspired by Prabhu et al.’s (1995) findings on perception of assembly structures and 
its influence on the assembly process, the videos were annotated with regard to 
assembly structures. It was annotated if participants assembled the objects by 
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following a vertical assembly strategy or a hierarchical one. This coding of 
assembly strategies was done for videos recorded in experiment 1 (unaided object 
assembly) and in experiment 2 (instruction). Assembly strategies were defined 
either as hierarchical or vertical. As outlined in the introductory section, 
participants following a vertical strategy assembled each story after the other. This 
could be observed when participants built the second story after building the first 
floor and placing the second board on top. In hierarchical assembly both stories 
were built in parallel and placed on top of each other in a final step. Participants 
who built houses that had one story and the roof part on top (see Figure 6.5) were 
classified as vertical assembly as well because the second board and the roof part 
were placed on top of the first floor after its completion. 
 
Figure 6.5: Picture of a one-story house by one participant. [52] 
In experiment 1 (unaided object assembly), all 50 videos could be annotated. 
However, as outlined in section 4.5.1, not all videos could be annotated for 
experiment 2 (instructions). 
Participants in the instruction experiment assembled the dollhouse multiple times 
(for more detail on the procedure see chapter 4.4.2). Assembly strategies were 
annotated for the explorative assembly (EA), the assembly prior to the instruction 
(PI), and during the instruction (I). The opportunity to analyze the same assembly 
at different states of knowledge acquisition, i.e. learner status in EA and advanced 
learner status in PI, as well as with and without the influence of communicative 
intention is unique to my knowledge. Unfortunately, only 11 videos showing the 
silent assembly in experiment 2 (instructions) could be annotated but 16 
instruction videos were annotated. 
DATA ANALYSIS 177 
 
 
6.3.2 Quantitative analysis 
Based on the final coding scheme, the distribution of each process category in all 
protocols was calculated. This frequency analysis provided an overview of the 
importance and prominence of the individual process categories. Furthermore, it 
allowed for a classification of topics that were addressed in the opening and 
closing sections of the assembly. 
However, as problem solving is a dynamic process the analysis went beyond mere 
frequency accounts towards the identification of emerging and recurring patterns 
of problem solving processes. Example (5) illustrates the sequence dead end – fresh 
start – hypothesis that is described in the literature. By extracting all sequences 
with this pattern, the question of the frequency of this sequence can be 
investigated. Example (6) illustrates which process could follow a fresh start. In 
this specific case, it was the process of planning an action and an insight gained by 
an observation regarding specific object features. By running a frequency analysis, 
it could be investigated if this was a typical pattern for following fresh starts. 
Example (7) included the process of comment on object features that has not been 
described in the literature so far. Taken together these examples suggest that 
hypotheses and actions are frequently verbalized processes. To verify or falsify this 
first impression a frequency analysis was run. 
(5) „das ist ja wirklich blöd / jetzt bin ich n bisschen überfordert wie ich das da 
abgeschrägt habe dann ist das richtig doof von mir [Dead end] ok nochmal 
sortieren [Fresh start] die Schrägen müssen irgendwie unter dieses Dach 
und zwar so dass das Dach da rauf passt [Hypothesis]“ [23] (“this is really 
bad now I feel a little overwhelmed about the way I placed this this is really 
stupid of me [Dead end] alright sort again [Fresh start] the bevels need to 
go under this roof somehow and in a way that the roof can be placed on 
top” [Hypothesis])122 
(6) “ich mach alles nochmal rückwärts [Fresh start] ich tausche die Stockwerke 
glaube ich ja oder [Plan for action] ja doch klar [Positive evaluation] weil 
hier ist es so abgeschrägt das Dach [Comment on object features]“ [47] (“I 
will do it in reverse order again [Fresh start] I will change the stories I think 
yes or [Plan for action] yes certainly [Positive evaluation] because the roof 
is bevelled here” [Comment on object parts]) 
(7) „so da fehlt so’n bisschen Stabilität drin [Hypothesis] bisschen was 
dazwischen tun [Action] was passiert dann hm hab ich zwei geteilte Räume 
[Comment on object features] aber es ist irgendwie zu viel Zwischenplatz“ 
[Negative evaluation] [19] (“so this misses some stability here [Hypothesis] 
put something in between [Action] what happens then hm I have two 
                                                        
122 In some cases, it is very difficult to translate the German phrases. Thus, the translations 
are not literal but rather content based ones. 
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separated rooms [Comment on object features] but somehow there is too 
much space in between” [Negative evaluation]) 
In order to extract recurring patterns of process sequences in the protocols and to 
compare their frequency, a script was written by André Scholz123. The program, 
which was used on a Mac OS X 10.6.8, was called ‘find pattern’ (the script is 
provided in the appendix). In order to make the process sequences readable for the 
program, they needed to be coded into simple one letter strings; example (8) 
represents an imaginary process sequence and example (9) represents the 
corresponding input string. 
(8) process sequence as annotated in the protocol: beginning – hypothesis – 
action – positive evaluation – action – false lead – hypothesis – end 
(9) input string for ‘find pattern’: BHAEAFHN 
The tool was used for identifying patterns of processes in the data. In order to 
extract patterns, the user enters one letter or a string of letters that the program 
needs to identify in the available input strings. This procedure was selected 
because the literature suggests the occurrence of specific patterns of processes in 
problem solving, such as ‘test – operate – test – evaluate’ (Miller et al. 1970) which 
could be translated into ‘hypothesis – action – hypothesis – evaluation’ in terms of 
the defined processes for this analysis.  
Besides extracting the exact sequence of processes, the program can also assist 
data mining by the function ‘greedy’. By choosing this function, the identified 
string in the input strings does not need to match the entered sequence exactly. In 
the case of example (9) as an input string, the pattern of BHHAEEAFHHN would 
also be identified and saved in the output file. In this sequence the underlined 
processes are not part of the input string. Additionally, the program counts the 
number of occurrences of the provided input string.  
In order to test if expected process sequences can be identified and to highlight 
additional recurring patterns, all coded processes were translated into input strings 
for ‘find pattern’. Then the program was run to identify and highlight recurring 
sequences in the available input strings. First, the program was used to search for 
patterns that are described in the literature on problem solving. Second, a search 
method referred to as data mining124 was used to extract frequent combinations of 
                                                        
123 Special thanks to André Scholz who wrote this program in 2009. 
124 This term has been chosen to describe the procedure that has been applied in this thesis 
because it also aims at discovering previously unknown patterns in the large data set of 
annotated processes. But it needs to be stressed that the analysis does not consider 
statistical significance because the aim of this exploratory approach is to identify recurring 
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longer sequences. The procedure was as follows, starting the search for two-
process sequences all possible combinations of annotated processes were entered 
as two-letter strings and their frequency was identified. The same procedure was 
run with three-process sequences, i.e. three-letter strings.  
To illustrate the procedure of data mining, let’s assume the following example: the 
frequency analysis showed that hypothesis → positive evaluation is a frequent two-
process string, encoded as HE. In order to extract the frequency of possible three-
process sequences, the letters encoding all other processes are added to the two-
letter string. In this case, the three-letter input strings would be HEH125, HEF, HEE, 
HED, HES, HEO, HEM, HEA, HEI. Then their respective frequency was extracted. 
After the frequency counts for all three-process sequences were run, the most 
frequent ones were identified. Let us further assume that the frequency analysis 
revealed HEA to be a very frequent sequence. To this three-letter string one more 
process was added. Therefore, all possible four-letter strings were entered: HEAH, 
HEAF, HEAE, HEAD, HEAS, HEAO, HEAM, HEAA, HEAI. The frequency of all of 
these four-letter strings was extracted. Assuming that HEAH was a frequent four-
process sequence one more process was added to this sequence. This procedure 
was repeated as long as the results seemed reasonable, in the sense that it captured 
a large proportion of the data. Following the same procedure as in the previous 
examples, the following five-letter strings were tested: HEAHH, HEAHF, HEAHE, 
HEAHD, HEAHS, HEAHO, HEAHM, HEAHA, HEAHI. Frequencies for all of these 
sequences were extracted. In the end, it showed that sequences with five processes 
at most could be extracted. Due to the huge amount of data that was generated by 
this procedure, only the most frequent sequences will be reported in the results 
section.  
6.4 Results 
In this section, the results of the performed analysis are presented. The 
presentation starts at the general level and proceeds to the most fine-grained level, 
i.e. the individual processes. In 6.4.1 the results of the general assembly strategy are 
presented. In 6.4.2 the findings on the global structure, i.e. beginning and ending 
                                                                                                                                                       
patterns in this specific data set but it does not claim to draw conclusions reaching beyond 
the specific context investigated. 
125 For a better overview, abbreviations are used. H: hypothesis, E: positive evaluation, F: 
negative evaluation, D: dead end, S: fresh start, O: comment on object features, M: 
description of mental state, A: action, I: plan for action. 
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sequences are reported. Categories describing introductory and closing statements 
are introduced and a frequency analysis is reported for the categories. In 6.4.3 the 
results of the analysis of problem solving processes are presented. In addition to 
the detailed description of each process category, the quantitative results on the 
frequency of the different processes are presented along with emerging patterns of 
those processes. 
6.4.1 Assembly strategy 
The results on the distribution of assembly strategies in unaided object assembly 
revealed that assemblers had a clear preference for vertical assembly (32 cases, 
65%) over hierarchical assembly (15 cases, 31%). One participant started vertically 
but changed to hierarchical assembly in the course of the assembly. No influence 
of prior information on assembly strategy could be observed (see Table 6.2).  
condition vertical hierarchical both none N 
underspecified goal 10 6 0 1 17 
verbal goal 10 5 1 0 16 
verbal and visual goal 12 4 0 0 16 
sum 32 15 1 1 49 
Table 6.2: Assembly strategies within conditions (raw frequency). 
Interesting observations were made in the analysis of assembly structures in 
experiment 2 (instructions) when the silent assemblies were considered. As 
outlined in sub-section 6.3.1, the data allows for the investigation of assembly 
strategies at three different times within the instruction experiment, namely 
during the first explorative assembly (EA), in the assembly prior to the instruction 
(PI), and in the instruction (I) itself. The condition in EA was comparable to the 
verbal and visual goal condition in the unaided object assembly experiment because 
instructors were shown the picture and instructed to assemble the pictured doll-
house for themselves but without the task to think aloud. 
The analysis of the instruction videos revealed that the great majority of 
instructors used the vertical assembly strategy as well (12 cases, 80%). Only three 
instructors chose a hierarchical assembly approach (20%). One participant did not 
assemble the dollhouse during the instruction; thus, no assembly strategy could be 
annotated for this participant. This trend was not reflected in the results on 
assembly strategies as observed in EA. The results rather revealed that six 
participants assembled the house hierarchically (54.5%) and 5 (45.5%) participants 
chose the vertical assembly strategy (see Table 6.3).  
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The comparison of the results recorded in the verbal and visual goal condition in 
experiment 1 and those observed in EA in experiment 2 revealed a strong trend of 
verbalization on assembly strategy. The likelihood ratio was L?2 (1, N = 26) = 3.37, 
p = .066. Participants assembling the dollhouse without thinking aloud used the 
hierarchical assembly strategy more often than participants who thought aloud. 
assembly time vertical 
assembly 
hierarchical 
assembly 
both strategies sum 
first explorative 
assembly (EA) 
5 (54.5%) 6 (45.5%) 0 11 
assembly prior to 
the instruction (PI) 
7 (63.6%) 2 (18.2%) 2 (18.2%) 11 
instruction (I) 12 (80.0%) 3 (20.0%) 0 15 
Table 6.3 Raw frequency and percentage of assembly strategies observed at different times within 
experiment 2. 
Observing this great difference between strategies chosen in EA and instructions, 
the assembly strategies for PI were annotated as well. The observed assembly 
strategies in PI highlighted an interesting phenomenon. From those six partici-
pants who assembled the dollhouse in a hierarchical fashion during EA only two 
used the same strategy in PI. Two participants started of hierarchically but 
switched to a vertical procedure during the assembly and one participant started 
with the vertical strategy in PI right away (participant 10). One participant changed 
from hierarchical to vertical assembly but she did not assemble the dollhouse once 
more during the instruction (participant 8) (see Table 6.4 for an overview).  
To summarize, six participants did not change their assembly strategy during the 
experiment whereas four participants changed from hierarchical to vertical 
assembly. One participant instructed only verbally; thus, no assembly strategy 
could be observed in I. The results revealed a strong trend of changing from 
hierarchical to vertical assembly during consecutive assemblies. However, this 
trend did not reach statistical significance, L?2 (4, N = 37) = 8.99, p = .06. 
participant 
ID 
first explorative 
assembly (EA) 
assembly prior to instruction 
(PI) 
instruction (I) 
2 hierarchical starts hierarchically change to 
vertical 
vertical 
3 vertical vertical vertical 
4 vertical vertical vertical 
5 hierarchical hierarchical hierarchical 
6 hierarchical hierarchical vertical 
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8 hierarchical vertical no assembly 
9 hierarchical starts hierarchically changes to 
vertical 
hierarchical 
10 hierarchical vertical vertical 
15 vertical vertical vertical 
20 vertical vertical vertical 
21 vertical vertical vertical 
Table 6.4: Summary of assembly strategies observed in first explorative assembly, assembly prior to 
instruction, and in the instruction. 
6.4.2 Global structure in think aloud protocols and 
instructions 
This part of the results section focuses on the presentation of the structure of the 
initial and final section of each protocol, i.e. the beginning and ending. The 
presentation will be structured as such and a comparison will be made between 
think aloud protocols and instructions. 
6.4.2.1 Beginning 
? Introductory sequences in think aloud protocols 
The introductory part of each of the 50 think aloud protocols was classified based 
on content analysis. Six categories could be identified (see Table 6.5 for an 
overview)126. 
Instruction related introductory phrases were most common (21 cases, 42.0%). 
Nine participants (18.0%) started their assembly without any further remarks 
about the task or the objects whereas eight participants (16.0%) conceptualized 
some of the given objects at that early stage. Three participants (6.0%) referred to 
their expectations and equally many verbalized what they saw (6.0%). Three 
participants (6.0%) verbalized their mental states at the beginning of the assembly. 
And three phrases (6.0%) did not fit into any of the categories. 
 
 
 
                                                        
126 No intercoder agreement is reported for this coding because the coding was done by 
Gralla only. There were no financial resources for training another coder on this specific 
coding scheme. 
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category label description example 
instruction 
related 
Parts of the instruction were 
repeated, such as what to do 
(e.g. think aloud, assemble a 
sensible object) and objects 
mentioned (e.g. box). 
a) „also laut denken“ (“alright think 
aloud”) [8] 
b) „ok also die Materialien in der Kiste 
dürfen ja auch verwendet werden” 
(“ok the objects in the box can also 
be used”) [20] 
c) „ok ein zweistöckiges Puppenhaus 
ohne Schrauben“ (“ok a two-story 
dollhouse without screws”) [53] 
con-
ceptualization 
Object parts were 
conceptualized within the 
goal domain after first 
perception. 
a) „… es sieht n bisschen aus wie n 
Puppenhaus” (“it kind of looks like a 
dollhouse2) [23] 
b) „ok das ist das Dach“ (“ok this is the 
roof”) [36] 
c) „ja da sind zwei Stockwerke“ (“yes 
there are two stories”) [49] 
expectation The assembler started by 
verbalizing an expectation. 
a) „da fehlt aber was oder” (“there is 
something missing, isn’t there”) [48] 
b) „gut Gedankenexperiment schön” 
(“well a mental experiment fine”) 
[57] 
action The assembler started by 
verbalizing an action. 
a) „mhm alles raus hier“ (“mhm 
everything out here”) [19] 
b) „ok ich hab jetzt hierdrei Teile die ich 
jetzt sinnvoll miteinander verbinden 
werde“ (“alright I have got three 
parts here that I will connect in a 
sensible way”) [35] 
c) „so dann nehm ich erstmal den 
Boden“ (“so I take the floor first”) 
[40] 
perception Verbalizations of a visual 
impression. 
a) „ok ich sehe einen Tisch“ (“ok I see 
a table”) [38] 
b) „oh nein die anderen Sachen sind 
hier drin“ (“oh no the other objects 
are in here”) [34] 
mental state Verbalizations of the 
participant’s mental state.  
a) „da bin ich jetzt erstmal neugierig“ 
(“now I am curious”) [13] 
b) „ah ja also mein erster Gedanke ist 
dass mir das Holz gefällt“ (“ah yes 
well my first thought is that I like the 
wood”) [29] 
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c) „also gut diese um Gottes Willen 
also ähm“ (“This phrase cannot be 
translated but it expresses the 
speaker’s puzzlement and some kind 
of difficulties that are not sepcified 
any further. ”) [25] 
others Phrases that did not belong 
to any of the previous 
categories. 
„so so dies ist kein Gesitze“ (“so this 
is not about sitting”) [16] 
Table 6.5: Summary of categories identified for initial sequences of think aloud protocols. 
As motivated in chapter 4, three conditions were distinguished in the first 
experiment based on prior information that was provided about the goal object. 
Participants in the underspecified goal condition were not given any specific 
information about the goal object. Participants in the verbal goal condition were 
told that they need to assemble a two-story dollhouse. Moreover, participants in 
the verbal and visual goal condition were additionally shown a picture of the 
assembled dollhouse. 
In their introductory phrases participants in the verbal goal condition tended to 
start their assembly right away (25.0%) if they did not refer to the instructions (see 
Table 6.6). Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition, in contrast, tended 
to conceptualize objects (29.4%) when they did not refer to the instructions. 
Participants in the underspecified goal condition, in contrast, only showed a 
tendency towards mention of instruction related information (35.3%) but for none 
of the other categories.  
category label underspecified goal 
condition 
verbal goal 
condition 
verbal and visual 
goal condition 
instruction 6 (35.29%) 8 (50.0%) 7 (41.18%) 
conceptualization 1 (5.88%) 2 (12.5%) 5 (29.41%) 
expectation 2 (11.76%) 0 1 (5.88%) 
action 3 (17.65%) 4 (25.0%) 2 (11.76%) 
perception 2 (11.76%) 0 1 (5.88%) 
mental state 2 (11.76%) 1 (6.25%) 0 
others 1 (5.88%) 1 (6.25%) 1 (5.88%) 
sum 17 (100%) 16 (100%) 17 (100%) 
Table 6.6: Distribution of categories of initial phrases between condition (raw frequency with 
percentage in brackets). 
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? Introductory sequences in think aloud protocols 
In addition to the think aloud protocols, the transcripts of the instructions were 
analyzed with regard to the introductory and finishing sequences. In the analysis 
of introductory sequences three categories were identified, namely action, 
instruction, and address. If instructors started the assembly without providing any 
information about the task and the goal object, these phrases have been labeled 
action (see examples (10) and (11)). In other cases, instructors told their partner 
explicitly what their task was; these phrases were annotated as task (see examples 
(12) and (13)). In some cases, these phrases started with a personal address (see 
example (14)). Furthermore, in one case the instructor asked for clarification by 
asking “also hörst du mich jetzt” (so you hear me now?) [8], this case was 
annotated as other. 
(10) „also man nimmt die beiden Bauplatten erst einmal auseinander um die 
eine waagerecht vor sich hinzustellen“ (“so one needs to take the two 
boards apart in order to put one in vertical position in front of oneself”) [4] 
(11) „also zunächst einmal die Teile sortieren“ (“so first of all sort the objects”) 
[5] 
(12) „so ich versuch dich mal so anzuleiten ganz langsam wie ich das Haus das 
letzte Mal zusammengebaut hab“ (“so I try to instruct you on how I 
assembled the house myself the last time”) [16] 
(13) „so die Aufgabe ist es dieses Haus zusammenzubauen“ (“so the task is to 
assemble this house”) [20] 
(14) „hallo Lena ich soll dir jetzt erklären wie man dieses Haus aufbaut ähm ich 
geh mal davon aus dass du das gleichzeitig dann auch da drüben aufbaust“ 
(“hello Lena I have to tell you how to assemble this house uh I assume that 
you assemble it at the same time over there”) [12] 
Instructors showed a clear preference for starting the assembly right away (nine 
cases, 56.25%), either with an address (four cases) or without (five cases). Six 
instructors (37.5%) provided their assemblers with information about the task. 
Half of them addressed their partner. 
6.4.2.2 End 
? Concluding sequences in think aloud protocols 
The final sections of all 50 think aloud protocols were analyzed in the same fashion 
as the initial sections. The analysis revealed four categories to describe the 
verbalizations appropriately (see Table 6.7 for examples). Some participants ended 
the assembly by evaluating the assembled structure or their own abilities. These 
cases were annotated as evaluation. Some evaluations referred to information that 
was provided in the instructions, such as the picture or the task to assemble a 
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sensible object. To distinguish this specific kind of evaluation from the more 
general category it was called instruction. Some participants determined the end of 
their task by referring to features of the construction (construction). And some 
participants did not provide any further information about why and how they 
determine the ending of the task; those cases were annotated as end. 
category label description example 
evaluation The protocol ends with a final 
evaluation either of the 
product, the assembler’s 
abilities, or the instructions. 
a) „vielleicht n bisschen locker 
[pause] besser kann ichs nicht“ 
(“maybe it’s a little loose [pause] 
I cannot do it better”) [23] 
b) „aber sieht aus wie’n Haus” 
(“but looks like a house”) [37] 
c) „Aufgabe gelöst“ (“task 
solved”) [40] 
instruction The current state is evaluated 
against information provided 
in the instructions, e.g. the 
picture or the constraint to 
assemble a sensible object. 
a) „also ich finds sinnvoll wenn 
man vorne reingreifen kann 
[pause] tja gut” (“I think it 
makes sense when you can 
reach inside from the front 
[pause] well”) [22] 
b) „ok sah das ungefähr so aus 
[pause] ja ich glaub schon 
[pause] ok fertig” (“ok did it 
look like this [pause] yes I think 
so [pause] ok done”) [24] 
construction The assembler finishes based 
on information about the 
construction. 
a) „hoffe, dass es alles nicht umfällt 
und dann bin ich fertig [pause] 
fertig” (“I hope that this will not 
collapse and then I am done 
[pause] done”) [12] 
b) „ich würd sagen dass es hält so“ 
(„I would say this works“) [16] 
end Phrases that express the 
ending of an action but 
without any further 
information. Some participants 
referred to themselves or the 
object in order to determine 
the ending. 
a) „ich bin fertig“ (“I am done”) 
[32] 
b) „es ist n zweistöckiges 
Familienhaus so [pause] ja“ (“it 
is a two-story house [pause] 
yes”) [50] 
none Participants did not explicitly 
indicate the ending of the 
assembly. 
 
Table 6.7: Summary of categories identified for final sequences of think aloud protocols. 
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The distribution of these categories revealed that assemblers had a clear tendency 
to end the assembly without much further information about why they were done 
(26 cases, 52.0%) (see Figure 6.6). Final sequences that contained evaluations of 
the assembled product or the assembler’s abilities were second most frequent 
(eleven cases, 22.0%). No difference between conditions was observed. 
 
Figure 6.6: Distribution of categories on final sequences in think aloud protocols. 
 
Taking a closer look at the two strategies that were most frequent, i.e. end and 
evaluation, interesting trends were revealed. The detailed analysis of the entity that 
was referred to when ending an assembly highlighted that assemblers either 
referred to themselves (e.g. “ich bin fertig”), to the product (e.g. “es ist n zwei-
stöckiges Familienhaus”), or provided no such information (e.g. “fertig”). 
Comparing the distribution between these three options, a clear tendency towards 
the assembler determining the end was revealed (see Table 6.8). This trend was 
reflected in the data for participants in the underspecified goal and verbal and 
visual goal condition. However, the trend was different for assemblers in the verbal 
goal condition. Those provided no further information to almost the same degree 
as they referred to themselves as the determining factor (four and three cases 
respectively). Interestingly, only participants in the underspecified goal condition 
referred to the product as the determining factor. 
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category label overall underspecified 
goal condition 
verbal goal 
condition 
verbal and 
visual goal 
condition 
subject centered 18 (69.23%) 8 (80.00%) 3 (42.86%) 7 (77.78%) 
product centered 2 (7.69%) 2 (20.00%) 0 0 
no further 
information 
6 (23.08%) 0 4 (57.14%) 2 (22.22%) 
sum 26 (100%) 10 (100%) 7 (100%) 9 (100%) 
Table 6.8: Distribution of sub-categories of the category end between conditions (raw frequency with 
percentage in brackets). 
The analysis of the nature of the entity that was evaluated highlighted that 
assemblers either referred to the product (e.g. „aber sieht aus wie’n Haus“ (“but 
looks like a house”) [37]), to their own abilities („vielleicht n bisschen locker 
(pause) besser kann ichs nicht“ („maybe it’s a little loose (pause) I cannot do it 
better“)[23]), or to the instructions („Aufgabe gelöst“ (“task solved”) [40]). Among 
those options, the first one was the most frequently used one. It was equally 
distributed between conditions (see Table 6.9).  
category label overall underspecified 
goal condition 
verbal goal 
condition 
verbal and visual 
goal condition 
product 9 (81.82%) 3 (75.00%) 3 (100.00%) 3 (75.00%) 
capabilities 1 (9.09%) 1 (25.00%) 0 0 
instruction 1 (9.09%) 0 0 1 (25.00%) 
sum 11 (100%) 4 (100%) 3 (100%) 4 (100%) 
Table 6.9: Distribution of sub-categories of the category evaluation between conditions (raw frequency 
with percentage in brackets). 
? Concluding sequences in instructions 
The analysis of 16 instructions revealed that the categories evaluation, end, and 
none could be adapted to categorize the final sections. The distribution revealed a 
similar pattern as in the think aloud protocols, i.e. half of all instructors ended 
without any further information (eight cases) as in examples (15) and (16). Five 
(31.3%) instructors evaluated the final product (example (17)) and two did not 
explicitly mark the end of the instruction (12.5%). 
(15) „und schon sollte das Haus fertig sein“ (“and the house should be finished 
already") [6] 
(16) „wenn ich jetzt alles richtig gemacht hab und und Glück hatte dann hast 
du wahrscheinlich jetzt auch n einigermaßen brauchbares Häuschen bei 
dir stehen“ (“and if I did everything right and and had some luck then you 
will have a somewhat sensible house standing there with you”) [3] 
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(17) „ja und dann hoffe ich, dass du das gleiche Haus hast wie ich“ (“well and 
then I hope that you have the same house as I do”) [2] 
Instructors who ended the assembly without any further information referred to 
themselves as the determining factor most of the times, five cases (62.5%). One 
such example would be „so und ich bin fertig (pause) ich hoffe du auch“ (“so I am 
done (pause) I hope you are too”) [5], and 2 participants (25.0%) referred to the 
final product. One participant did not provide any further information. Those 
instructors that ended with an evaluation, exclusively referred to the product that 
was assembled. 
6.4.3 Local structure of the middle part 
In the following section the results regarding the local structure of the assembly 
process will be presented. First, the identified processes will be described in detail 
with examples for illustration. Second, the frequency analysis of these processes 
will be reported. Third, the observed patterns of these processes will be reported 
and illustrated. 
6.4.3.1 Description of process types 
In this sub-section, the identified processes will be presented and their content 
will be described in detail with examples to illustrate the linguistic representation 
of the respective process. First, processes that are directly related to the problem 
solving process will be presented. In a second step, those that are activated by the 
problem solving activity will be described. 
6.4.3.1.1 Problem solving processes 
For an overview, the following processes will be described in detail in the next 
sections: description of mental state, comment on object parts, hypothesis, plan 
for action, action, positive evaluation, false lead (negative evaluation), dead end, 
and fresh start. 
? Description of mental state 
The first process category is called description of mental state because it contained 
verbalizations of the speaker’s current mental state. Example (18) illustrates that 
assemblers verbalized difficulties with regard to the structure of the goal object. In 
example (19), in contrast, the assembler expressed an emotion, i.e. being curious. 
(18) „ich kann aus den Teilen momentan wenn ich die so einzeln sehe noch 
nicht irgendwie schließen wie die zu was sinnvollem Ganzen zu-
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sammengefügt werden könnten“ (“by looking at the individual parts I 
cannot think of a way to combine them into a sensible structure”) [10] 
(19) „ich bin neugierig darauf was für Teile sich hier in der Kiste befinden“ (“I 
am curious about the parts that are in this box here”) [10] 
Example (18) represented the verbalization of the process of consideration whereas 
examples (19) and (21) highlighted that assemblers might lack information. The 
difficulties that might arise are illustrated once more in examples (20) and (22). 
(20) „und frag mich gerade ob ich alle einsetzen will oder ähm ob ich 
vielleicht doch n paar weglasse“ (“right now I am asking myself if I want to 
use all parts or uhm if I want to leave some unused”) [10] 
(21) „und was da steht ich weiß es nicht“ (“and what is written there I do not 
know”) [18] 
(22) „n bisschen schwierig (…) schwierig find ichs auch weil ich nicht ob 
diese Noppen eher besser nach oben sollten oder nach unten“ (“a little 
difficult (…) I find it difficult because I don’t if these parts shall be up or 
down”) [18] 
These examples demonstrate that this category contained the assembler’s 
statements about his/her consciousness („das weiß ich nicht“ (“this I do not 
know”), „ich kann nicht schließen“ (“I cannot conclude”)), that the speaker referred 
to himself/herself as the source of information („frage ich mich“ (“I ask myself”), 
„finde ich“ (“I think”), „ich hoffe“ (“I hope”)), and that emotions were verbalized 
(„ich bin neugierig“ (“I am curious”)). 
? Comment on object features 
The second category that was defined contained comments on object features, such 
as shape (example (26), (29), (30)), color (example (27)), or other physical 
properties (example (23)-(25), (28)).  
(23) „es gibt wohl keine Stecker“ (“apparently there are no connecting 
devices”) [16] 
(24) „so hier ist seltsamerweise nicht so'n Keil dran“ (“surprisingly there is no 
such notch here”) [16] 
(25) „phhw so was is hier mit dieser Kante“ (“puh and what about this edge”) 
[16] 
(26) „so ähm hier sind diese runden Halbkugeln drauf“ (“so uhm there are 
these half like balls up here”) [16] 
(27) „wieder andersrum denn irgendwie ist das blau“ (“the other way around 
because somehow it is blue here”) [19] 
(28) „weil die Bauteile unten Löcher haben dass da eigentlich n Dübel rein 
müsste“ (“because the object habe holes on the bottom into which 
connecting devices shall be inserted normally”) [18] 
(29) „das sieht aus wie Ecken“ (“this looks like an edge”) [27] 
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(30) „ok die Zweier hab ich hier in die Mitte getan“ (“allright those two object 
things I have placed in the middle”) [32] 
In example (23), the participant noticed that no connecting devices were provided. 
In order to draw such a conclusion, the participant needed to have noticed the 
boreholes as features of the given parts. This is stated more explicitly in (28). A 
more direct way of expressing a feature was provided in example (24) in which the 
assembler noticed that a feature (i.e. a groove) that he/she previously encountered 
was not characteristic for the current object.  
In example (26), the assembler mentioned the ball-like objects that are attached to 
half of all provided objects (see Figure 6.7). In example (28) another participant 
also refers to the object displayed in Figure 6.7. This example illustrates the 
different ways in which the same object was described. The object that was 
referred to as ‘Zweier’ (two) in example (29) is shown in Figure 6.8. In the picture, 
it can be observed that the object has two column-like parts on each the side and it 
can be assumed that the reference ‘Zweier’ refers to this specific object feature. 
 
Figure 6.7: Picture of one wooden object that 
has ball-like objects attached to it. 
 
Figure 6.8: Picture of the wooden object that 
has been referred to a ‘Zweier’. 
?  
? Hypothesis 
The third category that was identified was one in which participants formulated 
hypotheses. These concerned numerous different aspect of the assembly process, 
e.g. at the level of conceptualization, hypotheses about functions of objects are 
proposed (see example (31)127). At the level of planning, assumptions about actions 
that are to be taken were verbalized (see examples (34) and (35)). At the level of 
physical manipulation, hypotheses expressed possible configurations (see example 
(33)) and position (see examples (32), (36), (37)). 
                                                        
127 In hypotheses all examples are extracted from one protocol to highlight the richness of 
information that is considered by one assembler. 
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(31) „vermutlich sind das die Böden und das hier sind Wände“ (“presumably 
those are the floors and those over here are the walls”) [16] 
(32) „wahrscheinlich so damit die Wände hier so stehen“ (“probably this way 
in order for the walls to stand like this”) [16] 
(33) „vielleicht kann man das irgendwann verkeilen“ (“maybe one may fasten 
that at some point”) [16] 
(34) „und dann ähm kommt das natürlich alles aufs zweite“ (“and then uhm 
this goes onto the second”) [16] 
(35) „und ich muss jetzt natürlich irgendwie so anordnen, dass das obere 
Stockwerk auch da drauf hält ohne zu wackeln“ (“and I need to arrange 
somehow in a way that the upper story fits onto it without bouncing”) [16] 
(36) „vielleicht gehört die auch hier rein“ (“maybe this goes in here”) [16] 
(37) „das gehört ja wahrscheinlich hier oben“ (“probably this belongs up 
here”) [16] 
The examples highlight common linguistic representations that were characteristic 
for verbalizations categorized as hypothesis. As represented in the examples, the 
following modal adverbs were frequently identified in hypothesis: ‘vermutlich’ 
(probably), ‘vielleicht’ (maybe), ‘wahrscheinlich’ (probably), ‘natürlich’ (certainly), 
and ‘bestimmt’ (definitely). The modal adverbs ‘vermutlich’, ‘vielleicht’, and 
‘wahrscheinlich’ mark that the information expressed in the utterance is an 
assumption. More specifically, ‘vermutlich’ signals that information is based on 
expectations and speculations (Brinkmann 1972:401). ‘Vielleicht’ is often referred to 
as a hedge because it weakens what is said by stressing that it is only one 
possibility. The modal adverb ‘natürlich’, on the contrary, marks information to be 
a fact (Brinkmann 1972:401). It signals that what is said confirms an expectation 
and can thus be classified as a marker of affirmation (for more detail see chapter 
7). The modal adverb ‘bestimmt’ modifies the given information by emphasizing 
the speaker’s certainty about it (Brinkmann 1972:401).  
Additionally, many occurrences of ‘irgendwie’ (somehow), ‘irgendwo’ (somewhere), 
‘irgendwas’ (something), and ‘irgendwelche’ (some) were identified. By choosing 
‘irgend’ (some), the speaker stresses the indefiniteness of what is being said (Erben 
1972:217), i.e. it might be just any thing. This expresses uncertainty about an 
assignment. 
? Action 
The next two categories share the same goal, i.e. action taking. But the first one 
expresses the mental simulation of an action whereas the second one refers to the 
execution. Verbalizations of the first kind were categorized as plan for action 
whereas the verbalizations of actions were categorized as such. The first examples 
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illustrate planning processes and those will be contrasted with instances of action 
execution. 
Example (38) was classified as a plan for action because assembling the second 
story involves numerous sub-processes of placing objects. In example (39), the 
assembler verbalized the plan to assemble the second story the same way as he/she 
assembled the first story. This plan involved numerous sub-processes as well. In 
example (40) the assembler wanted to place the second board on the object that 
he/she assembled so far but he/she needed to stabilize the construction first. This 
utterance contained a number of plans. The speaker of example (41) expressed a 
clear intention to act right away by positioning the roof on top. 
(38) „also mache ich jetzt am besten die zweite Etage“ (“thus, I work on the 
second story now”) [24] 
(39) „ok dann mach ich das oben noch mal genauso“ (“ok then I will do it the 
same way again for the upper one") [32] 
(40) „aber bevor ich jetzt hier auf so wackeliges Gerüst noch ne zweite Platte 
stell muss ich mir irgendwie n Rezept ausdenken dass das halten kann“ 
(“but before I put a second board on this loose construction I need to have 
an idea about how to keep it fastened”)128 [27] 
(41) „aber jetzt werd ich das Dach oben auf setzen“ (“but now I will put the roof 
on top”) [27] 
In verbalizations of actions, in contrast, the action was expressed to start at the 
moment of speaking by verbs of action129 such as ‘take’, ‘put’, and ‘position’, for 
example. In example (42)130, the execution of ‘take out’ started at the moment of 
speaking and ended when everything was removed from the container131. The same 
pattern described the action expressed in example (43); a specific object (‘that’) 
was put into a specific location (‘in the corner’). Then the action was completed. In 
examples (45) and (46) the assembler was not specific about the action that he/she 
performed in terms of the schema described before he/she rather stated that 
he/she will try something. In examples (44) and (47)-(49) the location was central 
whereas example (50) exemplified a specific action. 
                                                        
128 In cases in which it is very difficult to translate the German phrases the translations are 
not literal but content based ones. 
129 In chapter 7 of this thesis the class of verbs will be defined as verbs of doing and 
happening but for the illustration at this point the less specific terminology of ‘action verbs’ 
seems adequate. 
130 All examples in the action category, except for the last one, were extracted from one 
protocol to illustrate the range of actions that were verbalized. 
131 It is very likely that the participant referred to the box and wanted to ‘take out’ the 
objects that were contained in it but since this reference was not clearly stated the 
subordinate term container was used at the description level. 
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(42) „dann hol ich erstmal alles raus“ (“then I take everything out first”) [27] 
(43) „das stell ich jetzt also mal in die Ecke“ (“this I out in the edge now”) [27] 
(44) „muss ich jetzt irgendwie hierher stellen“ (“I need to put it here 
somehow”) [27] 
(45) „und die anderen Teile ausprobieren“ (“and try the other parts”) [27] 
(46) „mal gucken, ob das irgendwie hinhauen kann“ (“let’s see if this can 
work”) [27] 
(47) „also stell ich doch alles wieder so hin wie vorher“ (“then I will put 
everything the way it has been before”) [27] 
(48) „jetzt diese zwei Dinger aufeinander stapeln“ (“now place those two 
things on top of each other”) [27] 
(49) „mach ich das alles auf das wackelige Fundament“ (“I put everything on 
the loose basement”) [27] 
(50) „ich kann jetzt gerade noch die Seiten ausrichten“ (“now I can even out 
the sides”) [16] 
The analysis also highlighted characteristic linguistic representations for 
verbalizations categorized as action. Two temporal markers, namely ‘jetzt’ (now) 
and ‘als Erstes’ (first), and the discourse marker ‘so’ were frequently identified. 
Both temporal markers stress that the speaker is referring to the present situation 
by what he/she is saying. Erben (1972:195) describes that one function of ‘so’ is the 
acceptance of a conclusion that was previously drawn. In the context of the ver-
balization of actions, the use of ‘so’ can be assumed to highlight the confirmation 
of a previous state and the shifting focus to the new state. This assumption is 
supported by Tenbrink’s (2008) finding that ‘so’ frequently highlights the ending of 
sub-processes. 
? Evaluation 
After presenting action planning and action taking, the two categories of 
evaluation will be presented. The super-ordinate category evaluation contains two 
categories. These can be distinguished based on the conclusions that are drawn, 
namely positive and negative evaluation. Negative evaluations were also called 
false lead. First, examples of positive evaluations will be reported before examples 
for false leads will be given. 
(51)      „auf einmal wird’s alles n bisschen klarer“ (“suddenly everything 
becomes clearer”) [27] 
(52) „so jetzt sind schon mal irgendwie einigermaßen die Löcher abgedeckt“ 
(“so now the holes are covered somehow”) [27] 
(53) „also hier scheint schon was zu passen / das ist schon mal was / so“ 
(“alright something seems to fit here / this is something to start with / so”) 
[27] 
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(54) „aber so ähnlich wie auf dem Bild sieht das aus“ (“but it looks similar to 
that on the picture”) [27] 
(55) „doch die passen hier rein“ (“yes they fit in here”) [27] 
(56) „jetzt wackelt der nicht mehr so doll“ (“now it does not bounce that 
much anymore”) [34] 
(57) „das passt“ (“this fits/ works”) [44] 
(58) „und dann ham wir schon mal das Erdgeschoss zusammen gebaut“ (“and 
then we have assembled the basement already”) [58] 
(59) „doch hält [pause] Wahnsinn irre“ (“it works [pause] great fantastic”) 
[58] 
These examples illustrate that participants evaluated different aspects of the 
assembly task. They evaluated their own understanding of the task or the structure 
that they were to assemble (see example (51)). Assemblers who saw the picture of 
the assembled dollhouse evaluated their matching success as illustrated in example 
(54). Furthermore, participants evaluated the possibility that objects could be 
inserted or fastened (see examples (53), (55), and (57)) and if they represented a 
stable structure (see example (56)). Participants also evaluated sub-assemblies (see 
example (58)). Additionally, evaluations revealed insights about the assembler’s 
personal intrinsic goals, i.e. those that were not defined by the task. Example (52), 
for example, revealed that the participant wanted to cover the holes and that 
he/she succeeded.132 
The same parameters were also evaluated negatively, i.e. goals were not achieved 
(see examples (60), (65), and (68)) or only in an unsatisfactory way or sub-
assemblies were not stable (see examples (61) and (64)). Furthermore, assumed 
positions were not correct (see examples (62), (66), and (67)). However, there were 
also cases in which it was not clear what was evaluated by looking at the written 
transcript only (see example (63)). 
(60) „das sieht aber auch nicht richtig gut aus – das sieht eher bescheuert 
aus“ (“this does not look very good – it looks rather stupid”) [58] 
                                                        
132 The analysis of retrospective reports revealed that some participants used the boreholes 
in the boards to guide their choices regarding the position and orientation of the different 
objects. This specific participant explicitly mentions the strategy in his retrospective report 
by saying „irgendwann ist mir dann die Idee gekommen dass vielleicht die Bretter auch 
irgendwie durch die Löcher vorgeben wo welches Teil hin muss ich hatte zuvor aber 
erstmal die Ecken erkannt und die in die Ecken im in der Platte gestellt das dann revidiert 
weil die längeren Teile nicht so recht dazwischen passten und da wieder ja auf die Löcher 
in der Platte geachtet äh und äh versucht die mit den Löchern in den Teilen überein äh 
stimmen zu lassen also Loch auf Loch“ (at some point I had the idea that the boards 
somehow suggest which object needs to go where because of the holes before this I noticed 
the corners and put them in the corners in the boards then reversed this because the long 
things did not really fit in between and then paid attention to the holes in the boards uh 
and uh tried to match the holes with the pieces uh quasi hole on top of hole) 
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(61)     „oh ah jetzt hab ichs kaputt gemacht“ (“oh now I broke it”) [58] 
(62) „nee nee quatsch die gehörn hier noch nicht drauf“ (“nonsense they do 
not belong here”) [58] 
(63) „auch irgendwie nicht“ (“no somehow not”) [27] 
(64) „nee wenn ich das jetzt aufeinander stapel dann fällt alles auseinander“ 
(“no if I stack this then it will fall apart”) [27] 
(65) „das was ich jetzt hier vorhabe nicht zu passen“ (“this what I plan to do 
not fit”)133 [27] 
(66) „nee dann sind diese runden Pinökel an diesen tragenden Flächen das 
geht nicht“ (“no then those round things are at those supporting surfaces 
this does not work”) [27] 
(67) „also so kann ich die Ecken hier nicht aufstellen“ (“thus, I cannot place 
the edges here”) [27] 
(68) „also kann das doch wieder nicht hinhauen“ (“thus, this does not work 
again”) [27] 
Positive evaluations were frequently characterized by the following linguistic 
representations: the discourse marker ‘so’ and the affirmative particle ‘gut’ (good). 
‘Gut’ was used along with different particles such as ‘ganz gut’ (alright) or in its 
superlative, i.e. ‘besser’ (better). Based on Erben’s (1972) interpretation of the dis-
course marker ‘so’ as signaling the acceptance of a conclusion, it can be argued 
that ‘so’ is also used as a marker of affirmation.  
Negative evaluations, on the other hand, were frequently characterized by 
negations, such as ‘nein’ (no), ‘nee’ (nope), and ‘nicht’ (not). Additionally, 
numerous instances of ‘irgendwie’ (somehow) were identified. As outlined in the 
sub-section focusing on the description of the category hypothesis, this phrasing 
indicated uncertainty of assignment. 
? Dead end 
At some stages within the assembly participants did not know how to proceed in 
their assembly; for some participants this resulted in a dead end state. The 
following examples are provided to illustrate the level of frustration expressed in 
those statements. 
In some utterances, participants expressed the state of helplessness (see examples 
(69), (71), (73), and (74)). Some participants verbalized reasons for this state, i.e. 
not knowing how to proceed (see examples (72) and (77)) and some stated the 
consequence, i.e. giving up (see example (70)). One participant verbalized that 
there was no progress, such as in examples (75) and (76). 
                                                        
133 The German phrase is elliptic, a verb is missing. Thus, the elliptic character is adapted in 
the translation. 
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(69) „ich krieg die Krise“ (“I am lost”) [32] 
(70) „mittlerweile bin ich fertig zum Aufgeben“ (“by now I am ready to give 
up”) [32] 
(71)     „scheiße ähm (pause) ähm ich hab keine Ahnung ich glaub ich werd nie 
fertig“ (“darn uhm (pause) uhm I have no clue I think I will never get this 
done”) [37] 
(72) „ich weiß überhaupt nicht wo ich anfangen soll“ (“I do not know where 
to start”) [37] 
(73) „ich weiß nicht mehr weiter“ (“I do not know how to go on”) [48] 
(74) „ok ich steh aufm Schlauch“ (“this phrase means that the spaker has no 
clue”) [50] 
(75) „äh ja ich bin gerade relativ ich komm nicht voran“ (“uh well I am 
relatively at the moment I do not progress”) [54] 
(76) „und ich komm gerade überhaupt nicht voran weil ichs nicht verstehe 
wie es funktionieren soll“ (“I do not progress at the moment because I do 
not understand how this should be working”) [54] 
(77) „und ich sehe momentan weiß ich garnicht wie ich weiter vorgehen soll“ 
(“and at the moment I see I do not know how to proceed”) [54] 
? Fresh start 
Some of those participants, who did not know how to proceed with the assembly, 
felt the need to take a fresh start. Fresh starts were rarely identified in the data, 
possibly because this process was seldom expressed linguistically or participants 
rarely chose this strategy. As linguistic representations of fresh start were rare, all 
occurrences are provided as examples. 
In examples (78), (83), and (85) participants verbalized the decision to start over 
again. Sometimes those plans were made explicit by stating that objects were 
disassembled as in examples (79), (80), (81), and (84). Other participants stated 
that they performed the actions in reverse order to recreate a previous state (see 
examples (82) and (86)). 
(78) „ok vielleicht fang ich noch mal von vorne an hier“ (“ok maybe I start 
over again”) [62] 
(79) „ok noch mal die zweite Etage runter nehmen“ (“ok take down the 
second story once more”) [62] 
(80) „und noch mal alles runter“ (“and everything down once more”) [62] 
(81)    „dann noch mal das Dach runter“ (“then the roof down once more”) [62] 
(82) „noch mal wieder zurück“ (“back again”) [59] 
(83) „also machen wir das ganze noch mal wieder von vorne“ (“thus, we will 
do all of this again from the start”) [59] 
(84) „also noch mal das weg“ (“thus, this away once more”) [14] 
(85) „ok noch mal sortieren“ (“ok sorting again”) [23] 
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(86) „obwohl doch ich mach alles noch mal rückwärts“ (“but yes I will do 
everything in reverse order once more”) [47] 
6.4.3.1.2 Further activated processes  
Besides those processes that reflect the problem solving activity directly, three 
additional categories were identified. These processes were activated by the 
problem solving activity. One category contained all verbalizations that reflected 
associations that arose while solving the task. This category was called aside (see 
examples (87), (89), (90), and (94)). The second category included all participants’ 
comments on the experiment. This information was subsumed in the category 
meta-level comments, such as in examples (92) and (93). The third category that 
was identified contained comments about the participants themselves and was 
thus called comment on self (see examples (91) and (95)). In some cases, more than 
one type of category was combined as illustrated in example (88). This example 
started with a comment at the meta-level about the task of think aloud. This 
reflection lead to an insight that was not related to the task at hand but of a 
general nature thus it was classified as an aside. 
(87) „wenn Häuslebauer in der Realität so ähm an nen Hausbau rangehen 
würden glaube ich würden wir alle doch ähm lieber in Höhlen leben“ (“if 
constructors uhm approach building a house like this in reality uhm we 
would rather live in caves again I believe”) [10] 
(88) „es hält wirklich auf sich bewusst zu werden was man eigentlich gerade 
denkt jetzt merk ich erst wie vielen glaub ich unbewusst stattfindet“ 
(“getting conscious about what you are think at the moment really slows 
you down now I realize how much happens unconsciously I think”) [10] 
(89) „ich denke dass es mir gut tut meine Gedanken zu formulieren ähm ich 
glaub es macht mich auch langsamer aber dafür werd ich mir bewusster 
was ich hier eigentlich tue“ (“I think it is good for me to verbalize my 
thoughts uhm I think it slows me down but I get more conscious about 
what I am doing”)134 [10] 
(90) „ich glaub räumliches Denken war noch nie so meine Stärke aber genau 
dafür lohnt sich das ja auch um irgendwie dieses räumliche Denken n 
bisschen zu schulen“ (“I believe spatial thinking as never been my strength 
but that is exactly why it is good to practice spatial reasoning a little”) [10] 
(91)     „ich hoffe das wird hier nirgendswo gezeigt weil irgenwie ist das gerade 
richtig peinlich“ (“I hope this will not be shown anywhere because for some 
reason Thus, is really embarrassing here right now”) [38] 
(92) „ich frag mich ob man mich versteht wenn das Holz so laut ist“ (“I am 
curious if I can be understood even though the wood is so loud”) [13] 
                                                        
134Interestingly, only one participant commented on the task of thinking aloud. The 
participant did so twice in the assembly highlighting that this topic was prominent in her 
mind. Therefore, both remarks are included. 
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(93) „ich glaub ich denk zu leise versteht man die Hälfte bestimmt nicht“ (“I 
think I am thinking to quietly half of it can probably not be understood”) 
[13] 
(94) „so beim Haus da denk ich ja erst recht wieder an mein Kinderzimmer 
an spielen aufm Spielplatz wo n Holzhaus war“ (“so a house I am thinking 
about my room as a child about playing at the playground at which there 
has been a wooden house”) [13] 
(95) „na ja Handwerk ist nicht so meine Sache“ (“well handcrafting is not my 
strength”) [13] 
Table 6.10 summarizes the identified problem solving processes and specifies if 
these are directly related to the problem solving process or if they are only 
activated by it. Additionally, the table indicates if these processes were previously 
described in the literature or if they were first identified in the present data set. 
process category problem solving activity or 
activated by problem solving 
activity 
previously described in the 
literature or new  
description of mental state problem solving activity new 
comment on object features problem solving activity new 
hypotheses problem solving activity previously described 
action problem solving activity previously described 
positive evaluation problem solving activity previously described 
negative evaluation problem solving activity previously described 
dead end problem solving activity previously described 
fresh start problem solving activity previously described 
meta-level comments activated by problem solving 
activity 
previously described 
comment on self activated by problem solving 
activity 
previously described 
aside activated by problem solving 
activity 
new 
Table 6.10: Summary of identified problem solving processes and those that were activated by the 
problem solving activity indicating their status as previously described or new. 
6.4.3.2 Frequency of process types 
In this section, the results of the frequency analysis of the processes defined above 
are presented. The presentation will follow the same structure as the previous sub-
section. First, the results of the distribution of the problem solving processes will 
be outlined. Second, the distribution of the other three processes, namely aside, 
meta-level comments, and comment on self will be presented. 
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The analysis of 50 think aloud protocols resulted in the coding of 2765 processes 
that belong to the categories description of mental state, comment on object 
features, plan for action, action, evaluation, dead end, fresh start, and hypotheses. 
Processes were summarized by participant to evaluate the influence of prior 
information on frequency of process types. 
The general distribution revealed that hypotheses were verbalized most frequently 
(976 cases, 35.3% of all cases) whereas dead end (26 cases) and fresh start (9 cases) 
were only rarely identified, i.e. both < 1.0% of all cases. Actions were the second 
most frequent process category (510 cases, 18.4%). Positive evaluations and de-
scriptions of mental state were equally frequently found (325 and 321 cases 
respectively). Furthermore, a comparable number of cases of negative evaluations 
and comments on object features were verbalized (280 and 273 cases respectively) 
(see Table 6.11). 
process category raw frequency mean (SD) raw 
frequency 
percentage 
hypothesis 976 19.52 (13.19) 35.30% 
action 510 10.20 (7.89) 18.44% 
positive evaluation 325 6.50 (5.33) 11.75% 
description of mental state 321 6.42 (5.24) 11.61% 
negative evaluation 280  5.60 (5.30) 10.13% 
comment on object features 273 5.46 (4.46) 9.87% 
plan for action 45 0.90 (1.89) 1.63% 
dead end 26 0.52 (0.99) 0.94% 
fresh start 9 0.18 (0.66) 0.33% 
sum 2765  100% 
Table 6.11: Distribution of process categories overall conditions (raw frequency and percentage); 
sorted by frequency from most to least frequent. 
The analysis of distribution of problem solving processes within conditions 
revealed a highly significant effect of prior information on frequency of problem 
solving processes, ?2 (16, N = 2765) = 45.2, p = .00. Evaluations were more often 
identified in the underspecified goal condition than in the other two conditions 
(see Table 6.12). Participants in the underspecified goal condition verbalized 
positive and negative evaluations at an almost equal frequency. Participants in the 
verbal and visual goal condition, in contrast, verbalized negative evaluations 
significantly less frequently (M = 4.2, SD = 1.01) than all other participants,  
z = -2.2, p < .01 (see Table 6.18 in the appendix for standardized residual).  
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process category underspecified 
goal condition 
verbal goal 
condition 
verbal and visual 
goal condition 
hypothesis 21.71 (4.44) 15.56 (2.15) 21.06 (2.49) 
action 11.82 (2.53) 8.88 (1.72) 9.82 (1.39) 
positive evaluation 8.12 (1.83) 5.94 (0.79) 5.42 (0.99) 
description of mental state 8.59 (1.54) 4.13 (0.91) 6.41 (1.11) 
negative evaluation 7.76 (1.75) 4.75 (0.76) 4.24 (1.01) 
comment on object features 6.06 (1.41) 4.88 (1.00) 5.41 (0.82) 
plan for action 0.94 (0.57) 1.25 (0.52) 0.53 (0.26) 
dead end 0.82 (0.27) 0.63 (0.30) 0.12 (0.81) 
fresh start 0.06 (0.06) 0.31 (0.25) 0.18 (0.13) 
Table 6.12: Mean raw frequency of process categories between conditions (standard deviation in 
brackets). 
Significant differences were also revealed in the distribution of descriptions of 
mental state. Participants in the underspecified goal condition described their 
mental state more frequently (M = 8.6, SD = 1.5) than participants in the verbal 
goal condition (M = 4.1, SD = 0.9), z = -2.0, p < .01. Additionally, participants in the 
underspecified goal condition verbalized comments on object features more 
frequently (M = 6.1, SD = 1.4) than participants in the verbal goal condition 
(M = 4.9, SD = 1.00).  
The same trend was revealed with regard to the frequency of hypothesis that was 
more frequently verbalized by participants in the underspecified goal condition 
(M = 21.7, SD = 4.4) than by participants in the verbal goal condition (M = 15.6, 
SD = 2.2). This trend is visually displayed in Figure 6.9. 
A reverse trend was observed with regard to planning an action; participants in the 
verbal goal condition verbalized plans significantly more often (M = 1.3, SD = 0.5) 
than participants in the other two conditions, z = 2.3, p < .01. A reverse trend was 
observed with regard to planning an action; participants in the verbal goal 
condition verbalized plans significantly more often (M = 1.3, SD = 0.5) than 
participants in the other two conditions, z = 2.3, p < .01. Dead end states were 
verbalized least frequently by participants in the verbal and visual goal condition 
(M = 0.1, SD = 0.8), z = -2.2, p < .01. 
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Figure 6.9: Distribution of the process categories hypotheses, actions, and description of mental state 
between conditions (mean raw frequency). 
In addition to the analysis of problem solving centered processes, a frequency 
analysis has been run for processes that are not directly involved in the problem 
solving process but rather activated by the task. Overall, the results revealed that 
comments on the meta-level (55 cases) were clearly more frequent than comments 
on self (22 cases) and asides (14 cases) (see Table 6.13). The great majority of these 
processes were verbalized in the underspecified goal condition, i.e. 62 processes as 
compared to 17 processes in the verbal goal condition, and 12 processes in the 
verbal and visual goal condition. The general distribution is not different between 
conditions, L?2 (4, N = 91) = 7.1, p = .13. 
process category asides 
 
comment on 
meta-level 
comment on 
self 
Sum 
underspecified goal 
condition 
13 (92.9%) 36 (65.5%) 13 (59.1%) 62 (68.13%) 
verbal goal 
condition  
1 (7.1%) 11 (20.0%) 5 (22.7%) 17 (18.68%) 
verbal and visual 
goal condition  
0 8 (14.5%) 4 (18.2%) 12 (13.19%) 
sum 14 (100%) 55 (100%) 22 (100%) 91 (100%) 
Table 6.13: Distribution of process categories between conditions (raw frequency with percentage in 
brackets). 
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6.4.3.3 Sequences of problem solving processes 
6.4.3.3.1 Process sequences assumed in the literature 
In an initial step, the frequency of sequences of problem solving processes that are 
often assumed in the literature were identified in the think aloud data. In order to 
assess the frequency of each combination, all possible combinations of annotated 
processes were extracted; Table 6.14 illustrates this procedure for the case of 
hypotheses. The analysis revealed that hypotheses were most frequently followed 
by evaluations (negative evaluations 19.0% and positive evaluations 18.2%). In 30% 
of the elicited sequences hypotheses were followed by actions. Examples (99) and 
(100) illustrate the sequence hypothesis → evaluation and examples (96) to (98) 
illustrate the sequence hypothesis → action.  
(96) „und diese Eckteile erklär ich einfach zu Trennwänden für 
Toilettenkabinen oder ja ne Küchenzeile [Hypothesis] mal sehen ob das 
hinkommt [Action]“ (“and those edgy things I declare to be separating 
walls for the toilets or yes a kitchenette [Hypothesis] let’s see if this works” 
[Action])135 [10] 
(97) „das ist schon mal das Dach alles klar [Hypothesis] dann hol ich erst mal 
alles da raus [Action]“ (“this is the roof al right [Hypothesis] then I will take 
everything out from there” [Action]) [27] 
(98) „ich brauch noch ne Platte [Hypothesis] ok also die Platte darunter 
wieder weg [Action]“ (“I still need a board [Hypothesis] ok this board away 
from down there again” [Action]) [27] 
(99) „so macht auch glaube ich nicht so wirklich Sinn [Hypothesis] aber geht 
ja darum wie es hinterher aussieht [Positive evaluation]“ (“I think this way 
it does not really make sense [Hypothesis] but it is all about what it looks 
like in the end” [Positive evaluation]) [27] 
(100) „und dann wird der letzte Teil da hin passen [Hypothesis] und das sieht 
auch aus wie witzig ja [Positive evaluation]“ (“and then this last object will 
fit over there [Hypothesis] and this looks funny yes” [Positive evaluation]) 
[27] 
sequence of problem solving processes raw frequency percentage 
Hypothesis → Action 154 30.20% 
Hypothesis → Negative evaluation 97 19.02% 
Hypothesis → Positive evaluation 93 18.24% 
Hypothesis → Dead end 3 0.59% 
Hypothesis → Fresh start 2 0.39% 
                                                        
135 The respective process category for the preceding process unit is specified in square 
brackets in the original and in the English translation. The number in square brackets after 
the original encodes the participants ID within the corpus. 
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Hypothesis → Comment on object feature 70 13.73% 
Hypothesis → Description of mental state 80 15.69% 
Hypothesis → Plan for action 11 2.16% 
SUM 510 100.00% 
Table 6.14: Raw frequency of all possible combinations of two-process sequences with hypothesis as 
the first process with the other categories that were identified. 
Sequences that started with an action were frequently succeeded by hypotheses 
(38.09%) or positive evaluations (22.62%) (see Table 6.15).  
sequence of problem solving processes Raw frequency Percentage 
Action → Plan for action 7 2.08% 
Action → Hypothesis 128 38.09% 
Action → Negative evaluation 46 13.69% 
Action → Positive evaluation 76 22.62% 
Action → Dead end 0 0% 
Action → Fresh start 1 0.30% 
Action → Comment on object feature 35 10.42% 
Action → Description of mental state 43 12.80% 
SUM 336 100.00% 
Table 6.15: Raw frequency of all possible combinations of two-process sequences with action as the 
first process with the other categories that were identified. 
The same approach was adapted to evaluate the frequency of a three-process 
sequence that is commonly assumed in the literature (e.g. Newell & Simon 1972), 
namely hypothesis → action → evaluation. The results, displayed in Table 6.16, 
revealed that this sequence was indeed the most frequently observed one in think 
aloud data if negative and positive evaluations are subsumed into one category of 
evaluation. Examples (101) to (105) illustrate verbalizations of this sequence. 
(101) „dann wär das glaub ich unten hinten [Hypothesis] mal ausprobieren 
[Action] so gut passt [Positive evaluation]“ (“I think this would be down 
there in the back [Hypothesis] let’s try it [Action] so this works fine” 
[Positive evaluation]) [36] 
(102) „dann kann man da ja noch Wände reinbauen [Hypothesis] ah erstmal 
wieder abbauen [Action] passt [Positive evaluation]“ (“then one may built 
in walls there [Hypothesis] ah disassemble first [Action] works” [Positive 
evaluation]) [53] 
(103) „theoretisch ist doch zumindest ne Tür da [Hypothesis] würd ich das so 
machen [Action] dann sind die aber wieder nicht verbunden [Negative 
evaluation]“ (“theoretically this is a door there [Hypothesis] I would do it 
like this [Action] the those are disconnected again” [Negative evaluation]) 
[19] 
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(104) „zumindest ist da ja kein Durchgang oder so [Hypothesis] kann man 
hier reinstellen [Action] nee wieder andersrum [Negative evaluation]“ (“at 
least there is no pass through or the like [Hypothesis] one my place it here 
[Action] no the other way around again” [Negative evaluation]) [19] 
(105) „vielleicht muss doch alles aufeinander gestapelt werden [Hypothesis] 
wenn ich jetzt hier die Ecken darunter packe [Action] nee dann sind diese 
runden Pinökel an diesen tragenden Flächen [Negative evaluation]“ 
(“maybe everything needs to be stacked on top of each other [Hypothesis] 
if I put the edges down here now [Action] no then those round things are 
at those supporting surfaces” [Negative evaluation]) [27] 
 
sequence of problem solving processes Raw frequency Percentage 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis  44 26.19% 
Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation 34 20.24% 
Hypothesis → Action → Negative evaluation 18 10.71% 
Hypothesis → Action → Dead end 0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Fresh start 1 0.60% 
Hypothesis → Action → Comment on object feature 9 5.36% 
Hypothesis → Action → Description of mental state 21 12.5% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action 38 22.62% 
Hypothesis → Action → Plan for action 3 1.79% 
SUM 168 100.00% 
Table 6.16: Raw frequency of all possible combinations of the three-process sequence starting with the 
two-process sequence hypothesis → action. 
6.4.3.3.2 Further process sequences  
Besides identifying process sequences that are described in the literature, the 
corpus was analyzed regarding frequent patterns that have not been described so 
far. In the literature no distinction is made between positive and negative 
evaluations but this was done in this analysis to investigate whether negative 
evaluations were followed by different processes than positive evaluations. The 
analysis revealed that negative evaluations were most frequently followed by 
hypotheses (see left column of Table 6.17) and positive evaluations were most 
frequently followed by hypotheses as well (see right column of Table 6.17). The 
process type hypothesis was also the most frequent one following dead end states 
(see Table 6.19 in the appendix). 
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sequence of problem 
solving processes 
raw 
frequency 
sequence of problem 
solving processes 
raw frequency 
Negative evaluation → 
Positive evaluation 
27 Positive evaluation → Dead 
end 
2 
Negative evaluation → 
Dead end 
4 Positive evaluation → Fresh 
start 
2 
Negative evaluation → 
Fresh start 
3 Positive evaluation → 
Comment on object features 
30 
Negative evaluation → 
Comment on object 
features 
22 Positive evaluation → 
Description of mental state 
33 
Negative evaluation → 
Description of mental 
state 
25 Positive evaluation → Action 52 
Negative evaluation → 
Action 
31 Positive evaluation → Plan 
for action 
4 
Negative evaluation → 
Plan for action 
1 Positive evaluation → 
Hypothesis 
75 
Negative evaluation → 
Hypothesis 
91 Positive evaluation → 
Negative evaluation 
21 
SUM 204 SUM 219 
Table 6.17: Frequency of all possible combinations of the category negative evaluation and positive 
evaluation with the other categories that have been identified. 
? Process sequences as observed in the data 
Additionally, it was analyzed which processes followed process types that were not 
described in the literature but identified in the data. The analysis highlighted that 
sequences starting with a comment on object features were also frequently 
succeeded by hypotheses. The same trend was observed for two-process sequences 
that started with descriptions of mental states (see Table 6.20 in the appendix). 
The same procedure was applied to search for frequent three process sequences 
expressing plans and actions. The search was not constrained to patterns that 
represent the exact string of processes but included strings that contained 
repetitions of the individual processes in the respective position to detect new 
patterns. In all extracted patterns the string that contained each process only once 
was the most frequent one. Thus, for a more structured overview only those strings 
are exemplified. The analysis highlighted that the sequences hypothesis → action 
→ hypothesis (see examples (106) and (107)) and hypothesis → action → action (see 
examples (108) and (109)) were very frequent.  
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(106) „sie bilden überhaupt kein System [Hypothesis] na gut die Dinger n 
draufsetzen [Action] an dem muss das jetzt so so könnte das halten 
[Hypothesis]“ (“they do not represent a system [Hypothesis] well put those 
things on top there [Action] now needs to at this now so so it could hold 
like that” [Hypothesis]) [19] 
(107) „und es muss ne zwote Etage hier noch rein [Hypothesis] erstmal alles 
rausholen [Action] achso das hießt hier n Fundament also muss das 
[Hypothesis]“ (“and there needs to be a second story in here [Hypothesis] 
take everything out first [Action] alright this means this basement here 
thus, this needs” [Hypothesis]) [18] 
(108) „so und jetzt hab ich hier noch zwei komische Wände [Hypothesis] mh 
also noch bisschen hier rauf [Action] und das so stellen [Action]“ (“so and 
now I still have to walls [Hypothesis] mh thus, some more up here [Action] 
and place this like this” [Action]) [19] 
(109) „irgendwas war noch in der Mitte [Hypothesis] dann kommen wir jetzt 
zu den beiden anderen Seiten [Action] ok also erstmal da drüben drauf 
[Action]“ (“something was in the middle there [Hypothesis] then we will 
start with the two sides here [Action] ok for a start there on top” [Action]) 
[19] 
Furthermore, the sequence action → hypothesis → action (see examples (110) and 
(111)) was frequently identified in the data (43 times, 41.0% of all possible 
combinations starting with action → hypothesis) (all results are reported in Table 
6.21 in the appendix).  
The two-process sequence hypothesis → negative evaluation was most frequently 
followed by hypothesis (30 times, 40.0% of all possible combinations starting with 
hypothesis → false lead) (all results are reported in Table 6.22 in the appendix). 
Examples (112) and (113) illustrate such a three-process sequence. 
(110) „die kann man so einzelnd verschieben [Action] ist hier noch ein Teil 
übrig doch das gehört dann vielleicht zum Dach [Hypothesis] versuche ich 
glaube ich mal [Action]“ (“one can slide those individually [Action] there is 
one part left here well this may belong to the roof [Hypothesis] I will try it I 
think” [Action]) [13] 
(111) „ich nehm das trotzdem mal [Action] ist wahrscheinlich nicht so 
gedacht [Hypothesis] ich machs aber trotzdem mal [Action]“ (“I will take 
this anyways [Action] probably this is not mend to be like this [Hypothesis] 
I will due it anyways” [Action]) [11] 
(112) „ähm ok sind das dann die Seitenwände [Hypothesis] nee die sind 
wahrscheinlich seitlich so [Negative evaluation] und das kommt dann 
bestimmt seitlich so [Hypothesis]“ (“ok those are the walls on the side then 
[Hypothesis] no those are probably on the sides like this [negative 
evaluation] and this probably belongs on the sides like that then” 
[Hypothesis]) [50] 
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(113) „und das irgendwie zusammen [Hypothesis] nee das macht ja auch 
keinen Sinn [Negative evaluation] oder ist es so rum [Hypothesis]“ (“and 
this together somehow [Hypothesis] no this does not make sense [Negative 
evaluation] or does it belong this way” [Hypothesis]) [50] 
The application of the search method for identifying four-process sequences 
revealed that four combinations were frequently used. All of them contained the 
combination of action and hypothesis. Thus, unsurprisingly, the most frequently 
used combination was hypothesis → action → hypothesis → action (17 times, 
41.46% of all possible combinations) (see Table 6.23 in the appendix) and in 
reversed order as well, i.e. action → hypothesis → action → hypothesis (11 times, 
28.95% of all possible combinations) (see Table 6.24 in the appendix). Examples 
(114) and (115) illustrate the sequence hypothesis → action → hypothesis → action 
and examples (116) and (117) exemplify the pattern action → hypothesis → action → 
hypothesis. 
Additionally, the sequence hypothesis → action → action → hypothesis has been 
identified 13 times (38.2% of all possible combinations) (see Table 6.26 in the 
appendix). The sequences action → hypothesis → action → positive evaluation was 
identified 11 times (29.0% of all possible combinations) (see Table 6.24 in the 
appendix). The sequence hypothesis → action → positive evaluation → hypothesis 
was also identified in 11 protocols (39.3% of all possible combinations) (see Table 
6.25 in the appendix). Example (117) illustrates the pattern action → hypothesis → 
action → positive evaluation, whereas example (118) exemplifies the sequence 
hypothesis → action → positive evaluation → hypothesis. 
(114) „da ist auch noch irgendwas Stift oder [Hypothesis] gut also das kommt 
hier unter [Action] dann muss ich [Hypothesis] nehm ich einfach 
irgendeins [Action]“ (“there is something a pin or [Hypothesis] well this 
belongs down here [Action] then I need to [Hypothesis] I take a random 
one” [Action]) [18] 
(115) „so vorne waren an beiden Seiten so zwei parallele Säulen [Hypothesis] 
muss ich jetzt irgendwie hier her stellen [Action] irgendwas war noch in 
der Mitte [Hypothesis] dann kommen wir jetzt zu den beiden Seiten 
[Action]“ (“so in the front there have been two columns in parallel 
[Hypothesis] I need to put here somehow [Action] something was in the 
middle [Hypothesis] then we will start with the two sides” [Action]) [27] 
(116) „so das da drauf [Action] eigentlich müsste hier glaube ich eine Ecke hin 
[Hypothesis] tue ich da in die Mitte [Action] zweistöckig [Hypothesis]“ (“so 
this on top there [Action] actually there needs to be an edge here I think 
[Hypothesis] I put it in the middle [Action] two stories” [Hypothesis]) [26] 
(117) „so das kommt hier hin dann hält das logischerweise auch besser 
[Action] hätte man auch vorher drauf kommen können [Hypothesis] so 
den Rest getan [Action] jetzt hält vermutlich auch das zweite Stockwerk 
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besser [Hypothesis]“ (“so this belongs here and then this stays fixed in a 
better way [Action] one may have had this idea before [Hypothesis] so the 
rest done [Action] probably the second story will stay fixed better as well 
now” [Hypothesis]) [26] 
(118) „ich leg jetzt erstmal alles was sich ähnlich sieht zusammen [Action] 
zum Teil soll dieses Gebäude nämlich auch noch irgendwelche Wände 
haben [Hypothesis] und jetzt möchte ich erstmal versuchen irgendwie das 
erste Stockwerk aufzubauen [Action] hm das geht [positive Evaluation]“ 
(“now I will put everything together that looks similar [Action] this 
building shall have walls partially as well [Hypothesis] and now I will try to 
assemble the first story [Action] hm this works“ [positive evaluation]) [23] 
(119) „bin ich genauso weit wie vorher [Hypothesis] wenn ich den jetzt hier so 
dazwischen [Action] so gut [Positive evaluation] und dann hier weiter 
[Hypothesis]“ (“I know as much as before [Hypothesis] if I this one in 
between here [Action] so well [Positive evaluation] and then continue 
here” [Hypothesis]) [19] 
Although the number of identical patterns decreased drastically by adding one 
more process, the ‘data mining’ technique was applied to identify frequent five-
process sequences as well. The results were in line with the previous findings 
highlighting that the processes action and hypothesis were part of all process 
combinations that were most frequently used. They frequently occurred within 
different patterns. Those were the following sequences  
? hypothesis → action → hypothesis → action → hypothesis (five 
times, 31.3% of all possible combinations). This sequence is 
exemplified in example (120) (all results are reported in Table 6.27 in 
the appendix). 
? action → hypothesis → action → positive evaluation → hypothesis 
(six times, 85.7% of all possible combinations) (all results are 
reported in Table 6.29 in the appendix). This sequence is 
exemplified in example (121). 
? hypothesis → action → action → hypothesis → action (six times, 
54.6% of all possible combinations) (all results are reported in Table 
6.28 in the appendix) This pattern is exemplified in example (122).  
(120) „hm das sind doch bestimmt zu wenig Teile denn nach meinen Plänen 
geht das so nicht [Hypothesis] dann nehm ich den und stell den und stell 
den ähh so da hin [Action] nee Dach was weiß ich [Hypothesis] das kommt 
da hin [Action] das hat bestimmt was mit dem Dach zu tun [Hypothesis] 
(“hm those are probably to few parts because according to my plans this 
does not work [Hypothesis] then I take this one and place it and place it uh 
this way over there [Action] no roof I don’t know [Hypothesis] this belong 
there [Action] probably this is related to the roof“ [Hypothesis]) [61] 
(121) „gut also das kommt hier runter [Action] dann muss ich [Hypothesis] 
nehm ich irgendeins [Action] so gut [Positive evaluation] noch einmal so 
[Hypothesis]“ (“alright this goes down here [Action] then I need to 
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[Hypothesis] I take just anyone [Action] so well [positive evaluation] this 
way once more” [Hypothesis]) [18] 
(122) „schon ganz andere Teile da sein [Hypothesis] erstmal den ganzen 
Krämpel raus [Action] so erstmal alle Teile und [Action] ja das Dach spar 
ich mir [Hypothesis] und erstmal fang ich hier mit den beiden Platten an 
[Action]“ (“different parts here [Hypothesis] first of all everything out 
[Action] so first all objects and [Action] yes the roof I disregard 
[Hypothesis] and first I will start with these boards over here” [Action]) [14] 
6.5 Discussion 
Research question 1 addressed the use of vertical and hierarchical assembly 
strategies under different conditions. Participants who built the second story on 
top of the first story followed a vertical structure, i.e. in a bottom-up manner. 
Participants who built the first and second story in parallel and placed the second 
story on the first story after it was completed, in contrast, followed a hierarchical 
assembly structure. In theses cases the overall structure was assembled by means 
of at least two subassemblies, i.e. first and second story. In experiment 1 the 
influence of prior information on the choice of assembly strategy was addressed. In 
experiment 2 the choice of assembly strategy was studied with regard to the 
influence of assembly trials because instructors assembled the dollhouse for 
themselves in an explorative assembly before their product was evaluated and they 
were told to assemble it once more to gain expert status. Furthermore, the 
assembly during the instructions could also be analyzed since the instructions 
were video taped as well (for more detail see chapter 4).  
Observations in think aloud protocols and in instructions revealed that 
participants assembling the dollhouse for themselves used vertical as well as 
hierarchical assembly. Participants who thought aloud during the assembly had a 
clear preference for vertical assembly (65%). Contrary to prior expectations, no 
influence of prior information on assembly strategy was observed. In contrast to 
Prabhu et al.’s (1995) proposal that perception of the product structure functions 
as a heuristic for the assembly procedure, these findings suggest that assembly 
structure was not guided by visual perception. One reason for these diverging 
findings might be the constraint that participants saw the picture but did not have 
it as a reference throughout the assembly. If the structure was not immediately 
salient in the 30 seconds in which the picture was presented, then the prerequisites 
might have been the same for all assemblers.  
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A trend was observed that suggests an influence of verbalization on choice of 
assembly strategy. Participants who assembled the dollhouse after seeing the 
picture but without the task to think aloud during the assembly chose the 
hierarchical assembly strategy more often than participants with the same prior 
information but who thought aloud. One possible explanation might be that 
participants observed the hierarchical structure of the dollhouse and used it as a 
guide in their assembly. Based on the proposal that hierarchical assembly involves 
more memory capacity to store the different sub-assemblies than vertical assembly 
(Prabhu et al. 1995), the findings suggest that these demands could be met by 
participants in the silent assembly condition but not by those who thought aloud.  
Interestingly, instructors showed a marked preference for vertical assembly (80%) 
in instructions. This preference was more marked than the preference observed in 
experiment 1. Comparing the occurrence of vertical assembly in first explorative 
assembly (EA) and in instructions (I) an influence of communicative intention can 
be assumed. This impression was supported by a minor statistically significant 
effect of influence of communicative intention on assembly strategy. 
This hypothesis was tested by annotating a third assembly, i.e. the assembly prior 
to the instruction task. As described in more detail in chapter 4, participants who 
assembled the dollhouse correctly were told to assemble it once more in 
preparation for a subsequent instruction (PI). Focusing on the use of hierarchical 
assembly the analysis revealed that two participants changed the strategy during 
the assembly and one participant chose the vertical strategy right away. Two 
participants kept using the vertical assembly. One of them choose the vertical 
assembly for the instructions as well. The other participant did not assemble the 
dollhouse during the instruction. This additional analysis highlighted that the 
observed difference between first time assembly (EA) and instructions was not an 
effect of communicative intention. The results rather suggest an unconscious 
learning effect. As participants knew the structure of the dollhouse, they did not 
need to construct the two stories in parallel but knew which objects belonged to 
which story. Thus, they sorted them, either physically or mentally, prior to the 
assembly and built the dollhouse in a vertical assembly. This finding suggests that 
vertical assembly is the default assembly strategy in assembling a two-story house. 
Research question 2 addressed the general structure of the think aloud protocols 
and the instructions. The content analysis revealed distinct categories to describe 
the beginnings of think aloud protocols. First of all, participants referred to parts 
of the instruction, e.g. what needed to be done (e.g. „also laut denken“ (“alright 
think aloud”)) and which objects were mentioned (e.g. „ok also die Materialien in 
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der Box dürfen ja auch verwendet werden“ (“ok the material in the box can be used 
as well”)). Second, participants conceptualized the objects they were presented 
with (e.g. „ok das ist das Dach“ („ok this is the roof”)). Third, participants started 
the task right away without any initial remarks (e.g. „ok alles raus hier“ („ok 
everything out here”)). The distribution of these processes revealed that the 
majority of participants started their assembly by referring to the instruction. The 
second most frequent categories were actions and conceptualizations of objects. 
The observation that assemblers most frequently recited parts of the instruction 
might be an effect of the experimental design. As participants were presented with 
the task before entering the room, their rehearsal may represent a strategy for 
memorization. The frequent identification of this strategy highlights the 
participants’ motivation to accomplish the task by paying close attention to the 
task constraints. This result might be an effect that is enhanced by the 
experimental situation because as Schoenfeld (1985) pointed out participants 
always want to fulfill the experimenter’s real or assumed expectations. The 
expectations are generally encoded in the instructions. Therefore, participants 
might pay close attention to them reciting them not to forget. Interestingly, the 
data revealed that participants who were provided with an external model, i.e. the 
picture of the goal object, tended to conceptualize objects in the introductory 
sequence more often than all other participants. This finding suggests that the 
external model encouraged first attempts of object conceptualization within the 
goal structure as early as in introductory remarks. 
Instructors were observed to either start the assembly by actions right away (e.g. 
„also zunächst einmal die Teile sortieren“ („alright sort all parts first”)) or to 
provide some information about the task (e.g. „so die Aufgabe ist es dieses Haus 
zusammen zu bauen“ (“so the task is to build this house together”)). This finding 
suggests that communicative intention does not have an effect on the way in 
which the assembly was introduced to an addressee. The high frequency of 
beginnings without any introductory information can be explained by the fact that 
instructors assembled the dollhouse at least two times prior to the instruction. 
Thus, they may have understood the instructions as a new assembly in line with 
the other ones. Alternatively, the results might reflect an effect of the experimental 
design. When the instructor was introduced to his/her partner the experimenter 
stated that their task was to assemble the dollhouse136. It might be possible that 
some instructors did not feel the need to restate the task again. 
                                                        
136 The exact instruction can be found in chapter 4. 
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The identified categories for beginnings in instructions correspond to the two 
strategies introduced by Rieser (1996), i.e. providing a global or local structure. 
Assemblers who started the assembly right away apparently choose the same 
strategy as instructors who did not provide any information about the goal 
structure but started with sub-assemblies as reported by Rieser (1996). Instructors 
who provided some information on the task offered a conceptualization of the task 
and the goal structure, a strategy that has been observed by Rieser (1996) as well. 
The strategy to offer lists of object parts as described in Daniel and Tversky (2012) 
was not observed in the data. One important difference between the experimental 
designs reported by Daniel and Tversky (2012) to that of Rieser (1996) and the one 
adapted in this thesis regards the instructor’s knowledge about the addressee. 
Whereas Daniel and Tversky (2012:305) asked their participants to instruct 
“someone else” on the assembly, instructors in the current experimental setting as 
well as in Rieser’s (1996) setting knew the addressee. As instructors did not know 
anything about the person who would read their instructions in Daniel and 
Tversky’s (2012) experiment, the instructors apparently adopted the general 
schema of an instruction, i.e. provide introductory information such as objects 
needed and goal structure, before providing detailed assembly steps. By choosing 
this approach, the instructor can expect that the majority of readers will be able to 
follow the instructions. In cases in which an addressee is known, there is no need 
to follow a formulaic structure; the instructor is less constrained and may start 
without much introduction. 
Regarding the closing of the assembly phase, it was expected that assemblers as 
well as instructors verbally indicated the task completion. Based on the proposed 
general structure of mental processes in assembly, it was assumed that assemblers 
evaluated the final product against the goal structure. It was expected that these 
evaluations were verbalized as comments on the final product as well as on 
personal performance.  
The analysis of the closing parts of the think aloud protocols revealed four 
strategies, namely evaluations, instruction related endings, construction related 
endings, and endings without any further information. The first category 
comprised phrases in which the assemblers evaluated the product or their abilities 
(e.g. „vielleicht n bisschen locker aber besser kann ichs nicht“ (“maybe a little loose 
but I cannot do it any better”)). If participants determined the ending in relation to 
an external point of reference, these were either the instructions (e.g. „ok sah das 
ungefähr so aus ja ich glaub schon“ (“ok did it look like this yes I think so”)) or 
some feature of the construction, such as stability (e.g. „hoffe dass es alles nicht 
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umfällt dann bin ich fertig (pause) fertig“ (“I hope that it will not collapse then I 
am done (pause) done”)). If no such information was verbalized, the phrases were 
coded as ending (e.g. „ich bin fertig“ (“I am done”)). The distribution of the 
identified categories highlighted the assemblers’ tendency to state that they were 
done without providing any further information about what determined this end 
(e.g. „ich bin fertig“(“I am done”)). If they provided information, they evaluated the 
assembled product. It is very likely that this tendency reflects one part of the initial 
task instructions as those explicitly stated „Wenn Sie mit der Aufgabe fertig sind, 
sagen Sie das bitte“ (“If you are finished with the task, please say so.”). No 
difference between assemblers was observed on closing sections with regard to 
prior information.  
Instructors either finished with evaluations or no further information (ending). 
Their endings did not differ from those observed in unaided object assembly in 
experiment 1. Contrary to the findings reported in Daniel and Tversky (2012), no 
suggestions on how to use the dollhouse or encouragements to be proud of the 
assembly that was completed could be identified. This difference is interesting 
because the results on the opening sequences of instructions suggested that 
participants in Daniel and Tversky’s (2012) study followed the general script of an 
instruction. In instructions accompanying objects or technical devices no 
encouragement to be proud will be provided because generally instruction texts 
are impersonal and action oriented (Engel 1996:132), i.e. not addressing the reader 
personally. The results suggest that instructors in the current experiment knew 
about this general convention and thus concluded the assembly by focusing on the 
assembled product without any comments about personal feelings. 
Whereas the introductory and closing sections of the protocols were analyzed so 
far, research question 3 focused about the content of the middle part. Eight 
problem solving processes and three activated processes were identified in the 
analysis. The eight problem solving processes resembled the expected categories 
and two additional ones. No instances of backtracking were identified though. 
Overall, the following processes were identified: comment on object features, 
hypotheses, action and plan for action, evaluation (positive and negative), dead end, 
and fresh start. Additionally, descriptions of mental state were verbalized. The later 
one was not described in the literature before. The identification of this process 
suggests that participants followed the instruction to verbalize everything what 
came to their minds. Therefore, this process might be specific to think aloud 
protocols. 
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Additionally, the problem solving activity resulted in the activation of the expected 
additional processes, namely meta-level comments, comments on self, and asides. 
Their distribution revealed that meta-level comments were most frequently and 
asides least often verbalized. The high frequency of meta-level comments can be 
interpreted as one feature of think aloud protocols as those have been identified in 
previous studies as well (Gralla et al. 2012). The low frequency of asides was 
surprising at first glance because the task to assemble a dollhouse was expected to 
activate childhood memories. However, keeping in mind that participants might 
have played with dollhouses but probably never assembled one themselves before, 
these memories might not be prominent during the assembly. The findings also 
suggest that participants were very engaged in the task without pondering about 
other topics. 
The observed frequencies of the eight problem solving processes revealed the 
components of the general search and test procedure as proposed by Newell and 
Simon (1972). In the data, hypotheses were the most frequently verbalized 
processes followed by evaluations (negative and positive combined) and actions. 
The formulation of hypotheses represents the verbalization of search processes 
because the analysis revealed that hypotheses expressed conceptualizations of 
objects and assembled structures as well as ideas about how to proceed. Taking 
actions and evaluating the outcome complement the search & test sequence 
because they represent sub-processes of a test procedure. The comparison of 
process frequencies between conditions revealed a significant effect of prior 
information on evaluations, descriptions of mental state and dead end states. 
Participants who were given only underspecified goal information verbalized 
negative evaluations and describe their mental state more frequently than 
participants who were provided with an external model (verbal and visual goal 
condition). Furthermore, in these protocols more verbalizations of dead end states 
were identified.  
These results can be interpreted as indicators of the more complex cognitive task 
that was posed by constructing an assembly structure from scratch; those 
participants formulated ideas that were not working and needed to be rejected as 
expressed in a negative evaluation. Participants who were provided with an 
external model seem to reject their hypotheses less frequently. One explanation 
might be that they used the memorized goal structure to access possible actions 
and concepts of objects – a strategy that seemed to result in acceptable and 
satisfactory new states in more cases than with participants in the underspecified 
goal condition. An alternative explanation might be that participants who needed 
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to construct a representation of the goal structure focused on each step and if a 
hypothesis did not work, they verbally rejected it. Participants who held a 
representation of the goal structure may have had different ideas and if one did not 
work, they tried another one. Thus, their focus was on the alternative hypothesis 
rather than on the rejection of the first hypothesis. Therefore, they might not have 
verbalized negative evaluations as frequently. This second explanation could be 
tested by comparing the frequency of the process sequence action → negative 
evaluation and action → hypothesis between these two conditions. This analysis 
was not run so far because the analysis of process sequences was performed across 
conditions and not within. 
The results revealed that prior information also influenced the frequency of task-
associated topics. Participants who were least constrained in their goal concept 
verbalized processes that were activated by the problem solving activity markedly 
more often than participants who knew about the nature of the goal. This finding 
suggests that participants who needed to define the goal object reflected on the 
task more frequently whereas participants who were presented with a well-defined 
problem adapted a pre-defined structure without engaging in free associations. 
The results further suggest that offering a goal concept, as imprecise as only 
mentioning its nature, activated a pre-defined structure already.  
Theoretical models of problem solving behavior assume a generic structure of 
sequences for problem solving processes, such as hypothesis → action → 
evaluation → hypothesis → action → evaluation. If the evaluation process confirms 
that the goal state is achieved, the task is done. However, empirical research on 
sequences of problem solving suggests that this assumption is too simplistic. 
Wedman et al. (1996), for example, studied problem solving processes involved in 
analogical transfer by comparing think aloud protocols of successful and 
unsuccessful problem solvers. In their introduction, the authors already caution 
that “analogical problem solving steps do not necessarily occur in a strict serial 
order” (Wedman et al. 1996:53). Their finding revealed that processes occurred in 
various sequences. The reported exemplary process graph (Wedman et al. 1996:55) 
illustrates very nicely that processes might be missing (here: exploring) and 
sequences do not represent the proposed theoretical model exactly. Furthermore, 
Wedman et al. (1996) do not offer any generalizations of their process graphs. This 
can be interpreted as an indicator of too much variance for extracting a general 
pattern of process sequences. 
Therefore, the question of recurring patterns of problem solving processes is 
addressed in research question 4. The analysis of sequences of problem solving 
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processes was performed with two aims in mind. First, process sequences as 
described in the literature were extracted. Second, additional recurring sequences 
of processes were identified. With regard to the first aim, the analysis of two 
process sequences revealed two frequent patterns, namely hypothesis → action and 
hypothesis → evaluation. These sequences represent parts of the process sequence 
that is assumed in the literature (e.g. de Groot 1969; Miller et al. 1970; Dörner 
1987). This is also the case for the most frequently verbalized three processes 
sequences. The patterns hypothesis → action → hypothesis, hypothesis → action → 
positive evaluation, and hypothesis → action → action represent parts of the 
structure but not in the exact order. The last example highlights the common 
phenomenon that processes occurred more than once before another process was 
verbalized.  
With regard to the second aim, the analysis revealed that sequences consisting of 
more than three processes were very difficult to identify because there was so 
much variability in the combination of processes. Keeping in mind that the 
frequency of each combination decreases as the number of possible combinations 
increases, the method was adapted by accepting that each process might occur 
multiple times at the respective spot. Under these revised constraints, the analysis 
revealed frequently recurring patterns of hypothesis → action → hypothesis → 
action, action → hypothesis → action → hypothesis, hypothesis → action → action 
→ hypothesis, and hypothesis → action → positive evaluation → hypothesis. These 
sequences reflect the search and test procedure highlighting that it can be 
expressed by different process combinations.  
Besides the identification of the most frequent patterns, interesting insights were 
gained by studying sequences that contained specific processes, such as comment 
on object features and description of mental state. The newly introduced process of 
comments on object features was frequently succeeded by hypotheses. This finding 
is in line with assumptions about people’s problem solving behavior in real live as 
described by Kirsh (2009). Kirsh (2009) points out that people actively search the 
environment to find clues to help them solve a problem. Object features such as 
affordances are used as hints to define their function and suggest which actions 
can be performed by using them. The result that perception of object features is 
frequently followed by hypotheses suggests that participants also use object 
features to generate ideas about functions of objects as well as possible actions. 
This interpretation is supported by the observation that three-process sequences 
starting with comments on object features → hypotheses were frequently followed 
by positive evaluation or action. The finding that formulated hypotheses were 
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followed by a positive evaluation suggests that actions might not have been 
verbalized but their outcome was evaluated subsequently. Interestingly, the rare 
cases of dead end states were either succeeded by description of mental state or 
hypotheses. This observation suggests that dead end states led to confusion and 
resignation as expressed in description of mental state or it was followed by new 
ideas as how to proceed as expressed in hypotheses. 
The presented results highlight that the method was suitable to identify frequently 
recurring patterns. However, the analysis also revealed that the frequency of 
sequences, in which each process occurs only once, is only reasonably high to 
compare different sequences of up to three processes. With sequences containing 
more than three processes the likelihood increases that each of the processes or all 
of them occur multiple times. Therefore, it was not possible to identify one single 
recurring frequent pattern of problem solving processes. This finding can be 
interpreted in three ways.  
On the one hand, participants may not have verbalized all processes and therefore, 
no single process sequences of the kind hypothesis → action → positive evaluation 
→ hypothesis could be identified. This explanation needs to be considered in all 
analyses of verbal reports because although participants are told to verbalize 
everything that comes to their minds there will always be thoughts that are not 
verbalized (for a general discussion see chapter 3). However, given the great 
number of processes that was elicited in the 50 think aloud protocols, namely 2765 
processes, this effect can be expected to be small. On the other hand, it may be 
possible that participants did not execute each individual process. 
The results suggest a third interpretation, namely that the processes do not occur 
in the schematic way as proposed in the literature (e.g. de Groot 1969; Miller et al. 
1970; Schoenfeld 1985; Dörner 1987). The observation that the proposed sequences 
occurred but only as one option among different sequences suggests that the 
literature focuses on only one possible combination of processes. This 
interpretation is supported by findings reported in Wedman et al. (1996) as 
outlined above. Their study of problem solving processes involved in analogical 
transfer revealed that processes occurred in various sequences and occasionally 
processes that were proposed by the theoretical model were missing. Thus the 
observed sequences of problem solving processes did not represent the proposed 
theoretical model exactly. 
Nonetheless, a comparison between Wedman et al.’s (1996) study and Schoenfeld’s 
(1985) study suggests that although no single generic model can be identified the 
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identification of problem solving processes and their content highlights a structure 
that allows for general conclusions. These general structures are detailed enough 
to compare problem solving behavior in different tasks within the same problem 
area, i.e. analogical reasoning. Schoenfeld (1985) proposed a general model for 
mathematical problem solving, namely read – analyze – explore – plan – implement 
– verify. Based on this theoretical model, Wedman et al. (1996:60) identified the 
general sequence of plan – implement – verify to describe analogous problem 
solving in their study. Thus their finding supported the initial general model by 
testing it in a specific area of mathematical problem solving. This finding stresses 
that recurring patterns can be identified but for drawing conclusions they need to 
be generalized, which results in abstractions of the observed processes. Ericsson 
and Simon (1993) emphasize the importance of this process of abstraction in order 
to match verbalizations of problem solving steps to the process traces generated by 
the computer program applying the theoretical general model. However, Wedman 
et al.’s (1996) analysis further suggests that variance is observed but is not 
accounted for in the generalized model. 
By adapting a similar approach in which variance is accounted for but repetition of 
processes is accepted, the findings in the present study revealed the following 
sequence of problem solving processes for unaided object assembly: hypothesis → 
action → hypothesis and hypothesis → action → positive evaluation. This general-
ized sequence supports one part of the structure that was identified at an early 
state of the analysis (see 6.2). The part that is supported involves the most 
frequently identified processes, i.e. hypotheses and evaluations. However, the 
analysis also revealed that sequences involving less frequent processes, such as 
dead end and fresh start, could not be generalized because they occurred in various 
combinations with other processes. 
This means that a trend that was observed in the analysis of eleven protocols could 
not be observed as clearly in the data of 50 protocols. This finding suggests that 
there are various possibilities for solving a task and the more verbalizations of 
structures are analyzed the less frequent one combination will be. Research 
reported by Gugerty and Rodes (2007) also highlights that there are different 
strategies that lead to the same observable performance. In their study they 
analyzed participants’ strategies of using a map for determining cardinal directions 
between two objects. They compared the observed behavior to the performance of 
the theoretical computational model. Behavioral data was elicited by think aloud 
protocols during practice trials and in terms of performance time in test trials. 
Their theoretical model made predictions for three different strategies. The 
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analysis of think aloud protocols highlighted that participants used all three 
strategies (Gugerty & Rodes 2007:206). The comparison between the model and 
the observed behavior revealed that different mental strategies result in the same 
observable behavior. 
The findings presented by Gugerty and Rodes (2007) and the results of the present 
study point out that single case studies, such as those reported by Newell and 
Simon (1972) or Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue (2010), are well suited for 
studying one possible way of solving a task but the comparison between different 
problem solvers allows to study alternative structures. However, as illustrated in 
the present analysis, the trade-off is a less coherent and less well-structured 
representation of the problem solving activity that is difficult to generalize. 
Therefore, future work would need to identify systematic patterns of variance, e.g. 
which process occurs multiple times most frequently and in which position, in 
order to define rules for generalizing sequences that display much variance by 
preserving the specific character displayed in the verbal protocols. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Before going into detail it needs to be stressed that the basic finding is the first 
important step in the analysis presented in this thesis; the identification of 
problem solving processes in the recorded think aloud protocols verifies the 
hypothesis that unaided assembly is a task that results in problem solving activity. 
More specifically, the categories that are identified to describe the initial sequences 
of think aloud protocols support one assumption postulated in the general 
structure of mental processes in assembly, namely that goal representations can be 
formulated on a conceptual level or on the action level. Additionally, the frequency 
of the categories action and conceptualization suggests that these are common 
points of reference when goal representations are formulated. With regard to the 
motivation for achieving the formulated goal, the great number of references to 
the task instructions suggests that participants were highly extrinsically motivated. 
Furthermore, the categories identified in instructions resembled some strategies 
that are described in the literature. The analysis of the closing phrases in think 
aloud protocols highlighted that assemblers evaluated the final product in the end 
as a final step of the assembly task if they provided information about the reason 
for determining the end of the task. This finding supports the assumption about 
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the final evaluation stage postulated in the general structure of mental processes in 
assembly.  
The analysis and description of the verbalized mental and physical actions revealed 
categories that are commonly assumed to characterize problem solving activities. 
The high frequency of hypotheses, evaluations, and actions represent the 
components of the search and test procedure. This observation is strengthened by 
the finding that the sequence hypothesis → action → positive evaluation, which 
reflects the search and test procedure, was among the three most frequent three-
process sequences. The identification of frequently recurring patterns of problem 
solving processes stressed that processes occur multiple times. This observation 
suggests that generalized models, such as the general structure of mental processes 
in assembly as proposed in 6.1.2.2 are helpful for a basic understanding but they 
cannot adequately represent the actual problem solving behavior that appears less 
serial structured. In addition to the identification of known problem solving 
processes, the analysis highlighted three processes that were activated by the 
problem solving activity and that are not systematically addressed in the literature 
on problem solving so far. 
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6.7 Appendix 
6.7.1 Script ‘find pattern’ 
#!/usr/bin/python 
#version 0.5.1 
import getopt, re, sys 
 
 
def usage() : 
 print '''Usage:  ./findpattern [OPTIONS] PATTERN INFILE 
OUTFILE 
Example: ./findpattern -g ABC file1.txt file2.txt 
 
Options: 
 -h, --help        Print this help. 
 -1, -e, --exact      Search for each occurrence of PATTERN in 
each line 
              of INFILE. (This is the default.) 
 -2, -g, --greedy     Search for each occurrence of PATTERN in 
each line 
              of INFILE. Each single letter in PATTERN may occur 
              multiple times. Matching is greedy. e.g. given the 
              pattern "ABC" and the line "AABBCCDDDDAABCCCD" the 
              search matches the substrings "AABBCC", "AABCCC". 
 -3, -c, --count      Only count the number of occurrences of the 
given 
              pattern. 
   -s, --sortbynumber  When counting, sort by the number of 
occurrences 
              instead of the alphabetical order of matches. 
              (Implies -c) 
   -m, --showmatches   Show detailed information about the matches 
in 
              each line. 
Comments: 
 Filename '-' stands for StdIn or StdOut.''' 
 
 
def main() : 
 # get options and arguments: 
 try : 
  opts, args = getopt.getopt(sys.argv[1:], 'h1e2g3csm', 
['help', 'exact', 'greedy', 'count', 'sortbynumber', 
'showmatches']) 
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 except getopt.GetoptError, err : 
  # print help information and exit: 
  print str(err) + "\n" # will print something like 
"option -a not recognized" 
  usage() 
  sys.exit(64) 
 
 # check wether all arguments are given: 
 if len(args) != 3 : 
  print "Wrong number of arguments!\n" 
  usage() 
  sys.exit(64) 
 
 # set defaults: 
 count = False 
 greedy = False 
 sortbynumber = False 
 showmatches = False 
 
 # read options: 
 for o, a in opts: 
  if o in ("-h", "--help") : 
   usage() 
   sys.exit(0) 
  elif o in ("-1", "-e", "--exact") : 
   greedy = False 
  elif o in ("-2", "-g", "--greedy") : 
   greedy = True  
  elif o in ("-3", "-c", "--count", "-s", "--
sortbynumber") : 
   count = True 
   matches_dict = {} 
   if o in ("-s", "--sortbynumber") : 
    sortbynumber = True 
  elif o in ("-m", "--showmatches") : 
   showmatches = True 
  else : 
   assert False, "unhandled option" 
 
 if not(showmatches or count) : 
  print "Nothing to do!\n" 
  usage() 
  sys.exit(64) 
 
 # compile the RegEx-Pattern: 
224 FEATURES OF ANALYSIS: PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESSES IN UNAIDED OBJEKT ASSEMBLY 
 
 patterN = args[0] 
 if greedy : 
  p = re.compile(pattern.replace('','+')[1:]) 
 else : 
  p = re.compile(pattern) 
 
 # open input and output files: 
 if args[1] == '-' : 
  infile = sys.stdin 
 else : 
  try : 
   infile = open(args[1], 'r') 
  except IOError : 
   print "Could not open the input file %s" % 
args[1] 
   sys.exit(66) 
 if args[2] == '-' : 
  outfile = sys.stdout 
 else : 
  try : 
   outfile = open(args[2], 'a') 
  except IOError : 
   print "Could not open the output file %s" % 
args[2] 
   sys.exit(74) 
 
 # search line by line: 
 line = infile.readline().strip() 
  
 # write command to outfile: 
 outfile.write("#%s " % sys.argv[0].lstrip('./')) 
 for i in sys.argv[1:] : 
  outfile.write("%s " % i) 
 outfile.write("\n\n") 
 
 while line : 
  if line[:1] != '#' : 
   string = line[line.find(':') + 1:] 
   if showmatches : 
    outfile.write(line[:line.find(':') + 1]) 
    matches_iter = p.finditer(string) 
    try : 
     firstmatch = matches_iter.next() 
    except StopIteration : 
     sys.exc_clear() 
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    else : 
     outfile.write("%d-%d %s" % 
(firstmatch.start() + 1, firstmatch.end(), firstmatch.group())) 
     for match in matches_iter : 
      outfile.write(", %d-%d %s" % 
(match.start() + 1, match.end(), match.group())) 
    outfile.write(";\n") 
   if count : 
    matches_list = p.findall(string) 
    for match in matches_list : 
     if match in matches_dict.keys() : 
      matches_dict[match] += 1 
     else : 
      matches_dict[match] = 1 
  line = infile.readline().strip() 
 if count : 
  if showmatches : 
   outfile.write('\n') 
  if sortbynumber : 
   matches_dict_sorted = 
sorted(matches_dict.items(), key=lambda(k,v):(v,k)) 
  else : 
   matches_dict_sorted = 
sorted(matches_dict.items()) 
  outfile.write("#Number of occurrences:\n\n") 
  for k, v in matches_dict_sorted : 
   outfile.write("%s: %d\n" % (k, v)) 
 
 # Close all files. 
 infile.close() 
 outfile.close() 
 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
 main() 
 
 
6.7.2 Local structure 
process 
category/ 
Condition 
description 
of mental 
state 
comment 
on object 
features 
action positive 
evaluation 
negative 
evaluation 
hypo-
thesis 
underspecified 1.4 -0.7 -0.4 0.5 1.7 -1.3 
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goal condition 
verbal goal 
condition 
-2.0 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.3 -0.5 
verbal and visual 
goal condition 
0.3 0.2 -0.2 -1.5 -2.2  1.9 
Table 6.18: Cross-table condition × process category displaying standardized residuals. 
6.7.3 Process sequences 
sequence of problem 
solving processes 
raw 
frequency 
sequence of problem 
solving processes 
raw frequency 
Dead end → Fresh start 1 Fresh start → Comment on 
object features 
1 
Dead end → Comment 
on object features 
1 Fresh start → Description of 
mental state 
0 
Dead end → Description 
of mental state 
7 Fresh start → Action 3 
Dead end → Action 0 Fresh start → Plan for action 0 
Dead end → Plan for 
action 
0 Fresh start → Hypothesis 5 
Dead end → Hypothesis 7 Fresh start → Negative 
evaluation 
0 
Dead end → Negative 
evaluation 
0 Fresh start → Positive 
evaluation 
0 
Dead end → Positive 
evaluation 
2 Fresh start → Dead end 0 
SUM 19 SUM 9 
Table 6.19: Frequency of all possible combinations of the category dead end and fresh start with the 
other categories that have been identified. 
sequence of problem 
solving processes 
raw 
frequency 
sequence of problem 
solving processes 
raw frequency 
Comment on object 
features → Description 
of mental state 
25 Description of mental state 
→ Action 
46 
Comment on object 
features → Action 
37 Description of mental state 
→ Plan for action 
2 
Comment on object 
features → Plan for 
action 
5 Description of mental state 
→ Hypothesis 
88 
Comment on object 
features → Hypothesis 
94 Description of mental state 
→ Negative evaluation 
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Comment on object 
features → Negative 
evaluation 
20 Description of mental state 
→ Positive evaluation 
25 
Comment on object 
features → Positive 
evaluation 
15 Description of mental state 
→ Dead end 
5 
Comment on object 
features → Dead 
2 Description of mental state 
→ Fresh start  
0 
Comment on object 
features → Fresh start 
0 Description of mental state 
→ Comment on object 
features 
23 
SUM 198 SUM 221 
Table 6.20: Frequency of all possible combinations of the category comment on object features and 
description of mental state with the other categories that have been identified. 
sequence of problem solving processes raw frequency percentage 
Action → Hypothesis → Negative evaluation 16 15.24% 
Action → Hypothesis → Positive evaluation 18 17.14% 
Action → Hypothesis → Dead end 0 0 
Action → Hypothesis → Fresh start 0 0 
Action → Hypothesis → Comment on object feature 14 13.33% 
Action → Hypothesis → Description of mental state 8 7.62% 
Action → Hypothesis → Action 43 40.95% 
Action → Hypothesis → Plan for action 4 3.81% 
SUM 103 100.00% 
Table 6.21: Frequency of all possible combinations of the category action → hypothesis with the other 
categories that have been identified. 
sequence of problem solving processes raw 
frequency 
percentage 
Hypothesis → Negative evaluation → Hypothesis 30 40.00% 
Hypothesis → Negative evaluation → Positive evaluation 10 13.33% 
Hypothesis → Negative evaluation → Dead end 1 1.33% 
Hypothesis → Negative evaluation → Fresh start 0 0 
Hypothesis → Negative evaluation → Comment on object 
feature 
10 13.33% 
Hypothesis → Negative evaluation → Description of mental 
state 
9 12.00% 
Hypothesis → Negative evaluation → Action 14 18.67% 
Hypothesis → Negative evaluation → Plan for action 1 1.33% 
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SUM 103 100.00% 
Table 6.22: Frequency of all possible combinations of the category hypothesis → negative evaluation 
with the other categories that have been identified. 
sequence of problem solving processes raw 
frequency 
percentage 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Negative evaluation 6 14.63% 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Positive evaluation 4 9.76% 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Dead end 0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Fresh start 0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Comment on object 
feature 
10 24.39% 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Description of 
mental state 
3 7.32% 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Action 17 41.46% 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Plan for action 1 < 1% 
SUM 41 100.00% 
Table 6.23: Frequency of all possible combinations of the categories hypothesis → action → hypothesis 
with the other categories that have been identified. 
sequence of problem solving processes raw 
frequency 
percentage 
Action → Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis 11 28.95% 
Action → Hypothesis → Action → Negative evaluation 6 15.79% 
Action → Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation 11 28.95% 
Action → Hypothesis → Action → Dead end 0 0 
Action → Hypothesis → Action → Fresh start 1 2.63% 
Action → Hypothesis → Action → Comment on object 
feature 
2 5.26% 
Action → Hypothesis → Action → Description of mental 
state 
6 15.79% 
Action → Hypothesis → Action → Plan for action 1 2.63% 
SUM 38 100.00% 
Table 6.24: Frequency of all possible combinations of the categories action → hypothesis → action 
with the other categories that have been identified. 
sequence of problem solving processes raw 
frequency 
percentage 
Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → Hypothesis 11 39.29% 
Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → Negative 
evaluation 
1 3.57% 
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Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → Dead end 0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → Fresh start 0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → Comment on 
object feature 
4 14.29% 
Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → Description 
of mental state 
2 7.14% 
Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → Action 9 32.14% 
Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → Plan for 
action 
1 3.57% 
SUM 28 100.00% 
Table 6.25: Frequency of all possible combinations of the categories hypothesis → action → positive 
evaluation with the other categories that have been identified. 
sequence of problem solving processes raw 
frequency 
percentage 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Hypothesis 13 38.24% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Negative evaluation 3 8.82% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Positive evaluation 9 26.47% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Dead end 0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Fresh start 1 2.63% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Comment on object 
feature 
3 8.82% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Description of mental 
state 
4 11.76% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Plan for action 1 2.63% 
SUM 34 100.00% 
Table 6.26: Frequency of all possible combinations of the categories hypothesis → action → action 
with the other categories that have been identified. 
sequence of problem solving processes raw 
frequency 
percentage 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis 5 31.25% 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Action → Negative 
evaluation 
3 18.75% 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Action → Positive 
evaluation 
4 25.00% 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Action → Dead end 0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Action → Fresh start 0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Action → Comment 
on object feature 
1 6.25% 
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Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Action → 
Description of mental state 
2 12.5% 
Hypothesis → Action → Hypothesis → Action → Plan for 
action 
1 6.25% 
SUM 16 100.00% 
Table 6.27: Frequency of all possible combinations of the categories hypothesis → action → hypothesis 
→ action with the other categories that have been identified. 
sequence of problem solving processes raw 
frequency 
percentage 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Hypothesis → Negative 
evaluation 
2 18.18% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Hypothesis → Positive 
evaluation 
1 9.09% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Hypothesis → Dead end 0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Hypothesis → Fresh start 0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Hypothesis → Comment 
on object feature 
0 0 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Hypothesis → 
Description of mental state 
1 9.09% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Hypothesis → Action 6 54.55% 
Hypothesis → Action → Action → Hypothesis → Plan for 
action 
1 9.09% 
SUM 11 100.00% 
Table 6.28: Frequency of all possible combinations of the categories hypothesis → action → action → 
hypothesis with the other categories that have been identified. 
sequence of problem solving processes raw 
frequency 
percentage 
Action →Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → 
Hypothesis 
6 85.71% 
Action →Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → 
Negative evaluation 
0 0 
Action →Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → 
Dead end 
0 0 
Action →Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → 
Fresh start 
0 0 
Action →Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → 
Comment on object feature 
0 0 
Action →Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → 
Description of mental state 
0 0 
Action →Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → 1 14.29% 
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Action 
Action → Hypothesis → Action → Positive evaluation → 
Plan for action 
0 0 
SUM 7 100.00% 
Table 6.29: Frequency of all possible combinations of the categories action → hypothesis → action → 
positive evaluation with the other categories that have been identified. 
 

 7 Features of analysis:  
verb form in problem solving 
processes 
7.1 State of the Art 
“The gateway through which meanings are brought together and realized in 
ordinary grammar is the clause; and the clause nucleus is a happening 
(Process + Medium, in systemic terms). So natural language represents 
reality as what happens, not as what exists; things are defined as 
contingencies of the flow.” (Halliday 2009:39) 
This quote by Halliday (2009b) on language and linguistics summarizes his 
postulate that language is the construction of meaning137 and the representation of 
                                                        
137  Halliday (2009a:60) stresses that “language has the further property that it is a 
semogenic system: a system that creates meaning” (emphasize in the original). 
Furthermore, Webster (2009) summarizes very cunningly that Halliday understands 
meaning as a formation “out of an infinite meaning potential for reflecting on the world 
and interacting with others in it” (Webster 2009:1). 
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experience. Furthermore, he stresses the dynamic nature of reality, which needs to 
be represented in a theory of language as well – this view will be outlined in more 
detail in the presentation of the systemic functional grammar approach to 
language. In general, this chapter focuses on the representation of the process, i.e. 
the experience, in the clause. Verb phrases encode a variety of aspects, among 
them are the nature of the process (verb type) and interpersonal elements (mood 
and modality). By the selection of verb mood, the speaker selects his own and the 
addressee’s role in the speech situation. The speaker’s judgments and predictions 
are encoded in the choice of modality (Halliday 2009:103). These features of the 
verb phrase will be introduced regarding the state of the art starting with the 
representation of modality in German. Mood is discussed as one aspect of modality 
in this section. Following this presentation, literature on verb types in German is 
summarized and discussed. Based on this overview, the guiding questions for the 
analysis of think aloud protocols in self-assembly and spoken instructions are 
formulated. Following a detailed description of the procedure for the analysis, the 
results are presented. The chapter closes with a summary of the main findings that 
are discussed in the light of the theoretical observations and descriptions that are 
outlined now. 
Erben (1972:62) states that it is the finite verb that encodes the sentence’s 
intention. Therefore, some more words shall be spent on the information that may 
be encoded in the verb in general before focusing on the literature on German 
modality and verb type. Boroditsky et al. (2003) subsume that verbs transmit 
different information for the addressee in the various languages. They summarize 
that verbs may encode different information about the speaker (the number of 
speakers, the gender), the action that is being described (is it completed or only 
partially done), the relevance of the action to the speaker and the addressee, 
politeness, and temporal aspects. In Japanese, politeness is encoded in verb form, 
i.e. potentially face threatening acts of asking a favor, permission, or saying out 
loud one’s thoughts are represented by the use of morphemes (for a brief overview 
see Bateman 1988). In Russian, the verb encodes information on the agent’s gender 
and on the action’s stage of completion if the speaker refers to the past. The stage 
of completion is also marked in the future tense, a fact which Lera Boroditsky (no 
date) commented on by stating that in Russian a teacher makes strong 
commitments by telling a student to read his paper tomorrow.138 In English 
information about tense is predominant. Hentschel and Weydt (2003:38) list 
                                                        
138 This examples is given in a talk about the relation between language and thought 
(Boroditsky, no date; http://fora.tv/2010/10/26/Lera_Boroditsky_How_Language_-
Shapes_Thought; 25.05.2012). 
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aspect as one feature that is shared by Slavic languages. They further remark that 
German also has aspect marking in its verb system but it is not as fine grained as in 
Slavic languages (Hentschel & Weydt 2003:46)139. Besides aspect, speakers of Tur-
kish include information on the source of knowledge (eyewitness vs. hearsay) in 
the verb (Boroditsky, no date).  
In German, verbs encode information on person, number, gender, mood, and tense 
(Hentschel & Weydt 2003:4). Hentschel and Weydt (2003) state that verbs are 
distinguished from other word classes by its information on time. Glinz (1973) 
provides an overview on the information that is encoded in a German verb (Figure 
7.1) illustrating that Hentschel and Weydt’s (2003) view is too limited. Glinz (1973) 
outlines that verb form encodes information on the role of the subject (person)140 
within the speech situation, i.e. is it the person speaking or is the subject the 
person who is addressed or is he/she being talked about and how many people are 
taking this role (number). The verb also encodes information on modality (mode), 
which is bound to tense as will be explained in the following sub-section. Glinz 
(1973:111) also includes the imperative mode in his overview. He calls it “fordernde 
Formen” (forms of request). 
 
Figure 7.1: Information encoded in the German verb; here exemplified with ‘be’ (adapted from Glinz 
1973:110,111). 
                                                        
139 Buscha and Helbig (2005:62-67) also describe the different types of aspect that can be 
found in German. But since aspect is not an important feature of German it will not be 
discussed in detail in this thesis. 
140 The figure is presented in German because Glinz (1973) specifies the information 
encoded in German verbs and the analysis in this thesis will focus on German data. The 
terminology provided in brackets is in English because the English terminology is adapted 
throughout the theoretical discussion within this chapter. 
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Engel (2002:77) argues that there is a need to construct temporal relation 
expressed in a verb by considering tense marking and nonverbal elements. He 
chooses the following examples to illustrate that verbs encode information beyond 
the temporal aspect: 
(123) Geht ihr mit zur Sitzung? (Präsens, aber Zukunft) (Are you going to the 
meeting?) 
(124) Wie war noch ihr Name? (Präteritum, aber Gegenwart) (How was your 
name?) 
(125) Harald wird wohl im Bett liegen. (Futur, aber Gegenwart) (Harald is 
probably lying in bed.) 
(126) Am 11.9.2001 wird das World Trade Center in New York zerstört. 
(Präsens, aber Vergangenheit) (On the 11 of September the World Trade 
Centre was distroyed.) 
In the first question, the speaker asks the addressees if they will be going to the 
meeting with him/her. Even though the event lies in the future, the speaker 
chooses the present tense. The second example represents a question that is 
frequently posed when unfamiliar people meet. The speaker is asking for the 
addressee’s name, knowledge that he is lacking at the moment, but he chooses the 
past tense. This example illustrates how much information is encoded in tense 
marking. Not knowing anything about the addressee and the speaker, the reader 
can already infer that the two people have introduced themselves before. It can be 
assumed that the speaker wants to highlight the moment of recognition by 
choosing the past tense marking over the present tense. By choosing the future 
tense in the third example, the speaker signals that she is assuming Harald’s 
current location but that he/she is not certain about it. This information is not 
included in the future tense marking but rather in the particle ‘wohl’.141 The final 
example illustrates a case in which a past event is described in the present tense. 
Based on examples as these, Engel (2002) concludes that verbs encode information 
on reality, relevance, and tense (see Figure 7.2 for an overview). Therefore, he 
argues that much information would be lost if the focus was exclusively on the 
tense aspect. 
 
 
 
                                                        
141 The presented analysis of Engel’s (2002) examples extends what is being said about their 
meaning potential by Engel himself. This more elaborate analysis shall give the reader a 
first impression of the detailed information that can be gained by a detailed linguistic 
analysis which goes beyond tense marking. 
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 reality relevance time 
present tense + + not specific 
past tense + – past 
subjunctive mood142 hypothetical – not specific 
imperative – + future 
Figure 7.2: Information that is encoded in the tense marking of the verb (adapted from Engel, 2002:78) 
(+ information encoded, - information not encoded). 
This view was already stated by Erben (1972) when he remarks that  
“eine Aussage (oder Frage), deren Hauptverb im Präsens steht, ist nicht 
schon durch die Verbfrom in ihrer zeitlichen Geltung eingeschränkt. Erst 
der Kontext kann solche Einschränkungen hinzufügen.” (Erben 1972:87)  
(“A statement (or question), with a main verb in the present tense is not 
restricted by the verb concerning its temporal dimension. It is the context 
that adds this restriction.”) 
In sum, tense is an indicator concerning the relation between time and the content 
expressed in an utterance. However, this relation is further refined by the context 
of speaking and additional markers within the sentence, such as modal adverbs, or 
aspects encoded in the verb, such as modality. 
7.1.1 Modality 
Modality encodes the speaker’s evaluation concerning the reality or possibility to 
realize the circumstances that are described in the utterance (Halliday 1970; 
Hentschel & Weydt 2003:114). It may also encode the speaker’s “request of a 
judgment of the listener on the status of what is being said” (Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2004:143). Languages offer different possibilities to encode modality in 
a sentence. In English, modality can be expressed by modal verbs, modal 
adjuncts 143, or a combination of both (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004:147). In 
German, it can be expressed by modal verbs, verb mood, modal adverbs144, and 
                                                        
142 In this category ‘Konjunktiv I’ and ‘Konjunktiv II’ have been subsumed. 
143  Halliday’s category of modal adjuncts (terminology introduced in Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2004:147) corresponds to the class of modal adverbs. Modal adverbs are 
described in more detail for German later. In the following chapter the focus will be on the 
German modality system since the data basis for this thesis is German. For those who are 
interested in the modality system in English, Halliday (1970) and Halliday and Matthiessen 
(2004) are recommended for a thorough account. 
144  Modal adverbs are adverbs that express the speaker’s evaluation of the uttered 
information, e.g. ‘certainly’ modifies a given information expressing the speaker’s degree of 
certainty (Brinkmann 1971:362). 
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modifying verbs145 (Hentschel & Weydt 2003). Brinkmann (1971:362) argues that 
out of these four, the first two options are the most important ones for expressing 
modality.  
Brinkmann (1971:359) distinguishes two types of communication, namely request 
and wish from question and statement. Utterances belonging to the first type are 
uttered with the intention of changing reality, hence it is referred to as the 
‘realization system’ (r-system). By uttering questions and statements, reality is 
captured and described hence it is called ‘information system’ (i-system). He 
distinguishes these two kinds of communication to show that it is not the lexical 
content of modal verbs and mood that encodes meaning but the type of 
communication in which it is used. Brinkmann (1971) points out that the same 
sentence can express very different modalities. The sentence ‘Tom should go on 
holiday’ may either be uttered by the boss who would express a wish or request (r-
system). Or the speaker reports what someone else has said about Tom in which 
case it would be a statement (i-system). The same observation holds for the 
subjunctive mood. It may either express a wish that has not been realized (r-
system) or it may be used in a question in which the speaker wants to know if the 
addressee could have behaved in the intended way (i-system); Figure 7.3 provides 
an overview on possible realizations of modality in r-type and i-type utterances. 
realization system information system 
imperative indicative 
subjunctive146 subjunctive147 
modal verbs modal verb + become 
 modal adverbs 
Figure 7.3: Possibilities of realizing modality in German (based on Brinkmann 1971). 
The language elicited in the verbal protocols is likely to resemble speech within 
both systems because participants may utter statements and questions connected 
                                                        
145 The following German verbs are classified as modifying verbs: ‘brauchen’ (need), ‘lassen’ 
(let), and ‘haben’ (have). However, Hentschel and Weydt (2003:84) point out that it is 
difficult to distinguish this class of verbs from other classes based on syntactic and 
morphological features. The only distinguishing factor is their manner of modifying the 
action that is expressed by the main verb in the sentence but they do so in very different 
ways. Additionally, ‘need’ fills a gap within the system of modal verbs (Hentschel & Weydt 
2003:82); a fact that encourages some linguists to classify ‘need’ as a modal verb. 
146 In German the subjunctive mood is expressed by ‘Konjunktiv I’ and ‘Konjunktiv II’. 
‘Konjunktiv I’ contains the present tense of the finite verb and ‘Konjunktiv II’ contains the 
past tense of the finite verb (Hentschel & Weydt 2003:118). 
147 In this system, ‘Konjunktiv I’ marks indirect speech, and ‘Konjunktiv II’ expresses that a 
condition is not fulfilled (Brinkmann 1971:366). 
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to the perceived situation, i.e. reality. However, they are also likely to express 
whishes as to how the situation needs to be changed in order to resemble a 
different state. 
7.1.1.1 Modal verbs 
As Erben (1972) stated, the finite verb encodes the sentence’s intention but these 
intentions can be modulated by specific accompanying verbs, namely modal verbs. 
Weinrich (2005) states that modal verbs add information about physical, psychical, 
and social conditions that need to be incorporated in order to construct the 
meaning of the respective utterance. Grammatically, modal verbs are defined by 
their syntactic characteristic of taking an infinite as a verbal complement and their 
special rules of inflection (Eisenberg 2006:90). The class of modal verbs has a 
limited number of members. In German there are six core148 members: ‘wollen’ 
(want), ‘dürfen’ (be allowed), ‘sollen’ (have to), ‘mögen’ (like), ‘müssen’ (must), and 
‘können’ (can)149. Eisenberg (2006) divides those core modal verbs into two classes, 
namely transitive and intransitive. The verbs ‘wollen’, ‘mögen’, and ‘möchten’ are 
transitive because the subject defines the goal of the action that is being expressed 
in the main verb. Thus these verbs are bound to the subject’s mental processes 
(Eisenberg 2006:97). The verbs ‘müssen’, ‘können’, ‘dürfen’, and ‘sollen’ are defined 
as intransitive because the initiating source of the stated action lies outside the 
sentence. The subject may define the goal but it is not the initiator. This can be 
observed on the grammatical level because in sentences with a transitive modal 
verb the subject needs to be explicit whereas in sentences with intransitive modal 
verbs the subject may be of a general nature, e.g. ‘man’ (one) (Eisenberg 2006:97-
99). 
Based on the distinction between i- and r-system, Brinkmann (1971) argues that 
modal verbs express preconditions for the realization of something in the r-system 
whereas they are used to mark the condition for the validity of the information 
provided in the sentence in the i-system. A further distinction is proposed by 
                                                        
148 These six verbs are introduced as core modal verbs because some grammarians argue 
that need, like, let, and become should also be classified among the class of modal verbs (for 
a brief discussion see Eisenberg 2006:91). 
149 The English correspondences to the German modal verbs ‘wollen’, ’müssen’, ‘können’, 
and ‘sollen’ are adapted from Nehlsen (1986) because this work investigates the 
correspondence between German modal verbs and their English counterparts. Nehlsen 
illustrates that German modal verbs have different English correspondences depending on 
the connotation which they have in a specific sentence. The translations which have been 
chosen express the most common use of the respective modal verb. 
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Brinkmann (1971) and Engel (2002)150: subject-centered use versus speaker-center-
ed use. In subject-centered use, modal verbs encode the subject’s relation to the 
uttered information. Engel (2002:92) is more specific by saying that the subject-
centered use specifies the possibilities that are given to the subject by a third party. 
In the speaker-centered use modal verbs encode the speaker’s attitude towards the 
uttered information. This distinction is important for the addressee because modal 
verbs encode the truth-value of a question or information that is distributed. More 
specifically, modals encode information regarding who is responsible for the action 
and which prerequisites need to be met (Brinkmann 1971:397). 
Moreover, Brinkmann (1971) elaborates on the meaning of modal verbs that are 
unrelated to the specific situation. He distinguishes between ‘wollen’, ‘dürfen’, and 
‘sollen’ which provide information on the driving force responsible for the 
realization or validity of the sentence’s verbal content. The verbs ‘müssen’ and 
‘können’, on the other hand, provide information on the prerequisites for the 
realization or validity of the sentence’s verbal content. Furthermore, Engel (2002) 
describes different meaning potentials depending on the subject-centered or 
speaker-centered perspective. To provide a schematic overview on the potential 
meanings of modal verbs, Table 7.1 summarizes the potential meanings described 
in Brinkmann (1971), Engel (2002), and Weinrich (2006). 
modal 
verb 
Brinkmann (1971) Engel (2002): 
subject-
centered use 
Engel (2002): 
speaker-centered 
use 
Weinrich (2006) 
‘wollen’ 
(want)  
points at the subject 
as the driving force 
behind the realization 
or validity of the 
sentence’s verbal 
content (362)151 
expresses a 
subject’s certain 
intention (93) 
expresses a 
possibility which 
is based on the 
claim made by the 
subject but which 
is doubted by the 
speaker (92) 
expresses the 
subject’s interest 
to enforce a 
statement (303) 
                                                        
150 In this thesis, Engel’s (2002:91-92) terminology will be adapted. Brinkmann (1971) 
distinguishes between objective use, which corresponds to ‘subject centered use’, and 
subjective use, which corresponds to ‘speaker centered use’. 
151 Numbers in brackets refer to page numbers in the respective texts. 
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‘dürfen’ 
(be 
allowed) 
points at the ad-
dressee as the driving 
force behind the reali-
zation or validity of 
the sentence’s verbal 
content (362)152 and 
the speaker is content 
that the addressee 
will agree to the 
expressed 
assumption (400) 
expresses the 
possibility of 
something to 
happen because 
of a granted 
permission 
(either by the 
speaker or a 
different force) 
(92) 
only used in 
subjunctive mood 
in which it 
expresses an 
assumption (91) 
signals that the 
forces and 
obstacles that 
are acknowled-
ged do not hold 
in this specific 
context (302) 
‘sollen’ 
(have to) 
points at an 
(unknown) force as 
the driving force 
behind the realization 
or validity of the 
sentence’s verbal 
content (362) 
expresses a 
force created by 
a third person’s 
demand (93) 
expresses a 
plausibility that is 
based on 
statements made 
by a third person 
(92) 
expresses that 
the subject’s 
interest is put on 
the subject by a 
third party (396) 
‘müssen’ 
(must) 
names compulsory 
prerequisites for the 
realization or validity 
of the sentence’s 
verbal content (362) 
expresses a 
force created by 
external 
conditions (92) 
expresses a 
strong, fact-based 
assumption (92) 
signals that 
specific forces 
demand the 
enforcement of 
the statement 
‘können’ 
(can) 
names sufficient 
prerequisites for the 
realization or validity 
of the sentence’s 
verbal content (362) – 
the possibilities for a 
realization are given 
(394) 
expresses the 
possibility given 
by the speaker’s 
abilities or 
based on a 
granted 
permission (92) 
expresses a vague 
possibility (91) 
external 
obstacles do not 
hold (297) 
mögen 
(like) 
depending on the 
mood it may either 
imply that the 
prerequisites can be 
met (indicative) or it 
points out that the 
subject is the driving 
force (subjunctive) 
(362) – both 
realizations imply that 
a wish is being 
uttered (393) 
expresses the 
subject’s wish 
or willingness 
(92) 
expresses a 
possibility which 
is restricted in 
ways that are 
specified in the 
subsequent 
sentence (91) 
expresses the 
subject’s liking 
Table 7.1: Overview on possible meanings encoded in modal verbs. 
                                                        
152 This meaning of ‘allowed’ clearly encodes the function of modality as requesting a 
listener’s judgment on the information presented in the utterance.  
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In addition to the six modal verbs that are described in more detail in the table, 
Engel (2002:92) includes ‘werden’ (become) as a modal verb. He argues that 
‘become’ expresses the future realization of the sentence’s content in the subject-
centered use whereas it marks an assumption that is believed to be fulfilled in the 
speaker-centered use. Brinkmann (1971:387) acknowledges the high correspondence 
between ‘become’ and ‘want’ in which ‘become’ expresses the fact that the speaker 
already imagines the realization of the sentence’s content. Additionally, ‘become’ 
marks an assumption to be based on experiences (Brinkmann 1971:398). However, 
he does not go as far as including ‘become’ into the class of modal verbs and 
thereby extending the class beyond the six core modal verbs. Another verb that is 
acknowledged to share some semantic features with modal verbs is ‘need’. It has a 
strong correspondence to ‘must’ because it is often used to state that something 
must not be done (Brinkmann 1971:395; Engel 2002:92). Hentschel and Weydt 
(2003:82) state that there is a meaning difference between ‘must not’ and ‘need 
not’. Both of them express that something is not necessary but they do so with 
different emphasize. They argue that the speaker uses ‘must not’ when he/she 
wants to stress that there is definitely no necessity to do something. 
Given the extra information that is provided by ‘braucht nicht’ (need not), 
‘brauchen’ (need) has entered the class of modal verbs but it is not part of the core 
modal verbs. Hence Hentschel and Weydt (2003) classify it as a modifying verb 
together with ‘lassen’ (let) and ‘haben’ (have). Although there are these possible 
extensions to the class of modal verbs, only those modal verbs that were 
introduced as being core modal verbs are coded as such in this thesis. 
Concerning the general distribution of German modal verbs in language, results 
obtained by different researchers and in different corpora of German can serve as a 
reliable baseline. For the subsequent analysis of think aloud protocols it is 
specifically interesting to look at corpora of spoken German but in order to check 
whether spoken language differs from written language in this respect, different 
corpora need to be considered. Based on Welke (1965)153, Brinkmann (1971:381) 
postulates three levels of frequency of modal verbs. On the first level there are 
‘können’ and ‘müssen’. On the second level there are ‘wollen’ and ‘sollen’. The third 
                                                        
153 Welke (1965:19) cites Kaeding’s results, i.e. ‘können’ (52,384 times), ‘müssen’ (30,350 
times), ‘wollen’ (27,834 times), ‘sollen’ (23,910 times), ‘mögen’ (14,406 times), and ‘dürfen’ 
(9,432 times). Brinkmann (1971:381, footnote 2) notes that the countings presented by 
Kaeding have been validated by the analysis performed at the Institut of German Language 
in Mannheim. Unfortunately in neither of the two publications any information can be 
found about Kaeding’s data and the original publication by Kaeding is not to be found in 
any German library or the internet. Therefore, these numbers could not be validated 
beyond these quotes. 
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level contains ‘mögen’ and ‘dürfen’. Brinkmann (1971) notes that the second level is 
twice as frequent as the third level. In addition to this report, two studies have 
been selected that provide an overview on different corpora and at different points 
in time. Wunderlich (1981:13) reports that he analyzed transcripts of spoken 
language of different discourse types, namely consultations154, game instructions155, 
instructions156, institutional learning157, and cooperative interactions158. All in all, he 
analyzed 2661 occurrences of modal verbs. The distribution of these occurrences 
among the different types of modal verbs is summarized in Table 7.2.  
Diewald (1996:7) analyzed the use of modal verbs in written German in the weekly 
newspaper Der Spiegel and spoken German as transcribed in volume III of Texte 
gesprochener deutscher Standardsprache. She reports to have identified 839 modal 
verbs in the corpus and 391 modal verbs in the sub-corpus of spoken German. The 
distribution is very much the same in the overall corpus and the spoken sub-
corpus (Diewald 1996:9). Since no notable difference is reported between the two 
corpora and this thesis focuses on spoken language, the results for the spoken sub-
corpus are reported in Table 7.2. When considering these results as a basis of 
comparison, it needs to be kept in mind that these corpora contain spoken 
language, which is produced with a specific addressee in mind or present.  
modal verb Wunderlich (1981) Diewald (1996) 
können (can) 42.5% 37.60% 
müssen (must) 29.4% 28.39% 
wollen (want) 12.1% 15.60% 
sollen (should) 8.5% 9.97% 
dürfen (allowed) 2.6% 3.32% 
möchten (want) 1.1% not reported 
mögen (like) 0.1% 5.12% 
Table 7.2: Frequency of modal verbs as reported for different corpora of German. 
                                                        
154 Here he looked at consultations at insurance agencies and at consultations regarding the 
choice of study (Wunderlich 1981:13). 
155 Those games were either dice games or card games (Wunderlich 1981:13). 
156 Those were instructions regarding first use of technical devices or specific activities 
(Wunderlich 1981:13). 
157 Wunderlich analyzed learning at German Volkshochschulen (comparable to American 
community colleagues) and seminars at universities (Wunderlich 1981:13). 
158 Wunderlich looked at transcripts of cooperative planning and joint action. (Wunderlich 
1981:13) 
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7.1.1.2 Modal adverbs 
Even though modal adverbs are not as frequent as modal verbs and verb tense in 
the expression of modality, they will be briefly introduced for two reasons. First, 
adverbs belonging to the category of modal adverbs are often used to distinguish 
different levels of certainty. However, they are not explicitly called modal adverbs, 
for example in Ericsson and Simon (1993). Second, Brinkmann (1971:402) observed 
that speakers show a tendency to combine information and evaluation in one unit. 
In these cases, the evaluation is encoded in modal adverbs. Brinkmann (1971:362) 
distinguishes between two characteristics. Modal adverbs can function as an 
answer (example 5) or they join other parts of the sentence to make a judgment 
about these parts (example 6). 
(127) Did he go abroad? – Certainly. 
(128) His plan, which is certainly (possibly) a good proposal, should be 
thoroughly evaluated. 
The characteristics of marking the speaker’s personal stance on the information 
that is provided in a sentence is achieved by three functions of modal adverbs. 
These functions will be briefly introduced and a list of adverbs provided by 
Brinkmann (1971:401) is cited. 
? Function 1: Modification of the given information 
by emphasizing the certainty of a given information: gewiß (definitely), bestimmt 
(certainly), sicher (certain) – in jedem Fall (at any rate), jedenfalls (anyway), unter 
allen Umständen (by all means) – zweifellos (certainly), unbedingt (absolutely); or 
by removing restraints: in keinem Fall (under no circumstances), keinesfalls (on no 
account), keineswegs (by no means), unter (gar) keinen Umständen (under no 
circumstances); and weakening restraints: kaum (hardly), schwerlich (hardly) 
? Function 2: Marking the information  
either as a fact: tatsächlich (actually), wirklich159 (really), natürlich160 (of course), 
selbstvertsändlich (of course), bekanntlich161 (as is generally known), offenbar 
(apparently), sichtlich (apparently); or 
                                                        
159 Marks a quest or search for confirmation that is formulated against a voiced doubt. 
160 Signals that information confirms given expectations. Thus it is a clear marker of 
affirmation. 
161 The adverbs ‘bekanntlich’ and ‘angeblich’ hint at the source on which the information is 
based. 
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as an assumption: wahrscheinlich (probably), voraussichtlich162 (expected), ver-
mutlich (presumably), angeblich (allegedly), vielleicht 163  (maybe), wohl 164 
(probably), möglicherweise (possibly) 
? Function 3: Express the emotional quality of a statement (Brinkmann 
1971:402): many adverbs with the suffix “–weise” (e.g. glücklicherweise 
(luckily), seltsamerweise (curiously)) 
7.1.1.3 Verb mood 
Hentschel and Weydt (2003:115) describe verb mood as a statement about modality 
that is closely connected to the selected verb form. In German, three verb moods 
are distinguished, namely imperative, indicative, and subjunctive. The subjunctive 
has two main forms: ‘Konjunktiv I’ and ‘Konjunktiv II’. On the grammatical level, 
‘Konjunktiv I’ and ‘Konjunktiv II’ are distinguished by the verb tense of the finite 
verb. In the ‘Konjunktiv I’ the finite verb is in the present tense, for example  
(129) “er komme, sie sei gekommen” (Hentschel & Weydt 2003:119).  
The finite verb in the ‘Konjunktiv II’ is marked in the past tense 
(130) “er wäre gekommen, sie würde kommen” (Hentschel & Weydt 2003:119).  
However, even though the two types of subjunctive mood can be distinguished by 
the verb tense of the finite verb, the tempus function is not important in 
interpreting the subjunctive mood (Hentschel & Weydt 2003:119) because all 
moods assign different meaning to the content expressed in the sentence. 
Furthermore, the frequency of use of both possibilities reveals that the ‘Konjunktiv 
I’ is rarely used. If so, it is done in highly conventional contexts, such as in manuals 
and conventional forms of wishes, which results in it being almost non existent in 
colloquial speech (Hentschel & Weydt 2003:118). Even though the ‘Konjunktiv II’ is 
more frequent in a direct comparison, there is a tendency to substitute the 
subjunctive forms of the verb with a ‘würde’-construction (example (10)) in spoken 
language (Hentschel & Weydt 2003; Thierhoff 2010).  
(131) Wenn sie doch mal vorbei käme! (If she would only be dropping in!) 
[Konjunktiv II] 
(132) Wenn sie doch mal vorbei kommen würde! (If she would only be 
dropping in!) [infinitive + ‘würde’] 
                                                        
162 The adverbs ‘voraussichtlich’ and ‘vermutlich’ mark assumptions that are based on 
expectations and speculations. 
163 The adverb ‘vielleicht’ signals that information is an assumption and thus it is often 
referred to as ‘hedge’ in the literature on politeness.  
164 The adverb ‘wohl’ also signals the tentative character of an utterance. 
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Acknowledging that there are different forms of expressing the subjunctive mood 
in German, it is important to look at its meaning more closely. This can be 
achieved by contrasting its meaning with the meaning encoded by the other mood 
types. The imperative mood is the basic mode of realization, marking the content 
of the sentence to be the realization of an action. A request or wish is directed 
towards the addressee with the assumption that the action will be performed 
directly after it is uttered. The assumed reaction is the performance of the specified 
action which lies within the scope of the sentence, i.e. all prerequisites are met. 
The imperative may have two forms, either the imperative singular (‘Sprich!’) or 
the imperative plural (‘Sprecht!’). Usually imperatives are used without a subject 
and there are no tense distinctions (Thieroff 2010:150). 
The indicative mood is the basic mode of providing information. It makes 
statements within the scope that is created by the sentence and marks the content 
as information (Brinkmann 1971:361). The use of the indicative mood is not bound 
to reality, i.e. the actual truth-value of the information, but it depends on the 
speaker’s interpretation of the situation (Brinkmann 1971:368). Three kinds of 
meaning of the indicative mood are distinguished: 
? the things and circumstances that are described are given, i.e. assumed 
to be true (for example scientific insights, perception), 
? it marks a goal that still needs to be accomplished, such as in “Ich gebe 
dir Geld, damit165 du dich erholen kannst.” (I give money to you so you 
can relax.) (Brinkmann 1971:369) 
? it marks a prerequisite that is not yet existent in reality, e.g. “Wenn ich 
Geld habe, werde ich verreisen.” (If I have got money, I will be 
traveling.) (Brinkmann 1971:369) 
In contrast to statements in the imperative and the indicative mood that stay 
within the scope of the sentence, the subjunctive mood extends it and even goes 
beyond it. By the use of the ‘Konjunktiv I’ the speaker extends the scope that is 
generally assigned to the sentence. This extension is realized by introducing a third 
person. And the use of the ‘Konjunktiv II’ makes claims about things that are 
beyond the extended scope. These different functions of extending the sentence’s 
scope becomes especially clear by looking at their different functions within the i-
system. The ‘Konjunktiv I’ is the mode of indirect speech, thereby introducing a 
third person. And the ‘Konjunktiv II’ is used to mark unfulfilled prerequisits, 
thereby pointing at something which is beyond the current scope (Brinkmann 
1971:366). 
                                                        
165 The different meanings can be distinguished by looking at the conjunctions that are 
used (for illustration purposes these are in italics here). 
STATE OF THE ART 247 
 
 
Brinkmann (1971) argues against the simplification of calling the indicative mood 
the mode of reality and contrasting it with the subjunctive mood which is referred 
to as the mode of possibility as can be found, for example, in Hentschel and Weydt 
(2003). Brinkmann (1971:369) states that in cases in which both indicative and 
subjunctive mood are grammatically possible, the indicative mood is not simply 
the mode of reality but rather the mode of givenness. The speaker determines this 
givenness within his own ‘universe’, i.e. his world knowledge, his experience, and 
his judgment. Brinkmann’s (1971) description of verb mood emphasizes that mood 
choice is highly individual and situation bound.  
Based on these considerations, the analysis will distinguish between indicative, 
subjunctive, and imperative mood. Furthermore, modal verbs and modal adverbs 
will be coded for. Besides the grammatical category ‘tense’ verbs will be 
distinguished based on their semantic meaning, i.e. verb types. This latter 
approach is central to functional grammar as will be outlined in the following sub-
section. 
7.1.2 Verb types 
7.1.2.1 Verb types in functional grammar 
Language in the Systemic Functional Linguistics approach is organized around five 
features of language, namely genre, register, discourse semantics, lexico-grammar, 
and graphology/phonology (Martin 2011:103-4). The approach of functional 
grammar focuses on lexico-grammar. Halliday (1985) was the first scholar to 
present this concept in a comprehensive book. His studies that started in the 1960s 
(see Halliday 2009 for an overview of his works including the early ones166) were 
driven by the argument that traditional grammars investigated and described the 
structure of written texts, thereby ignoring an important mode of language: 
speaking. He argued that the focus on written texts ignores one fundamental 
difference between those two modes, namely written language presents the 
product of speech whereas spoken language presents a process. Based on this 
thought, he refers to traditional grammar as ‘product grammars’ (Halliday 
1985:xxiii) since they cannot account for the dynamic process character of spoken 
language. Contrary to traditional grammarians, Halliday (1985) stresses that 
speaking is the more basic mode of language use. Therefore, Halliday (e.g. 1985) 
                                                        
166 This book is highly recommended to readers who want to get an overview on the 
concepts which Halliday has been working on during his long research carreer and how 
these concepts are described in his numerous publications. 
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presents the model of functional grammar to describe the basic structure of a 
process grammar on language in use. He stresses that 
“the internal organization of the linguistic system has itself a functional 
basis, so that in order to understand the nature of language it is necessary 
to start from considerations of its use.” (Halliday 1970:361)  
Ertel and Bloemer (1975) argue for the need to describe grammatical constructions 
in a process oriented model as well. They start by proposing a new view on 
affirmative and negative sentences. In his seminal work, Halliday (1985:xxvii) 
presents a detailed account of functional grammar but he explicitly states that he 
does not provide a full model of dynamic grammar at this point but rather the first 
attempts in this direction. Furthermore, he points out that he presents a functional 
grammar of English but he is convinced that some concepts can be regarded to be 
universal whereas others will show to be language specific. The ‘metafunctional’ 
hypothesis, for example, is considered to be one universal feature of language. This 
hypothesis states that “in all languages the content systems are organized into 
ideational, interpersonal and textual components167” (Halliday 1985:xxxiv) and “all 
systemic contrasts in the grammar derive from one or the other of these functions” 
(Halliday 1970:326). However, the descriptive categories for the individual 
components are likely to be language particular.  
Much work has been done to specify the peculiarities of a systemic-functional 
approach168 to language (see Caffarel et al. 2004 for a collection of studies on 
different languages and Matthiessen 2009, Caffarel 2010 for an overview on SFL). 
Although numerous theoretical assumptions underlying these functional 
grammars have been validated by computer-driven text generation (e.g. linear 
recursion in Bateman 1989; for an overview O’Donell & Bateman 2005), Bateman 
(2008) stresses that the second part of language use, namely text analysis, does not 
show satisfactory results when performed by computers. Thus he concludes that as 
long as this part of language use cannot be modeled, the systemic functional 
language approach achieved only a limited proportion of the scope of its goal, 
namely drawing on corpora for validation. Although this on-going debate about 
                                                        
167 The distinction between those three metafunctions is based on the idea that besides 
construing experience in language (ideational function, i.e. ‘language as reflection’) 
personal and social relationships are enacted in language (interpersonal function, i.e. 
‘language in action’). Furthermore, a textual metafunction of grammar is represented in the 
construction of text by “organizing each element as a piece of information and relating it 
significantly to what has gone before” (Halliday 1979(2002):199). More importantly “the 
textual function is internal to language and is instrumental to the other two” (Halliday 
1970:326). 
168  For a recent reflection on the development of systemic functional linguistics 
Matthiessen (2009) is highly recommended. 
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the applicability and validation of functional grammar needs to be acknowledged, 
the basic idea of a grammar that attempts to capture the dynamic nature of spoken 
language is uncontested. Given the specific text genre that will be analyzed in this 
thesis, i.e. think aloud protocols, this approach is specifically suited for the 
analysis.  
Given that the structure of functional grammar is very complex, this sub-section is 
intended as a brief introduction on the sentence’s verbal complex only169. More 
specifically, it will focus on the ideational aspect of grammar and the different 
types of experiences that are encoded in verbs. After presenting this specific aspect 
of functional grammar it will be related to German verb class types. It will be 
argued that the resulting correspondences are valid enough to apply the classify-
cations and terminology proposed by functional grammar in the verb analysis in 
this thesis. 
In functional grammar, a sentence is conceptualized as a figure with different 
constituents, namely participants, a process, and circumstances. To say it more 
technically, “a figure is a basic fragment of experience that embodies one quantum 
of change” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2002:128). Experience is encoded in the process 
of the figure, which in turn is represented in the verb of the sentence. Initially, 
Halliday (1985) proposed three principal types of processes, namely material, 
mental, and relational, and three subsidiary process types, namely behavioral, 
verbal, and existential. These process types encode different category meanings. 
These category meanings are referred to as ‘domains of experience’ in Halliday and 
Matthiessen (2002). In this later work, four primary domains of experience are 
distinguished, namely doing (material process), sensing (mental process), saying 
(verbal process), and being (relational process). Sensing and saying share the 
quality of symbolic processing, which means that those verbs have the power to set 
up other figures as semiotic realities. Those semiotic realities are encoded in the 
figure’s projections. The process of projection is instantiated on two levels. The 
first level is the act of saying or sensing itself, i.e. the experience, whereas the 
second level expresses the content of saying or sensing (example 11) or saying only 
(example12).  
(133) She said/thought (1st level) that he had left (2nd level) (Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2002:129). (function: proposition) 
(134) She asked him (1st level) to leave (2nd level) (Halliday & Matthiessen 
2002:129). (function: proposal) 
                                                        
169 The verbal complex is made up by the Finite [verb] and the Event. Additionally, it may 
contain an auxiliary (Halliday 1985:175). 
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These two examples illustrate that different speech functions can be expressed in a 
sentence. In propositions, information is exchanged in the form of statements or 
questions. In proposals, goods and services are exchanged either by a command or 
an offer (Halliday 1985:87). Although structure and function are similar in both 
domains, there is an important difference with regard to the direction of symbolic 
processing. Sensing projects the subject’s interior content, e.g. ideas. These ideas 
are projected into existence either through cognition or by a wish or need (called 
desideration). Two types of sensing are distinguished based on the product and the 
activating energy. Cognitive and desiderative processing create ideas. Emotive and 
perceptive processing, in contrast, are activated by facts. The first type of sensing is 
interpreted as the most central class by Halliday and Matthiessen (2002:144). 
Saying projects exterior content. The differences that are implied by this 
distinction are summarized in Table 7.3. 
parameters of 
difference 
sensing saying 
direction of symbolic 
processing 
interior  exterior  
characteristics of the 
symbolizer170 on the 
semantic level 
participant engaged in 
conscious processing thus it is 
limited to human 
consciousness 
conscious speaker who is not 
limited to human 
consciousness  
allows ‘semiotic things’ (e.g. 
documents, institutions) to 
take this role 
characteristics of the 
receiver on the 
semantic level 
non existent the figure’s addressee  
characteristics of the 
receiver on the 
grammatical level 
receiver is not a grammatical 
constituent of the mental 
clause (she wanted ? him to 
leave) 
receiver is a grammatical 
constituent of the verbal clause 
(she told him ? to leave) 
directionality the senser’s involvement 
ranges over the phenomenon  
the phenomenon has an 
impact on the senser’s 
consciousness 
from sayer to receiver 
Table 7.3: Summary of parameters of difference between saying and sensing (based on Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2002:129-131). 
The remaining domains of doing and being do not have the characteristic of 
projection. Both domains contribute the notion of change to figure but they do so 
                                                        
170 The symbolizer can be understood as the syntactic subject. 
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with complementary perspectives. Whereas doing initiates change in the “thusness 
of a participant” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2002:132), change in being “appears as an 
achieved or attained result” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2002:132); compare examples 
13 and 14:  
(135) He washed it. (domain: doing) 
(136) It was clean. (domain: being) 
Halliday and Matthiessen (2002) include happening in the domain of doing 
because material processes can either refer to an action (doing) or to an event 
(happening). Furthermore, having is included in the domain of being. In order to 
understand the reason for this classification, the category of relational processes 
needs a more detailed description. Relational processes have two different modes: 
attributive (‘a is an attribute of x’; example 15) or identifying (‘a is the identity of x’; 
example 16).  
(137) Sarah is wise. (Halliday 1985:113) (mode: attributive)  
(138) Tom is the leader./The leader is Tom. (Halliday 1985:113) (mode: 
identifying)  
As being construes relations between participants, there are three basic subtypes in this 
domain, namely intensive (‘x is a’), circumstantial (‘x is at a’), and possessive (‘x has a’) 
(Halliday 1985:113). Halliday and Matthiessen (2002) do not give reasons for the 
combination of being and having into one domain. However, based on the definition 
above, it can be argued that having is one realization of the attributive mode, specifically 
expressing the subtype of possession. The domain of doing also contains subtypes, i.e. 
figures of doing can be transitive or intransitive (Halliday & Matthiessen 2002:148). The 
verb analysis presented in this thesis will focus on the general distinction between process 
types; therefore, no further detail is provided on this detailed level. The differences 
between the two domains on the broadest level are summarized in Table 7.4. 
Parameters of 
difference 
doing and happening being and having 
change over time involves a change over time 
which may either be  
no change over time, i.e. the 
actualization will be the same at any 
point in time  
energy input is required either by the 
participant or an agent outside 
the figure 
no input is required 
Table 7.4: Summary on parameters of difference between doing and being (based on Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2002:132). 
Each figure type has a specific realization in functional grammar. The domain of 
doing and happening is realized in material clauses, the domain of sensing is realized 
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in mental clauses, the domain of saying is realized in verbal clauses, and the domain 
of being and having is realized in relational clauses. These clauses are characterized 
differently with regard to directionality of the process, nature of participants, 
unfolding in time, participation, and projection (see Table 7.5 for a summary). 
grammatical 
reactance171 
mental clause material clause relational clause verbal clause 
directionality 
of process 
bidirectional, i.e. 
on the senser and 
by the senser172 
one directional one directional not stated173 
nature of 
participants 
conscious senser; 
unrestricted 
phenomenon  
unrestricted sub-
ject; participants 
may be phenol-
menal or macro-
phenomenal174 
unrestricted 
subject and 
unrestricted 
phenomenon 
not stated 
unfolding in 
time 
unmarked 
tense175: present 
tense  
unmarked tense: 
present 
progressive 
unmarked 
tense: present 
tense 
unmarked 
tense: 
present tense 
participation no special pro-
verb 
have a special 
pro-verb ‘do’ 
no special pro-
verb 
not stated 
projection projects ideas and 
locutions176 
no projection no projection projects ideas 
and locutions 
Table 7.5: Summary of the characteristics of the different types of clauses (based on Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2002:134-135). 
 
                                                        
171 The concept of reactance is adapted from Whorf (1956). It means that words become 
members of a specific category only if they are used and referred to in sentences that 
belong to this specific class.(Whorf (1956) in Halliday & Matthiessen 2002:27). In this table 
the specific characteristics of the reactance of different clause types are summarized. 
172 “it is a general feature of mental processes that they can be realized in either direction – 
either the senser, or the phenomenon that is being sensed, can be the Subject, still keeping 
the clause in the active voice” (Halliday 1985:110). 
173 Fewer information is provided on verbal clauses than on mental, material, and relational 
clauses in Halliday and Matthiessen (2002). This might result from the original 
categorization (in Halliday 1985) of verbal clauses to be a subsidiary type whereas the 
others are considered to be principal types. 
174 If participants in the material or relational clause are acts then this participant is called 
marco-phenomenal (example “She remembered him coming down the stairs.” (Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2002:135)). Whereas if the participant in a relational clause refers to a fact it is 
called meta-phenomenal (example “She remembered that they had been happy in the old 
house.” (Halliday & Matthiessen 2002:135)). 
175 The notion of unmarked tense refers to the tense which is conventionally used in the 
respective verbal clause. This conventional usage results in all other tenses being salient 
because they are unexpected (for clarification also Halliday 1985:110, table 5(2)). 
176  Locution is defined as a construction of wording, a specific phrase (Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2004:378). 
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7.1.2.2 Verb types in German grammar books 
Engel (2002:77) states that the only thing that can be said about verbs is their 
function of defining an action within the event described in the sentence. This 
simple definition leaves a number of aspects underspecified, e.g. the different 
nature of processes that are described by verbs and the influence of tense marking 
and mood on the meaning encoded by the verb. Generally, verbs can be classified 
in three ways, either by morphological, syntactic, or semantic means (Hentschel & 
Weydt 2003; Helbig & Buscha 2005). Morphological verb classification is based on 
the observation that the surface appearance of verbs changes differently to express 
different grammatical meanings, e.g. taking additional words to form the future 
tense. In general, Hentschel and Weydt (2003:46) conclude that tense building is 
most important in distinguishing verbs morphologically. Syntactic verb 
classification is based on the observation that verbs influence the case marking of 
related words within the sentence. Semantic verb classification focuses on 
meanings encoded in verbs. Semantic classifications help to systematically 
organize a potentially indefinite number of semantically different verbs by some 
characteristics. Furthermore, it may also highlight shared syntactic structures that 
can be described accordingly (Bredel & Töpler 2007:874). The analysis in this thesis 
is based on the semantic classification of verb types.  
Traditionally, three verb types are distinguished in German, namely performance 
verbs (Handlungsverben), verbs of state (Zustandsverben)177, and process verbs 
(Vorgangsverben) (see Figure 7.4 for a schematic overview). According to Helbig 
and Buscha (2005:5), this traditional distinction is based on two features: 
(139) the verb’s inherent semantic characteristic of [+/- static], and  
(140) the subject’s semantic character of [+/- agency] which may be added to 
the verbs inherent semantic characteristic. 
Performance verbs are dynamic and they co-occur with a strong subjective agent, 
e.g. ‘walk’, ‘play’, and ‘fight’. The encoded actions are often goal directed. 
Frequently, the goal is bound to the verb in object position of the sentence. From a 
functional linguistic point of view, performance verbs are considered to be the 
prototypical verb type (Hentschel & Weydt 2003:36)178. 
                                                        
177 The English translation is based on Palmer (1965 (1974)) who defines verbs of state as 
“verbs which refer not to an activity but to a state of condition” (Palmer 1965(1974):73). 
This supports the assumption that this class is the English equivalent to the class of 
Zustandsverben by definition. 
178 This view is supported by Eichinger (1989:23) who introduces performance verbs, and 
more specifically verbs of movement, as the prototypical verb type. 
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Process verbs are also dynamic but they lack the subject’s agency because they 
describe an action that is performed on the subject. Hence they are not goal 
directed and do not imply an object position. This description holds for verbs such 
as ‘fall’, ‘grow’, and ‘die’. Verbs of state are static, i.e. not calling for subject agency 
because they simply describe a change in state. ‘Stand’, ‘lay’, and ‘be’ describe 
lasting events that are observable in the situation of speaking179. The distinction 
between performance and process verbs is sometimes difficult to make, for 
example with ‘live’180. In these cases, the context needs to be considered to draw 
valid conclusions on the nature of the verb type (Hentschel & Weydt 2003:38).  
 
Figure 7.4: Verb types in German (based on Helbig & Buscha 2005:59). 
Obviously, these three verb types do not cover the whole range of verbs that are 
available in natural speech. To account for this observation, Bredel and Töpler 
(2007:876) mention a verb class called verba sentiendi (also referred to as 
propositional verbs by Bäuerle 1991181), which include verbs such as ‘feel’, ‘think’, 
and ‘see’. Helbig and Buscha (2005:61)182 also note the existence of verbs that are 
                                                        
179 Certainly the communicative situation can also be of the kind that the utterance is 
written down or only thought of. In favour of text fluency the mode of speaking has been 
chosen here because interactive communication is assumed to be the basic mode of 
speaking (e.g. Tomasello 1996). 
180 Hentschel and Weydt (2003:37) use this example to show that some verbs are difficult to 
categorize. Helbig and Buscha (2005:59), in contrast, list ‘live’ in the category of state verbs.  
181 This term is used by Bäuerle (1991:709) to describe a class of verbs that provide an 
attitude on the propositional statement made in the complementary sentence coming with 
it. For example, in the sentence “Peter assumed that it would be raining tonight.” The verb 
assume expresses Peter’s personal certainty about tonight’s weather. 
182 Interestingly there is no mention about verbs of perception or knowledge in Hentschel 
and Weydt (2003) or Engel (2002). Unfortunately there is no space here for a thorough 
discussion on this observation. But it is puzzling that these grammar books leave a large 
number of verbs unspecified. Nevertheless, there are some publications that focus 
specifically on a selected group of these verbs (e.g. Latzel 1978). 
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not covered by the traditional three-type classification and propose to subsume 
them in one additional category. They propose that this group includes verbs of 
perception (e.g. ‘see’, ‘hear’, ‘feel’), verbs of knowledge (e.g. ‘think, ‘know’, ‘miss’, 
‘understand’), and verbs of common relations (e.g. ‘love’, ‘hate’). In some respects 
these verbs behave like performance verbs (e.g. in passive constructions) but in 
their meaning they resemble state verbs because their subject is a demi-agent. 
Demi-agents are defined as possessors of perception, knowledge, or relations who 
are passive with regard to the action described by the verb. Nevertheless, in some 
cases the subject still behaves as an agent syntactically (Helbig & Buscha 2005:61). 
Some linguists refer to a verb type called cognitive verbs (e.g. Bühler 1989) but they 
neither define the category nor provide references in which this definition can be 
found. Now it could be hypothesized that there is a class of cognitive verbs in 
English and the category label has been transferred into German linguistic 
research without being discussed and specified in more depth. However, the 
search for a class of cognitive verbs in English grammar books did not yield the 
expected result. A more detailed search highlighted that verbs that are categorized 
as private verbs183 by Palmer (1965 (1974):71) resemble English translations of verbs 
that are listed as cognitive verbs in Butulussi (1991). The class definitions provided 
by Palmer (1965 (1974):71) and Butulussi (1991) also match.  
Butulussi’s (1991) definition is more fine grained by stating that cognitive verbs 
describe inner, mental states and processes, such as possession, acquisition, loss, 
or regain of knowledge. Furthermore, she argues that cognitive verbs express 
assumptions about events.184 She proposes that German cognitive verbs can be 
classified with respect to the level of certainty that they express by either 
expressing the possession of knowledge (‘wissen’ 185  and ‘kennen’ (know)) or 
expressing assumptions (‘glauben’ (believe), ‘vermuten’ (suppose), ‘ahnen’ (guess), 
                                                        
183 In English the majority of verbs include a temporal aspect. But some verbs do not have a 
temporal marker. Those are so called non-progressive verbs. Palmer (1965(1974)) further 
divides this class into private verbs and verbs of sensation. Private verbs “refer to states or 
activities that the speaker alone is aware of” (Palmer 1965(1974):71). Among them are 
‘think’, ‘imagine’, ‘hope’, ‘plan’, ‘forget’, and ‘believe’. Examples for the category verbs of 
sensation are ‘see’, ‘smell’, ‘hear’, ‘taste’, and ‘feel’. Furthermore, Palmer (1965(1974):73) also 
lists verbs of state as belonging to the class of non-progressive verbs. The definition he 
gives for this category is equivalent to the definition commonly used to describe the class 
of Zustandsverben in German. 
184 However, it needs to be noted that Butulussi (1991) does not refer to any further 
publication to verify her classification or the type ‘cognitive verb’ by itself. She presents the 
classification as if it was a natural fact that this class exists and that it is referred to as 
‘cognitive verbs’. 
185 The cited verbs are also in German because the analysis will be performed on German 
data, hence a list of German cognitive verbs seems reasonable at this point. 
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‘annehmen’ (assume), ‘zweifeln’ (doubt)). Additionally, cognitive verbs can be 
classified with respect to the nature of the cognitive process. Whereas ‘erfahren’ 
(experience), ‘kennenlernen’ (get to know), and ‘erkennen’ (realize) signal the 
acquisition of knowledge, ‘vergessen’ (forget) expresses the loss of knowledge 
(Butulussi 1991:3). Based on this more detailed classification of cognitive verbs, it 
can be argued that verbs expressing processes that are counted among higher-level 
cognitive functions186 belong to the class of cognitive verbs. Furthermore, the class 
of cognitive verbs would include members of the class of verbs of knowledge that 
is proposed by Helbig and Buscha (2005).  
This short review illustrates that a fundamental part of verbs is not classified in 
traditional accounts of German grammar. In order to compensate for this lack 
Steiner and Teich (2004), for example, adopted Halliday’s category of mental verbs 
for German. In this thesis, the terminology proposed by Helbig and Buscha (2005), 
that seems to be the most thoroughly defined one for verbs of sensing in German, 
will be adopted and combined with the concept of mental verbs by Halliday. 
7.1.2.3 Correspondence between verb types in German and in 
English from a functional grammar perspective 
Before presenting empirical research on verb analysis in think aloud protocols, the 
domains of experience presented by Halliday and Matthiessen (2002) will be 
related to traditional German verb classification in order to motivate the approach 
that will be pursued in this thesis. Combining the characteristics and the 
mentioned members of verb types listed in traditional German grammar books 
(see Table 7.6 for an overview), the following correspondences are proposed: the 
domain of sensing expressed in mental clauses subsumes the verb types of verbs of 
perception, verbs of knowledge, and verbs of relations. Cognitive verbs are already 
represented in Helbig and Buscha’s (2005) category of verbs of knowledge. The 
domain of doing and happening, which is expressed in material clauses, subsumes 
the verb types of performance verbs and process verbs. Verbs of state correspond 
to verbs in the domain of being and having that are expressed in relational clauses. 
No correspondence for the domain of saying could be found in the German 
grammar books that have been consulted.  
 
 
                                                        
186 Critical thinking, reasoning, and decision-making are generally referred to as higher 
order mental process in cognitive science (e.g. http://general-psychology.weeb-
ly.com/what-are-the-higher-order-of-mental-processes.html; 08.11.2012). 
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verb type characteristics example of 
members 
corresponding domain 
in functional grammar 
performance verbs 
(Hentschel & 
Weydt 2003) 
dynamic; strong 
subjective agency 
walk, play, fight Doing & happening 
process verbs 
(Hentschel & 
Weydt 2003) 
dynamic; no 
subjective agency 
fall, grow, die Doing & happening 
verbs of state 
(Hentschel & 
Weydt 2003) 
static; no subjective 
agency 
stand, lay, be Being & having 
verbs of perception 
(Helbig & Buscha 
2005) 
subject is not an 
agent but a demi-
agent 
see, hear, feel Sensing 
verbs of knowledge 
(Helbig & Buscha 
2005) 
subject is not an 
agent but a demi-
agent187 
think, know, 
miss, understand 
Sensing (specifically 
mental clause of 
cognition188) 
verbs of common 
relations (Helbig & 
Buscha 2005) 
subject is not an 
agent but a demi-
agent 
love, hate Sensing (specifically 
mental clause of 
emotion189) 
cognitive verbs 
(Butulussi1991) 
 know, think, 
assume 
Sensing 
Table 7.6: Summary of verb types proposed in traditional German grammar books and the 
corresponding domain in functional grammar. 
Steiner and Teich (2004) outline parts of a functional grammar of German, namely 
the aspects of mood, transitivity, and theme. Furthermore, Petersen’s 190  un-
published manuscript of a functional systemic grammar approach for the German 
language strengthens the proposed correspondences. In this manuscript Petersen 
convincingly applies the Sydney functional grammar framework to the German 
language. The description of the experiential function of language and the 
different process types in particular support the verb correspondences that have 
been proposed in Table 7.6. Petersen (unpublished) describes the representation of 
and distinction between material, relational, verbal, and mental processes in 
German. Thus the lack of representation of verbal processes in traditional German 
grammars, as has been pointed out in the previous section, can be filled by 
                                                        
187  A demi-agent is defined to be the “Wahrnehmungsträger, Erkenntnisträger, 
Verhältnisträger” (Helbig & Buscha 2005:61). All of these roles are subsumed in the concept 
of senser as proposed by Halliday (1985). 
188 Halliday & Matthiessen (2004:198). 
189 Halliday & Matthiessen (2004:198). 
190 I want to kindly thank Mr. Petersen for providing me with the relevant parts of his 
manuscript and his interest in our work. 
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Petersen’s (unpublished) category of verbal processes, for which the verb ‘sagen’ 
(say) is the prototypical representation. Furthermore, Petersen identifies the four 
different mental processes (namely cognitive, desiderative, emotive, and per-
ceptive) that have been described for English (Halliday & Matthiessen 2002) for 
German as well. He further notes that the cognitive type is the most frequent sub-
type of mental processes whereas desidervative mental processes, such as 
‘wünschen’ (wish), are very rare. 
7.1.3 Analysis of verbs and other linguistic markers in 
verbal reports in problem solving research 
A detailed review of studies that investigate the linguistic structure of think aloud 
protocols recorded during problem solving activities was provided in chapter 3. 
Therefore, this section highlights the analysis and findings of the structure of the 
verb phrase in reference to the more detailed accounts provided already. 
Being interested in the differences between different problem solving 
performances on the level of mental processes, Roth (1985; 1987) was among the 
first researchers who analyzed the grammatical features of think aloud protocols. 
Drawing on a number of previous studies by other scholars, he analyzed verbal 
phrase structure with regard to modality, i.e. verb mood and modal verbs. Based 
on previous findings, Roth (1985) assumed that protocols by successful problem 
solvers exhibit a different linguistic structure than those reported by unsuccessful 
problem solvers. These expectations were confirmed as the analysis revealed that 
unsuccessful problem solvers used modal verbs in the subjunctive mood at a 
statistically significant higher frequency than successful participants. No difference 
was observed with regard to modal verbs in the indicative mood (Roth 1985:186). 
Roth (1985) argued that these findings illustrate that unsuccessful problem solvers 
feel the need to fill in missing information very quickly as expressed in hypotheses 
that are marked by modal verbs and the subjunctive mood. He further argued that 
the lack of subjunctive mood in the protocols by successful participants indicated 
that those focused on the current task situation. Moreover, he proposed that the 
indicative mood highlighted their tendency to incorporate new information, which 
was created in the interaction with the system. These findings were supported by 
results obtained in a second study by Roth (1987). 
Taking a similar approach, Bartl and Dörner (1998) studied participants’ problem 
solving strategies while solving a dynamic system task. Their analysis of linguistic 
features, i.e. conjunctions, verb tense, and mood, of two recorded think aloud 
protocols revealed systematic differences between one successful and one 
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unsuccessful participant. The analysis revealed significant differences in the kind 
of conjunctions and their overall frequency (for more detail see chapter 3). 
Moreover, Bartl and Dörner (1998) observed differences in verb tense. The partici-
pant who did not succeed, used the subjunctive mood only once. This participant 
used the present tense exclusively. The participant who succeeded, however, used 
the subjunctive mood nine times as well as past tense ten times and the verb 
phrase ‘I think’ (Bartl & Dörner 1998:236). In their discussion they argued that 
these results highlight that the successful participant speculated about possible 
moves and incorporated information from the past into the current problem 
representation. Bartl and Dörner (1998) propose that if these findings are 
combined with the findings on use of conjunctions, they suggest that participants 
who are flexible in their thinking, i.e. incorporating new and past information, 
finding reasons for relations between information, and hypothesizing about 
possible moves, were more likely to succeed than participants who focus on the 
current problem state only. This observed difference in thinking partially supports 
findings previously reported by Roth (1985; 1987). Interestingly, Roth (1985) 
reported that unsuccessful participants used subjunctive mood more frequently 
than successful participants; which was the reversed trend to that reported by Bartl 
and Dörner (1998). As both studies investigated performance on a dynamic 
systems task and analyzed think aloud protocols, these contradictory findings 
might be an effect of the case study that was reported by Bartl and Dörner (1998). 
This highlights the necessity to support findings and effects by analyzing multiple 
data sets. 
Whereas Roth (1985; 1987) and Bartl and Dörner (1998) investigated think aloud 
protocols on a dynamic system task, another research group focused on the 
linguistic analysis of think aloud protocols on a logic-based task. Caron, Caron-
Pargue, and their collaborators conducted experiments on the tower of Hanoi and 
the problem of the Chinese rings. Through in-depth linguistic analyses of the 
recorded think aloud protocols combined with descriptions of the current 
configuration of pags and rings, they identified linguistic and pragmatic markers in 
think aloud protocols. They linked those to the organization of the speaker’s 
situational mental model, the function of units in the organization, and changes in 
the organization. With regard to action, as expressed in the verbal phrase of a 
sentence, Caron and Caron-Pargue (1987) note that  
“a given action (…) may consist in the achievement of an intended goal, or 
an auxiliary step to that goal; it may also be the result of an actual 
computation or the execution of an already learnt pattern.” (Caron & 
Caron-Pargue 1987:173) 
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They argue that this difference is expressed in the modality of the verbal phrase. 
Caron and Caron-Pargue (1987) observed that participants pointed to a goal by 
stating “I have to” or “I want to” (Caron & Caron-Pargue 1987:175). These phrases 
were later called ‘modalities of action’, also including “I am able to” (Caron-Pargue 
& Caron 1991:32). In 1996, Caron disentangled interjections and modal expressions 
further by stating that “access to LTM [Long Term Memory] is mainly marked by 
interjections” and “modal expressions (…) can be interpreted as marking, in these 
protocols, the computation of new goals” (Caron 1996:26). Along these lines, 
Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue (2009) studied the linguistic difference 
between internal, external, and intermediate spaces involved in problem solving. 
In their final discussion, they argued that their previous work showed that “modal 
markers suppose a disentanglement from the situation, and imply a gap, 
difficulties, attempts, retrieval of information for an intended reorganization of the 
representation” (Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2009:121). They further argued 
that modal markers highlight “non automatic but critical and intentional goals” 
whereas connectives mark automatic goals (Bégoin-Augereau & Caron-Pargue 
2009:121). 
Based on these previous findings, Bégoin-Augereau and Caron-Pargue (2010) 
argued that modal terms always involve a detachment from the situations. Those 
are either expressed in goals or in evaluations. Referring to previous work, Bégoin-
Augereau and Caron-Pargue (2010) distinguished between strategic goals and 
automatic goals. They argue that automatic goals do not involve any restructuring 
of the representation because it is already known to the problem solver; these 
goals do not contain modal terms. Strategic goals, in contrast, represent 
restructuring processes that result in planning. Their analysis revealed that 
strategic goals were marked by modal terms, such as ‘could’ or ‘should’ (Bégoin-
Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2010:263). If modal terms were identified in evaluative 
statements, it was at times in which new information was verbalized. Bégoin-
Augereau and Caron-Pargue (2010) argued that this finding suggests that the 
representation is re-organized by a strategic retrieval of information (Bégoin-
Augereau & Caron-Pargue 2010:263). 
Tenbrink (2008) applies the methodology of Cognitive Discourse Analysis 191 
(hereafter CODA) for analyzing the mental processes of one participant engaged in 
solving the traveling salesman problem. She analyzed three different discourse 
tasks, namely think aloud protocols, retrospective reports, and instructions to a 
                                                        
191 The methodology that is applied in this thesis as well is described in detail in chapter 3. 
Additionally, an overview is to be found in Tenbrink (2010). 
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friend. The comparison of the verb phrase in these discourse tasks revealed that 
action verbs in the present tense were frequent in think aloud protocols. Tenbrink 
(2008:131) argued that this highlighted the participant’s focus on the current 
situation. Building on these findings and further earlier work in spatial problem 
solving, Tenbrink and Seifert (2011) provide an elaborate overview on the linguistic 
analysis of written tour plans for holiday trips around Crete (a real island) or 
Cretopia (a fictional island). They studied the distribution and nature of nouns, 
verbs, adjectives/adverbs, and temporal markers in written route descriptions. In 
their analysis the authors were specifically interested in the linguistic 
representation of the two domains that were involved, i.e. the domain of planning, 
that was visually present on the map, and the domain of travelling that was a 
conceptual representation of the real world. They categorized each annotated item 
as indicators for the conceptual domain of planning (e.g. ‘map’ (noun), ‘helpful’ 
(adjective), and ‘plot’ (verb)) or travelling activity (e.g. ‘trip’ (noun), ‘boring’ 
(adjective), and ‘2 days’ (temporal markers)) (Tenbrink & Seifert 2011:115). Cases in 
which this binary categorization was not possible were also indicated. The analysis 
revealed that modal verbs in subjunctive mood (‘could’ and ‘should’) and the 
discourse particle (e.g. ‘in order to’) were indicators of the connection between the 
two domains (Tenbrink & Seifert 2011:116). Moreover, besides encoding domain 
specificity, linguistic markers, such as nouns, quantifiers, and preposition, were 
also shown to distinguish different spatial strategies (for an overview see Tenbrink 
& Seifert 2011:116).  
Investigating verbal reports on analogical problem solving, Gralla et al. (2012) also 
reported that different strategies were represented by a distinct linguistic reper-
toire with regard to verbs, nouns, temporal order, and markers of generalization 
(‘again’)192 and similarity (‘same’). One strategy was marked by the frequent use of 
the verbs ‘connect’ and ‘draw’, referring to the activity of connecting symbols. 
Another strategy was marked by the verb ‘copy’ as this strategy involved copying 
the solution of a previous problem to solve the recent problem. 
In their seminal work, Ericsson and Simon (1993) focus on the indicative mood and 
modal verbs and combine verb tense and other syntactical constructions to 
distinguish between current-state information, future-state information, and hypo-
thetical information. They argue that current-state information is often expressed 
                                                        
192 The terminology marker of generalization is based on the finding presented in Tenbrink 
(2010:131) that ‘again’ marks the process of gradual generalization. 
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by the present tense and verbs such as ‘be’ and ‘have’193. They propose that infor-
mation that reflects “intentions or goals to attain configurations or attributes not 
true for the current construction” (Ericsson & Simon 1993:223) is often marked by 
verbs in the future tense. Additionally, constructions expressing wishes, such as 
‘want to have’ or ‘like to have’, are assumed to be common markers of information 
on the future. Moreover, information can also be marked as hypothetical or 
conjectural by selecting modal verbs, using modal adverbs (such as ‘maybe’ and 
‘perhaps’), verbs marking the mental state of the speaker, e.g. ‘guess’, ‘assume’, and 
if-constructions. 
In sum, the reported results suggest that verb phrases in think aloud protocols 
contain information on the current situation expressed by present tense marking. 
Moreover, verbs of doing and happening were frequently observed, indicating that 
participants verbalize their actions rather than plans. If hypothetical states, such as 
new goals, were verbalized, these were marked by modal verbs. The studies 
highlighted that verbs signal the connection between different conceptual do-
mains, such as mental and physical, and different ways of approaching problem 
solving, i.e. closed-systems vs. open-systems into which new information is 
continuously integrated. However, the reported findings (see Table 7.7 for a 
summary) were based on verb phrase analyses based on their semantic meaning 
but not concerning the more general categories of verb typology. Therefore, the 
analysis presented in this chapter extends these findings in two ways. First, verbs 
are analyzed with regard to their general type rather than their specific meaning. It 
is proposed that this approach allows for more general conclusions because fewer 
categories are compared, i.e. five kinds of verb type. Second, verbs are analyzed 
with regard to their function as indicators of different problem solving processes. 
This is achieved by a systematic analysis of verb type patterns with regard to the 
previously identified processes (see chapter 6). The analysis of verb type is 
combined with the analysis of verb tense and modality to investigate if the 
expression of problem solving processes differs in these respects. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
193 As has been shown in the section on verb classes, both of these verbs belong to the class 
of being and having (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999). 
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Grammatical 
category 
members that are 
mentioned 
indicator of references 
modal verb 
(subjunctive 
mood) 
wollte (would), 
könnte (should) 
a) connection between 
two conceptual 
domains; 
b) express mental 
simulation, e.g. 
hypotheses, and 
uncertainty 
a) Tenbrink & 
Seifert (2011); 
b) Roth (1985); 
Bartl & Dörner 
(1998); 
Ericsson & 
Simon (1993) 
modal verb  müssen (must) dogmatic thinking, i.e. a 
closed system, and connects 
actions to the real world 
Roth (1985) 
modal verb können (can) a) non-dogmatic thinking, 
i.e. open system and 
connects actions to the 
real world; 
b) in the context of goal 
formulation this marks a 
strategic goal in which 
the representation is re-
organized and plans are 
stated 
a) Roth (1985); 
b) Bégoin-
Augereau & 
Caron-Pargue 
(2010) 
modal 
expressions 
‘have to’, ‘able to’, 
‘want to’, ‘like to’ 
a) computation of new 
goals;  
b) information about 
intentions and goals 
that are not yet attained 
a) Caron-Pargue 
& Caron 
(1991); Caron 
(1996); 
b) Ericsson & 
Simon (1993) 
modal 
adverbs 
maybe, perhaps information that is 
hypothetical or conjectural 
Ericsson & Simon 
(1993) 
epistemic 
modals194 
‘I think’, ‘of course’ in an evaluative utterance 
they express the recognition 
that a pattern has already 
been stored (modal in the 
present or future tense) or 
the representation is 
reorganized (modal in the 
past tense) 
Caron-Pargue & 
Caron (1991) 
verb type: 
sensing 
‘think’, ‘assume’ information that is 
hypothetical or conjectural 
Ericsson & Simon 
(1993); Bartl & 
Dörner (1998) 
verb type: ‘I believe’ in the context of evaluation Bégoin-Augereau 
                                                        
194 This term is introduced by Caron-Pargue and Caron (1991) with the two examples that 
are quoted. As these examples belong to different grammatical classes, i.e. verb and adverb, 
they cannot be grouped with any of the other categories thus the term is quoted here. 
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sensing these verbs signal the 
detachment from the 
situation 
& Caron-Pargue 
(2010) 
verb tense present tense focus on the current 
situation; current state 
information 
Tenbrink (2008); 
Ericsson & Simon 
(1993) 
verb tense future tense future-state information 
about intentions and goals 
that are not yet attained 
Ericsson & Simon 
(1993) 
verb tense past tense information from the past 
that is reconsidered and 
incorporated into present 
considerations 
Bartl & Dörner 
(1998) 
Table 7.7: Summary of reported findings on verb analysis in verbal reports. 
7.2 Research Questions and expectations 
The presented literature overview illustrated that previous research has focused on 
modal verbs and semantic content of verbs in order to describe the difference in 
problem solving performance or the reported problem solving behavior itself. In 
contrast to those studies, the analysis in this thesis focuses on the different 
problem solving processes and their linguistic representation. Thus the problem 
solving process, i.e. hypothesis, evaluation, action etc. will be the unit of analysis. 
Furthermore, the verbs will be annotated on a more general level based on the 
verb classification proposed by Halliday (1985) and Halliday and Matthiessen 
(2002). This approach should be suitable to find answers to the following basic 
research question: 
? Research question 1: Is there a systematic difference between problem 
solving processes with regard to verb type? 
As speakers mark certainty about statements by modality, this aspect of the verb 
phrase is addressed in research question 2: 
? Research question 2: Is there a difference between the investigated 
processes with regard to mood (subjunctive and indicative) and modal 
adverbs? 
Based on the reviewed findings (see Table 7.7) and preliminary analyses (Tenbrink 
& Gralla 2009; Gralla & Tenbrink 2012), the following expectations are raised. Only 
those processes which are directly related to the problem solving process will be 
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analyzed, i.e. those processes which are introduced as local processes of problem 
solving in chapter 6. 
It was expected that hypotheses are marked by modal verbs as indicators for the 
connection between the domains of wooden objects (physically present in the real 
world) and functional objects as parts of a house or building (conceptual domain 
of the target object) (Tenbrink & Gralla 2009; Tenbrink & Seifert 2011). Further-
more, modal verbs were reported to mark hypothetical, conjectural and therefore 
tentative assumptions about information and relations between information 
(Ericsson & Simon 1993). The tentative and hypothetical character of hypotheses 
are further expected to be expressed by modal adverbs (e.g. ‘maybe’, ‘perhaps’) 
(Ericsson & Simon 1993) and modal verbs in the subjunctive mood which indicate 
mental simulation (Roth 1985). Future actions, intentions, and goals, which are 
typically formulated in hypotheses, are indicated by future tense marking (Ericsson 
& Simon 1993) and in verbs such as ‘have to’, ‘like to’, and ‘want to’ (Caron-Pargue 
& Caron 1991; Ericsson & Simon 1993; Caron 1996). Preliminary findings suggest 
that verbs of being and having are frequently used in hypotheses when participants 
suggest the function of objects (Tenbrink & Gralla 2009) or when they assume 
which actions are suitable. Verbs of sensing (e.g. ‘guess’) express that the speaker is 
not certain about the uttered information and refers to himself as the reference 
point for the proposal which is formulated in the hypothesis (Gralla & Tenbrink 
2012). In cases in which different domains are connected, it was expected that 
verbs of comparison (‘use as’, ‘look like’) were used along with other options of 
mapping between domains (Tenbrink & Gralla 2009:10 and results in chapter 8). 
Actions were expected to be represented by action verbs (Tenbrink 2008) and the 
present tense which signals current state information (Ericsson & Simon 1993; 
Tenbrink 2008). Tenbrink (2008) does not define her category ‘action verbs’ but 
she provides the example ‘ich gehe’ (go) (Tenbrink 2008:131) and the exemplary 
think aloud protocol contains the verb ‘gehen’ (go) in most information units and 
‘laufen’ (run) in one of them. Therefore, it can be assumed that Tenbrink’s (2008) 
class of ‘action verbs’ corresponds to verbs of doing and happening as previously 
introduced. 
Considering the classification of process categories195, descriptions of mental state 
contain processes in which speakers refer to themselves as the source of 
information and expresses an opinion regarding the content of what is being said. 
Those processes are expected to contain epistemic modals, such as ‘I think’, 
                                                        
195 Definitions of the respective categories and examples are to be found in chapter 6. 
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because those have been reported to signal a change in procedure and storage in 
long-term memory (Caron-Pargue & Caron 1991). The verb ‘think’ belongs to the 
class of verbs of sensing, more specifically, to the sub-class of cognitive verbs of 
sensing. The use of these verbs in combination with the first person pronoun 
signals that the speaker focuses on himself/herself for information, i.e. the 
information source is internal. The source of information may be background 
knowledge, perceptual information, or memory traces. Additionally, the speaker 
expresses his/her opinion on what is being said because these verbs signal that the 
presented conclusions are tentative with regard to their relation to the real world.  
Evaluative processes, positive as well as negative, were expected to be marked by 
the present tense. Given that evaluations refer to the current state, a high 
frequency of verbs of being and having could be expected. The same expectations 
were raised concerning the category of features of object parts since those 
processes are essentially reports about perceptual information on objects. 
7.3 Data Analysis 
The first part of the analysis focused on the description of the linguistic 
representation of problem solving processes. Thus the basic unit of analysis in this 
part of the chapter were the coded process. A process unit (abbreviated PU) may 
contain more than one discourse unit (abbreviated DU), as shown in example 17 
that represents one hypothesis196. 
(141)  (DU 1) okay so sieht das schon aus (DU 2) als würde die hier oben sein 
(DU 3) deswegen wird das wohl hinten oben unterm Dach sein (okay this 
already looks / as if this is up here / therefore this will be above in the back 
underneath the roof) 
In each PU all verbs were annotated with regard to form, i.e. tense, mood, and verb 
category. Tense might either be present, past, or future. Mood was coded as 
indicative, subjunctive, or imperative. Five verb types were distinguished, namely 
being and having, doing and happening, sensing, saying, and modal. The distinction 
between the first four categories was based on Halliday and Matthiessen (2002). 
Furthermore, instances of ellipsis were coded. The application of this scheme 
results in the following annotation (see Figure 7.5): 
                                                        
196 The concept of ‘process units’ is introduced in chapter 3. 
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Figure 7.5: Screenshot of part of the annotation table for one hypothesis (“existenzielle Prozesse (des 
Seins)” correspond to being and having). 
For a better understanding some examples are provided for all annotated verb 
categories197: 
? being and having: aussehen (look like), Bedeutung haben (have meaning), 
gehören (belong), halten (hold), passen (fit), sein (be), stehen (stand), … 
? doing and happening: anfangen (start), angucken (look at), anordnen 
(arrange), auspacken (unpack), bauen (build), benutzen (use), einbauen 
(build), funktionieren (work), gucken (look for198), legen (put), machen 
(do), tuen (do), verkeilen (fasten), verrutschen (shift), versuchen (try), 
zusammenfallen (crash), … 
? sensing: annehmen (assume), denken (think), erinnern (remember), sich 
fragen (ask oneself), glauben (believe), gucken (look around), hoffen 
(hope), nachdenken (think), rauskriegen (find out), sehen (see), überlegen 
(think), … 
? saying: sagen (say) 
? modal: dürfen (allowed), können (can), möchten (want)199, müssen (must), 
sollen (should), wollen (want) 
The analysis categories were defined in an iterative process. For most verbs it was 
clear which category they belong to. However, in some cases it was more difficult. 
Among the more difficult to define ones were ‘gucken’ (look), ‘passen’ (fit), and 
‘funktionieren’ (work). Those three cases will be discussed in more detail in turn. 
‘Gucken’ (look) was used in an active sense in some cases i.e. look for an object or 
try something (example 18). This figure has features of a material clause. 
(142) Ich gucke mal, ob das passt. (I will see if this fits.) 
In other cases, ‘gucken’ was used in the sense of ‘looking around’ and seeing 
something without an intention. If ‘gucken’ was used with the first connotation, it 
                                                        
197 The first four classes are figure types whereas the class of modal verbs is one expression 
of modality. 
198 More specifically in the sense of ‘search’. 
199 As outlined section 1.2 of this chapter, these are the core modal verbs in German. 
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was classified as doing and happening and if it was used with the second 
connotation, it was classified as sensing.  
The verb ‘passen’ (fit) was frequently used (examples 19 and 20 are typical), e.g. 
(143)  das passt nicht zusammen (this does not fit) [26] 
(144)  jetzt dürfte es aber passen (now it should fit) [16] 
In both examples the speaker evaluates if the object parts fit together. It is not an 
action of fitting objects together but rather the state that is evaluated or debated. 
It is evaluated if an arrangement or object has the characteristic of fitting together. 
Based on its configuration, the figure is classified as a relational clause thus 
‘passen’ has been categorized as a verb of being and having. 
The verb ‘funktionieren’ (work) was also difficult to categorize. The following two 
examples illustrate its typical usage in which ‘funktionieren’ encodes an evaluative 
judgment about the action that has been performed. The figure that is created by 
the verb determines the structure of a material clause more specifically it encodes 
a qualitative change200. Based on this argumentation, ‘funktionieren’ was classified 
as a verb of doing and happening. 
(145) vielleicht funktioniert es, dass es so hält (maybe it works in a way that 
this holds) 
(146) (DU1) wenn ich einfach nur das versuche erstmal einzubauen/ (DU2) 
nee das funktioniert, glaube ich, nicht (when I first try to fit this in first/ 
no, this does not work, I think) [29] 
By annotating modal verbs and verb mood two ways of expressing modality are 
captured. In order to capture all possible expressions of modality, all occurrences 
of modal adverbs need to be annotated as well. The identification and annotation 
was based on the list presented by Brinkmann (1971:401). All occurrences have been 
coded for the respective function that has been assigned to them by Brinkmann 
(1971). As previously outlined, he identified three functions of modal adverbs, 
namely modification, marking information as facts or assumptions, and 
highlighting the emotional quality of what is being said. These functions are coded 
as  
? function 1 (certainty): highlighting that what is being said is certain 
? function 1 (prerequisite): signaling that prerequisites do not hold 
anymore 
? function 2 (fact): signaling that a piece of information is a fact 
                                                        
200 Please recall the categorization in Halliday and Matthiessen (2002:132) in which they 
specify that existential change involves creation and destruction. ‘Funktionieren’ 
comments on this existential change. 
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? function 2 (assumption): signaling that an information is an 
assumption 
? function 3: encoding emotional quality 
7.4 Results 
The results describing the form of the verb phrase are presented with regard to the 
distribution between problem solving processes. In the first part of the analysis, 
results on the verb class of the main verb, tense, and modality are presented. 
Modality is investigated in its representation by mood of the main verb, in modal 
verbs, and modal adverbs. Modal verbs may either fill the role of the main verb or 
fill one part of a modal verb phrase (e.g. ‘wie ich das machen könnte’ (how I could 
go about doing this)); both cases will be looked at separately. The second part of 
the analysis focuses on modal adverbs. 
7.4.1 Form of the verb phrase 
In the following graphs the distribution of verb type within process categories is 
described first. Then the distribution of modality is presented. The analysis of the 
verb phrase will be ended by the presentation of the results on tense in different 
problem solving processes. 
Overall, 2789 verb phrases were identified and coded. Regarding process types, the 
majority (1022 phrases, 36.6%) of these were hypotheses, followed by evaluations 
(482 cases, 17.3%; positive: 236 phrases and negative: 246 phrases), actions (467 
phrases, 16.7%), and descriptions of mental state (441 phrases, 15.8%). Less frequent 
were features of object parts (241 phrases, 8.64%) and least frequent were plans for 
action (90 phrases, 3.2%), dead end (39 phrases, 1.4%), and fresh start (7 phrases, 
0.3%). This distribution within verb phrases mirrors the findings on process types 
in general (see results in chapter 6). 
7.4.1.1 Verb type 
The majority of verbs were coded as verbs of being and having (1351 cases, 48.4%). 
The second most frequent type were verbs of doing and happening (950 cases, 
34.1%). Verbs of sensing were less frequent (405 cases, 14.5%). Verbs of saying were 
notably least frequent (24 cases, 0.8%). Verbs have been skipped in only 59 cases 
(2.1%). 
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A chi-square test revealed highly significant differences in the distribution of verb 
type between process types; L?2 (24, N = 2730) = 828.84, p = .00. The general trend 
is displayed in Table 7.8 (p.270). The graph visualizes that verbs of being and having 
were most frequent in hypotheses (53.0%, SD = 16.7)201, features of object parts 
(64.0%, SD = 34.2), and evaluations (negative (57.0%, SD = 37.5) as well as positive 
(63.4%, SD = 34.2)). These differences were significant at the p < .001 level for 
hypotheses (z = 4.8), features of object parts (z = 6.5), and positive evaluation 
(z = 5.1) and at the p < .05 level for negative evaluations (z = 2.4)202.  
Verbs of the category being and having were more frequent in hypotheses (53.0%) 
than in actions (10.8%) or plans for action (7.3%). The processes in which verbs of 
being and having were most frequent are related to mental activities (ideas on what 
things represent and how they are arranged) and descriptions as well as 
evaluations of what is being perceived.  
Verbs belonging to the type of doing and happening, on the other hand, were most 
frequently observed in actions (77.6%, SD = 18.0) and plans for action (33.3%, 
SD = 43.6). In both cases, the difference was highly significant at the p < .001 level, 
action (z = 16.6) and plan for action (z = 6.4). Furthermore, verbs of doing and 
happening were the only ones that were used in fresh starts. As suggested by the 
names of these process categories, they are related to action, i.e. interaction with 
and manipulation of the physically present world.  
Verbs of the category sensing, which project the speaker’s mental world into an 
utterance, were most frequently used in descriptions of the speaker’s mental state 
(32.7%, SD = 25.2). The frequency of verbs of sensing in this category was 
significantly different from the frequency in all other processes at the p < .001 level 
with z = 10.3.  
Verbs of saying were rarely observed in the data (0.7%, SD = 5.8 overall processes). 
Those rare cases were observed in hypotheses and description of mental state. 
                                                        
201 Raw frequencies and percentage are reported in Table 7.12 and Table 7.13 in the appendix. 
202Standardized residuals for all process categories × verb type are reported in Table 7.14 in 
the appendix. 
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Table 7.8: Distribution of verb type within problem solving processes (by mean percentage). 
7.4.1.2 Modality 
7.4.1.2.1 Verb mood 
The second grammatical feature of the verb phrase that was investigated was the 
expression of modality. The distribution of indicative and subjunctive mood, the 
imperative, and modal verbs is displayed in Figure 7.6. The graph clearly shows 
that the indicative mood was used in the majority of cases. Nevertheless, highly 
significant differences could be observed between process categories; L?2 (16, 
N = 2718) = 153.01, p = .000. The high frequency of indicative mood in hypotheses 
contributed to this main effect highlighting that indicative mood was significantly 
more frequent than expected (M = 18.7, SD = 12.6203, z = -2.0, p < .01204). 
Furthermore, the distribution of the subjunctive mood contributed to the statistic 
effect. The statistical analysis revealed that the subjunctive mood was significantly 
more frequent in hypotheses (M = 3.1, SD = 3.5; z = 7.3), actions (M = 0.2, SD = 0.4; 
z = -4.5), comment on object features (M = 0.14, SD = 0.41; z = -2.7), description of 
mental state (M = 0.4, SD = 0.9; z = 2.6), and negative evaluations (M = 0.2, 
SD = 0.5; z = 2.5) than in the remaining process categories. 
                                                        
203 Raw frequencies for all process categories and verb moods are reported in Table 7.15 in 
the appendix. 
204 Standardized residuals for all verb mood × process categories are reported in Table 7.16 
in the appendix. 
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Imperatives were infrequently used. If they occurred, they were more frequent in 
actions (M = 0.1, SD = 0.4; z = 3.2) and fresh starts (M = 0.02, SD = 0.1; z = 5.8) than 
in all other process categories. 
 
Figure 7.6: Distribution of modality within problem solving processes (by mean percentage). 
7.4.1.2.2 Modal verbs 
Besides verb mood, modal verbs can be used to take a stance on sentence meaning. 
Overall, 458 modal verbs have been identified. These were few cases as compared 
to the overall number of verbs (2.8%, SD = 9.6) (see Table 7.13 in the appendix).  
Modal verbs were most frequently observed in hypotheses (M = 9.4, SD = 10.7) (see 
Figure 7.7). Modal verbs can fill two kinds of verb roles in the sentence, i.e. main 
verb position or as part of the verb phrase. The distribution of these two options 
illustrated that modal verbs were most often used in verb phrases (see Figure 7.7). 
Only in hypotheses, the two options were observed at a comparable frequency 
(M = 3.2, SD = 3.5 for verb phrase position and M = 2.2, SD = 3.2 for main verb 
position205). A high frequency of modal verbs that were embedded in a verb phrase 
was also observed in descriptions of mental state (1.10 cases, SD = 1.3). 
                                                        
205 All results are reported in Table 7.19 and visualized in Figure 7.13, Figure 7.14 in the 
appendix. 
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Figure 7.7: Distribution of modal verb roles within problem solving processes (by mean raw 
frequency). 
A more fine-grained analysis of the type of modal verbs that were used adds a 
further aspect to the understanding of the different nature of the described 
problem solving processes. A chi-square test revealed highly significant differences 
of modal verb type between process categories, L?2 (35, N = 458) = 114.07, 
p = .000206.  
The frequency analysis highlighted that ‘können’ (can) was the most frequent 
modal verb in all process categories except for the process of description of mental 
state (see Table 7.9). ‘Sollen’ (should) was more frequently used in description of 
mental state (23.6%, SD = 5.4; z = 4.1)207 and action (2.0%, SD = 1.0; z = -2.5) than in 
all other process categories. Furthermore, ‘können’ (can) was observed 
significantly more often in positive evaluations (25.0%, SD = 6.1; z = 2.8) than 
expected. The modal verb ‘müssen’ (must) was more frequently used in hypotheses 
(40.6%, SD = 4.8; z = 2.9) and description of mental state (9.3%, SD = 3.7; z = -2.9), 
whereas it was used less frequently in positive evaluations (1.00%, SD = 1.00; z = -
2.1) than in the other process categories.  
Given that 458 modal verbs were identified, the results can be compared to the 
findings reported in Diewald (1996). This comparison highlighted that the general 
trend that ‘können’ and ‘müssen’ are most frequent was also observed in the 
                                                        
206 Likelihood ratios are reported because the reported results vary markedly from the 
expected results. 
207 All standardized residuals are reported in Table 7.20 in the appendix. 
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elicited self-assembly data. There was only one category, namely description of 
mental state, in which this general trend did not show (see Table 7.9 for an 
overview).  
modal 
verb 
hypothesis action descrip-
tion of 
mental 
state 
features 
of object 
parts 
positive 
evaluation 
negative 
evaluation 
können 
(can) 
41.46 % 
(5.00) 
33.71 % 
(6.25) 
20.30 % 
(4.97) 
10.67 % 
(4.31) 
25.00 % 
(6.10) 
19.00 % 
(5.51) 
müssen 
(must) 
40.65 % 
(4.79) 
19.96 % 
(4.81) 
9.30 % 
(3.65) 
4.00 % 
(2.80) 
1.00 % 
(1.00) 
7.00 % 
(3.50) 
wollen 
(want) 
0.90 % 
(0.63) 
5.33 % 
(2.91) 
5.71 % 
(2.89) 
0 % 0 % 0 % 
sollen 
(should) 
10.92 % 
(2.75) 
2.00 % 
(1.00) 
23.56 % 
(5.40) 
3.33 % 
(2.83) 
2.00 % 
(2.00) 
0 % 
dürfen 
(allowed) 
1.68 % (0.91) 1.00 % 
(1.00) 
1.00 % 
(1.00) 
0 % 0 % 0 % 
möchten 
(like) 
0.40 % 
(0.40) 
1.00 % 
(1.00) 
2.67 % 
(2.10) 
0 % 0 % 0 % 
Table 7.9: Frequency of modal verbs reported for the six most frequent process categories (mean of 
percentage with standard deviation in brackets) – ‘mögen’ (like) has not been coded as a modal verb in 
the analysis because it does not count as one of the core modal verbs. 
Furthermore, it could be observed that ‘wollen’ was notably less frequent in the 
self-assembly data than in Diewald’s (1996) and Wunderlich’s (1981) analysis. Based 
on this comparison, a normal distribution208 for modal verbs in hypotheses and 
actions and a diverging distribution for description of mental state can be assumed. 
In order to test whether the observed trend holds for both syntactical 
constructions, modal verb type frequencies were analyzed for each possible 
construction separately, too. This part of the analysis of modal verbs was restricted 
to hypothesis and description of mental state since those two categories were 
observed to contain most modal verbs209. 
                                                        
208 Note that this term does not refer to the statistical phenomenon of normal distribution 
but rather expresses that the distribution is normal with regard to the reported frequency 
for spoken German (see section 1 of this chapter for more detail). 
209 For those interested in the distribution within the remaining processes see Figure 7.13 
and Figure 7.14 in the appendix. 
RESULTS 275 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Distribution of modal verbs that are part of a larger verb phrase within hypothesis and 
description of mental state (by mean percentage). 
First, the distribution of modal verb types in verb constructions was analyzed. The 
analysis revealed that ‘können’ (can) was the most frequently used modal verb in 
hypotheses (36.5%, SD = 38.8), followed by ‘müssen’ (must) (24.7%, SD = 31.2), and 
‘sollen’ (should) (12.2%, SD = 25.2) (see Figure 7.8). ‘Können’ was also most 
frequently used in descriptions of mental state (21.9%, SD = 38.5). However, in this 
category ‘sollen’ (19.6%, SD = 37.1) was the second most frequently used form. In 
both process categories, ‘möchten’ (like) was the least frequently used modal verb 
type210.  
The distribution for modal verbs that fill the role of main verbs was different from 
the previously described pattern (see Table 7.10). The modal verb ‘müssen’ (must) 
was most frequently used in hypotheses (41.4%, SD = 44.8) and ‘können’ (can) less 
frequently (22.9%, SD = 37.6). Overall, modal verbs in main verb position were less 
frequent in description of mental state. Considering the distribution of the different 
modal verb types, a different picture emerged in this category than in hypothesis. 
In description of mental state, ‘sollen’ was most frequent (11.0%, SD = 30.8) and 
‘können’ (6.0%, SD = 24.0) was also the second most frequent modal verb211. 
                                                        
210 All results are reported in Table 7.21 in the appendix. 
211 All results are reported in Table 7.22 in the appendix. 
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Table 7.10: Distribution of modal verbs in main verb position in hypothesis and description of mental 
state (by mean percentage). 
7.4.1.3 Tense 
The third grammatical feature that was coded for was tense. The distribution of 
the dependent variable ‘tense’ with its features (present, past, future) is displayed 
in Figure 7.9. The graph clearly shows that participants tended to use verbs in 
present tense. The frequency of present tense was different between plan for action 
(34.5%, SD = 43.0) and hypotheses (89.3%, SD = 11.6), action (92.6%, SD = 12.8), 
positive evaluation (85.3%, SD = 30.6), and negative evaluation (85.3%, SD = 30.1) 
(all results are summarized in Table 7.18 in the appendix). If past tense was used, 
those cases were observed in descriptions of mental state (6.5%, SD = 14.9). The 
future tense was sometimes used in stating plans for action (6.7%, SD = 19.1)212.  
                                                        
212 Raw frequencies are also reported in Table 7.17 in the appendix. 
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Figure 7.9: Distribution of tense within problem solving processes (by mean percentage). 
7.4.2 Modal adverbs 
7.4.2.1 Results 
As outlined in the introduction of this chapter, modality can be expressed in 
different ways. Besides mood and modal verbs, modal adverbs serve as indicators 
of modality. In this part of the analysis the results for the annotation of modal 
adverbs are presented.  
All in all 254 modal adverbs were identified. However, not all modal adverbs that 
were proposed by Brinkmann (1971) were observed in the think aloud protocols. 
The following adverbs were identified with differing frequencies of usage (see 
Table 7.11 for raw frequency): ‘bestimmt’ and ‘sicher’ (certainly), ‘jedenfalls’ 
(anyway), ‘unbedingt’ (necessarily), ‘tatsächlich’ (really), ‘natürlich’ (naturally), 
‘wahrscheinlich’ (probably), ‘vermutlich’ (presumably), ‘vielleicht’ (maybe), ‘wohl’ 
(probably). Three participants did not use any modal adverbs in their protocols.  
The frequency analysis revealed that ‘vielleicht’ (maybe) was the most frequently 
used modal adverb and it was used by the majority of participants (70%). The 
modal adverb ‘wahrscheinlich’ (probably) was the second most frequent adverb, 
being used in 42% of all protocols. The third most frequent adverb, namely 
‘bestimmt’ (certainly), was used to an almost comparable amount of times in 
protocols but by only 1/3 of the participants. No adverbs encoding emotional 
quality were identified in the data.  
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To conclude, modal adverbs that signal the tentative state of an utterance, i.e. 
function 2, were most frequently used in think aloud protocols as compared to 
modal adverbs that signal certainty, i.e. function 1. 
modal adverb frequency 
(overall) 
number of participants 
who used it 
function assigned by 
Brinkmann (1971:401) 
vielleicht 127 (50.00%) 35 (70.00%) 2 (assumption) 
wahrscheinlich 50 (19.69%) 21 (42.00%) 2 (assumption) 
bestimmt 37 (14.57%) 15 (30.00%) 1 (certainty) 
wohl 17 (6.69%) 12 (24.00%) 2 (assumption) 
sicher 13 (5.12%) 9 (18.00%) 1 (certainty) 
jedenfalls 5 (2.00%) 4 (8.00%) 1 (certainty) 
vermutlich 2 (< 1.00%) 2 (4.00%) 2 (assumption) 
unbedingt 1 (< 1.00%) 1 (2.00%) 1 (certainty) 
tatsächlich 1 (< 1.00%) 1 (2.00%) 2 (fact) 
natürlich 1 (< 1.00%) 1 (2.00%) 2 (fact) 
sum 254 (100%)   
Table 7.11: Summary of occurrences of modal adverbs in think aloud protocols ordered by frequency 
from most to least frequent (raw numbers with percentage in brackets). 
After presenting this general overview, the distribution of modal adverbs will be 
considered from two perspectives, i.e. with regard to the different conditions and 
the process categories that were distinguished in the analysis of this chapter. No 
differences of distribution between conditions were observed. The distribution 
reflects the general trend that was described above (see Table 7.23 in the appendix). 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that the two occurrences of modal adverbs belonging 
to the category 1, i.e. signaling that a fact is being stated, were used by two 
participants with few prior knowledge (i.e. the underspecified and verbal goal 
condition) (see Figure 7.10).  
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Figure 7.10: Distribution of modal adverbs (categorized according to their function) between 
conditions (based on mean percentage). 
The distribution of modal adverbs between process categories highlighted that 
markers signaling the tentative character of an utterance were most frequent in all 
process categories (see Figure 7.11). The only process that was different from this 
general pattern was the category of description of mental state in which modal 
adverbs signaling certainty were used as frequently as modal adverbs signaling 
tentativeness (see Table 7.24 in the appendix). The raw frequency of modal adverbs 
was very low in this category; thus, no conclusions can be drawn but the emerging 
trend should be noted nevertheless.  
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Figure 7.11: Distribution of modal adverbs (categorized according to their function) between process 
categories (based on percentage overall). 
7.4.2.2 Summary 
Summarizing and combining all results, the following description of verb phrase 
form emerges for the respective process categories: 
? Hypothesis: verbs of being and having in indicative mood (85.3%) or 
subjunctive mood (12.8%) and present tense; modal verbs ‘können’ 
(can) (36.5%), ‘müssen’ (must) (24.7%), and ‘sollen’ (should) (12.2%); 
modal adverbs signaling tentativeness (‘vielleicht’, ‘wahrscheinlich’) 
? Action: verbs of doing and happening in indicative mood and present 
tense 
? Plan for action: verbs of doing and happening in indicative mood and 
present tense (34.5%) or future tense (6.7%) 
? Features of objects: verbs of being and having in indicative mood and 
present tense 
? Positive evaluation: verbs of being and having in indicative mood and 
present tense 
? Negative evaluation: verbs of being and having in indicative mood and 
present tense 
? Description of mental state: verbs of sensing in indicative mood and 
present tense; modal verbs ‘können’ (can) (21.9%) and ‘sollen’ (should) 
(19.6%) 
? Dead end: verbs of sensing (7.5%) and being and having (7.1%) in 
indicative mood and present tense 
? Fresh start: verbs of doing and happening in indicative mood and 
present tense 
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7.5 Discussion 
Research question 1 investigated whether there were systematic differences 
between problem solving processes with regard to verb type. Research question 2 
studied the representation of modality in the identified verb phrases. A suggestive 
picture about the linguistic representation of each process category can only be 
constructed by combining verb type and modality. Therefore, these two research 
questions are discussed together. 
In order to engage in a solid discussion, the overall frequency of the different 
processes needs to be taken into account. As outlined in the first paragraph of the 
results section, the majority of processes were hypotheses, evaluations and actions. 
Descriptions of mental state were more frequent than features of object parts. Plans 
for action, dead end states, and fresh start were rarely verbalized. Since the aim of 
this study was to investigate the linguistic nature of these processes, all of them 
will be discussed in turn but the validity of the conclusions is higher for a greater 
data sample than for a very small one as in the cases of the three last mentioned 
processes. This being said the discussion is guided by the order of frequency, 
starting with the most frequent one. 
The results revealed that hypotheses contained verbs of being and having at a very 
high frequency indicating persistence over time without any active engagement by 
the speaker. If plans were formulated, verbs of doing and happening are used as in 
“das Dach kommt oben rauf” (the roof goes on top). The low frequency of future 
tense marking suggests that future goals were rarely mentioned. As expected, 
present tense, which is the unmarked tense of both verb types (Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2002:135), was clearly the most frequently used tense. Furthermore, 
hypotheses were either expressed with certainty as in „das ist unten“ (“this is 
below”) or signal a tentative character as in „eigentlich müsste hier, glaube ich, 
eine Ecke hin“ (“actually there needs to be a corner part here I think”). Since the 
indicative mood was the most frequently found verb mood in hypotheses, it can be 
concluded that most hypotheses were uttered with certainty. Nevertheless, there 
were examples in which tentativeness was expressed by various means. In the 
example above, the modal verb ‘müssen’ (must) signals that the speaker’s idea, 
emphasized by the phrase “I think”, was externally constraint by requirements. The 
tentative character of ‘could’ further stressed by the use of modal adverbs, such as 
‘vielleicht’ (maybe) and ‘wahrscheinlich’ (probably).  
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As outlined in the introductory section of this chapter, the distribution of modal 
verbs in the elicited think aloud protocols was compared to that described for 
spoken German in the literature in order to discuss the observed distribution and 
implications of modal verb type. The comparison between the elicited data and 
that reported in the literature highlighted that the self-assembly findings on the 
distribution of the two syntactic possibilities of modal verb position reflect 
Wunderlich’s (1981) findings. He reported that most modal verbs were used within 
a verb phrase and this was also observed in the elicited data. Nevertheless, he did 
not distinguish between modal verbs in main verb position and modal verbs within 
a verb phrase in his frequency analysis. Diewald (1996) did not address these two 
syntactic options at all. Thus the results of the present study are compared to 
Wunderlich’s (1981) findings. The comparison revealed the same distribution for all 
process categories except for description of mental state. Based on this comparison, 
it can be assumed that the identified patterns of modal verb distribution reflect the 
general pattern in German. 
The analysis of the distribution of modal verbs highlighted that hypotheses 
contained forms of ‘können’ (can) at the same frequency as forms of ‘müssen’ 
(must). Based on Engel’s (2002) description of subject-related use213 of modal verbs, 
‘können’ signals that the speaker has the possibility to act upon his/her intentions 
because of his/her abilities, i.e. the action or idea is subject driven. The modal 
verbs ‘sollen’ and ‘müssen’ signal that intentions and ideas are driven by external 
forces. In the case of ‘sollen’ these external forces are expectations raised by a third 
party. In the case of ‘müssen’ requirements influence the speaker’s intentions. The 
finding that hypotheses were marked by the use of ‘können’ and ‘müssen’ suggests 
that there were two influencing forces with regard to the formulation of 
hypotheses, i.e. subject-driven possibilities and requirement-based prerequisites 
for expressed ideas and intentions. In some cases, the tentative character of 
hypotheses was stressed by the use of modal adverbs. This process category 
contained the highest frequency of modal adverbs and the majority of them 
belonged to the functional category marking an assumption, namely ‘vielleicht’ 
(maybe) and ‘wahrscheinlich’ (probably).  
Halliday and Matthiessen (2002:131) argue that verbs of doing and happening 
encode dynamic processes involving input of energy that leads to a change of the 
actualization through time. Given the finding that actions contain verbs of doing 
and happening at the highest frequency within its process category and between all 
                                                        
213 His descriptions of subject-related usage have been summarized in sub-section 1 of this 
chapter. 
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process categories, it can be argued that the category action refers to the execution 
of actions. Furthermore, verbs in the category action were mostly marked by 
present tense signaling the situatedness of the performed action. The finding that 
most verbs were used in indicative mood further adds to the picture of certainty 
and performance. If uncertainty was expressed, it was done by modal verbs. In 
actions ‘können’ was more frequent than ‘müssen’. This suggests that the subject’s 
abilities influenced the actions that were performed more than requirements that 
needed to be fulfilled. As expected, actions could be distinguished from plans for 
action by tense marking. If future marking was observed at all, it was in plan for 
action. Nevertheless, the unmarked214 present tense was most frequent in this 
category as well. 
A third process category that was frequently observed in the data but not 
described in the literature on problem solving so far was description of mental 
state. This category could be distinguished from the previously mentioned 
processes very clearly. First of all, this process category contained the highest 
frequency of verbs of sensing. These are verbs that encode mental activities, such 
as ‘think’, ‘hope’, ‘assume’, ‘believe’, and verb phrases which signal that the speaker 
turns to himself/herself for answers as in ‘ask myself’. Verbs of sensing encode the 
projection of interior content and ideas into 2nd order semiotic reality (Halliday & 
Matthiessen 2002:128). Therefore, this category contains the speaker’s projected 
thoughts that become part of the present context through their verbalization. The 
observation that those verbs were mainly used in the present tense stresses the 
focus on the present context and task. Additionally, the distribution of modal verb 
type frequency in this process category was a little different from that reported for 
German in the literature. Whereas ‘können’ is the most frequent modal verb in the 
literature, ‘müssen’ was most frequent in description of mental state. This finding 
suggests that requirements were more important in internal consultations than the 
speaker’s abilities. The distribution of modal adverbs was also different in this 
category than the one observed in all other process categories. The analysis 
highlighted that modal adverbs signaled certainty and tentativeness at the same 
frequency. This suggests that speakers either described their mental state with 
certainty (see example (147)) or expressed uncertainty about the present state of 
the assembly process (see example (148)). 
 
 
                                                        
214 The term ‘unmarked’ refers to the observation that the present tense is the most 
frequently used tense with verbs of doing and happening (Halliday & Matthiessen 2002:135). 
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(147) „Ich bin mir relativ sicher.“ (“I am almost certain.”) 
(148) „… dann vielleicht / wo können die hin hinkommen …“ (“… then maybe/ 
where can those be placed …”) 
The linguistic structure of evaluation processes did not differ whichever 
conclusions were drawn, i.e. either positive or negative. In both categories verbs of 
being and having were most frequent and they were used in the unmarked present 
tense. This finding confirms the expectation that participants evaluated the stages 
and outcomes of their actions at the moment of observation and not in retrospect.  
Considering the findings for all identified process categories, it can be concluded 
that systematically different patterns were identified. However, considering the 
frequency of modal verb types, it was observed that requirements were of greater 
importance to the assemblers than expectations. This finding can be explained by 
the fact that in two conditions participants were provided with specific 
requirements regarding the goal object. Furthermore, these results mirror the 
findings of the content-based analysis on the use of task specific constraints which 
revealed that participants verbalized physical constraints and adhered to them in 
consecutive actions (see chapter 9). Expectations that are expressed by ‘sollen’ 
(should) are externally presented to the speaker (Engel 2002). In the self-assembly 
experiment no expectations regarding time or performance were formulated in the 
instructions; this context may explain why ‘sollen’ was only rarely observed. 
In sum, the analysis of verb form revealed a systematic difference of verb type 
between the identified problem solving processes. The results highlighted that 
hypotheses differ from actions, and both of these differ from descriptions of mental 
state. Furthermore, characteristic features of think aloud protocols were identified 
in the frequency of verbs of saying and the frequency of subjunctive mood. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the goal of identifying the linguistic structure 
of problem solving processes has been achieved.  
Moreover, the combination of these results highlights specific features of verb 
phrase form with regard to the task at hand. First, instances of verbs of saying were 
rarely identified in the protocols. This finding can be interpreted as a specific 
feature of think aloud protocols in which the communicative intention is very low 
if it is at the speaker’s mind at all. In the self-assembly scenario participants were 
not encouraged to communicate; thus they do not need to use reported speech or 
introduce sentences with phrases such as ‘I would say’. Therefore, verbs of saying 
are not needed to structure discourse coherently. Second, the present tense is the 
most frequently used verb mood. This result needs to be interpreted against the 
backdrop of the task specific instructions and conditions. In the self-assembly task 
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participants were not given any specific constraints as to how the objects can be 
placed but most importantly they were free to disassemble the object at any time. 
Thus there was no need for mental simulation as to where to put a specific object 
and in which order they need to be assembled.  
One indicator for mental simulation is the use of subjunctive mood because it 
signals that the reported event is assumed (e.g. Glinz 1973). Furthermore, modal 
verbs encode the simulation character of what is being said because they signal 
that something is not done yet but will be (indicative mood) or shall be 
(subjunctive mood) done in the future. In order to assess if the frequency of 
markers of mental simulation is notably low in the self-assembly data, it was 
compared to another data set of think aloud protocols which were elicited while 
performing a task in which planning (one kind of mental simulation) was a 
necessary prerequisite for success. This data was elicited by Sven Brüssow, Daniel 
Holt, and Joachin Funke at the university of Heidelberg215. The researchers asked 
participants to think aloud while solving a specific scheduling task called “Plan a 
day” (abbreviated PAD) (for more details on the design see Brüssow et al. (in 
preparation)). In a collaborative work with Sven Brüssow216 I have been looking for 
the best way of capturing and visualizing the differences in the amount of mental 
simulation expressed in the protocols. The visualization of a correspondence 
analysis seems to be the most informative representation (see Figure 7.12). The 
analysis revealed more indicators for simulation processes in think aloud protocols 
collected in PAD than in “Unaided Object Assembly” (abbreviated UOA). As 
outlined above, the majority of verbs that were used in UOA were main verbs in 
indicative mood. There were only few instances of subjunctive mood and modal 
verbs. Verb forms used in PAD, in contrast, showed a greater variability with 
regard to type as well as mood. The search for clusters that were representative for 
each task revealed that PAD could be described in these terms (see Figure 7.12). 
However, the graph highlighted clearly that modal verbs (in indicative as well as 
subjunctive mood) were more frequent in PAD than in UOA and the subjunctive 
mood was generally more frequent in PAD. If these findings are related to the 
theoretical assumptions about indicators of simulation processes, a clear picture 
emerges; participants who were planning the errands for a day engaged in more 
simulation processes than participants who assembled the dollhouse for 
                                                        
215 I thank all three researchers for offering us the great opportunity to work with them on 
this data set. I want to specially thank Sven Brüssow with whom I devised and ran the 
analysis. 
216 This is ongoing work and a first publication together with Daniel Holt, Thora Tenbrink, 
and Joachim Funke referred to as Brüssow et al. (in preparation). 
286 FEATURES OF ANALYSIS: VERB FORM IN PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESSES  
 
themselves. Furthermore, it can be observed that participants engaged in the 
assembly task used the subjunctive mood frequently with modal verbs which 
implies that they combine both markers of simulation processes in one verb form 
thereby strengthening the simulation character. 
 
Figure 7.12: Correspondence analysis of the frequencies of verbs in the indicative and subjunctive mood 
in verbal protocols for PAD (p) and UOA (u); statistical analysis and graphical representation by Sven 
Brüssow (Verb labels reflect the respective STTS tag and mood information (VMFIN-IND modal verb, 
finite, indicative; VAFIN-IND auxiliary, finite, indicative; VVFIN-IND main verb, finite, indicative; 
VMFIN-SUBJ modal verb, finite, subjunctive; VAFIN-SUBJ auxiliary, finite, subjunctive; VVFIN-SUBJ main 
verb, finite, subjunctive)). 
To sum up, in addition to differences in the distribution of verb type between 
problem solving processes the analysis of verb mood and modal verbs suggests an 
influence of the task on observed mental planning activity. The differences 
between the analyzed task of self-assembly in a largely unconstrained context and 
a problem solving task in which planning was a prerequisite for success suggest 
that the assembly encouraged situated, action oriented behavior rather than 
mental simulation. 
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7.6 Appendix 
7.6.1 Results Verb type, mood, and tense 
process being & 
having 
doing & 
happening 
sensing saying ellipsis modals 
hypothesis 12.24 (9.71) 5.12 (4.26) 2.42 (2.48) 0.18 (0.48) 0.48 (0.99)  2.20 (3.19) 
action 1.12 (1.44) 7.26 (5.83) 0.70 (1.20) 0.02 (0.14) 0.24 (0.69) 0.22 (0.55) 
plan for 
action 
0.28 (0.78) 1.32 (2.63) 0.18 (0.44) 0.00 0.02 (0.14) 0.04 (0.20) 
features of 
object parts 
3.66 (4.05) 0.70 (1.22) 0.30 (0.79) 0.02 (0.14) 0.14 (0.61) 0.10 (0.30) 
positive 
evaluation 
3.32 (3.05) 0.68 (1.11) 0.60 (0.95) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.31) 0.06 (0.31) 
negative 
evaluation 
2.92 (2.97) 1.20 (1.78) 0.72 (1.41) 0.00  0.08 (0.34) 0.18 (0.39) 
description 
of mental 
state 
3.16 (3.23) 2.38 (2.57) 2.94 (2.99) 0.20 (0.45) 0.14 (0.50) 0.34 (0.72) 
dead end 0.32 (0.94) 0.22 (0.82) 0.24 (0.72) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
fresh start 0.00 0.12 (0.39) 0.00 0.00 0.02 (0.14) 0.00 
overall 3.00 (5.34) 2.11 (3.65) 0.90 (1.80) 0.05 (0.25) 0.13 (0.52) 0.35 (1.30) 
Table 7.12: Results of distribution of verb classes with regard to problem solving processes; mean of 
raw frequencies (standard deviation in brackets). 
process being & 
having 
doing & 
happening 
sensing saying ellipsis modals 
hypothesis 52.97 
(16.74) 
22.59 
(13.35) 
12.05 
(12.18) 
0.87 (3.31) 2.16 (4.37)  9.36 
(10.69) 
action 10.77 
(13.79) 
77.62 
(18.02) 
7.07 (11.47) 0.17 (1.18) 1.92 (6.17) 2.46 (6.34) 
plan for 
action 
7.29 (21.29) 33.29 
(43.61) 
5.02 
(16.63) 
0.00 0.29 (2.02) 2.12 (14.15) 
features of 
object parts 
63.96 
(38.02) 
17.54 
(28.65) 
3.52 (8.94) 0.63 (0.44) 3.17 (14.93) 1.75 (5.98) 
positive 
evaluation 
63.42 
(34.20) 
12.95 
(23.69) 
9.50 
(17.28) 
1.44 (7.38) 0.55 (3.01) 2.14 (9.92) 
negative 
evaluation 
57.00 
(37.49) 
18.45 
(25.41) 
8.79 
(16.74) 
0.00 1.09 (4.56) 4.67 (16.14) 
description 
of mental 
state 
30.78 
(24.49) 
22.93 
(19.70) 
32.69 
(25.24) 
3.86 
(15.02) 
1.23 (4.30) 2.51 (5.40) 
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dead end 7.06 
(19.34) 
3.46 
(11.05) 
7.48 (22.10) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
fresh start 0.00 10.00 
(30.30) 
0.00 0.00 2.00 (14.14) 0.00 
overall 32.58 
(35.91) 
24.31 
(35.56) 
9.57 
(18.26) 
0.71 (5.78) 1.38 (7.68) 2.78 (9.60) 
Table 7.13: Results of distribution of verb classes with regard to problem solving processes; mean of 
percent (standard deviation in brackets). 
process 
category/ Verb 
type 
being & having doing & 
happening 
sensing saying 
hypothesis 4.8 -5.2 -2.5 0 
action -11.1 16.6 -3.9 -1.5 
plan for action -4.5 6.4 -1.1 -0.9 
features of 
object parts 
6.5 -5.0 -3.3 -0.7 
positive 
evaluation 
5.1 -5.1 -0.6 0.7 
negative 
evaluation 
2.4 -2.6 0 -1.5 
description of 
mental state 
-3.9 -2.6 10.3 3.2 
dead end -0.6 -0.6 2.7 -0.6 
fresh start -1.7 2.8 -0.9 -0.2 
Table 7.14: Cross table with standardized residuals for verb mood × process category. 
process indicative subjunctive imperative infinitive 
hypothesis 18.66 (12.57) 3.14 (3.45)  0.02 (0.14) 0.36 (0.78) 
action 8.70 (7.16) 0.16 (0.37) 0.12 (0.36) 0.20 (0.53) 
plan for 
action 
1.44 (2.82) 0.08 (0.27) 0.00 0.30 (0.76) 
features of 
object 
parts 
4.64 (4.92) 0.14 (0.41) 0.00 0.04 (0.28) 
positive 
evaluation 
4.28 (3.65) 0.44 (0.84) 0.00 0.02 (0.14) 
negative 
evaluation 
4.80 (4.87) 0.16 (0.51) 0.00 0.08 (0.27) 
description 
of mental 
state 
8.42 (7.18) 0.38 (0.90) 0.06 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30) 
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dead end 0.76 (2.05) 0.20 (0.14) 0.00 0.00 
fresh start 0.10 (0.36) 0.00 0.02 (0.14) 0.00 
overall 5.76 (8.11) 0.50 (1.56) 0.02 (0.18) 0.12 (0.45) 
Table 7.15: Results of distribution of mood with regard to problem solving processes; mean of raw 
frequencies (standard deviation in brackets). 
process category/Verb type indicative subjunctive imperative 
hypothesis -2.0 7.3 -1.5 
action 1.1 -4.5 3.2 
plan for action 0.3 0.8 -0.6 
features of object parts 0.8 -2.7 -1.0 
positive evaluation -0.2 0.9 -1.0 
negative evaluation 0.8 -2.5 -1.0 
description of mental state 0.7 -2.6 0.9 
dead end 0.4 -1.2 -0.4 
fresh start -0.2 -0.7 5.8 
Table 7.16: Cross table with standardized residuals for verb mood × process category. 
process present past future 
hypothesis 19.54 (13.82) 1.36 (2.74)  0.82 (1.08) 
action 8.62 (6.97) 0.18 (0.56) 0.38 (1.24) 
plan for 
action 
1.08 (1.82) 0.04 (0.20) 0.40 (0.20) 
features of 
object 
parts 
4.54 (4.95) 0.14 (0.35) 0.06 (0.24) 
positive 
evaluation 
4.46 (3.92) 0.22 (0.51) 0.04 (0.20) 
negative 
evaluation 
7.86 (6.89) 0.16 (0.37) 0.10 (0.36) 
description 
of mental 
state 
8.42 (7.18) 0.70 (1.39) 0.26 (0.49) 
dead end 0.74 (2.03) 0.04 (0.20) 0.00 
fresh start 0.10 (0.36) 0.00 0.00 
overall 5.74 (8.42) 0.32 (1.14) 0.23 (0.75) 
Table 7.17: Results of distribution of tense with regard to problem solving processes; mean of raw 
frequencies (standard deviation in brackets). 
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process present past future 
hypothesis 89.30 (11.64) 5.12 (8.47)  3.77 (5.91) 
action 92.59 (12.79) 1.06 (5.29) 3.39 (8.60) 
plan for 
action 
34.46 (42.98) 2.12 (14.15) 6.74 (19.08) 
features of 
object 
parts 
81.71 (36.61) 5.42 (20.10) 0.75 (3.46) 
positive 
evaluation 
85.25 (30.57) 3.67 (9.82) 0.90 (4.48) 
negative 
evaluation 
85.27 (30.11) 2.92 (7.87) 0.63 (2.49) 
description 
of mental 
state 
84.90 (27.24) 6.47 (14.88) 1.94 (4.10) 
dead end 17.05 (37.05) 0.95 (5.09) 0.00 
fresh start 8.00 (27.40) 0.00 0.00 
overall 64.28 (43.96) 3.14 (11.20) 2.01 (7.88) 
Table 7.18: Results of distribution of tense with regard to problem solving processes; mean of percent 
(standard deviation in brackets). 
7.6.2 Distribution of modal verbs within process categories 
process category within verb phrase main verb 
hypothesis 3.18 (3.52) 2.20 (3.19) 
action 0.88 (1.27) 0.22 (0.55) 
plan for action 0.20 (0.53) 0.04 (0.20) 
features of object parts 0.16 (0.51) 0.10 (0.20) 
positive evaluation 0.28 (0.54) 0.06 (0.24) 
negative evaluation 0.12 (0.44) 0.18 (0.39) 
description of mental state 1.10 (1.34) 0.34 (0.72) 
dead end 0.10 (0.42) 0 
fresh start 0 0. 
overall 0.67 (1.67) 0.35 (1.30) 
Table 7.19: Distribution of modal verbs between process categories depending on the modal verb 
position; mean raw frequency with standard deviation in brackets. 
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process 
category/ 
modal verb 
type 
wollen 
(want) 
dürfen 
(allowed) 
sollen 
(should) 
können 
(can) 
müssen 
(must) 
mögen 
(like) 
hypothesis -1.3 -0.1 -1.0 -1.4 2.9 -1.3 
action 1.6 0.2 -2.5 1.3 -0.4 0.3 
plan for 
action 
1.0 -0.4 0.2 -1.0 -0.2 4.6 
features of 
object parts 
-0.7 -0.4 0.8 1.0 -1.2 -0.4 
positive 
evaluation 
-0.7 -0.5 -0.9 2.8 -2.1 -0.5 
negative 
evaluation 
-0.7 -0.5 -1.5 1.8 -0.6 -0.4 
description of 
mental state 
1.7 0.9 4.1 -0.6 -2.9 1.1 
dead end -0.4 -0.3 2.7 -0.1 -1.3 -0.3 
Table 7.20: Standardized residuals of modal verb type × process category. 
modal verb type hypothesis description of mental state 
wollen (want) 1.28 (6.35) 3.00 (15.68) 
dürfen (allowed) 1.33 (6.60) 1.33 (9.43) 
sollen (should) 12.22 (25.23) 19.63 (37.09) 
können (can) 36.50 (38.82) 21.90 (38.52) 
möchten (like) 0 0.67 (4.71) 
müssen (must) 24.66 (31.17) 7.47 (22.44) 
Table 7.21: Distribution of modal verb type (in verb phrase constructions) in hypotheses and description 
of mental state; mean percentage with standard deviation in brackets. 
modal verb type hypothesis description of mental state 
wollen (want) 0 4.00 (19.79) 
dürfen (allowed) 0.85 (4.86) 0 
sollen (should) 3.86 (11.85) 11.00 (30.79) 
können (can) 22.85 (37.63) 6.00 (23.99) 
möchten (like) 1.00 (7.07) 2.00 (14.14) 
müssen (must) 41.43 (44.82) 3.00 (15.68) 
Table 7.22: Distribution of modal verb type (in main verb position) in hypotheses and description of 
mental state; mean percentage with standard deviation in brackets. 
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Figure 7.13: Distribution of modal verbs that are part of a larger verb phrase within problem solving 
processes (by mean percentage) (false lead (a term adapted from Palmer (1977)) refers to negative 
evaluations). 
 
Figure 7.14: Distribution of modal verbs in main verb position within problem solving processes (by 
mean percentage) (false lead (a term adapted from Palmer (1977)) refers to negative evaluations). 
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7.6.3 Results modal adverbs 
condition function 1 (certainty) function 2 
(assumption) 
function 2 (fact) 
underspecified goal 14.70% (4.45) 73.12% (7.89) 0.42% (0.42) 
verbal goal 13.69% (5.00) 67.56% (9.60) 6.25% (6.25) 
verbal and visual 
goal 
21.64% (7.57) 78.36% (7.57) 0 
Table 7.23: Results distribution of modal adverbs (categorized according to their function) between 
conditions (mean percentage with standard deviation in brackets). 
process category function 1 (certainty) function 2 
(assumption) 
function 2 (fact) 
hypothesis 42 (22.34%) 145 (77.13%) 1 (0.53%) 
action 1 (10.00%) 9 (90.00%) 0 
plan for action 0 3 (75.00%) 1 (25.00%) 
features of object 
parts 
1 (12.50%) 7 (87.50%) 0 
positive evaluation 0 2 (100.00%) 0 
negative evaluation 2 (20.00%) 8 (80.00%) 0 
description of 
mental state 
5 (54.45%) 6 (54.55%) 0 
fresh start 0 2 (100.00%) 0 
dead end 0 1 (100.00%) 0 
Table 7.24: Results distribution of modal adverbs (categorized according to their function) between 
process categories (raw frequency with percentage in brackets). 

 8 Features of analysis:  
object reference 
8.1 State of the Art 
8.1.1 Traditional accounts: references in communicative 
settings 
“People create symbols in order to use them as instruments in acts of 
communication – and these communicative acts always involve another 
person as recipient.” (Tomasello 1996:230) 
Referential form can be very different depending on context (e.g. Laucht 1982; 
Ungerer & Schmid 2006), the speaker’s memory (e.g. Horton & Gerrig 2005a), and 
the speaker’s ability to conceptualize the object or event (Mangold-Allwinn et al. 
1995). As an example consider the situation in which we want our friend to hand us 
the milk. We may either use the proper noun, i.e. milk, or we may refer to it by an 
exophoric reference.  
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(1) Please pass me the milk. 
(2) Please pass me that milk that you bought this morning. 
(3) Please pass it to me. 
Although the noun is identical, there is a difference between examples (1) and (2) 
regarding the information provided about the referent. In example (1) the noun 
phrase contains enough semantic information to identify the referent. This also 
holds for example (2) but in this case the reference is more specific pointing out an 
object that has been encountered before. This information is encoded in the 
demonstrative that. In example (3) the referential expression it does not carry 
sufficient semantic meaning. It is rather an act of verbal pointing which may be 
visually supported by a pointing gesture. 
As this example shows and Tomasello (1996) rightly pointed out, naming is in 
almost all cases embedded in an act of referring for an addressee hence his/her 
needs need to be considered by the speaker as well. This fact reveals the 
fundamental difference between the presented ways of pointing out an entity. The 
use of deictic expressions is only successful if the desired object is salient, i.e. 
cognitively or visually accessible to the interlocutor. If the speaker is uncertain 
about the listener’s current focus of attention, the use of a proper noun can be 
more successful. However, in order to use a proper noun its semantic information 
has to be known to both speaker and listener. Von Stutterheim et al. (1993) showed 
that specific nominal references (i.e. subordinate terms) are only helpful for the 
identification of a referent if object parts closely resemble generally known 
features of the associated concept. In their study, participants were told to instruct 
someone else on the assembly of a robot. If there is no clear resemblance between 
the object and the concept, references to objects are based on physical properties. 
They argue that referring to a specific concept in cases in which resemblance is not 
salient does not help in solving the task and involves additional work for the 
addressee (von Stutterheim et al. 1993:118). Additionally, Clark and colleagues 
found that instructor and addressee engage in negotiation processes until a shared 
referential term is established if no conventional referring expression exists (e.g. 
Clark 2005). 
It is generally assumed that speakers tailor the content and linguistic form of a 
reference inferring the addressee’s needs, a phenomenon called audience design 
(e.g. Clark 1996; Clark & Krych 2004; Arnold 2008). Methodologically, many 
studies have been conducted in an interactive setting such as the referential 
communication paradigm (e.g. Krauss & Weinheimer 1966; Hermann & Deutsch 
1976; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; Horton & Gerrig 2002, 2005a; Fukumura & van 
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Gompel 2012; Matthews et al. 2012). Different strategies for tailoring an utterance 
according to the listener’s needs as inferred by the speaker have been described in 
the literature. The following two sections will focus on two of them, namely 
salience of objects that is expressed in linguistic form and the conceptualization of 
a given object as expressed in nominal specificity.  
As will be shown in the literature review most studies that investigate referential 
form and referential change over time focus on interactive settings, i.e. those in 
which an addressee is present or imagined. Nevertheless, there are also a few 
studies that point out that referential form may also be influenced by the speaker’s 
own mental capacities. These theoretical observations will be reviewed regarding 
the assumed integration of the addressee’s needs. Based on the literature overview, 
different degrees of interactivity and engagement between speaker and addressee 
will be distinguished. Then research questions and expectations will be outlined. 
These research questions investigate the general pattern of referential form as 
observed in think aloud protocols (experiment 1217) and compares it to referential 
forms observed in instructions (experiment 2). Furthermore, the influence of 
amount of prior information on referential form in both experiments will be 
investigated. Following these theoretical sections the coding procedure as well as 
the annotation scheme will be presented followed by a detailed overview of the 
results. The chapter will close with a general discussion of the results.  
8.1.1.1 Cognitive statuses of referential expressions 
Prince (1981) states, that “information packaging reflects the sender’s hypotheses 
about the receiver’s assumptions and beliefs and strategies” (Prince 1981:224). 
Thus, she views text as a “set of instructions from a speaker to a hearer on how to 
construct a particular discourse model”218 (Prince 1981:235). She distinguishes three 
types of givenness that are expressed in referential form, namely GivennessP, 
GivennessS, and GivennessK. GivennessP is based on predictability or recoverability 
in which the predictions are based on the receiver’s knowledge about sentence 
structure (Prince 1981:226). Here Prince (1981) refers to the different sentence 
positions of information that is assumed as given and information that is newly 
introduced. GivennessS is based on saliency that is evoked by an entity being in the 
receiver’s consciousness while listening to an utterance. This kind of givenness is 
expressed by the use of pronouns, including deictics, and syntactically by clause 
                                                        
217 For a general introduction to the experimental studies see chapter 4. 
218 This model contains entities, attributes, and links between entities. According to Prince 
(1981), discourse entities are discourse-model objects and they are represented by NPs 
(Prince 1981:235). But note, that not all NPs are automatically discourse entities. 
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subjects (see example 4). GivennessK, which is based on shared knowledge, signals 
that the speaker assumes the hearer to know the referent or at least that he/she is 
able to infer it (Prince 1981:230) (see example (5)). 
(4) “We got some beer out of the trunk. The beer was warm.” (Prince 
1981:229; emphasize in the original). 
(5) “We got some beer out of the trunk and it was warm.” (Prince 
1981:231; emphasize in the original). 
In her theory, Prince (1981) considers syntactical constructions as well as nominal 
phrases and her givenness classes are defined by their source of information. 
Gundel et al. (1993) draw upon this theory but extend Prince’s (1981) thoughts by 
proposing a more fine-grained distinction between the different states of givenness 
and without focusing on the source of information. In their work, they analyzed 
the distribution of nominal and pronominal references in English, Japanese, 
Mandarin Chinese, Russian, and Spanish. Based on their findings, they conclude 
that “different forms of determiners and pronominal forms signal different cog-
nitive statuses” (Gundel et al. 1993:274). Cognitive statuses include information 
about the location in memory (short- vs. long-term memory) and the attention 
state. By selecting a specific referential expression, the speaker signals which 
cognitive status he/she assumes for a referent to be met. Gundel et al. (1993) pro-
pose six different cognitive statuses (see Table 8.1). These statuses are hierarchically 
ordered, thus the use of a more restricted status entails the assumption that all 
lower statuses (to the right in the table) are met. For the addressee these different 
referential forms provide processing signals and clues about the assumed discourse 
status of a referent (Gundel et al. 1993:275).  
cognitive 
status 
in 
focus 
activated familiar uniquely 
identifiable 
referential type identi-
fication 
referring 
expression 
it that 
this 
this N 
that N the N indefinite 
this N 
a N 
Example219 it 
(280) 
that dog 
(279) 
that 
dog 
next 
door 
(278) 
the dog 
next door 
(277) 
this dog 
next door 
(277) 
a dog (276) 
Table 8.1: Givenness hierarchy from most restricted (far left) to least restricted (far right) (Gundel et al. 
1993:375).  
                                                        
219 These examples are taken from Gundel et al. (1993); the numbers in parentheses provide 
the page numbers of the respective example. 
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A noun phrase with an indefinite article is the least restricted form because the 
addressee is assumed to have sufficient semantic knowledge to access a general 
representation of the nominal expression, i.e. the type, of the entity in question 
(type identification). If the speaker wants to point out a specific object, he/she 
needs to signal this by using the indefinite this with a noun (referential). This 
identification of a specific object is necessary for the appropriate use of all definite 
expressions (Gundel et al. 1993:276). If the speaker wants to signal that a referent is 
already represented in the speaker’s memory, either because of previous mention 
in discourse or because the necessary information is sufficiently encoded in the 
nominal alone, he/she uses the definite article the (uniquely identifiable). If a very 
specific referent is assumed to be familiar to the addressee because of a prior re-
presentation in long-term memory, this is expressed by the use of personal 
pronouns and definite demonstratives (familiar).  
The use of pronominal forms, demonstrative that, stressed personal pronouns, and 
the definite demonstrative determiner this, signals that a referent is assumed to be 
held in short-term memory (activated). These “activated representations might 
have been retrieved from long-term memory, or they may arise from the 
immediate linguistic or extralinguistic context” (Gundel et al. 1993:278). By the 
choice of an unstressed pronominal, clitics, or zero pronominals the speaker 
signals that he/she assumes the referent to be in short-term memory and at the 
current center of attention (in focus) because these forms do not provide sufficient 
semantic information about the referent by themselves. In general, Gundel et al. 
(1993) observed that “entities in focus (…) include at least the topic of the 
preceding utterance as well as any still-relevant higher-order topics” and 
“membership of the in focus group is partially determined by linguistic form“ 
(Gundel et al. 1993:279) and partially by pragmatic factors. Prince’s (1981) 
familiarity scale can be considered to be one of these pragmatic factors. 
Furthermore, Fukumura & van Gompel (2012:1292) provide a literature overview of 
factors that have been shown to foster pronoun usage besides frequent mentioning 
of the referent in prior discourse or more recent linguistic context. Among those 
are the referent’s animacy, visual context, and similarity between discourse 
entities. Another concept that is important with respect to this most restrictive 
cognitive status is Garrod and Sanford’s (1982) distinction between implicit and 
explicit focus. An entity is in implicit focus when it has been mentioned in the 
discourse whereas it is in explicit focus when it is directly relevant to something 
mentioned and it is presented in the situational scenario.  
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8.1.1.2 Nominal references – Towards a German Givenness 
Hierarchy 
Gundel et al. (1993) based their givenness hierarchy on the English language thus it 
was necessary to define a similar categorization for German. Since, to the best of 
my knowledge, no such hierarchy was proposed for the German language, works 
that focused on parts of the hierarchy are reviewed.  
Bosch and Umbach (2007:50) found that personal pronouns most frequently refer 
to discourse topics220 that are most expectable. If expectable means that the 
referents in this discourse topic are most salient, it seems reasonable to equate ‘it’ 
as signaling ‘in focus’ with German personal pronouns. German demonstrative 
pronouns were found to mainly relate to discourse-new referents (Bosch & 
Umbach 2007). Petrova and Solf (2010) presented the German equivalents for the 
statuses ‘in focus’ and ‘activated’. They highlight that unbound demonstrative 
pronouns can encode information of both of these two cognitive statuses in 
German. Based on this finding, it can be argued that unbound demonstrative 
pronouns signal the status ‘activated’ but nothing can be said about it being in 
explicit focus in German. But given the specific experimental context of our study 
and the rule formulated for the coding process, we can be quite certain that objects 
are in focus when they are referred to by unbound demonstratives. The status of 
‘familiarity’ is expressed by a demonstrative pronoun used within a nominal 
phrase. This status can be distinguished from ‘uniquely identifiable’ in which a 
definite article is used with a noun phrase. The two statuses of ‘referential’ and 
‘type identifiable’ cannot be distinguished in German because they are both 
encoded in nominal phrases with an indefinite article. This is supported by Gundel 
et al.’s (2010) acknowledgement that  
“not all statuses are encoded by separate lexical items in every language. 
For example, few languages explicitly encode the distinction between the 
two lowest statuses, ‘referential’ and ‘type-identifiable’.” (Gundel et al. 
2010:1773)  
Based on this literature a reduced Givenness Hierarchy for German is proposed in 
Table 8.2. This Givenness Hierarchy will be referred to in the discussion. 
 
 
 
                                                        
220 Bosch and Umbach (2007:50) define discourse topics to be referents that have been 
introduced into the discourse before, i.e. they are discourse-old. 
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cognitive 
status 
in focus activated familiar uniquely 
identifiable 
referential 
German 
expression 
Personal-
pronomen 
(personal 
pronoun), 
unge-
bundenes 
Demons-
trativ-
pronomen 
(demon-
strative 
pronoun) 
ungebun-
denes 
Demonstrativ-
pronomen 
(demon-
strative 
pronoun) 
gebundenes 
Demonstrativ-
pronomen 
(demon-
strative 
pronoun) 
bestimmter 
Artikel + NP 
(definite 
article + np) 
unbestimmter 
Artikel + NP 
(indefinite 
article + np) 
Table 8.2: Cognitive statuses German. 
8.1.1.3 Nominal specificity 
8.1.1.3.1 Definition of nominal specificity 
Malt et al. (1999) argue that there are two kinds of categorization of objects, i.e. 
knowing an object versus naming an object. Knowing an object implies that an 
object is mentally encoded in terms of ‘recognition categories’ that are based on 
perception and representation of objects (Malt et al. 1999:259). Naming an object, 
implies that a name in terms of linguistic categories is chosen for an object. This is 
only possible if the object as well as its linguistic label is stored as a mental 
representation in long-term memory. Since naming an object is motivated by the 
intention to communicate the concept of an object, Malt et al. (1999:260) argue 
that “linguistic categories (…) may be more complex because of the various 
mechanisms that influence their composition”. According to the authors, the 
complexity of linguistic categories is based on the process of referring to known 
object that are similar and the use of conventional terminology. Malt et al. 
(1999:260) point out that current research investigates the categories that are 
chosen to describe objects rather than the “process of perceiving, representing, and 
communicating” about objects. They strongly suggest that future research should 
study the latter process systematically as well.  
Malt et al. (1999) investigated naming and knowing of objects in non-interactive 
settings. Adopting this approach, Malt et al. (2003) compare their findings regard-
ing the difference between knowing an object and naming an object to findings on 
knowing and naming an action. Again, their study is based on cross-linguistic 
differences but they were more specifically interested in assessing the influence of 
language on thought. This investigation is consistent with their differentiation 
between knowing and naming as they expect that ‘recognition categories’ are not 
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influenced by language whereas ‘linguistic categories’ most naturally are. The 
findings of the more recent study confirm their previous findings, highlighting that 
thinking about an object or event in terms of ‘recognition categories’ is similar 
across languages whereas ‘linguistic categories’ differ.  
As outlined above, there are different levels of naming objects, i.e. refer to them on 
a descriptive level as opposed to referring to them functionally. It could be argued 
that references on the descriptive level are linguistic representations of 
‘recognition categories’ and are thus different from ‘linguistic categories’ that 
include conventional names etc. If this is assumed as a working hypothesis, it is 
interesting to study how participants express these two levels of conceptualization 
linguistically and how they are connected. 
The theories that were presented so far investigated references in interactive 
communicative settings or with an addressee in mind but findings obtained in 
these studies can be adopted to analyze referential expressions in a setting in 
which only minimal communicative intention is assumed. Hermann and Deutsch 
(1974:19) also stress that the process of naming is a cognitive process in which the 
speaker chooses a verbal sign from a repertoire of signs in order to classify an 
object, person, or action. Thus, they argue that the analysis of object reference 
allows conclusions about the features that have been classified as relevant for the 
identification (Hermann & Deutsch 1974:171). Based on the presented literature 
review, it can be concluded that the nominal phrase carries much information 
about the level of conceptualization as well as about the cognitive status of a 
referent. 
Mangold-Allwinn et al. (1995) summarize the following features of a noun phrase 
that encode its specificity: 
? definite vs. indefinite article,  
? specific modifiers, and  
? the lexical specificity of the noun and the object class221 that it 
denotes (Mangold-Allwinn et al. 1995:13).  
Its taxonomic level can define the specificity of a noun. The following nouns, for 
example, demonstrate increasing lexical specificity: building, house, semi-detached 
house. According to Rosch et al.’s (1976) classification, ‘building’ is a member of 
the superordinate level, ‘house’ belongs to the basic level category, and ‘semi-
detached’ house is a member of the subordinate level.  
                                                        
221 Object class is defined as the amount of objects that can be regarded to be the same 
(Mangold-Allwinn et al. 1995:116). 
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Ungerer and Schmid (2006:49) introduce the concept of cognitive representations 
to represent the interaction of a real world object to the mental image of an object. 
The mental concept of an object is referred to as cognitive categories. The authors 
propose that all cognitive representations that have been encountered are stored 
in memory as cognitive models. These cognitive models are activated when a 
perceived event including objects is categorized. Thus Ungerer and Schmid 
(2006:51) argue that one of the characteristics of models is their omnipresence 
along with their incompleteness. Besides these general characteristics, Ungerer 
and Schmid (2006) propose that there are differences between cognitive models as 
stored by individuals because they make different experiences. These different 
experiences are assumed to be personal as well as collective experiences, i.e. 
cultural background. It is proposed that cultural models are shared by members of 
the same social group and represent specific abstractions, i.e. prototypes of events 
and objects (Ungerer & Schmid 2006:51-53). Based on these assumptions, Ungerer 
and Schmid (2006) point out that cognitive categories mainly contain prototypical 
examples as they have  
“the largest number of attributes in common with other members of the 
category and the smallest number of attributes which also occur with 
members of neighbouring categories.” (Ungerer & Schmid 2006:32)  
This idea is already expressed by Brown (1958) in his theoretical observation that  
“the name of a thing, the one that tells what it ‘really’ is, is the name that 
constitutes the referent as it needs to be constituted for most purposes. The 
other names represent possible reconceptualizations useful for one or 
another purpose.” (Brown 1958:17)  
The second sentence stresses the influence of context on the conceptualization of 
an object or concept. Ungerer and Schmid (2006:46) state more specifically that 
context influences the structure of the individual items with regard to their 
position in terms of prototypical examples or marginal bad examples for this 
specific category. The concept of cognitive categories is of interest to the 
theoretical framework of this thesis because it aims at investigating the linguistic 
representation of mental processes in general and sepcifically the concept of 
conceptualization in this chapter. Therefore, Rosch et al.’s (1976) taxonomy of the 
three levels will be reviewed in reference to Ungerer and Schmid (2006).  
Superordinate categories function as collectors of categories highlighting salient 
attributes shared by all members because they do not contain distinctive features 
but a large set of categories (Ungerer & Schmid 2006:84). Basic level terms en-
compass the greatest, presorted bundle of shared attributes of specific members. 
Most of the time, the basic level term is associated with the prototypical 
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representation of the term (Ungerer & Schmid 2006:75). Thus, categories can be 
best distinguished on this level and basic level terms are very frequently used in 
everyday language in order to minimize cognitive effort (Ungerer & Schmid 
2006:71). Tversky and Hemenway (1984) argue, that members of the basic level 
category can be distinguished by their structural components, such as parts. Thus, 
they propose that “the informativeness of the basic level may originate from the 
availability of inference from structure to function at that level” (Tversky & 
Hemenway 1984:169). Subordinate categories share parts and are separated by 
other attributes (Tversky & Hemenway 1984). Those specific attributes are only 
shared by items of the category in question, and not by any other category which 
belongs to the same basic level category (Ungerer & Schmid 2006:81). Subordinate 
terms are the second most frequent category in natural language (Ungerer & 
Schmid 2006:79).  
Reviewing numerous studies on reference production by other authors and 
reporting their own work conducted with various collaborators over the years, 
Mangold-Allwinn et al. (1995) conclude that nominal specificity is not only a 
feature of audience design. It is rather influenced by visual perception, expertise 
and prior-knowledge as well as by aspects of the communicative situation. It was 
observed that participants who had seen an object for a short period of time 
produced more basic level terms to refer to them than participants who were 
allowed to inspect the object for a longer time. With more time for inspection, 
participants used more subordinate terms. The authors conclude that participants 
can only perceive the shape of an object during brief investigation whereas they 
can pay attention to details if they are allowed to spend more time on inspection 
(Mangold-Allwinn et al. 1995:135). This finding supports the argument that object 
class specificity can only be as specific as the representation of the object 
(Mangold-Allwinn et al. 1995:133).  
With regard to expertise it is assumed that experts have a richer and more 
differentiated cognitive representation of the objects that they regularly interact 
with, which shows in a high frequency of subordinate level terms (Mangold-
Allwinn et al. 1995:138). Kiefer et al. (1993), for example, investigated the influence 
of the nature of prior-knowledge on reference production. They asked students 
(role: speakers) to either instruct another student (role: addressee) in an assembly 
task or to describe an assembled object. The speaker’s prior-knowledge was varied 
between two conditions. Half of the participants were shown a video of the as-
sembly process and they were given the time to assemble the object themselves 
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(action-oriented prior knowledge)222. The other half of the participants was shown a 
picture of the assembled object (static prior knowledge). Results show that 
participants with action-oriented prior knowledge produce more subordinate level 
terms than participants with static prior knowledge (Kiefer et al. 1993:22). 
Mangold-Allwinn et al. (1995) argue that participants who interacted with the 
objects and assembled it themselves created a richer representation of the different 
parts and the assembly structure. Thus they were able to produce more 
subordinate nouns than participants with a static representation.  
These findings can also be interpreted in relation to Rieser’s (1996) concept of 
representational metonymy. Representational metonymy describes the 
combination between a verbal phrase and a representational relation in order to 
classify nominal references with regard to their specificity to the goal domain 
(Rieser 1996:2). The basic idea is that speakers describe object parts in relation to 
another well-known object in order to facilitate identification of the object at 
hand, i.e. they re-conceptualize the objects at hand by projecting the features and 
functions of another object onto them. The concept of representational metonymy 
involves two different levels of conceptualization. The first level is the description 
level that is based on the physical appearance of an object and the conventionally 
known way to describe it (e.g. “Fünfträger” denotes a bar with five holes (Rieser 
1996:15)). The second level, which is called representational metonymy, contains 
the conceptualized description of an object, i.e. the object is described according 
to its function in the conceptualized target object (e.g. propeller, airplane). 
Information on the first level is unspecific and perception based. References on the 
second level are constructed based on world-knowledge, which makes it context 
specific. Following this line of argumentation, the use of representational 
metonymy reflects the speaker’s contextual representation based on which specific 
objects are interpreted. It may well be that Kiefer et al. (1993) observed this 
phenomenon. Participants who were given the time to inspect the object may have 
conceptualized the object in relation to objects that they know and thus they 
described the objects by more specific terms on the subordinate level. 
Besides investigating the influence of prior-knowledge, Mangold-Allwinn et al. 
(1995:36) also studied the influence of different aspects of the communicative 
situation, i.e. communicative goal, addressee, and discourse context, on referential 
                                                        
222 This terminology is not mentioned in the experimental description by Kiefer et al. 
(1993:19) but is later introduced in Mangold-Allwinn et al. (1995:141). 
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form. In their study, discourse context223 is defined as the position of a reference 
within the discourse. Based on von Stutterheim et al. (1993), Mangold-Allwinn et 
al. (1995) distinguish between three discourse times: introduction, referential 
maintenance, and reintroduction. Furthermore, they varied the communicative 
goals, either instructing a person to assemble an object or describing an object to a 
person. They find that people tend to use definite articles in introductions during 
instructions and indefinite articles in the description scenario. With regard to 
nominal specificity the results revealed that participants tended to provide as 
much information as possible in introductory phrases, i.e. subordinate terms were 
most frequent in this category. In subsequent references, the same trend showed 
regardless of the communicative goal: pronouns were frequent in referential 
maintenance and use of definite articles in cases of reintroduction.  
Wachsmuth and Jung (1996) investigated reference production in an interactive 
assembly task. They point out that names and classifications of objects change over 
time within the assembly process because 
“internal representations are constructed, maintained and restructured 
along with the changes that occur when assemblies are constructed from a 
variety of multi-function construction objects.” (Wachsmuth & Jung 
1996:348) 
They refer to two kinds of concepts that drive this dynamic conceptualization 
process, namely long-term and short-term concepts. Long-term concepts contain 
general information on multi-functional objects such as fixation points or shape 
and the potential roles of these objects. Additionally, long-term concepts contain 
information on actions involved in assembly processes and background-knowledge 
on specific objects such as airplanes (Wachsmuth & Jung 1996:354). Short-term 
concepts hold “temporal conceptualizations of individual entities (objects and 
aggregates) in the current task environment” (Wachsmuth & Jung 1996:357). The 
concept of short-term concepts is needed to account for the creation of new 
concepts when aggregates are built or objects are assigned a function within the 
goal assembly. This observation of dynamic conceptualization, its representation 
in language, and the change of referential behavior over time stresses the 
                                                        
223 Note that this terminology does not seem to be a good choice because the concept 
‘context’ has been used differently in all other studies. In the presented studies ‘context’ 
was defined by factors such as participants, communicative intentions, time pressure, 
written or spoken mode etc. Miller (1996:4) defines context as “the part of the situation (or 
field) that is used to determine meaning in general, and in particular is used to resolve 
potential ambiguities of meaning”. Von Stutterheim et al. (1993) call this tracing of 
references over repeated mentioning ‘referential movement’ (von Stutterheim et al. 
1993:107). In this thesis, the terminology ‘referential process’ will be used to refer to 
referential change and continuity in repeated mentioning. 
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importance of analyzing object references throughout the assembly process and 
not restricting it to initial references. 
8.1.1.3.2 Explicit assignment of function to objects224 
Concerning the function of representational metonymy, Rieser (1995; 1996) alone 
as well as with colleagues (e.g. Meyer-Fujara & Rieser 2005) studied conceptual-
ization of objects as expressed in referential forms chosen in an interactive setting. 
In these experiments instructor and assembler could not see each other, thus only 
verbal communication was possible, but they shared the same workspace. These 
dialogues highlighted that participants used representational metonymies to 
facilitate reference to the parts at hand and already assembled aggregates. Two 
different strategies were identified. First, instructors used metonymies for 
aggregates which could not be easily described by referring to the individual parts 
and which had a close resemblance to a real-world object, e.g. ‘propeller’ when 
referring to two joint bars (Rieser 1996:7). Second, representational metonymy was 
used when the fixing point of the object part at hand needed to be defined. In this 
case, the intrinsic orientation of the real-world object was used to indicate the 
orientation of the aggregate(s) to be worked on. So far the focus has been on the 
nominal representation of the different layers (e.g. von Stutterheim et al. 1993) or 
the interactional motivation for function assignment (Rieser 1997) if the 
phenomenon of conceptual layers in construction tasks was studied.  
Instead of analyzing instructions that are collected in an interactive set-up, Daniel 
and Tversky (2012) analyzed written instructions to a generic addressee on the 
assembly of a TV stand. In their study, participants assembled the TV stand 
themselves before writing the instruction. Their analysis revealed different 
strategies of presenting objects in the introductory phase of the assembly. Some 
instructors started their instruction by giving a list of objects. Unfortunately, the 
authors do not specify if the objects are referred to on the descriptive level or with 
functional terminology. A second strategy for starting the instruction is reported, 
namely providing information on the task or the goal object. To illustrate the 
strategy of providing information on the task they give the following example: “the 
two square-shaped pieces of wood are the sides of the stand” (Daniel & Tversky 
2012:306). This example illustrates that at least one participant assigned function at 
this early state of the instruction by relating the descriptive nominal phrase the 
                                                        
224 This part of the introduction together with the respective parts of the analysis and the 
discussion were shortened for a paper that is accepted as a talk at the annual meeting of 
the Cognitive Science Society 2013 in Berlin. The paper with the title ”‘This is a wall’ – 
Assigning function to objects” is joint work with Thora Tenbrink. 
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two square-shaped pieces to its function within the TV stand, namely the sides of 
the stand. Although the studies reported by Rieser (1995; 1996) as well as the one 
reported by Daniel and Tversky (2012) suggest that explicit function assignment 
happens in instructions it is not addressed in the extensive body of research on the 
design of instructions, i.e. manuals. This may be the result of the observation that 
text is accompanied by visuals in the majority of manuals (Maes & Lenting 1999), 
which makes explicit function assignment unnecessary.  
Tenbrink and Seifert (2011) were interested in the linguistic representation of 
conceptual mapping in a spatial problem solving task analyzing written tour plans 
for holiday trips. Their study involved two domains of conceptualization. The first 
domain was that of the road map that was presented to the participants, i.e. the 
map that was physically present. The second domain was that of the real but 
unknown holiday destination that was represented by the map. Tenbrink and 
Seifert (2011) analyzed the linguistic structure of the collected verbal reports in 
depth focusing on the distribution and nature of nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, 
and temporal markers. The verb analysis highlighted that ‘wollte’ (want) and 
‘könnte’ (could) were frequently used to mark mapping processes between the two 
domains. According to Engel (2002:93), these two modal verbs express intentions 
to act but with different implications. Whereas ‘wollen’ (want) expresses the 
subject’s intention, ‘können’ (can) expresses the possibility given that the subject is 
granted the permission to act in the described way (Engel 2002:92). The 
subjunctive mood that was described by Tenbrink and Seifert (2011) adds a 
tentative character to the statements. Furthermore, their analysis revealed that 
discourse markers introducing a purpose (i.e. ‘in order to’) and the particle ‘als’ (as) 
also signaled “mapping from plan to purpose” (Tenbrink & Seifert 2011:116). 
This review illustrates that although different authors provide examples of 
function assignment it is not systematically investigated so far, except for those 
findings reported in Tenbrink and Seifert (2011). Parts of the analysis in this thesis 
aim at filling this gap. 
8.1.2 Different degrees of interactivity and engagement 
between speaker and addressee 
8.1.2.1 Influence of the speaker’s cognitive state on audience 
design in reference production 
As outlined above, there are numerous studies supporting the assumption that 
referential expressions are tailored for the addressee. This is also mirrored in the 
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fact that Gundel et al.’s (1993) proposal of cognitive status is reviewed and 
discussed in various fields of linguistics (e.g. psycholinguistics (Cornish 2001; 
Wittek & Tomasello 2005), traditional linguistics (Halmari 1994; Epstein 2011), and 
sociolinguistics (Meyerhoff 2009)). In 1983, however, Levelt already suggested that  
“the speaker solves the listener’s continuation problem225 by solving his 
own continuation problem, rather than by keeping a running model of the 
listener’s state of knowledge.” (Levelt 1983:100)  
This question arose after the analysis of descriptions on visual patterns verbalized 
for a generic addressee226. Levelt (1983) studied the kinds of repair mechanisms, i.e. 
hesitation markers and interruptions, that are produced in spontaneous speech in 
order to learn more about the language production system. His data suggests that 
there is a structural relation between repair and original utterance similar to the 
structural relation between question and answer227. This finding supports the 
theory that speakers monitor their own speech as if they were their own listeners. 
Hence, Levelt (1983:97) proposes that “controlling one’s own speech is like 
attending to somebody else’s talk”, which allows the speaker to apply the same 
parsing and repair procedures that he/she uses in speaking to others. Based on 
these theoretical and empirical observations, Levelt (1983) argues further that  
“in listening to somebody else, one normally matches it to the current 
discourse model, in order to modify or extend the latter. In listening to 
oneself the matching is with the intended message, and the criterion is 
identity of intention.” (Levelt: 1983:97) 
Although he presents evidence for the self-monitoring theory, which he calls ‘the 
perceptual theory of monitoring and repair’228, Levelt (1983) concludes that he 
cannot provide a final answer to the question if self- or other-monitoring is 
predominant at his time of writing.  
                                                        
225 Presumably, Levelt (1983) refers explicitly to the continuation problem because the data 
that he investigates in his paper has been elicited in order to investigate the question on 
how speakers organize information for speaking (for more detail see Levelt 1981). 
226 The addressee was generic in the sense that the study design did not involve any 
physically co-present addressees but rather asked the participants to describe the visual 
patterns in a way that the listener could draw them by listening to their recorded 
descriptions. However the listener was specific with regard to background knowledge 
because the speaker was informed that the listener had some background knowledge about 
these visual patterns in general. 
227 The following example illustrates this hypothesis very nicely: “With his sister he talked 
frequently, uh with his mother he talked frequently” (Levelt 1983:98). Levelt argues that the 
repair is the answer to the question With whom did he talk frequently?. In order to answer 
the question properly the preposition with is needed and it is also needed to form a correct 
sentence after the repair signal uh.  
228 Levelt (1983) points out that the theory “is perceptual only in that the same parser is 
involved in understanding an interlocutor’s speech and in deriving the message from one’s 
own inner speech” (Levelt 1983:97). 
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Recent studies support the claim that the speaker’s cognitive state is the 
predominant influence on referential behavior. Horton & Gerrig (2005a), for 
example, conclude that “speakers will show evidence of audience design to the 
extent that suitable memory representations become accessible within an 
appropriate time course” (Horton & Gerrig 2005a:141). This conclusion is based on 
their findings that “directors229 mostly used information to the extent that it was 
readily accessible to them” (Horton & Gerrig 2005a:140). More specifically, Horton 
and Gerrig (2005b) argue that individuals, who are engaged in a conversation 
function as cues for retrieving memories that are associated with these people. 
Given that utterances are produced within a short period of time only those 
memories that are highly and consistently activated are retrieved (Horton & Gerrig 
2005b:10). The speaker assumes that the retrieved information is shared by 
himself/herself and the interlocutor because he/she associates these memories 
with this specific individual. This assumption leads to the proposal that common 
ground is only one potential constraint on message formation besides factors such 
as lexical and contextual frequency (Horton & Gerrig 2005b:28). To support their 
claims Horton and Gerrig supplemented experimental studies (e.g. Horton & 
Gerrig 2005a) with corpus studies of actual telephone conversations230 (Horton & 
Gerrig 2005b).  
Horton and Gerrig’s (2005a;b) proposal is supported by Arnold (2008) who also 
investigated the influence of production-internal and addressee-oriented processes 
in audience design. She concludes that referential behavior might seem addressee 
designed but it may as well result from production-internal processes. As examples 
of such processes, she mentions subject position for accessible referents in 
sentences. Even though this may be a strategic move to facilitate understanding for 
the listener this observation can also be explained by the need to “facilitate 
production by postponing more difficult words and phrases” (Arnold 2008:508). 
She also notes that “speaker-internal processing effects are often evident in 
situations of mental effort” (Arnold 2008:520). As an example, she mentions 
disfluent speech when referring to ‘difficult’ objects, such as new or unfamiliar 
objects without conventional names (Arnold 2008:509). As further evidence 
Arnold (2008) outlines that speakers intend to produce reference phrases, which 
                                                        
229 Horton & Gerrig (2005a) asked participants (role: director) to instruct participants (role: 
matcher) to arrange arrays of 16 cards. Four cards showed the same kind (e.g. flower) but 
different types of objects. Each director instructed two different matchers. By choosing this 
design the authors wanted to investigate how directors keep track of the established 
references and how they make use of this knowledge. 
230 In their study, Horton and Gerrig (2005b:5) investigated a subset of the CallHome 
American English corpus.  
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make the intended referent most salient against all other candidates. But the 
production process is constrained by the speaker’s ability to detect all possible 
competitors within the time that he has for preparing the utterance (Arnold 
2008:520). So she concludes, in contrast to Gundel et al. (1993), that referential 
accessibility is not just a result of discourse status, but rather the result of “both 
linguistic and nonlinguistic constraints on the attention of speakers and their 
interlocutors” (Arnold 2008:510). 
In this line of thought, Fukumura and van Gompel (2012) present an experiment 
that is specifically designed to investigate whether speakers base the produced 
referential form on their own discourse model or if they consider the addressee’s 
discourse model. Speaker and addressee were engaged in an arrangement task in 
which a pictured scene needed to be represented. In the beginning of each trial the 
addressee arranged two LEGO toy characters, e.g. a pirate and a mermaid, as 
presented in a picture. Then speaker and addressee were provided with some 
information about the pictured scene. Next new information about the scene was 
provided which initiated a new arrangement of the scene. In order to investigate 
which discourse model was referred to by the speaker Fukumura and van Gompel 
(2012) distinguished between two conditions. In one condition the new 
information was shared between speaker and addressee (shared context) and in the 
other condition it was presented exclusively to the speaker (privileged context). 
Additionally, the referent of the second sentence was varied, i.e. it was either the 
toy character that needed to be moved or the one that remained in its initial 
position. Fukumura and van Gompel (2012) expected that speakers who take the 
addressee’s discourse model into account produce more pronouns when the 
previous information was about the character to be moved in the shared context 
condition than in the privileged context condition. If speakers mainly focus on their 
own discourse model they were expected to produce more pronouns when the 
previous information was about the character to be moved regardless of the kind 
of context that was provided. Their data revealed that speaker referred to their 
own discourse model more frequently than to the addressee’s discourse model. 
Thus, Fukumura and van Gompel (2012) argue that  
“speakers do not routinely use the addressee’s discourse model when 
choosing between pronouns and definite noun phrases, but instead choose 
referring expressions depending on how accessible the referent is in their 
own discourse model.” (Fukumura & van Gompel 2012:1306) 
This argument is very strong and it might be too strong since it allows for the 
reading that referents that are highly accessible in the speaker’s discourse model 
are always referred to by pronouns. However, these pronominal references can be 
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expected to contain too few information for an addressee to distinguish the 
referent against other competing objects. This reading would result in great 
difficulties in referential identification tasks until the addressee asks for 
clarification. Based on the literature review as a whole, it seems more likely that 
speakers rely on their own discourse model as well as on the one which they 
assume for their addressee. Furthermore, the studies show that it is difficult to 
assess to which degree and under which circumstances one discourse model is 
more influential regarding referential choice. 
8.1.2.2 Referential form in self-oriented speech 
Now it could be argued that it is not important to know if a phenomenon is 
strategically designed for the listener or a product of speaker-internal processes 
because, in general, it has been observed that listeners use cues such as sentence 
position (Arnold 2008) or hesitations (Maclay & Osgood 1959; Levelt 1983) to draw 
conclusions about referents and other discourse entities. Even though this debate 
may not be of great importance to study the effect of audience design on the flow 
of communicative situations, it is a very valuable contribution to the question, 
which referential forms people may produce when they have little communicative 
intentions.  
So far, the focus was on experimental studies that were either conducted within 
the referential communication paradigm or studies that investigated referential 
behavior with regard to a distant listener (Levelt 1983). Maes et al. (2004), for 
example, investigated referential form in written instructions for a distant reader. 
They observed a general trend of shortening in consecutive references. However, 
differently than in spoken instructions, they found that instructors had a tendency 
to be more specific than necessary. They conclude that this may be an effect of the 
specific context in which instructions for use are consulted. Given the need to 
perform an action and then consult the text again, more information may help 
readers to keep track of the necessary objects. These findings seem to reveal a high 
level of speaker consideration with regard to their addressee’s needs. 
Summarizing the previously presented studies, the interaction between speaker 
and listener can be understood as a continuum with full engagement and 
interactivity on the one end of the continuum and no engagement on the other 
end. Writing or speaking for a distant addressee can be located in between these 
two poles because there is no interactivity but there is mental engagement with 
regard to assumed knowledge, expertise, goal of reading etc. (see Table 8.3 for an 
overview). 
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forms of talk degree of 
interaction and 
engagement with 
another person as 
addressee 
research methods exemplary studies 
dialogue  full interaction and 
engagement 
referential 
communication 
paradigm 
Krauss & Weinheimer 
(1966); Clark & Wilkes-
Gibbs (1986)  
written text, 
recorded 
spoken text 
no interaction, full 
engagement 
text analysis of 
transcriptions or written 
texts (e.g. instructions, 
letters) 
Levelt (1983); Maes et al. 
(2004) 
self-talk, 
monologue 
no interaction and 
engagement  
Discourse analysis of 
transcriptions of think 
aloud data or 
spontaneous speech231 
Ericsson & Simon (1993) 
Table 8.3: Overview of forms of talk and its features with regard to speaker/addressee interactivity and 
engagement. 
The proposed continuum ties in with a proposal by Horton (2009). Based on 
experimental findings (Horton & Gerrig 2005) and different theoretical positions 
that are postulated on referential behavior, he proposes the following continuum 
of degrees of speakers’ considerations of their addressees (see Figure 8.1). 
 
 
Figure 8.1: A continuum of possibilities describing the extent to which speakers might consider their 
addressees, including ways in which full consideration might be limited (Horton 2009). 
                                                        
231 It needs to be pointed out that self-talk is a form of spontaneous speech but spontaneous 
speech does not necessarily need to be self-talk. This later notion is incorrectly suggested 
by Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986:36) in their review of literature in which there was no 
interaction between speaker and listener. Maclay and Osgood’s (1959) study is listed as 
studying monologues but they study transcriptions of a university conference. This speech 
can be classified as spontaneous in that it is not planned but it is not a monologue because 
it is directly addressed at the audience and with the expectation for concurrent feedback. 
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Much has been said about theories that propose that the speaker considers the 
addressee. Horton (2009) explicitly mentions audience design referring to his own 
work. Additionally, some literature has been presented which proposes a limited 
view on the ways in which a speaker can actually consider his/her addressee. But 
unfortunately, Horton (2009) does not go into detail about the theories that have 
paid special attention to situations in which speakers are assumed not to consider 
their addressee’s needs. After substantial literature review it needs to be concluded 
that to the best of my knowledge there are no studies on referential expressions 
produced in self-oriented speech 232 . Kibrik (2011:62) postulates that “when 
referring, speakers use various referential devices – nominal expressions that link 
to concepts in the cognitive representation”. Thus, it can be argued that the an-
alysis of referential form produced in think aloud protocols reveals the currently 
held concepts of a referent.  
Assigning meaning to an object – collectively or alone – can be understood as an 
externalized procedure of conceptualization. In line of this thought previous 
studies in linguistics have already investigated speaker’s conceptualization of 
objects by presenting participants with pictures of objects and asking them to 
name those (Rosch et al. 1976; Schmid 1993) or to perform typicality judgment tests 
(Labov 1973). However, although these studies provide insights on the concepts 
that are associated with objects, they do not provide any information on the 
dynamic nature of object conceptualization. So far, the dynamic nature has been 
studied and described in dialogue only (e.g. Pickering & Garrod 2006; Steels & 
Loetzsch 2009). The process of referring to an object by the same referential term 
is called alignment (e.g. Pickering & Garrod 2004; Pickering & Garrod 2006). In 
cases in which no conventional names for an object exists a new reference is 
negotiated between partners (e.g. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986). 
The data analysis that will be presented in detail in the following sections sheds 
light on the process of conceptualization of unfamiliar objects that need to be 
integrated into the structure of a dollhouse. Furthermore, it is proposed that a 
detailed analysis of multiple references to the same object combined with the 
analysis of nominal specificity provides a tool to study the speaker’s mental 
conceptualization process. This proposal is based on the assumption that 
participants who think aloud do not tailor their speech for an addressee. Although 
there is no way to rule out the possibility that speakers have an addressee in mind, 
                                                        
232 The phenomenon of talking to oneself has been termed differently: e.g. private speech 
(Vygotsky 1934) or self-talk (Goffman 1981). In this thesis the terminology ‘self-oriented 
speech’ will be used because the orientation is explicitly highlighted. Furthermore, the 
other terms carry specific associations, e.g. private speech is associated with child speech. 
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there are a number of reasons that suggest that the intention to communicate is 
very low in the study on unaided object assembly. First, it can be assumed that the 
given task reduces the motivation to communicate because it does not pose any 
explicit communicative task. Second, literature that investigates the influence of 
speakers’ internal processes on reference production, suggests that audience 
design is only part of reference production. Third, participants are expected to en-
gage in the assembly task so much that speaking out loud accompanies assembling 
as a subconscious act. The practice session on think aloud before the experiment is 
assumed to acquaint participants with the task and thus reduce the necessity to 
concentrate on verbalizing thoughts. Rather than consciously formulating speech, 
it is expected that think aloud protocols reflect an observation, as reported by 
Levelt (1983). He suggests that 
“the speaker will try and interpret his own speech in the context of what 
was previously said by himself (…). He may thus become aware of 
ambiguity, vagueness, indeterminacy of reference, incoherence etc.” (Levelt 
1983:97) 
Based on these theoretical assumptions, the following sub-section focuses on 
research questions investigating different aspects of referential behavior in think 
aloud protocols. The presentation of research questions and expectations will be 
followed by a description of the steps taken in the analysis including the 
presentation of the devised annotation scheme (section 8.3). Applying this 
analytical background the results of referential behavior in self-oriented speech 
(first experiment: Unaided Object Assembly) and in a setting with communicative 
intentions but without interactivity (second experiment: Instruction) will be 
presented in section 8.4. The findings of both experiments will be contrasted and 
discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
8.2 Research questions and expectations 
A number of questions arise from the presented literature. After stating the 
questions for an overview, the expectations regarding each of them are presented 
in the following paragraphs. 
? Research question 1: How do people refer to objects that are not 
prototypical in nature? How is referential behavior influenced by the 
two independent variables, i.e. amount of prior information and 
communicative intention? 
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? Research question 2: How does reference change over time? How is 
referential change influenced by the two independent variables? 
? Research question 3: At which point in time do participants 
conceptualize the objects within the goal domain? 
? Research question 4: How is explicit function assignment linguistically 
expressed? 
As outlined in detail in chapter 4, there are three conditions in the first experiment 
on unaided object assembly (hereafter UOA) that vary regarding the provided 
amount of prior information about the goal state (independent variable: prior 
information). To recall, in the first condition underspecified information about the 
goal object is provided, i.e. a sensible object (underspecified goal condition). In the 
second condition verbal information about the goal object is included in the 
instruction to the participants, i.e. the participants are told to assemble a two-story 
dollhouse (verbal goal condition). In the third condition this verbal information is 
supplemented by visual information, i.e. participants are shown a picture of the 
ready assembled dollhouse for 30 seconds (verbal and visual goal condition). This 
experiment does not involve an addressee and no explicit motivation to 
communicate. 
This is different in the second study, referred to as instructions on object assembly 
(hereafter Instructions). In this experiment a distant listener is introduced (for 
more detail see chapter 4). This difference between experiments introduces the 
independent variable communicative intention. As will be illustrated in much 
detail in the following sub-section the dependent variable will be reference form. 
More specifically, references are analyzed with regard to form (reduced forms vs. 
nominal phrases and definiteness), nominal specificity, and the referential process. 
8.2.1 Research question 1 
Research question 1 investigates how people refer to objects that are not typical in 
nature, i.e. objects that do not suggest a function and that do not have a con-
ventional name. The experiment involves more non-typical objects than con-
ventional ones. The only object that can be easily recognized as a conventional 
object is the roof-like object because it is red and has a triangular shape (see Figure 
8.2).233 The other objects that were provided to the participants did not suggest any 
                                                        
233 The upright position might have already cued participants to conceptualize this object 
part as a roof. It could be assumed that the conceptualization process might be different if 
it lies on the table in a more unnatural position. This difference was not addressed in the 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS 317 
 
 
prototypical function or name (for examples see Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4234). Only 
the bevels hint at their functional property within a possible structure because 
they need to be placed beneath the roof to stabilize it. However, in order to draw 
this conclusion the participant needs to have an idea of possible structures already. 
Based on Norman’s (2002) concept of cultural constraints235 and von Stutterheim 
et al.’s (1993) observation on the use of functional terminology, it is assumed that 
people will use domain specific nominal references, i.e. roof, frequently when 
referring to the object displayed in Figure 8.2. Assuming that there are no 
remembered functional terms for referring to the other objects it is expected that 
participants use domain unspecific terms, such as piece and thing, to refer to them. 
Beyond this general trend, the independent variables communicative intention and 
the amount of prior information are expected to influence the dependent variable 
nominal specificity. Miller (1966:6) proposes that “instructions provide a context 
that makes an experimental situation meaningful”. As the goal concept ‘two-story 
dollhouse’ is explicitly mentioned in the instructions for participants in the verbal 
goal condition it is expected that those participants use more domain specific 
references than participants who do not know anything about the goal object. The 
picture shown to participants in the verbal and visual goal condition provides a 
specific external model that can be used in subsequent assembly. Miller (1966:7) 
points out that such a context “can enable a person to restrict the range of possible 
alternatives”. Therefore, it is expected that participants who are given much prior 
information, i.e. who saw the picture, use more specific nominal references than 
participants who do not know anything about the nature of the goal object. 
  
Figure 8.2: Roof piece from the dollhouse. The picture presents it in upright position as it was 
presented to the participants in the experiment. 
                                                                                                                                                       
present experiments. Nevertheless, one participant tried to use it as a wall but changed this 
idea later on. 
234 Pictures of all objects are provided in chapter 4. 
235 Norman’s (2002) classification of constraints is introduced in chapter 2. 
  
Figure 8.3: Non-prototypical objects that 
belong in the second story. 
 
Figure 8.4: Non-prototypical object that 
belongs in the second story. 
8.2.2 Research Question 2 
Research question 2 addresses the change of reference over time, referred to as 
referential process. Wachsmuth and Jung (1996) described the dynamic nature of 
conceptualization in an assembly tasks. Therefore, changes in nominal references 
are expected to be found as the same object is referred to throughout the assembly. 
In the literature strategies of shortening in repeated references (Krauss & 
Weinheimer 1966; Gundel et al. 1993; Maes et al. 2004) as well as syntactical (Bock 
1986; Levelt 1983) and lexical (Fukumura & van Gompel 2012) entrainment have 
been observed in different discourse tasks, such as describing a scene for an ad-
dressee or instructing an addressee. Although none of these studies investigated 
think aloud reports, those are general strategies and thus they are expected to be 
observed in the analyzed data as well. Generally, subsequent references are 
assumed to be reduced, i.e. higher frequency of pronouns. It is expected that 
objects are referred to by a domain specific noun at some time within the assembly. 
If the subsequent reference to that object is not shortened, it is expected that the 
same specific noun is reused. 
The way in which references change is assumed to differ depending on the 
participant’s prior information. Participants who are provided with much prior 
information (verbal and visual goal condition) are expected to use many 
pronominal forms because they are familiar with the objects right from the start 
based on the presented external model. Those participants are assumed to 
remember the overall structure. This knowledge allows them to start incorporating 
the given object parts much earlier than participants who need to construct the 
overall structure first. This tendency is expected to show in the use of definite 
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noun phrases236 as well. The following observations are expected; if participants are 
provided with much prior information they use definite noun phrases with specific 
nouns earlier within the assembly than participants who are provided with verbal 
prior information only. If participants are provided with no specific information 
(underspecified goal condition), they are expected to use domain specific nominal 
references only rarely and late in the assembly process. This difference is expected 
because those participants need to construct the goal structure first before labeling 
object parts functionally. 
Instructors are assumed to have gained detailed knowledge about the structure of 
the goal object in the assembly phase237. Previous studies showed that instructors 
who assembled the goal object themselves incorporated the individual parts in the 
goal structure and label them accordingly more often than instructors who did not 
assemble the object themselves (von Stutterheim et al. 1993; Kiefer et al. 1993). 
Therefore, instructors are assumed to be specific in their references by using 
domain specific terminology and definite noun phrases. The referential form is 
expected to change throughout the instruction. Studies that investigated 
referential form of introductions of objects in instruction texts revealed that 
instructors are very specific (Maes et al 2004). According to von Stutterheim et al. 
(1993:109), instructors assign specific meaning to the objects that are important in 
the manipulation process at this early state of object conceptualization. Based on 
these findings, it is expected that instructors will be specific about the object in the 
introductory phase, i.e. in first reference to the object. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that instructors will repeatedly use the same references or pronouns after 
introduction because they assume the objects to be in focus and common ground.  
Differences between the two studies are expected to be observed regarding the 
dependent variable of communicative intention. Participants assembling the 
object for themselves are expected to use more pronouns than instructors. Given 
that participants who are engaged in assembly depend on their own discourse 
model without any need to consider an addressee’s discourse model they can theo-
retically refer to every object by using a pronoun. Instructors need to be certain 
that their addressee can identify the object in question and thus they need to be 
specific. A pronominal reference would not be unambiguous given that different 
objects are in the set of available objects twice. 
                                                        
236 On the use of definite noun phrases in instructions see von Stutterheim et al. (1993:115). 
237 Fore more detail on the assembly phase and specifically the concept of action-oriented 
prior knowledge see chapter 4. 
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8.2.3 Research question 3 
Based on the assumed differences in references as outlined above, research 
question 3, focuses on the identification of the time at which participants thinking 
aloud use domain specific references within the referential process. In the 
investigation of this research question two different times need to be 
distinguished, namely reference process time and assembly/instruction time. The 
former refers to the number of references (1st – 4th) and the later brings into picture 
the actual time within the assembly or instruction process. The technicalities of 
the time scale of the later time will be outlined in the next section on data analysis. 
The use of domain specific terminology is assumed to highlight the speaker’s 
conceptualization of the specific object into the goal domain. The analysis of think 
aloud protocols allows to investigate the time of conceptualization. It is assumed 
that participants conceptualized objects functionally within the goal domain when 
they refer to them by domain specific nouns. Participants who are provided with 
specific verbal and visual prior information are expected to conceptualize the given 
object in first or second reference. Participants who are given unspecific prior 
information (underspecified goal condition) will conceptualize the object parts late 
in the referential process. And participants who are provided with a verbal cue 
about the goal object (verbal goal condition) are expected to be in between those 
two extremes. 
Instructors are expected to conceptualize the objects when they assemble the 
dollhouse for themselves silently, i.e. in the explorative assembly phase238. Thus the 
time at which instructors use domain specific nouns highlights the addressee’s 
familiarity to an object as assumed by the instructor. 
8.2.4 Research question 4 
In addition to implicit function assignment, i.e. use of a domain specific noun from 
one reference to the next one, participants are also expected to assign function 
explicitly. Explicit function assignment is defined as instances in which explicit 
mapping between the descriptive domain of the given object parts and the goal 
domain is expressed. In a content-based analysis all discourse units that contain a 
domain unspecific object reference as well as a domain specific noun were 
extracted. Examples (6), (7), and (8) exemplify the different ways in which function 
is assigned to the given objects in the protocols: 
                                                        
238 For more detail on the different phases involved in the second experiment see chapter 4. 
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(6) „also das werden dann die Rückwände für hinten sein“ (“these 
will be the walls in the back”). 
(7) „das rote Baustück nen bisschen wie n Dach eines Hauses 
aussieht“ (“this red building part looks a bit like a roof of a 
house”). 
(8) „ähm das können ja nur Seitenwände sein“ (“uhm these can only 
be walls that go on the sides”). 
Based on first analyses of some mapping phrases (as reported in Tenbrink & Gralla 
2009:9-10) a mapping phrase can be described as consisting of the reference to a 
physically present object x that is assigned the functional term y by a relational 
term. X may either be referred to by a deictic expression (examples (6) and (8)) or 
by a nominal phrase (‘rote Baustück’ in example (7)). The domain specific term (y) 
belongs to the semantic filed ‘house’, in the previous examples the participants 
referred to two kinds of walls and the roof.  
The relational term has different forms signaling different states of certainty. 
Either function is directly assigned by stating that x is y (examples (6) and (8)) or 
by using comparisons x looks like y (example (7)). In the first kind of mapping the 
relation is established by the verb ‘sein’ (be). Halliday (1985:113) calls this type of 
relational clause intensive. It expresses a high level of certainty thus it is called 
direct mapping. The second category of mapping between domains includes 
different realizations, namely by comparison (examples (7) and (9)), by verbs of 
doing and happening (examples (10), (11), and (13)), or by verbs of being and having 
(example (12)). 
(9) „es scheint schonmal sowas wie eine Wand zu sein“ (this seems to 
be something like a wall). 
(10) „ich muss das wohl als Seitenwand benutzen“ (I probably need to 
use this as a side wall). 
(11) „und es als Boden nehme“ (and take it as the floor). 
(12) „und zwar fungieren sie dann als extra Miniräume“ (thus they 
function as extra tiny rooms). 
(13) „das stell ich einfach so als Wand“ (I put this as a wall). 
The following verbs are to be found in the category of representational mapping: 
take as x (example(11)), use as x (example (10)), function as x (example (12)), and 
put as x (example (13)). Most of these examples contain the preposition ‘als’ (as) 
which specifies that something (here source entity) represents something else 
(here domain specific function). This assignment of function is marked by 
tentativeness because the speaker determines that x is used as y; this implies that x 
represents y but x is not y. This difference means that x has properties shared with 
y thus it can function as y but also as something different and it is the speaker who 
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defines the nature of x in the specific context. In order to stress the difference 
between the two categories of domain mapping this kind is called representational 
mapping. 
Preliminary findings (reported in Tenbrink & Gralla 2009:9-10) further suggest that 
the tentative character of assignment expressed by comparisons can be stressed by 
using modal verbs in the subjunctive mood to express low certainty (‘müsste’ 
(might), ‘könnte’ (could), ‘sollte’ (should)). Modal verbs can also be used to stress 
the certainty of an assignment, for example by using ‘müssen’ (must) in the 
indicative mood. Based on findings reported in Tenbrink and Seifert (2011) who 
identified ‘wollte’ (want) and ‘könnte’ (could) as markers of domain mapping it is 
expected that these modal verbs will be frequently used in mapping phrases. In 
contrast to Tenbrink and Seifert’s (2011) findings, it is expected that the subjunctive 
mood is not as prominent in the assembly data because all actions can be redone, 
i.e. all arrangements of objects can be disassembled and reassembled in a different 
way. Additionally, instructors are expected to assign function by mapping phrases 
expressing high certainty because they assembled the dollhouse at least two 
times239 and thus they are expected to know the function of the individual object 
parts. 
8.3 Data Analysis 
Table 8.4 combines the research questions with the analytical tools that will be 
proposed in this sub-section. This overview of the features of analysis will be 
theoretically introduced, motivated, and practically outlined in this sub-section. 
research question features of analysis 
1.1 How do people refer to objects that are not 
typical in nature? 
nominal specificity 
1.2 How is this referential behavior influenced by 
amount of prior information and communicative 
intention? 
referential form (reduced vs. full 
noun phrase, nominal specificity) 
2.1 How does reference change over time? referential process 
2.2 How is referential change influenced by 
amount of prior information and communicative 
intention?  
referential process 
3. At which point in time do people conceptualize 
the objects within the goal domain?  
nominal specificity combined with 
the referential process 
                                                        
239 For more detail on the procedure see chapter 4. 
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4. How is explicit function assignment 
linguistically expressed? 
mapping phrases 
Table 8.4: Summary research questions and features of analysis. 
8.3.1 Reference coding 
In order to identify the referents of all referential phrases the video recordings of 
the assembly task were annotated for the first experiment (UOA). For the second 
experiment (Instructions) the skype recordings were annotated240. To collect un-
constrained language data experiments were not designed as a referential task and 
people were not instructed to explicitly refer to all objects or display them when 
talking about them. Thus the annotation procedure needs to account for the fact 
that some participants may not refer to all objects or some objects were very rarely 
referred to by all participants. 
The annotations of the video recordings are based on the assumption that 
attention to an object is the prerequisite for naming it because during the process 
of attending to an object it is categorized and conceptualized. Brinck (2001) points 
out that this act of ‘attention-focusing’ has an intentional character. She argues 
that “attention is attracted by objects that have an informational (…) impact on the 
subject” (Brinck 2003:288). Brinck (2003) distinguishes two kinds of motivations 
for attention, i.e. it is either goal-driven or stimulus-driven. In goal-driven at-
tention, people are actively searching for an object directing their attention to the 
object when it appears. In stimulus-driven attention the object initiates the focus 
of attention. Clark (2003) describes that the intention to focus an addressee’s 
attention is displayed by acts of pointing and placing objects in interactions. A 
study that recorded participants’ eye movements during performance of ritualized 
and novel actions highlighted that in performance of routine tasks, such as 
brewing tea, people focus on task relevant objects fast without a long orientation 
phase. Interestingly, Funke and Sperring (2006) report that people did not fixate 
the hands but the objects that were grasped when performing actions. 
This review suggests that there are three ways that signal that an object is in the 
current focus of attention, i.e. pointing to an object, moving an object, or looking 
at it for some time. In the assembly task, participants are expected to move and 
place objects when they focus their attention on them. Additionally, they may look 
at an object for some time before turning to another object if they did not find a 
location where they wanted to move it to. 
                                                        
240 For more details on the procedure in each of the experiments see chapter 4. 
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Based on this review, it was defined that people focus on an object when they hold 
it and direct their gaze towards it, or when they are engaged in an action with it, 
such as lifting or placing it. Since no eye movements were recorded in these 
studies the focus was on peoples’ head movements. Following Funke and 
Sperring’s (2006) report it was assumed that if participants moved their heads 
towards the object and thereby facing it, people were looking at the object in their 
hands. This approach has been supported post-hoc by a taxonomy of ‘indexical 
referential behaviour’ that Brinck (2012) proposed recently. It consists of four cate-
gories, namely individual (visual) attention, individual manual action, shared 
attentional frame, and ostensive/explicit communication. The category individual 
manual action is interesting in the context of object assembly because it consists of 
reaching for an object, grasping/holding an object, and placing an object.  
The coding was tested by myself and then performed manually by one trained 
research assistant. First, each object was assigned a label. There are always two 
objects that look alike but that can be unambiguously identified by their position 
and orientation in the goal structure (see Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6). The annotator 
needed to keep track of all 13 objects and mentally rotate them in cases in which 
their label was not obvious right away. While watching the videos the objects that 
were referred to were marked in the transcripts of the think aloud protocols. The 
annotator put down the object ID and highlighted the referential phrase. 
 
Figure 8.5: Corner pieces on the second floor. 
 
Figure 8.6: Corner pieces on the second floor 
they way they would be placed on the board. 
Besides the technical problems that are outlined in detail in chapter 4 the video 
was not recorded or incomplete for three participants. Thus, 47 protocols could be 
coded in the UOA experiment. The coded protocols were almost equally 
distributed between conditions, i.e. 17 protocols in the underspecified goal 
condition, and 15 protocols each in the verbal goal condition and verbal and visual 
goal condition. 
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As outlined in detail in chapter 4, a comparable number of protocols could be 
coded in the instruction experiment, namely 16 instructions. The coding was 
facilitated when participants used the possibility of visual support. Six instructors 
made use of the visual support and assembled the house for the addressee while 
speaking, i.e. those participants oriented the house towards the video camera. Four 
instructors assembled the house for themselves while speaking, i.e. they oriented 
the rear end of the house towards the camera. In these cases, coding was difficult if 
participants did not display the objects before placing them. The third strategy was 
to ignore the camera during the assembly process, i.e. by turning the back on the 
camera, and showing the ready assembled house to the camera at the end. One 
participant gave verbal instructions but did not assemble the object in parallel at 
all. Table 8.5 provides an overview of the number of protocols that could be coded 
and the objects that were referred to at least once and which could be coded 
unambiguously241. 
condition number of 
coded 
protocols 
number of 
potential 
references242 
number of 
coded 
references 
% of all 
possible 
references 
underspecified goal 
condition 
17 221 170 76.9% 
verbal goal condition 15 195 154 79.0% 
verbal and visual goal 
condition 
15 195 173 88.7% 
instructions 16 208 195 93.8% 
overall 63 819 692 84.5% 
Table 8.5: Overview of protocols and coded references in both experiments. 
The figures in Table 8.5 highlight that most references could be coded 
unambiguously in the instruction experiment. The figures are different for think 
aloud protocols (UOA). Least references could be annotated unambiguously in the 
underspecified goal condition. On average 81.3% of all references could be coded 
unambiguously in the experiment on unaided object assembly. This study is 
explorative in that it collected unconstrained language as opposed to data in 
referential tasks as reported by Fukumura and van Gompel (2012) for example. 
Thus the obtained coding percentage cannot be accessed against previous studies 
                                                        
241 This overview is limited to first mentions because, as will be outlined in the results 
section, the majority of participants tended to refer to an object only once or twice. Thus 
first mention will provide an accurate count of all coded objects. 
242 The number of possible object references is calculated by the formula 13 (objects)×the 
number of protocols in the respective condition. 
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but with an average of more than 80%, it seems reliably high. The high number of 
coded references in the instruction scenario already indicates that producing 
references for an addressee fosters reference to each object. As described in the 
literature, instructors presented objects to their addressees in order to direct their 
attention to the object in question. This visual presentation of objects helped the 
annotator in coding the objects. 
8.3.2 Referential form 
The term referential form is defined as the form of the referential phrase that may 
either be pronominal or nominal phrases. Nominal phrases differ with regard to 
the article (definite vs. indefinite), the number and kind of modifiers, and nominal 
specificity. The definition of articles as well as modifiers is based on the German 
grammar and thus does not need much introduction. But the classification of 
nominal specificity in the specific context of the dollhouse assembly needs more 
description. In the next section the theoretical considerations for the classification 
are outlined before the final annotation categories are introduced. Section 8.3.3 
focuses on the analysis of the referential process to study the dynamical change of 
object references over time. In section 8.3.4 the annotation procedure for explicit 
function assignment in mapping phrases is presented. In these sections the pheno-
mena described in the literature are extended with regard to the specific nature of 
object assembly. 
8.3.2.1 Nominal specificity 
The topic of nominal specificity will not be addressed on the level of object class. 
Although the distinction between superordinate, basic level, and subordinate 
terms helps to get a first impression on the specificity of the concept that is 
expressed by them (as outlined in section 8.1.1.2) the interest was on a more fine-
grained distinction. In order to highlight the concepts that are developed over the 
assembly process it is important to investigate nouns with regard to their speci-
ficity relating to the conceptual target domain. Thus the approach outlined in this 
thesis applies the framework of representational metonymy (Rieser 1997; Meyer-
Fujara & Rieser 2005). As outlined in the first section of this chapter, the frame-
work of representational metonymy distinguishes between two levels, i.e. the de-
scription level and representational metonymy. Terms that belong to the first level 
contain information on physical appearance; thus the information is unspecific 
with regard to the specific context. Representational metonymy contains concept-
ualized descriptions of an object, i.e. the object is described according to its func-
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tion in the conceptualized target object. Those references are constructed based on 
background knowledge and are thus context specific.  
In both experiments, the assembly and the instruction task, the goal concept is a 
house, specifically a two-story dollhouse. The concept dollhouse is reduced to the 
basic level term house because in the task no context is provided which would cue 
participants for the function ‘dollhouse’. This can be expected to be different if 
dolls or small furniture would have been provided as well. Furthermore, the Wort-
schatzportal on German language was consulted. The ‘Deutsche Wortschatzportal’ 
provides detailed entries (e.g. frequency, description, domain, morphology, syno-
nyms, forms, subordinate terms etc.) for German words (see Figure 8.7 for an im-
pression). This information is automatically gathered from publicly available 
sources. The project was initiated and is supervised by the University of Leipzig.  
 
Figure 8.7: Screenshot of the entry Haus in the ‘Wortschatzportal’243. 
The ‘Wortschatzportal’ defines a dollhouse to be a house. Based on this finding 
and the missing contextual clues for a dollhouse, the categorization of the 
identified nouns was based on the functional concept house. Two categories have 
been defined: domain specific terminology244 and domain unspecific terminology. 
Furthermore, a third category has been introduced called constraints containing 
                                                        
243 Available at: http://wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de/abfrage/; 24.10.2012. 
244 This category is equivalent to the concept of representational metonymy but this 
terminology is not adapted to highlight the distinction between the two categories – 
domain specific vs. domain unspecific – at first glance. It is also intended to foster 
understanding of the two distinct categories for readers who are unfamiliar to the 
framework of representational metonymy. 
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all nouns that referred to constraints that were induced by the task or the objects 
(for more detail on the notion of constraints see chapter 9).  
Among the various nouns that were used to describe the objects, some could be 
classified easily. Among the clear candidates for the category domain specific were 
‘Etage’ (story), ‘Wand’ (wall), ‘Dach’ (roof), ‘Decke’ (ceiling), or ‘Fenster’ (window). 
Among the clear candidates for the category domain unspecific were ‘Ding’ (thing) 
and all its synonyms, ‘Bretter’ (boards), or ‘Gerüst’ (gantry). However, there were 
also cases in which it was difficult to decide if it was specific or unspecific, such as 
‘Ebene’245. If it is assumed to be used within the conceptual frame of house, it is a 
synonym for ‘story’. However, it can also denote the orientation (horizontal) or 
surface (smooth) of an object which would not be domain specific but part of a 
general conceptual frame. In this case it needs to be classified as unspecific. 
After categorizing parts of the transcribed nouns intuitively the nouns classified as 
domain specific have been checked against the ‘Deutsche Wortschatzportal’ entries 
and the architectural ontology called IfcBuildingElements which was more specific 
in some respects including, for example, ‘column’ (Pfeiler) and ‘railing’ (Geländer) 
(see Figure 8.8). Furthermore, nouns that were compositions and contained house 
specific terms were classified as domain specific.  
 
Figure 8.8: Screenshot of the entry house in the architectural ontology IfcBuildingElement246. 
Given both of these sources there were still 28 nouns for which it was difficult to 
find the appropriate category. Those 28 nouns were presented to 57 university 
students with the task to rate each word with regard to its specificity for the 
concept house (the original task is to be found in Figure 8.20 in the appendix). The 
scale was from 1 (very specific) to 6 (not specific at all). This scale allows for three 
equally well-defined intervals, i.e. 1,0-2,0 means specific with regard to the 
concept, 2,1-3,9 indicates an undecided category, and 4,0-6,0 indicates that an 
                                                        
245 It is already difficult to translate this word because there is not one exact translation for 
it but different words for the different meanings, which it has in German.  
246 Available at: http://www.buildingsmart-tech.org/ifc/IFC2x3/TC1/html/ifcproductext-
ension/lexical/ifcbuildingelement.htm#definition; 08.12.2009. 
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object is unspecific with regard to a ‘house’. No fillers have been used because it 
was important to find out about their categorization of the respective objects but it 
was not important to distract them. Only those nouns that have been rated 2,0 or 
better were included in the category house-specific; these were ‘Garten’ (garden), 
‘Möbel’ (furniture), ‘Dachziegel’ (tiles), and ‘Inneneinrichtung’ (interior of the 
house). This test helped to highlight nouns that are not typically house-specific 
and contributed to an objective categorization. Importantly, the presented words 
have been used with different frequency, e.g. ‘Garten’ is used by two participants, 
whereas ‘Seite(n)’ (side) has been mentioned by 28 participants. An overview of the 
categories and their members is provided in Table 8.34 in the appendix.  
Members of the third category labeled ‘constraints’ were also difficult to define. 
For a broad orientation the categories defined by Norman (2002) have been used, 
namely physical, semantic, cultural, and logical constraints. During the analysis of 
the assembly process in terms of problem solving processes it became evident that 
the label ‘constraints’ was too specific because participants did not have to adhere 
to these constraints in order to build a house. Certainly some constraints were 
more binding such as physical constraints but some could also be disregarded 
without any negative consequences. Hence, the category was rephrased to con-
straints and perceptual object features. In some parts of the analysis this category 
will be collapsed with the category domain-unspecific nouns because the members 
of this class were not house specific but rather object and task specific.  
8.3.2.2 Coding scheme: referential form 
In German definiteness is encoded in definite articles, demonstrative pronouns, 
and possessive pronouns. Indefiniteness is encoded by the indefinite article and 
further indefinites, such as ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘much’, ‘one’ (Engel 2002:118). Additional 
markers of indefiniteness, which are found in the data, are ‘irgendein’ (any) and 
‘irgendwelche’ (anything), and ‘jedes’ (each) (Erben 1972:218). Furthermore, Prince 
(1992:299) classifies quantifiers, such as numerals, to mark indefiniteness in 
English. This was adopted for German in the presented analysis. Thus, the two 
categories definite and indefinite noun phrase could be distinguished. In German 
plural nouns are only used with an article in cases in which a definite article would 
be used in the singular. In all other cases it is optional, i.e. indefinite references in 
the plural are used without an article (Engel 2002:122). Cases in which participants 
used a definite article with a plural noun (e.g. ‘diese Teile’ (those parts)) were 
annotated as definite nominal phrases. Consequently, all references that were 
coded as plural with no article were classified as indefinite references.  
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Combining all the presented detail into one coding scheme resulted in a number of 
categories. Table 8.6 provides an overview of the annotated features. 
feature variables  examples 
nominal specificity domain specific,  
domain unspecific, 
constraints and perceptual 
object features 
Wand (wall) 
Teil (thing) 
Löcher (holes) 
articles 1) definite,  
2) indefinite,  
3) numerical 
4) 0 article 
1) die Wand (the wall) 
3) eine Wand (one walls)247 
4) _ Wand (_ wall)248 
 
grammatical number 1) singular 
2) plural 
1) die Wand (the wall) 
2) (die) Wände ((the) 
walls)249 
quantifiers indefinite determiners250 alle Sachen (all things), 
keine Einkerbung (no 
groove) 
numerals numbers 
cardinal numbers 
eins, zwei (one, two) 
erste Etage (first floor) 
pronouns pronouns 
demonstratives 
a) der, die, das 
b) dieser, diese, dieses 
Table 8.6: Overview of the annotated features on referential form. 
8.3.3 Referential process: maintenance or change of 
conceptual state 
As outlined above, references to the same object change over time. These changes 
might result from re-negotiations in conversation (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986) or 
re-conceptualization of objects (Wachsmuth & Jung 1996). In the literature four 
forms of referential change have been described: lexical entrainment, reduction, 
re-mention, and re-conceptualization. There may be no change but rather the 
repeated use of the negotiated referring expression for an item (Brennan & Clark 
1996; Horton & Gerrig 2002, 2005). Lexical entrainment is a direct measure of 
                                                        
247 Problems arose during the annotation process because ‘eine’ encodes the indefinite 
article (a) but at the same time the numeral (one). These two meanings cannot be 
differentiated based on the verbal data. Since there are numerous object parts and five of 
them even twice I concluded that the likelihood is very high for ‘eine’ to encode the 
numeral. Hence all instances of ‘eine’ have been coded as numerals. 
248 In these cases participants omitted the article which was needed. 
249 In German, the use of articles is optional in plural nominal phrases (Engel 2002:122). 
250 Classification according to Erben (1972). 
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referential continuity. However, there are also forms of change. First, shortening 
across references may either be on the semantic level by dropping modifiers (e.g. 
Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986) or on the lexical level by use of pronominal forms in 
subsequent sentences or utterances. This strategy has been described as an in-
dication for a referent to be in focus (Gundel et al. 1993) and as an indication of 
changed conceptualization (Horton & Gerrig 2002). Second, people have been 
observed to depart from a previous reference by adding new information or re-
ducing information (Horton & Gerrig 2002). Third, people may offer a completely 
different conceptualization of the same object across trials. This is defined as re-
conceptualization (Wachsmuth & Jung 1995; Horton & Gerrig 2002). This later 
process can be investigated by studying nominal specificity, hence this process is 
called reframing in the analysis. Change of referential form by adding or reducing 
information is disentangled in the proposed analysis. Instances in which the 
nominal reference is changed but within the same conceptual domain are called 
rephrasing. Instances of reduced nominal references are annotated as belonging to 
the category reducing. 
In order to study change in referential form, von Stutterheim et al. (1993:102) 
introduced three temporal points within discourse251. They argued that referential 
movement could be studied by looking at referential form in the introduction, at 
times of maintenance, and in re-mention. Maintenance was defined as “repeated 
reference to an object in the immediately following utterance” (von Stutterheim et 
al. 1993:108). The proposed temporal sequences were adopted by Kiefer et al. 
(1993). Although this approach provides an insight on the change of referential 
form this insight is only partial if the analysis is restricted to two references to the 
same object. Therefore, all references to an object up to eight times of mentioning 
were annotated in this study. This approach provides information on which objects 
were frequently referred to and which ones were mentioned only once or twice.  
The terminology ‘referential movement’, as proposed by von Stutterheim et al. 
(1993), suggests activity on the side of the referential term that is not the case. 
Thus the term referential process is proposed to highlight the dynamic nature but 
to stress that it is passive on the side of references as it is the speaker/writer who is 
actively creating referential terms. The coded references were annotated with 
regard to change from the previous to the current form; eight categories were 
identified as outlined in Table 8.7. 
 
                                                        
251 In von Stutterheim et al.’s (1993) study those are description and instruction texts. 
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category description change in 
conceptual state 
example 
no reference the object has not been 
referred to at all 
  
single 
reference 
the object has been referred 
to only once 
  
reducing the previous form has been 
reduced either to a pronoun 
or by dropping modifiers 
change to 
familiarity 
das Teil – das (the 
piece – it) 
 
reframing the previously domain-
unspecific term is now 
conceptualized within the 
goal frame, i.e. house 
big change ein Teil – eine Wand 
(one piece – one wall) 
repeating the previous form is repeated 
unchanged 
no change das Teil – das Teil (the 
piece – the piece) 
rephrasing a new form is introduced that 
is within the same domain  
slight change die Platten – dieses 
Ding (the boards – 
this thing) 
reusing taking up a previously used 
referential form 
slight change das Dach – das – das 
Dach (the roof – it – 
the roof) 
Table 8.7: Coding categories for referential process. 
In Table 8.7 an additional dimension is introduced, namely change in conceptual 
state. Since this thesis investigates the change of mental concepts over time and 
their representation in language it was important to make predictions about the 
relation between a change in lexical form and the change of mental concepts. It is 
proposed that the five categories of referential process resemble a continuum of 
change in conceptual state, i.e. from repeating to reframing. If references are 
simply repeated, there is no conceptual change. If references are rephrased or 
reused, there is a slight conceptual change. If people choose a different noun but 
from the same domain, the object may either be conceptualized a little differently 
or people may not remember what they have called the object before. If a term is 
reintroduced that has been used before a slight change can be observed in that 
participants recall the previously assigned noun and substitute the latest one by it. 
In this case the argument for a failed memory may hold as well if it is assumed that 
the person cannot recall the assigned name but the first one which may possibly be 
more conventional. 
By reducing a noun phrase to pronominal form or by dropping additional 
information, which is encoded in modifiers, a big conceptual change is indicated. 
This change signals that an object is familiar and in the case of reduction to pro-
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nouns it also signals that the object is in focus. The biggest change, nevertheless, is 
assumed to be represented in the category reframing because in these cases the re-
conceptualization of an unspecific object to a functional object within the goal 
domain is explicitly marked by the feature of nominal specificity. 
Before presenting the results, it needs to be noted that the annotations reflect the 
change of referential form over time but they do not contain any information on 
actual time, i.e. the assembly time. Specifically with regard to reframing, this 
additional information is important to capture the actual time of re-conceptuali-
zation, i.e. at which time within the problem solving process. For capturing the 
dimension of assembly time, the participants’ mention of instances of reframing 
was related to the protocol structure at large in an in-depth analysis. As 
summarized in chapter 5.3.1, there was a great difference in the amount of time 
that people needed to finish the assembly and give instructions. Comparing the 
number of annotated discourse units instead of performance time can standardize 
this difference. Thus the protocols, that resemble the assembly process, were 
divided into four quarters to structure the assembly process. The respective 
instance of reframing was located in one of these quarters and coded accordingly. 
8.3.4 Functional mapping phrases 
Based on the outlined expectations, the annotation scheme of functional mapping 
phrases contained the following features: 
? nature of the source entity (exophoric, i.e. deictic, nominal, or 
missing (ellipses)) 
? mapping category (direct mapping or representational mapping) 
? modal verbs in connection with main verbs (see Figure 8.9). 
 
Figure 8.9: Screenshot of the annotation scheme for mapping between functional and goal domain. 
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This annotation scheme worked well for self-assembly data. However, the content-
based analysis of mapping phrases in instructions (study 2) revealed that 
instructors used a third strategy. More specifically, they used a more implicit way 
of assigning function as illustrated in example (14). 
(14) „jeweils mit einem kurzen Stück einem ähm einem Wandelement“ 
(“each with a small piece a uhm a wall element”). 
In this example, the source entity (a small piece) is assigned its function (a wall 
element) by the act of renaming after a hesitation. This third kind of mapping is 
more implicit than the previously introduced kinds. Drawing on the terminology 
that has been introduced in this chapter regarding the specific kinds of referential 
process, this type of mapping is called reframing because it represents the change 
from an unspecific term to a goal specific terminology. 
In the following section, the results of the analysis of nominal form, referential 
process, and mapping phrases are presented. In section 8.4.1 the results regarding 
the different features of the referential form are outlined. Section 8.4.2 focuses on 
the results of the referential process throughout the assembly and the instruction. 
In section 8.4.3 the results regarding the analysis of mapping phrases are 
presented. In all of these sections the results on the first study, i.e. UOA are 
presented first. In this study the influence of the independent variable prior 
information is investigated. Then the results on instructions are provided. Based on 
these findings a comparison is made between results obtained in instructions to 
those obtained in the verbal and visual goal condition to study the influence of 
communicative intention252. After the presentation of the results, a final discussion 
concludes this chapter of analysis. 
8.4 Results 
The first sub-section provides a general overview on the number of references to 
objects throughout the assembly and the instruction. In the second sub-section, 
the results concerning referential form will be presented. As outlined in the 
analysis section, there were different aspects of referential form that were 
distinguished thus this sub-section is further divided. First, the analysis of nominal 
and pronominal phrases is presented (8.4.1.1). Second, the pronominal phrases are 
further distinguished into definite and indefinite ones (8.4.1.2). Third nouns are 
                                                        
252 For a detailed discussion of the independent variable communicative intention see 
chapter 4. 
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differentiated into domain specific and domain unspecific nominal references 
(8.4.1.3). Then the results regarding referential change are summarized (8.4.2). 
Finally, the results on the mapping phrases are reported (8.4.3). 
8.4.1 Referential form253 
This presentation shall start with a technical note: the analysis can either be done 
on a by subject or a by object count. In a by subject count it is analyzed by which 
form one specific addressee referred to the objects. In the by object count, , it is 
evaluated which object was referred to in which way without distinguishing 
between individual participants. The results reported in this section, i.e. in the 
graphs and in the tables254, are based on by subject counts because only this 
analysis allows to distinguish between conditions in the unaided assembly 
experiment (UOA). These findings were compared to the by object results in the 
statistical analysis and the findings were the same.  
8.4.1.1 Number of references to objects throughout the 
assembly 
Table 8.8 summarizes the raw frequency of references throughout the assembly 
process. The results revealed that most participants referred to an object only once 
or twice. Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition referred to objects 
more than twice most often. Participants in the underspecified goal and verbal goal 
condition referred to an object for a fourth time in only 14.9% and 13.3% of all cases 
respectively. Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition referred to an 
object a fourth time in 18.5% of the cases. As these numbers were fairly close and 
higher than those for fifth to eighth mention were, the analysis in the following 
sections is restricted to first to fourth mention. 
More than one quarter (26.2%) of the participants who were provided with few 
prior information (underspecified goal condition) did not refer to an object once. 
This number was twice as large as the one for participants in the verbal and visual 
goal condition (12.8%). The difference was found to be statistically significant 
(Tukey p = .016; LSD p = .003). 
                                                        
253 Preliminary analyses of a smaller data set were run in collaboration with Thora Tenbrink 
and Elena Andonova. Although the data sample was extended to the whole corpus and the 
analysis was further refined, I want to greatly acknowledge their contribution. 
254 Most of the tables are to be found in the appendix on this chapter. 
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 condition reference 
number 
reference255 no reference ellipsis 
underspecified goal 1st 163 (73.76%) 58 (26.2%) 0 (0.0%) 
underspecified goal 2nd 102 (46.15%) 119 (53.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
underspecified goal 3rd 58 (26.24%) 162 (73.3%) 1 (0.5%) 
underspecified goal 4th 33 (14.93%) 188 (85.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
underspecified goal 5th 21 (9.50%) 200 (90.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
underspecified goal 6th 13 (5.88%) 208 (94.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
underspecified goal 7th 7 (3.17%) 214 (96.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
underspecified goal 8th 3 (1.36%) 218 (98.6%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal goal 1st 152 (77.95%) 43 (22.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal goal 2nd 96 (49.23%) 99 (50.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal goal 3rd 57 (29.23%) 138 (70.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal goal 4th 26 (13.33%) 169 (86.7%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal goal 5th 13 (6.67%) 182 (93.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal goal 6th 9 (4.62%) 186 (95,4%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal goal 7th 6 (3.08%) 189 (96,9%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal goal 8th 4 (2.05%) 191 (97.9%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal and visual goal 1st 170 (87.18%) 25 (12.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal and visual goal 2nd 128 (65.64%) 67 (34.4%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal and visual goal 3rd 75 (38.46%) 120 (61.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal and visual goal 4th 36 (18.46%) 159 (81.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal and visual goal 5th 25 (12.82%) 172 (88.2%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal and visual goal 6th 11 (5.64%) 184 (94.4%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal and visual goal 7th 3 (1.54%) 192 (98.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal and visual goal 8th 1 (0.51%) 194 (99.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
Table 8.8: Results on references to objects from one reference to eight references throughout the 
assembly; raw frequency with percentage in brackets. 
8.4.1.2 Feature: nominal and pronominal phrase 
? Study 1: UOA 
If first to fourth reference were analyzed as a combined set of data, a significant 
effect of amount of prior information on pronominal and nominal forms could be 
observed, L?2 (8, N = 2444) = 49.5, p = .00. Participants in the underspecified goal 
                                                        
255  References contain nominal phrases, pronominal phrases, and numerals. A more 
detailed table distinguishing between these forms is provided in the appendix (table 115). 
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condition (138 cases) used pronominal forms significantly less frequently than 
participants in the verbal and visual goal condition (208 cases). Additionally, 
participants in the verbal and visual goal condition had significantly fewer 
instances of ‘no reference’ (see Table 8.9). Participants in the verbal goal condition 
used numerals significantly more often than participants in the other conditions 
(see Table 8.10). 
condition nominal 
phrase 
pronominal 
phrase 
no 
reference 
numerals ellipsis 
underspecified 
goal 
214 138 527 4 1 
verbal goal 186 135 449 10 0 
verbal and visual 
goal 
199 208 317 2 0 
Table 8.9: Distribution of nominal and pronominal forms within conditions in UOA, first to fourth 
reference; raw frequency. 
condition nominal 
phrase 
pronominal 
phrase 
no 
reference 
numerals ellipsis 
underspecified 
goal 
-0.2 -2.7 1.8 -0.7 1.1 
verbal goal -0.4 -1.5 0.9 2.2 -0.6 
verbal and visual 
goal 
0.6 4.4 -2.8 -1.4 -0.6 
Table 8.10: Distribution of nominal and pronominal forms within conditions in UOA, first to fourth 
reference; standardized residuals. 
The second part of the analysis investigated if the influence of amount of prior 
information on nominal or pronominal form could be observed in each of the four 
references individually. In 1st reference, the distribution of nominal and prono-
minal forms was similar in the three assembly conditions. Participants tended to 
use nominal phrases more frequently than pronouns (see Table 8.11 and Figure 
8.10).  
condition noun phrase pronoun no reference others 
underspecified 
goal 
49.78 22.62 26.24 1.36 
verbal goal 51.28 22.56 25.64 0.51 
verbal and visual 
goal 
50.77 37.44 11.28 0.51 
Table 8.11: Distribution of nominal and pronominal references within conditions in UOA in first 
reference; mean percentage. 
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Figure 8.10: Distribution of pronominal and nominal references in first reference within conditions in 
UOA; mean percentage with standard error. 
The difference between conditions concerning the use of pronouns got more 
marked in 2nd reference. Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition 
(37.4%) used pronominal forms more frequently than participants in the 
underspecified goal condition (19.5%) (see Table 8.12). However, this trend did not 
reach statistical significance; F (2,44) = 2.58, p = .09. 
condition noun phrase pronoun no reference 
underspecified 
goal 
26.39 19.53 54.07 
verbal goal 21.53 27.18 51.28 
verbal and visual 
goal 
28.20 37.44 34.36 
Table 8.12: Distribution of nominal and pronominal references within conditions in UOA in second 
reference; mean percentage. 
There was no significant influence of amount of prior information on nominal and 
pronominal choice in 3rd and 4th reference (see Table 8.35 in the appendix for all 
results). 
? Study 2: Instructions 
Instructors had a clear tendency for using nominal phrases; 87.5% nominal 
references as compared to 5.3% pronominal references in 1st reference (see Table 
8.13). This trend remained the same from 1st to 4th reference. 
 
RESULTS 339 
 
 
 experiment reference number nominal phrase pronominal phrase 
instruction 1st 182 (87.5%) 11 (5.3%) 
instruction 2nd 123 (59.1%) 38 (18.3%) 
instruction 3rd 85 (40.9%) 33 (15.9%) 
instruction 4th 67 (32.2%) 16 (7.7%) 
instruction 5th 39 (18.8%) 8 (3.9%) 
instruction 6th 21 (10.1%) 2 (1.0%) 
instruction 7th 14 (6.7%) 0 (0.0%) 
instruction 8th 7 (3.4%) 0 
Table 8.13: Nominal and pronominal reference to objects in instructions in first to eights reference; raw 
frequency with mean percentage in brackets. 
? Between verbal and visual goal condition and instructions 
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant influence of communicative intention on 
the dependent variables pronominal reference and nominal reference in 1st 
reference (see Figure 8.11). Instructors used significantly more nominal references 
(87.5%) than participants in the verbal and visual goal condition (49.2%), 
F ( 1,29) = 14.16, p = .001. Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition 
(37.4%) used significantly more pronominal forms than instructors (5.3%) in first 
reference, F ( 1,29) = 21.40, p = .00. 
 
Figure 8.11: Distribution of nominal and pronominal references in instructions and verbal and visual goal 
condition in UOA in first reference; mean percentage with standard error. 
The same significant differences were observed in 2nd reference. Instructors used 
significantly more nominal references (59.1%) than participants in the verbal and 
visual goal condition (28.2%) (see Table 8.12 on page 338), F ( 1,29) = 8.75, p = .006. 
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Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition (37.9%) used significantly more 
pronominal forms than instructors (18.3%) in second reference, F ( 1,29) = 5.06, 
p = .03. 
In 3rd reference, the results revealed a significant effect of communicative attention 
on nominal references but no such effect on pronominal use. Instructors used 
significantly more nominal references (40.9%) than participants in the verbal and 
visual goal condition (19.5%), F ( 1,29) = 4.83, p = .04. 
In 4th reference, the results revealed a significant effect of communicative attention 
on nominal references but no such effect on pronominal use. Instructors used 
significantly more nominal references (32.2%) than participants in the verbal and 
visual goal condition (5.6%), F ( 1,29) = 10.40, p = .003. 
8.4.1.3 Feature: definiteness of nominal phrase  
? Study 1: UOA 
If 1st to 4th reference were analyzed as a combined set of data, a significant effect of 
amount of prior information on definiteness in nominal phrases could be 
observed, L?2 (8, N = 615) = 29.94, p = .00. Participants in the verbal and visual goal 
condition used indefinite noun phrases significantly less frequently than partici-
pants in the other conditions, z = -3.0 (see Table 8.14 and Table 8.15). 
condition definite 
noun 
phrase 
indefinite 
noun phrase 
plural noun 
phrase 
zero article 
noun 
phrase 
numeral 
noun 
phrase 
underspecified 
goal 
93 59 37 25 4 
verbal goal 105 51 21 18 1 
verbal and visual 
goal 
119 24 40 40 1 
Table 8.14: Distribution of definite and indefinite noun phrases within conditions in UOA, first to fourth 
reference; raw frequency. 
condition definite 
noun 
phrase 
indefinite 
noun phrase 
plural noun 
phrase 
zero article 
noun 
phrase 
numeral 
noun 
phrase 
underspecified 
goal 
-1.8 1.7 0.4 0.8 1.3 
verbal goal 0.4 1.3 -1.8 0.3 -0.6 
verbal and visual 
goal 
1.5 -3.0 1.4 -0.6 -0. 
Table 8.15: Distribution of definite and indefinite noun phrases within conditions in UOA, first to fourth 
reference; standardized residuals. 
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Considering the distribution of categories annotating definiteness in 1st reference 
only, the same trend was observed. The results revealed that definite noun phrases 
were more frequent than indefinite ones in first reference (see Figure 8.12). There 
was no significant effect of amount of prior information on definiteness of nominal 
phrases in 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th reference (see Table 8.16 for all results). 
 
Figure 8.12: Distribution of definite and indefinite noun phrases within conditions in UOA in first 
reference; mean percentage and standard error. 
condition reference 
number 
definite 
noun 
phrase 
indefinite 
noun 
phrase 
plural 
noun 
phrase 
zero 
article 
noun 
phrase 
numerals ellipsis 
underspe
cified 
goal  
1st 51 (23.1%) 30 (13.6%) 14 (6.3%) 15 (6.9%) 3 (1.4%) 0 (0.0%) 
underspe
cified 
goal  
2nd 21 (9.5%) 17 (7.7%) 14 (6.3%) 7 (3.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
underspe
cified 
goal  
3rd 10 (4.5%) 8 (3.6%) 7 (3.2%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.5%) 
underspe
cified 
goal  
4th 8 (3.6%) 3 (1.4%) 6 (2.7%) 3 (1.4%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal 
goal 
1st 58 (29.7%) 29 (14.9%) 4 (2.1%) 12 (6.2%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal 
goal 
2nd 20 (10.3%) 12 (6.2%) 6 (3.1%) 5 (2.6%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal 
goal 
3rd 16 (8.2%) 10 (5.1%) 8 (4.1%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
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verbal 
goal 
4th 11 (5.6%) 0 3 (1.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal 
and visual 
goal 
1st 50 (25.6%) 15 (20.0%) 21 (10.8%) 10 (5.1%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal 
and visual 
goal 
2nd 
33 
(16.9%) 
4 (9.7%) 14 (7.2%) 3 (1.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal 
and visual 
goal 
3rd 26 (13.3%) 3 (4.1%) 5 (2.6%) 4 (2.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
verbal 
and visual 
goal 
4th 10 (5.1%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Table 8.16: Results on the distribution of categories annotating definiteness of nominal phrase within 
conditions in UOA in first to fourth reference; raw frequency and mean percentage in brackets. 
? Study 2: Instructions 
Instructors had a clear tendency to use indefinite noun phrases from 1st to 4th 
reference (see Table 8.17). 
condition reference 
number 
definite noun 
phrase 
indefinite 
noun phrase 
zero 
article 
noun 
phrase 
numerals ellipsis 
instruction 1st 79 (38.0%) 103 (49.6%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
instruction 2nd 47 (22.6%) 73 (35.1%) 3 (1.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
instruction 3rd 32 (15.4%) 50 (24.0%) 3 (1.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
instruction 4th 31 (14.9%) 33 (15.9%) 3 (1.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Table 8.17: Results definite an indefinite noun phrases in instructions from first to fourth reference, 
raw frequency with percentage in brackets. 
? Between verbal and visual goal condition and instructions 
The analysis revealed a significant effect of communicative intention on 
indefiniteness of noun phrases in 1st reference (see Figure 8.13). Instructors used 
significantly more indefinite references (49.6%) than participants in the verbal and 
visual goal condition (20.0%), F ( 1,29) = 9.14, p = .005. 
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Figure 8.13: Distribution of definite and indefinite noun phrases in instructions and verbal and visual 
goal condition in UOA in first reference; mean percentage, standard error. 
The analysis revealed the same effect of communicative intention on indefiniteness 
of noun phrases in 2nd reference (see Table 8.17). Instructors used significantly 
more indefinite references (35.1%) than participants in the verbal and visual goal 
condition (9.7%), F (1,29) = 14.23, p = .001. 
The same effect of communicative intention on indefiniteness of noun phrases was 
revealed in 3rd reference. Instructors used significantly more indefinite references 
(24.0%) than participants in the verbal and visual goal condition (4.1%), 
F (1,29) = 8.90, p = .006. 
The significant effect of communicative intention on indefiniteness of noun 
phrases was also revealed in 4th reference but indefinite noun phrases were very 
rare in the verbal and visual goal condition. Instructors used significantly more 
indefinite references (15.9%) than participants in the verbal and visual goal 
condition (0.5%), F (1,29) = 8.78, p = .006. 
8.4.1.4 Feature: nominal specificity 
? Study 1: UOA 
Comparing the frequency of specific and unspecific nominal references from 1st 
through 4th reference, a significant effect of amount of prior information on 
specific nominal references was revealed, ?2 (2, N = 594) = 9.19, p = .01. Participants 
in the underspecified goal condition used domain specific nouns less frequently 
from 1st to 4th reference (66 cases) than participant in the other two conditions, 
z = -1.7 (see Table 8.18). 
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condition domain 
specific 
terminology 
(raw 
frequency) 
domain specific 
terminology 
(standardized 
residual) 
domain 
unspecific 
terminology 
(raw 
frequency) 
domain 
unspecific 
terminology 
(standardized 
residual) 
underspecified 
goal 
66  -1.7 148 1.4 
verbal goal 85 1.6 102 -1.3 
verbal and visual 
goal 
76 0.3 117 -0.2 
Table 8.18: Raw frequency and standardized residuals of domain specific and domain unspecific 
nominal reference from first to fourth reference within conditions in UOA. 
Considering 1st reference separately, the analysis of nominal specificity revealed 
that participants used domain unspecific nouns more frequently than domain 
specific nouns in all conditions (see Figure 8.14). There was no significant effect of 
amount of prior information on domain specific terminology when 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 
4th reference were analyzed individually. 
 
Figure 8.14: Distribution of domain specific and domain unspecific nouns within conditions in UOA in 
first reference; mean percentage and standard error. 
Since the analysis focused specifically at the use of domain specific references, 
observed differences between conditions will be described although they are 
minor. Participants who were provided with unspecific information about the goal 
object used domain unspecific nouns (38.0%) slightly more often than participants 
who were provided with specific domain knowledge (29.2% in the verbal goal 
condition and 31.3% in the verbal and visual goal condition) in 1st reference (see 
Table 8.19). This tendency was mirrored in the use of domain specific terminology. 
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Domain specific nouns were used slightly more frequently in the verbal goal 
condition (19.0%) than in the underspecified goal condition (11.8%) in 1st reference.  
Participants in the verbal goal condition were the only ones who used domain 
specific nouns more often than domain unspecific ones at some point. This was the 
case in second reference in which 13.3% of the references were domain specific as 
compared to 8.2% that were domain unspecific. In the verbal and visual goal 
condition, the frequency of domain specific and domain unspecific nominal 
references was similar (12.3% and 14.4% respectively). Although these differences 
between conditions were minor, it suggests that participants who were provided 
with least specific prior information used domain unspecific nominal references 
more often than participants who were provided with specific prior information. 
condi-
tion 
referen-
ce 
number 
domain 
specific 
noun 
phrase 
domain un-
specific 
noun 
phrase 
con-
straints  
pro-
nominal 
phrase 
no 
reference 
others 
A 1st 26 (11.8%) 84 (38.0%) 0 (0.0%) 50 (22.6%) 58 (26.2%) 3 (1.4%) 
A 2nd 24 (10.9%) 34 (15.4%) 1 (0.5%) 43 (19.5%) 119 (53.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
A 3rd 11 (5.0%) 15 (6.8%) 0 (0.0%) 32 (14.5%) 162 (73.3%) 1(0.5%) 
A 4th 5 (2.3%) 14 (6.3%) 0 (0.0%) 13 (5.9%) 188 (85.1%) 1 (0.5%) 
B 1st 37 (19.0%) 57 (29.2%) 2 (1.0%) 48 (24.6%) 43 (22.1%) 8 (4.1%) 
B 2nd 26 (13.3%) 16 (8.2%) 1 (0.5%) 53 (27.2%) 99 (50.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
B 3rd 14 (7.2%) 21 (10.8%) 0 (0.0%) 22 (11.3%) 138 (70.8%) 0 (0.0%) 
B 4th 8 (4.1%) 6 (3.1%) 0 (0.0%) 12 (6.2%) 169 (86.7%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 1st 34 (17.4%) 59 (31.3%) 3 (1.5%) 73 (37.4%) 25 (12.8%) 1 (0.5%) 
C 2nd 24 (12.3%) 28 (14.4%) 2 (1.0%) 74 (37.9%) 67 (34.4%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 3rd 12 (6.2%) 25 (12.8%) 1 (0.5%) 37 (19.0%) 120 (61.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 4th 6 (3.1%) 5 (2.6%) 0 (0.0%) 25 (12.8%) 159 (81.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
Table 8.19: Results referential form, variable: nominal specificity, within experiment 1 (all 3 conditions) 
(A: underspecified goal condition, B: verbal goal condition, C: verbal and visual goal condition); 
distribution over all coded forms. 
? Study 2: Instructions 
Instructors tended to use domain unspecific nouns from 1st to 3rd reference. The 
difference between domain specific and domain unspecific terminology was not as 
marked in 4th reference (see Table 8.20). 
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reference 
number 
domain specific 
noun phrase 
domain 
unspecific noun 
phrase 
pronominal 
phrase 
no reference 
1st 35 (16.8%) 147 
(70.67%) 
11 (5.3%) 15 (7.2%) 
2nd 38 (18.3%) 85 (40.87%) 38 (18.3%) 47 (22.6%) 
3rd 29 (13.9%) 56 (26.92%) 33 (15.9%) 90 (43.3%) 
4th 31 (14.9%) 36 (17.31%) 16 (7.7%) 125 (60.1%) 
Table 8.20: Results on domain specific and domain unspecific nouns in instructions in first to fourth 
reference; raw frequency with percentage in brackets. 
? Between verbal and visual goal condition and instructions 
The analysis revealed a significant effect of communicative intention on domain 
unspecific nominal references in 1st reference (see Figure 8.15). Instructors used 
significantly more domain unspecific references (70.7%) than participants in the 
verbal and visual goal condition (31.3%), F ( 1,29) = 15.68, p = .00. 
 
Figure 8.15: Distribution of domain specific and domain unspecific nouns in instructions and in the 
verbal and visual goal condition in UOA in first reference; mean percentage and standard error. 
The analysis revealed the same effect of communicative intention on domain 
unspecific noun phrases in 2nd reference. Instructors used significantly more 
domain unspecific references (40.9%) than participants in the verbal and visual goal 
condition (14.4%), F (1,29) = 8.28, p = .007. 
There was no statistically significant effect of communicative intention on domain 
unspecific noun phrases in 3rd reference. However, the effect was revealed again in 
4th reference. Here instructors used significantly more domain unspecific references 
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(17.3%) than participants in the verbal and visual goal condition (2.6%), 
F (1,29) = 6.85, p = .014. 
? Domain specific and domain unspecific nominal reference to specific 
objects 
In order to assess the typicality of the different objects, nominal specificity of all 
objects in first reference was compared. The analysis focused on 1st reference only 
because it was assumed that first references highlighted the intuitive con-
ceptualization of the respective object. The most culturally specific object was the 
object functioning as the roof. This object was most frequently referred to by the 
domain specific noun ‘Dach’ (roof). All other objects tended to be referred to by 
domain unspecific nominal or pronominal phrases (see Table 8.21). 
condition object(s) domain 
specific 
nominal 
phrase 
domain 
unspecific 
nominal 
phrase 
pronomin
al phrase 
others no 
reference 
under-
specified 
goal 
roof 7 (41.2%) 4 (23.5%) 2 (11.8%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (23,5%) 
verbal 
goal 
roof 12 (80.0%) 1 (6.7%) 1 (6.7%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (6.7%) 
verbal and 
visual goal 
roof 11 (73.3%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (6.7%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (20.0%) 
under-
specified 
goal 
all others 19 (9.3%) 80 (39.2%) 48 (23.5%) 3 (1.5%) 54 (26.5%) 
verbal 
goal 
all others 25 (13.9%) 58 (32.2%) 47 (26.1%) 8 (4.4%) 42 (23.3%) 
verbal and 
visual goal 
all others 23 (12.8%) 62 (34.4%) 72 (40.0%) 1 (0.6%) 22 (12.2%) 
Table 8.21: Results on nominal specificity in reference to the roof part and all other objects in UOA; raw 
frequency and percentage in brackets. 
8.4.2 Referential process 
8.4.2.1 Distribution of referential process categories  
? Study 1: UOA 
The analysis of referential process in 1st to 2nd reference highlighted a significant 
effect of amount of prior information on the dependent variable repeating, 
F (2,44) = 5.104, p = .01. Post-hoc tests revealed that participants in the verbal goal 
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condition (10.3%) repeated references significantly less frequently than partic-
ipants in the verbal and visual goal condition (29.2%) (see Table 8.22), 
Tukey p = .010 and LSD p = .004. Additionally, the less sensitive LSD post-hoc test 
revealed that participants in the verbal and visual goal condition used repeating 
more frequently than participants in the underspecified goal condition (15.4%) as 
well, LSD p = .025. 
con-
dition 
no re-
ference 
no 
further 
re-
ference 
re-
ducing 
re-
framing 
re-
peatin
g 
re-
phrasing 
reusing single 
re-
ference 
A 5 (2.3%) 0 (0.0%) 22 
(10.0%) 
17 (7.7%) 34 
(15.4%) 
27 
(12.2%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
116 
(52.5%) 
B 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 40 
(20.5%) 
21 
(10.8%) 
20 
(10.3%) 
15 (7.7%) 0 
(0.0%) 
99 
(50.8%) 
C 2 (1.0%) 0 (0.0%) 31 
(15.9%) 
16 
(8.2%) 
57 
(29.2%) 
23 
(11.8%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
66 
(33.8) 
Table 8.22: Distribution of categories of referential change within conditions in UOA in first reference; 
raw frequency with mean percentage in brackets (A: underspecified goal; B: verbal goal; C: verbal and 
visual goal). 
No significant effect of amount of prior information was revealed in 2nd to 3rd 
reference. A trend was observed in 3rd to 4th reference. It was observed that prior 
information influenced frequency of no further reference. However, this trend did 
not reach statistical significance, F ( 2,44) = 2.697, p = .08. The LSD post-hoc test 
highlighted that participants in the verbal and visual goal condition (45.6%) had 
more instances of the category no further references than participants in the 
underspecified goal condition (29.9%), p = .03 (see Table 8.36 in the appendix). 
The same trend was also observed in 4th to 5th reference and as before the amount 
of prior information had an effect on repeating. However, both of these trends did 
not reach statistical significance. A one-way ANOVA testing for the influence of 
amount of prior information on the dependent variable no further reference 
revealed a similar trend as before, F ( 2,44) = 2.754, p = .075. Again, the difference 
was between the two conditions that differed most with regard to amount of prior 
information and it was in the same direction. The LSD post-hoc test highlighted 
that participants in the verbal and visual goal condition (52.3%) had more instances 
of the category no further references than participants in the underspecified goal 
condition (34.4%), p = .024 (see Table 8.36 in the appendix). 
A one-way ANOVA testing for the influence of amount of prior information on the 
dependent variable repeating revealed a minor trend, F ( 2,44) = 2.904, p = .07. The 
LSD post-hoc test revealed that participants in the verbal goal condition (2.1%) 
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repeated references less frequently than participants in the verbal and visual goal 
condition (8.2%), p = .021 (see Table 8.36 in the appendix). 
? Study 2: Instructions 
Similarly, instructors referred to 79% of the objects more than once and did so by 
repeated (26.0%) or reduced forms (20.7%) (see Table 8.23).  
refer-
ence  
no re-
ference 
no 
further 
re-
ference 
reducing re-
framing 
repeating rephra-
sing 
reusing single re-
ference 
1st – 
2nd 
13 
(6.3%) 
0 (0.0%) 43 
(20.7%) 
23 
(11.1%) 
54 
(26.0%) 
46 
(22.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
42 
(20.2%) 
2nd – 
3rd 
13 
(6.3%) 
47 
(22.6%) 
27 
(13.0%) 
13 
(6.3%) 
34 
(16.4%) 
34 
(16.4%) 
11 
(5.3%) 
42 
(20.2%) 
3rd – 
4th 
13 
(6.3%) 
83 
(39.9%) 
4 (1.9%) 16 
(7.7%) 
31 
(14.9%) 
22 
(10.6%) 
10 
(4.8%) 
42 
(20.2%) 
4th – 
5th 
13 
(6.3%) 
119 
(57.2%) 
5 (2.4%) 4 (1.9%) 16 (7.7%) 17 
(8.2%) 
5 
(2.4%) 
42 
(20.2%) 
Table 8.23: Distribution of categories of referential change within instructions from first to fifth 
reference; raw frequency with mean percentage in brackets. 
? Between verbal and visual goal condition and instructions 
No effect of communicative intention on referential process was revealed in 1st to 
2nd reference. A trend was observed, however, in 2nd to 3rd reference. In these re-
ferences communicative intention had a slight effect on reducing, F ( 1,29) = 3.504, 
p = .071. Instructors tended to reduce third references more frequently (12.98%) 
than participants thinking aloud in the verbal and visual goal condition (5.1%). 
A slight effect of communicative intention on the dependent variable reusing was 
observed in 3rd to 4th reference on, F ( 1, 29) = 3.505, p = 0.7.1 Instructors tended to 
reuse references from 3rd to 4th reference more frequently (4.8%) than participants 
thinking aloud in the verbal and visual goal condition (1.0%). 
? Summary 
Reviewing these findings, it can be summarized that prior information as well as 
communicative intention influenced the referential process slightly. Table 8.24 
summarizes the most frequent referential process categories for both studies and 
the individual conditions. 
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reference underspecified 
goal condition 
verbal goal 
condition 
verbal and 
visual goal 
condition 
instruction 
1st – 2nd repeating (15.4%), 
rephrasing (12.2%) 
reducing 
(20.5%), 
reframing 
(10.8%) 
repeating 
(29.2%), 
reducing (15.9%) 
repeating 
(26.0%), 
reducing 
(20.7%) 
2nd – 3rd repeating (10.0%) repeating 
(11.3%) 
repeating 
(17.9%), 
rephrasing 
(10.3%) 
repeating 
(16.4%), 
rephrasing 
(16.4%) 
3rd – 4th  repeating (5.9%) repeating (5.2%) repeating (8.2%) repeating 
(14.9%), 
rephrasing 
(10.6%) 
Table 8.24: Summary of the most frequent referential processes in the three conditions in UOA and in 
instructions; the most frequent referential process category and the second most frequent one are 
only listed if it accounts for more than 10% of the annotated cases. 
8.4.2.2 Function assignment within the referential process in 
terms of reference process time 
As pointed out in sub-section 2 of this chapter, the point in reference process time 
at which participants conceptualized the given objects within the conceptual 
domain ‘house’ was of interest to the theoretical discussion. Therefore, a closer 
analysis of the category reframing is reported in the following section.  
? Function assignment from 2nd to 5th reference 
Considering the occurrences of reframing within the first four references to an 
object, it was revealed that objects were most frequently reframed in second 
reference in UOA as well as in instructions (see Table 8.25). The frequency of 
reframing was almost equal between all three conditions and both experiments. 
Frequency of domain specific function assignment decreased over consecutive 
references. 
reference underspecified 
goal condition 
verbal goal 
condition 
verbal and 
visual goal 
condition 
instruction 
1st – 2nd 17 (7.7%) 21 (10.8%) 16 (8.2%) 23 (11.1%) 
2nd – 3rd 9 (4.1%) 9 (4.6%) 9 (4.6%) 13 (6.3%) 
3rd – 4th  4 (1.8%) 5 (2.6%) 2 (1.0%) 16 (7.7%) 
Table 8.25: Occurrences of reframing in the three assembly conditions (UOA) and in instructions; raw 
frequency with mean percentage in brackets.  
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By adding the number of objects that were verbalized within the goal domain by 
reframing from second to fourth reference a measure of explicit function 
assignment 256  is established. In order to get an accurate percentage of 
conceptualized objects, the number of referred objects needed to be calculated as a 
first step. For participants in the underspecified goal condition the following 
equation was calculated: 221-58=163, i.e. number of all objects minus number of 
objects that were not referred to at all. This number of referred objects represents 
100% of possible references and from these 100% the number of explicitly 
conceptualized objects was calculated.  
The results highlighted that participants in the underspecified goal condition 
explicitly conceptualized 30 objects (18.4% of all 163 objects), participants in the 
verbal goal condition conceptualized 35 objects explicitly (23.0% of all 152 objects) 
whereas participants in the verbal and visual goal condition conceptualized 27 
objects (15.9% of all 172 objects) explicitly. Instructors referred to 52 objects by 
functional terms (26.9% of all 193 objects).  
Besides the number of objects that are functionally referred to, it is important to 
know how many participants, i.e. protocols, contributed to those numbers. In the 
underspecified goal condition, 13 out of 17 participants (76.5%) conceptualized at 
least one object functionally from second to fourth reference. Similarly, 11 out of 15 
participants (73.3%) in the verbal goal condition conceptualized at least one object 
functionally from second to fourth reference. In the verbal and visual goal 
condition, fewer participants referred to an object functionally from second to 
fourth reference, i.e. nine out of 15 participants (60.0%). Even fewer instructors 
assigned function explicitly, namely nine out of 16 instructors (56.3%).  
? Function assignment throughout the referential process 
In order to evaluate the number of objects that were functionally referred to 
throughout the analyzed referential process, the objects that were referred to by 
specific nominal phrases in first reference were considered as well. The results 
revealed that participants in UOA and instructors conceptualized objects to a 
comparable amount in first reference (see Table 8.26 first row). 
The frequency of object conceptualization from first to fifth reference showed that 
participants who were provided with verbal goal information conceptualized 
                                                        
256 The term explicitly refers to the fact that those concepts are verbally expressed in a 
change from an unspecific term to a more functional term. Objects that are referred to by 
functional, i.e. domain specific terms, in first reference are not included in the first step of 
the calculation. 
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almost half of all objects in first reference (47.4%). Instructors conceptualized 
objects at a comparable frequency in first reference (45.1%). Participants who were 
provided with verbal and visual information referred to almost as many objects 
functionally as participants who were provided with no goal information (see Table 
8.26 last row). 
reference underspecified 
goal condition 
verbal goal 
condition 
verbal and 
visual goal 
condition 
instruction 
1st  26  37  34  35  
1st – 4th 30 35  27  52  
sum explicitly 
conceptualized objects 
56 72 61 87 
objects without one 
reference 
58 43 25 15 
percent conceptualized 
objects 
34.4% 47.4% 35.9% 45.1% 
Table 8.26Overview of domain specific nouns in first reference, occurrences of reframing from first to 
fifth reference, objects which are not referred to at all, percent conceptualized objects from first to 
fifth reference in the three conditions (experiment 1) and instructions (experiment 2). 
8.4.2.3 Function assignment within the referential process in 
terms of assembly time 
So far, conceptualization was investigated in terms of reference process time. 
However, the assembly process itself also provides a time scale, referred to as 
assembly time. This time needs to be considered as well in order to get the full 
picture of object conceptualization over time.  
The distribution revealed a difference between assembly conditions and think 
aloud and instructions (see Table 8.27). Participants who were provided with no 
specific information about the goal object (underspecified goal condition) tended 
to conceptualize objects in the second quarter of the assembly process. Partici-
pants who were provided with verbal and visual prior information conceptualized 
most objects in the last quarter of the assembly. Those participants who were given 
verbal goal information tended to conceptualize most objects in the third quarter.  
Focusing on the first quarter, a marked difference in the amount of conceptuali-
zation was observed with regard to the amount of provided goal information. 
Those participants who were provided with verbal information assigned function 
to objects most often. Instructors tended to assign function explicitly most often in 
the fourth quarter of their instructions. 
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quarter underspecified 
goal condition 
verbal goal 
condition 
verbal and visual 
goal condition 
instruction 
1st  4 (13.3%) 8 (22.9%) 2 (7.4%) 6 (11.5%) 
2nd  13 (43.3%) 6 (17.1%) 7 (25.9%) 10 (19.2%) 
3rd  4 (13.3%) 13 (37.1%) 5 (18.5%) 5 (9.6%) 
4th  9 (30.0%) 8 (22.9%) 13 (48.1%) 31 (59.6%) 
Table 8.27: Overview of occurrences of reframing in assembly and instruction time from 2nd to 4th 
reference in the different quarters of the annotated discourse units; distinguished between the three 
conditions in UOA and in instructions; raw frequency with percentage in brackets. 
8.4.3 Functional mapping phrases 
Overall 131 instances of mapping were identified and coded. Most instances were 
identified in protocols recorded in the underspecified goal condition (54 instances, 
41.2%). Fewer instances were identified in protocols in the verbal goal condition 
(44 instances, 33.6%) and even fewer in protocols of the verbal and visual goal 
condition (33 instances, 25.2%). 
8.4.3.1 Mapping phrases in process categories 
The great majority of verbalizations of mapping processes was identified in the 
category hypothesis (83.1%). Fewer cases were revealed in positive evaluations 
(7.6%) and negative evaluations (3.1%). Actions did not contain any verbalizations 
of mapping processes (see Table 8.28). 
problem solving process category raw frequency percentage 
hypothesis 109 83.21 
action 0 0 
positive evaluation 10 7.63 
negative evaluation 4 3.05 
description of mental state 2 1.53 
comment on object features 1 0.76 
beginning 2 1.53 
end 2 1.53 
unrelated 1 0.76 
sum 131 100 
Table 8.28: Distribution of mapping phrases between process categories (mean raw frequency and 
percentage). 
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8.4.3.2 Kinds of mapping phrases and conditions 
Two kinds of mapping phrases were distinguished in self-assembly protocols, 
namely direct mapping of the kind “this is a wall” and representational mapping 
“this looks like a wall” (see section 8.3.3 for more detail). 
Participants in the underspecified goal condition used explicit mapping phrases 
most frequently (M = 3.1 cases, SD = 0.8). Participants in the verbal and visual goal 
condition assigned function explicitly least often (M = 1.8 cases, SD = 0.5) (see 
Table 8.38 in the appendix). 
The frequency of the two kinds of mapping based on mean percentage highlighted 
that direct mapping was more frequent in all conditions than representational 
mapping (see Figure 8.16). It was most frequent in the verbal goal condition (71.9%, 
SD = 9.9%), less frequent in the underspecified goal condition (62.4%, SD = 10.5%) 
and least frequent in the verbal and visual goal condition (53.9%, SD = 11.7%) (see 
Table 8.39 in the appendix). The analysis of the different verbs used in phrases of 
direct mapping highlighted that ‘sein’ (to be) was used in the majority of cases 
(91.5%). 
 
Figure 8.16: Distribution of mapping types between conditions (mean percentage with +/ - 2 standard 
errors). 
Representational mapping was used to a comparable number in the underspecified 
goal (14.1%, SD = 6.2) and the verbal goal condition (15.6%, SD = 7.2%) and less 
frequently in the verbal and visual goal condition (7.8%, SD = 6.1%) (see Table 8.39 
in the appendix). The verb analysis highlighted that ‘aussehen wie’ (look like) was 
the most frequently used relational term in representational mapping (59.1%). 
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Among the others were ‘benutzen’ (use) (13.6%) and ‘verwenden’ (use) (9.1%) 
which are synonymous in English. 
8.4.3.3 Mapping phrases in instructions 
23 instances of mapping were identified in 12 instruction texts. As described in the 
analysis section, a third kind of mapping was identified in instruction texts. This 
type was called reframing. The distribution of mapping types within instructions 
revealed a clear trend (see Figure 8.17). Instructors used direct mapping most 
frequently (36.5%, SD = 10.7) (see Table 8.29). The influence of experimental 
condition on the dependent variable mapping strategy was statistically significant, 
L?2 (6, N = 154) = 36.42, p = .00. 
Dependent variable mean raw frequency mean percentage 
direct mapping 0.63 (0.20) 36.46% (10.67) 
representational 
mapping 
0.44 (0.18) 26.04% (10.43) 
reframing 0.31 (0.12) 21.88% (9.09) 
ellipsis 0.06 (0.06) 3.13% (3.13) 
Table 8.29: Frequency of mapping types within instructions (mean raw frequency and percentage with 
standard deviation in brackets). 
 
Figure 8.17: Distribution of mapping types in instructions (mean raw frequency with + / - 2 standard 
errors). 
The strategy of reframing that was unique to instructions contributed most to this 
effect, z = 5.4, p < .001. Additionally, instructors also used instances of 
representational mapping (M = 0.4, SD = 0.2) significantly more frequently than 
participants in UOA (M = 0.4, SD = 0.8). Furthermore, the results revealed that 
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reframing (21.9%, SD = 9.1) was used almost as frequently as instances of 
representational mapping. These results reflected a greater variability of mapping 
types in instructions than in self-assembly.  
In phrases of direct mapping instructors used the verb ‘sein’ (to be) exclusively. In 
representational mapping, ‘bilden’ and ‘darstellen’ (both in the sense of ‘represent’) 
were used. 
After providing a broad overview on the distribution of mapping types within the 
self-assembly experiment and in instructions, two additional features of mapping 
processes were investigated, namely use of modal verbs and type of source entity. 
8.4.3.4 Distribution of modal verbs in mapping phrases between 
experiments 
In all mapping processes 29 modal verbs were used by 18 participants. The use of 
modal verbs in mapping processes was equally distributed between conditions 
with regard to raw frequency of use (see Table 8.30). Instructors did not use modal 
verbs in mapping processes at all. 
dependent 
variable 
condition raw frequency mean raw 
frequency 
mean 
percentage 
no modal verb underspecified 
goal 
23 2.59 (0.72) 59.85% (11.27) 
no modal verb verbal goal 5 2.06 (0.57) 62.08% (10.81) 
no modal verb verbal and 
visual goal 
9 1.24 (0.39) 41.10% (10.91) 
modal verb underspecified 
goal 
11 0.59 (0.23) 16.62% (7.96) 
modal verb verbal goal 8 0.50 (0.18) 25.42% (9.29) 
modal verb verbal and 
visual goal 
10 0.58 (0.23) 23.42% (8.97) 
Table 8.30: Results on the dependent variable modal verb in mapping processes in unaided object 
assembly (raw frequency, mean raw frequency and percentage with standard deviation in brackets). 
The analysis of modal verb type revealed that these were differently distributed 
between conditions. However, this difference did not reach statistical significance, 
L?2 (4, N = 29) = 8.51, p = .075. This result could be explained by the low frequency 
of modal verbs. As these tendencies were highlighted, these are reported.  
Three modal verbs were used in mapping processes, namely ‘können’ (can), 
‘müssen’ (must), and ‘sollen’ (have to). Participants in the underspecified goal 
condition used all three modal verbs. However, the modal verbs ‘können’ (41.7%, 
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SD = 16.0%) and ‘sollen’ (44.4%, SD = 18.6%) were more frequent than ‘müssen’ 
(13.9%, SD = 9.0%). Participants in the verbal goal condition showed a clear 
preference for ‘können’ (75.0%, SD = 7.1%), whereas participants in the verbal and 
visual goal condition used ‘müssen’ most frequently (55.6%, SD = 20.5%) (see Table 
8.31). 
dependent 
variable 
condition raw frequency  mean percentage & 
standard deviation 
müssen underspecified goal 2  13.89% (9.04) 
müssen verbal and visual goal 5  55.56% (20.49) 
können underspecified goal 5  41.67% (15.69) 
können verbal goal 6  75.00% (17.08) 
können verbal and visual goal 3  22.78% (18.09) 
sollen underspecified goal 4  44.44% (18.59) 
sollen verbal goal 2  25.00% (17.08) 
sollen verbal and visual goal 2  16.67% (16.67) 
Table 8.31: Results on the dependent variable modal verb type in mapping processes within the 
different conditions in UOA (raw frequency with mean percentage in brackets and standard deviation 
of percentage). 
8.4.3.5 Object reference and functional terminology in mapping 
phrases between experiments 
The second part of the analysis concerned the nature of the source entity. As 
outlined in the analysis section, these could either be deictic, i.e. referring to an 
object in the environment, or nominal. 
  
Figure 8.18: Nature of source entities in UOA (mean percentage with +/ 2 standard errors). 
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The clearest effect of condition was observed on the nature of the source entity. A 
chi-square test revealed a significant effect of communicative intention on the 
dependent variable nominal source (see Figure 8.18), L?2 (6, N = 154) = 57.7, p = .00. 
Instructors used nominal terms to refer to the source entity (M = 0.9, SD = 0.9) 
more frequently than participants in the self-assembly scenario (M = 0.1, SD = 0.2), 
z = 7.5, p < .001 (all results are reported in Table 8.40 in the appendix; see Table 
8.42 in the appendix for standardized residuals).  
Deictic expressions were most frequently used in all three self-assembly 
conditions, i.e. underspecified goal (69.1%, SD = 11.3), verbal goal (87.5%, SD = 8.54), 
and verbal and visual goal (63.7%, SD = 11.8) (see Table 8.41 in the appendix). 
Instructors used deictic references significantly less often than assemblers, z = 2.6, 
p < .01. The results further highlighted that participants in the verbal goal 
condition used deictic references only. 
The analysis of the functional term that was assigned to the object revealed that 
five functional terms or their synonyms were used most frequently, namely ‘Boden’ 
(floor), ‘Dach’ (roof), ‘Wand’ (wall), ‘Etage’ (story), and ‘Haus’ (house). This list 
represents two perspectives, i.e. whereas one perspective focuses on parts of the 
goal structure (floor, roof, and wall), the other perspective focuses on the whole 
structure (house and story).  
A chi-square test revealed a significant effect of amount of prior information on 
perspective expressed by the assigned functional term, L?2 (4, N = 131) = 13.122, 
p = .01. Participants in the underspecified goal condition tended to consider the 
whole structure of the goal object (M = 1.6, SD = 0.6) (see Table 8.32). All other 
participants in unaided assembly tended to refer to functional parts of the goal 
object (see Figure 8.19). 
The difference remained statistically significant if instructors were considered as 
well, L?2 (6, N = 154) = 13.4, p = .04. This finding highlights that instructors tended 
to refer to functional parts of the goal object rather than on the structure, too. 
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Figure 8.19: Distribution of functional terminology expressing structure-based and part-based 
perspectives (mean raw frequency with +/ - 2 standard errors). 
perspective expressed in 
functional term 
condition mean raw frequency 
whole goal structure underspecified goal 1.59 (0.57) 
whole goal structure verbal goal 0.69 (0.27) 
whole goal structure verbal and visual goal 0.41 (0.17) 
whole goal structure instruction 0.44 (0.13) 
parts of goal structure underspecified goal 1.35 (0.37) 
parts of goal structure verbal goal 1.75 (0.53) 
parts of goal structure verbal and visual goal 1.41 (0.39) 
parts of goal structure instruction 0.93 (0.21) 
Table 8.32: Frequency of categories of functional terminology (raw frequency with standard deviation 
in brackets). 
8.5 Discussion 
Research question 1 investigated which referential form participants chose when 
referring to objects that did not suggest a specific function right away. The 
difference between referential form was investigated in think aloud data and in 
instructions, i.e. in self-oriented speech vs. addressee-oriented speech. Against 
prior expectations, no influence of amount of prior information was observed in 
the analysis of individual references. 
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Although the results were presented individually in the previous section, those 
findings about referential form are combined in the discussion to provide a picture 
on the general form of nominal reference. This analysis revealed a significant effect 
of amount of prior information on definiteness of nominal phrase and pronominal 
use. Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition tended to use fewer 
indefinite noun phrases than participants in the other conditions. They rather used 
more pronominal forms than the other participants did. Participants in the 
underspecified goal condition used pronominal forms least frequently. 
Furthermore, participants in the verbal and visual goal condition had the lowest 
frequency of ‘no references’ in first to fourth reference. Table 8.33 summarizes the 
most frequent forms in the three assembly conditions and in instructions from 1st 
to 4th reference. 
condition reference 
number 
most frequent referential form example  
underspecified 
goal 
1 definite noun phrase with 
unspecific noun 
diese Sachen (those things) 
[60]257 
verbal goal 1 definite noun phrase with 
unspecific noun 
die Teile (those parts) [11] 
verbal and 
visual goal 
1 definite noun phrase with 
unspecific noun 
die ganzen Zwischenstücke 
(all of those parts) [24] 
Instruction 1 indefinite noun phrase with 
unspecific noun 
die Einzelteile (those single 
parts) [20] 
underspecified 
goal 
2 indefinite noun phrase with 
unspecific noun 
dieses Ding (this thing) 
verbal goal 2 pronoun  das (it) 
verbal and 
visual goal 
2 pronoun die (it) 
Instruction 2 indefinite noun phrase with 
unspecific noun 
dieses Brett (this board) 
underspecified 
goal 
3 pronoun die (it) 
verbal goal 3 definite or indefinite noun 
phrase with unspecific noun 
das (it) 
verbal and 
visual goal 
3 definite noun phrase with 
unspecific noun, pronoun 
die (it) 
Instruction 3 indefinite noun phrase with das (that) 
                                                        
257 All examples in the respective condition are taken from one protocol. The participant’s 
ID is provided in brackets. In the case of instructions it was not possible to select a 
prototypical case. The deviation from the prototypical example is indicated in italics. 
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unspecific noun 
underspecified 
goal 
4 definite noun phrase with 
unspecific noun 
das Ding (that thing) 
verbal goal 4 definite noun phrase with 
unspecific noun, pronoun 
das Ding (that thing) 
verbal and 
visual goal 
4 pronoun das (it) 
Instruction 4 definite or indefinite noun 
phrase with unspecific noun 
dieses Brett (this board) 
Table 8.33: Summary of the most frequent referential forms (nominal vs. pronominal, definiteness, 
nominal specificity) in the conditions in UOA and in instructions in 1st to 4th reference. 
Going back to the proposed German givenness hierarchy it can be observed that 
three cognitive statuses were encoded in referential form in the analyzed data. The 
least restricted cognitive status (type identifiable) is encoded in indefinite noun 
phrases. Definite noun phrases, in contrast, encode the cognitive status of uniquely 
identifiable, and pronouns signal that an object is in focus. These three cognitive 
statuses can be distinguished into two broader categories, namely familiar within 
the assembly context (pronouns and definite noun phrases) and generally 
identifiable but unfamiliar within the assembly context (indefinite noun phrases). 
Participants engaged in the assembly task referred to objects as familiar within the 
assembly context but not in focus in first reference. This suggests that the 
individual object parts were identified on the descriptive level258 but they were not 
familiar and in focus yet because otherwise they would have been referred to by 
pronouns.  
Instructors used indefinite noun phrases indicating that those objects can be 
identified by type but they were unfamiliar within the given task context. This is 
supported by von Stutterheim et al. (1993:111) who pointed out that indefinite noun 
phrases encode the status ‘to be identified’. Since instructors themselves were 
familiar with the goal object and the function of the individual parts, it can be 
assumed that they tailored their reference for an uninformed listener. This data 
revealed a notable influence of communicative intention on referential form. 
Participants speaking for themselves indicated a higher cognitive status of a 
referent than instructors. This finding suggests that the objects were more familiar 
to participants thinking aloud than the familiarity that was assumed by instructors 
for their listener. 
                                                        
258 This terminology refers back to the opposition between descriptive level and the domain 
specific level of representational metonymy (Rieser 1996). 
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In 2nd reference, the picture in self-assembly got more diverse, i.e. the influence of 
amount of prior information showed. Participants who did not have any goal 
specific prior information (underspecified goal condition) used referential forms 
encoding the least restrictive cognitive status (type identifiable) indicating that the 
objects were less recognizable within the assembly context than assumed in first 
reference. Objects were described on a basic level as objects that could be 
identified by type but were unfamiliar within the specific context. This was 
different for participants who were provided with specific goal information. Those 
self-assemblers used pronominal forms signaling that the referred object was in 
focus. Participants who were provided with verbal information also conceptualized 
objects within the goal domain in second reference. 20% of the participants used 
definite noun phrases with a domain specific noun. This was the most explicit 
indication for conceptualization within the goal domain. The occurrence of 
pronominal forms and definite domain specific nominal phrases at a comparable 
frequency supports the claim that pronouns signal not only the cognitive status of 
‘in focus’ but also conceptualization and familiarity within the specific assembly 
context. Instructors still assumed the initial unfamiliar cognitive status of objects 
for their listener.  
Those participants in the underspecified goal condition, who referred to an object 
for a third time (26.7%), signaled that the objects were known and conceptualized 
within the assembly context. This was also observed for participants in the verbal 
and visual goal condition. Participants in the verbal goal condition signaled 
familiarity as well as general type knowledge about the objects to a comparable 
degree. This suggests that those participants held a possible goal concept and thus 
identified objects within the assembly task. Other participants, in contrast, had 
difficulties in categorizing objects within the assembly context hence they referred 
to its type. However, this insecurity was resolved by fourth reference; here all 
references by participants engaged in the self-assembly task signaled familiarity 
within the assembly context. At this point in referential process time, instructors 
also assumed familiarity for some objects whereas other objects were still referred 
to by a less specific form. 
To conclude, the analysis of referential form revealed that amount of prior 
information as well as communicative intention influenced referential form. 
Participants who were provided with verbal and visual goal knowledge referred to 
objects with forms indicating familiarity within the assembly context over all four 
references. Change in cognitive status was observed in references by participants 
who were provided with unspecific goal knowledge or verbal goal information. This 
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finding confirms parts of the initial hypothesis about referential form. It suggests 
that participants who had much prior information used forms signaling familiarity 
more frequently and constantly than participants in the other two conditions. 
However, unexpectedly, they did not use more specific nominal forms. One 
possible explanation can be found in Ungerer and Schmid’s (2006) observation 
that  
“with regard to its cognitive function, the superordinate category HOUSE 
does not highlight a single or a few attributes of its ‘members’, as is typical 
of type-of superordinates (ROOM for LIVING ROOM, BEDROOM, 
KITCHEN etc.). Its strength is its assembling function, the notion that the 
category HOUSE is thought of as being composed of LIVING ROOM, 
BEDROOM etc.” (Ungerer & Schmid 2006:88) 
Following this argument it was not the attributes (e.g. wall, door, window) that 
came to mind first when looking at the presented picture. Given that the structure 
of the house needed to be assembled, the broader structures of rooms were not 
prominent in the beginning but the parts of a house needed to be conceptualized. 
Thus, the low number of specific nouns might mirror the encountered difficulties 
in conceptualizing the individual parts as attributes of the concept house. 
Communicative intention had the greatest influence on referential form in that 
objects were referred to by the least restricted form for a long time (first to third 
reference) before some of the objects were assumed to be familiar. This observed 
referential behavior by instructors did not confirm the initial hypothesis. Rather 
than introducing the objects in first and second reference explicitly concerning 
their function and assuming them as known thereafter, instructors used the least 
restricted form in the first three references. These findings contradict the 
expectations about nominal specificity. Recalling the findings presented by Meyer-
Fujara and Rieser (2005) that are contradicted by the presented findings, it 
supports the claim that the given object parts did not resemble conventional house 
parts. Thus, domain specific references would not facilitate identification of the 
referent. Assuming that instructors conceptualized the objects for themselves 
during assembly, this fallback on terms on the description level can be interpreted 
as an indicator for audience design.  
The findings on definiteness also contradicted the formulated assumptions that 
were based on data reported in Mangold-Allwinn et al. (1995:36), who reported 
that instructors used definite noun phrases in first mention. The differences might 
be attributed to differences in design. In their experiment, Mangold-Allwinn et al. 
(1995) showed an assembly video to the instructors and asked them to instruct a 
fictional listener afterwards. Regarding prior information the data presented in this 
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chapter contradicted Kiefer et al.’s (1993) findings. Kiefer et al. (1993) reported that 
instructors with action-oriented prior knowledge used more subordinate terms. 
This was interpreted to highlight higher levels of conceptualization of objects. In 
my analysis this level of conceptualization was expected to be reflected in a high 
frequency of definite noun phrases. As this expectation was not confirmed, the 
second factor, i.e. that of motivation, needs to be considered more closely.  
In the present study, instructors assembled the house themselves and they were 
introduced to the person who they were to instruct. Thus, two factors can be 
identified that might account for the observed differences. First, participants in my 
study were provided with action-oriented prior information and second the 
motivation was different. In the present study, instructors knew the person they 
were instructing and the assembly was done while listening, hence the finished 
product could be evaluated by the instructor. Interestingly, participants who 
instructed the specific addressee and who knew the goal object verbally, seem to 
have assumed a listener who did not have any context specific prior information 
(uninformed listener) whereas instructors who did not know anything about their 
addressee, as in Kiefer et al. (1993), seemed to assume some prior information and 
possibly even background knowledge. This observation stresses that assumptions 
about the addressee’s knowledge state need to be carefully considered and 
discussed in the interpretation of experimental findings collected in the referential 
communication paradigm and in comparisons between studies. 
Confirming the hypothesis that culturally constrained objects were more 
frequently conceptualized, it was observed that one object, namely the roof part, 
was conceptualized significantly more explicitly in first reference than the other 
objects. Participants in self-assembly as well as instructors referred to this part by 
domain specific nouns significantly more frequently than to all other objects. 
However, it was pointed out to me that the cultural bias might have been 
strengthened by the upright position in which the roof part was placed on the 
table. This influence was not accounted for in the presented study but more 
caution will be paid to this possible confounding factor in future experimental 
studies. Despite this potential bias, the observation that instructors referred to this 
specific object functionally in the introductory phase indicates that instructors 
made use of general cultural background knowledge in their references. Although 
the general observation held for participants in the underspecified goal condition, 
the results also indicated that those participants referred to the object functionally 
least frequently. This finding suggests that prior information has an effect on 
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function assignment even in cases in which cultural constraints strongly suggest a 
certain function.  
Research question 2 investigated referential change in general. This process of 
change was then studied in more detail by focusing on the differences between the 
two independent variables of amount of prior information and communicative 
intention. Furthermore, it was of great interest to shed light on the influence of 
prior information on the time of object conceptualization. In general, the results 
revealed that repeating was the most frequent process in the underspecified goal, 
verbal and visual goal condition, and in instructions in first reference. Since 
repeating does not signal any change in conceptual state, it can be hypothesized 
that those participants did not change their concepts. However, if the second most 
frequent processes were considered as well, the data revealed that changes to 
familiarity were expressed in the verbal and visual goal condition and in 
instructions. Participants in the verbal goal condition tended to reduce initial 
references and some participants assigned functional terms to objects at this stage 
of the referential process as well. Thus, participants who were provided with verbal 
goal information showed the greatest change in conceptual state in first reference. 
Their referential choice indicated change towards familiarity and towards a 
domain specific conceptualization. In all subsequent references, repeating was 
most frequent in both studies indicating no conceptual change. Only slight 
changes were observed by change of referential form (rephrasing) in instructions.  
The finding that repeating was more frequent than reducing carries an important 
implication because reducing signals a change in conceptual state whereas 
repeating signals maintenance of an expression and concept. Horton and Gerrig 
(2002) pointed out that consistency of expression is a principle of speech economy. 
This phenomenon can be interpreted from two perspectives, namely the speaker’s 
internal production perspective and the addressee’s perspective. Concerning the 
first perspective, Bock (1986:379) described that people used the same structure 
repeatedly in cases in which production of new structures would result in 
hesitations and pauses. Fukumura and van Gompel (2012) stated more explicitly 
that “repeating the recently mentioned word is usually easier than producing a 
word that has not been mentioned” (Fukumura & van Gompel 2012:1305). Horton 
and Gerrig (2002) observed a tendency for repetitions in instructions but they did 
not discuss the implications of this observation. Referring to data that was 
presented in Horton and Gerrig (2005a), Brennan and Clark (1996) proposed that 
instructors used the same structures to facilitate identification for the listener.  
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The presented data highlighted that if conceptual changes happened, it was early 
within the referential process, i.e. in first to second reference. Overall, great 
changes, as expressed in the category of reframing, were rarely identified. 
Nevertheless, the results revealed that participants who were provided with verbal 
goal information conceptualized almost half of all 13 objects (47.7%) from first to 
fourth reference and throughout the assembly process (assembly time). This 
number is a little higher than function assignment that was observed in 
instructions (45.1%). Instructors showed a tendency to reframe objects late in the 
instructions, i.e. in the fourth quarter of the instruction time. This observation 
supports the findings that instructors started marking objects as familiar only at a 
late stage in the referential process. Possibly this observation is an effect of 
participants’ general knowledge about the generic structure of an instruction, i.e. 
assume familiarity of an object only after it was properly introduced. Given the 
similarity of overall conceptualization, the notion of the uninformed listener that 
was proposed in the discussion on referential form needs to be reassessed. The 
observed similarity in overall conceptualization suggests that instructors assumed 
their listeners to have general domain knowledge regarding components of houses 
as well as general knowledge about building toy houses.  
Research question 3 investigated at which point participants conceptualized the 
objects within the goal domain, either for themselves or for an addressee. First, it 
needs to be noted that instructors and listener in the presented study were 
provided with two sources of information about the goal object: the experimental 
task instructions and the verbal instructions. In the experimental task instruction 
the experimenter introduced the goal object verbally but without highlighting it 
(for more detail see chapter 4). Furthermore, the instructor may provide the 
addressee with additional prior information. In order to assess how often the goal 
object was explicitly restated at the beginning of the instruction, introductory 
sentences of the instructions were analyzed at the content-level. Five out of 16 
instructors restated the instructions saying that they would assemble a house259 
with the listener. This finding suggests that instructors noticed which background 
information was provided to their listeners and that they tailored their references 
accordingly. Recalling the discussion on referential form in instructions and 
combining it with the presented discussion, converging evidence was found for the 
proposal that instructors kept track of the shared discourse history and tailored 
their references specifically for the introduced listener. 
                                                        
259 One instructor referred to a doll’s house when starting the instruction by saying „wir 
bauen heut zusammen ein Puppenhaus auf“ (we will assemble a dollhouse together today) 
[B17].  
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Participants who were provided with no specific goal information used references 
indicating conceptualization to a similar degree as participants who were provided 
with verbal and visual goal information (34.4% and 35.9% respectively). It can be 
assumed that participants who did not know anything about the goal object had 
difficulties in assigning function to the individual parts. Since they did not know 
anything about the nature of the goal object, they needed to create a mental image 
of possible objects first. This was expressed in the frequent use of domain 
unspecific description terms. This assumption is supported by the finding that 
there was little interpersonal variation with regard to instances of reframing in this 
condition. Interestingly, participants without information about the goal object 
assigned function by reframing most frequently in the second quarter of the 
assembly process. Participants who were provided with much prior information 
tended to reframe objects in the fourth quarter. This unexpected observation can 
be explained in two ways. First, those participants did not need to conceptualize 
the individual parts explicitly because they matched them with the provided 
external model mentally. This explanation is supported by the findings that 
participants in this condition used pronouns more frequently indicating that the 
objects were clearly represented in memory, as noted by Fukumura and van 
Gompel (2012:1306). The second explanation would assume that participants 
encountered difficulties in matching the provided objects to the remembered 
picture (external image) and thus drew on unspecific terms on the description 
level. This explanation can be supported by the observation that participants in 
this condition did not use domain specific nouns more frequently than other 
participants. Furthermore, they tended to explicitly assign function late in the 
assembly process (in the fourth quarter), which may indicate initial identification 
and classification problems. Based on the reviewed observations, it can be assumed 
that both explanations contribute to the findings.  
To conclude, the hypothesis on the time of conceptualization was not confirmed 
because participants in all three conditions tended to reframe initial references 
more frequently than subsequent references. Furthermore, it was observed that 
participants who were provided with an external model tended to conceptualize 
objects later in the assembly process than participants who were provided with 
verbal goal information only or none at all. With regard to instructors, the 
expectations were confirmed regarding reference process time. However, contrary 
to the expectations, findings on instruction time revealed that instances of 
reframing were most often observed late in the instruction text. This finding 
mirrors the findings on referential form which highlighted that instructors used 
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forms that signal familiarity only late in the referential process. Overall, the data 
seems to confirm that  
“internal representations are constructed, maintained and restructured 
along with changes that occur when assemblies are constructed from a 
variety of multi-functional construction objects.” (Wachsmuth & Jung 
1996:348) 
Beyond this general observation, the presented analyses shed light on the time 
course of conceptual changes and the influence of prior information on referential 
change behavior. Furthermore, the presented data also highlighted differences 
between self-oriented and addressee-oriented speech. The discussed differences 
between think aloud data and addressee tailored speech support the claim, for 
example made by Ericsson and Simon (1993), that think aloud data reflect 
unaltered thought processes in the sense that no conscious changes are made for 
an assumed addressee.  
Further specific features of language use in think aloud protocols have been 
identified with regard to the process of mapping the functional goal domain to the 
physically present object as investigated in research question 4. The majority of 
mapping instances was identified in protocols by participants who were provided 
with no prior information (underspecified goal condition). Participants who were 
told about the goal object and saw the picture (verbal and visual goal condition 
used explicit mapping least often.  
Overall direct mapping was most frequent in all conditions suggesting that 
assemblers were certain in their assignment. Taking the overall distribution of 
mapping phrases into account, the results highlighted that participants with fewer 
background knowledge expressed more certainty in their assignment. This finding 
suggests that knowing the goal object and holding specific mental representations 
constraints the options for matching physical parts and function. It can be 
assumed that these participants had concrete expectations as to the number and 
shape of objects that would be presented to them. This interpretation is supported 
by the analysis of modal verb type that revealed that participants who were shown 
the picture used ‘müssen’ (must) most frequently. The choice of must signals a 
high certainty in function assignment. Furthermore, it implies that the certainty 
was based on some external source, possibly the memory of the picture. However, 
if the provided objects did not match the participant’s expectations, function 
assignment might be difficult and therefore not done. Participants who were 
provided with unspecific goal information or a verbal clue seemed to be more 
flexible in their associations that were expressed in a higher number of mapping 
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phrases. It seems that those participants expressed lower certainty by using modal 
verbs in their mapping phrases rather than by choosing representational mapping 
that signals an even lower level of certainty. These findings suggest that the 
amount of prior information has an influence on certainty of mapping as expressed 
in the frequency of mapping phrases and modal verb choice. 
In addition to the amount of prior information, the data revealed a significant 
effect of communicative intention on mapping phrase structure as well. The 
comparison of think aloud protocols to spoken instructions revealed systematic 
differences in the reference term for the source entity, i.e. object domain, the 
strategies for mapping the domain specific function to the respective physical 
object, and the functional term that was assigned. The frequency analysis revealed 
that instructors used mapping phrases less frequently than assemblers did. There 
are two possible interpretations for this finding. First, it implies that instructors 
focus on the systematic procedure of the assembly rather than on the goal 
structure as a whole. Daniel and Tversky (2012) showed that instructors omit 
explicit information on object parts and sequential order when they were told to 
be brief but they did not omit information about the step-by-step action sequence. 
Thus, Daniel and Tversky (2012:318) concluded that “the critical information to 
include in instructions, then, is the sequence of actions on objects that users need 
to perform to correctly assemble the object”. These findings support the first 
interpretation. However, instructors might believe that functional terms would not 
facilitate object identification because the functional relation between the physical 
object and its position in the goal structure was not intuitive (von Stutterheim et 
al. 1993). Therefore, instructors might have concluded that functional terminology 
would rather result in additional cognitive load for their addressee. This 
interpretation seems reasonable given that the wooden objects did not suggest any 
prototypical usage unrelated to the specific context of this dollhouse assembly. 
These two interpretations are not exclusive but may both explain the observed 
behavior. 
A significant effect of communicative intention was also observed on referential 
form to the physical object. In self-assembly the physical object is often referred to 
by deictic expressions. As pointed out before, this referential choice signals the 
assembler’s engagement with the physical world and his speaker centered 
perspective. Instructors used nominal phrases to refer to the physical object most 
frequently. This finding may suggest that instructors did not rely on the visual 
support in function assignment but rather used the strategy of verbally identifying 
the physical object before assigning its function.  
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In instructions, function is either assigned by one of the two strategies identified in 
think aloud protocols (direct mapping and representational mapping) or by using a 
third strategy, namely reframing. In reframing the referential term was elaborated 
by a functional term without a verb phrase in between. In most cases, hesitation 
markers separated the two references. This additional strategy of assigning 
function was identified post-hoc during the analysis. After the strategy was 
identified an additional example of this structure was identified in the literature, 
e.g. “da ist dieses Baufix, diese Baufixschraube” (“there is this baufix”260, “this baufix 
screw”) (Rieser 1996:10). In this example, a more explicit reference replaced the 
initial one without any interaction between instructor and addressee. The 
structure is similar to those cases of reframing that were identified in the presented 
assembly data only without a marker of hesitation. This kind of mapping is the 
least explicit one and it does not allow for any conclusions about certainty of 
assignment. Whereas assemblers tended to express certainty in function 
assignment, instructors also expressed tentative assignment by representational 
mapping and they used reframing. The use of representational mapping and 
reframing was not markedly different. This finding was surprising because 
instructors could have expressed a high level of certainty in their assignment 
because they assembled the house, i.e. goal object, themselves prior to the 
instruction task; an activity that should result in expert knowledge about the 
assembly and the objects’ functions.  
The use of representational mapping supports the interpretation that the objects 
were not prototypical for their specific function. Instructors encode this 
information by stating that an object represents the specific function in this 
specific context of the assembly. Possibly this is a strategy to implicitly ask the 
addressee for acceptance. The strategy of reframing from unspecific terms to goal 
specific terms can also be interpreted as a strategy designed for the addressee. This 
conclusion is based on the observation that only instructors used reframing and 
comparable phenomena are described in the literature on interaction. In 
communicative settings, instructors are observed to rephrase references when 
their addressee signals difficulties by hesitations or questions for clarification (e.g. 
Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; Horton & Gerrig 2002). However, although there was 
no interaction in the experiment, instructors still spontaneously felt the need to 
conceptualize the objects with regard to its function within the assembled goal 
structure. This observation can be explained by assuming that instructors have 
expert knowledge regarding the different functions but they adopt the addressee’s 
                                                        
260 Baufix is a brand name. 
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perspective. Since the addressee does not know about the function, the object is 
identified first before offering expert information about the object’s function. This 
interpretation suggests that reframing is a communicative strategy that is specific 
to the goal of shared attention and object identification. 
Additionally, a clear effect of amount of prior information as well as 
communicative intention on type of functional terminology assigned to the 
physical object was observed. Participants who were provided with underspecified 
goal information tended to assign terms that refer to structural parts of the goal 
object (e.g. ‘room’, ‘story’) or the goal structure itself (‘house’). Instructors as well 
as participants who were provided with more explicit goal information, in contrast, 
tended to assign function of parts, such as ‘wall’, ‘roof’, and ‘floor’. This finding 
allows for two readings. First, it suggests that the complete structure of the goal 
object was more prominent in the participants’ minds who needed to construct the 
goal structure from scratch than in participants’ minds who already held a mental 
representation. Apparently, those participants needed to conceptualize each 
individual part in relation to the overall structure. Second, participants who did 
not have precise information about the goal referred to already assembled object 
structures because they did not know the nature of the overall structure before 
conceptualizing the assembled parts. This interpretation suggests that the 
perception of the assembled parts leads to an insight regarding the overall 
structure or to the confirmation of the assembler’s hypotheses on its nature. 
Participants who were provided with some information about the goal structure 
matched the functional parts that are commonly associated with a house to the 
objects at hand without the need to focus on the overall structure. 
8.6 Conclusion 
In sum, the detailed analysis of referential form to objects throughout the 
assembly highlighted the influence of prior information and communicative 
intention on referential choice. The findings highlight that participants who were 
provided with much prior information conceptualized objects as familiar earlier 
than participants who were not provided with an external model. This observation 
suggests that participants integrated the given objects into the remembered goal 
structure thereby conceptualizing them within the assembly context. Participants 
who were only told about the nature of the goal structure marked references as 
familiar within the given context later in the process. The finding that the one sole 
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object that was prototypical, namely the roof part, was referred to as roof very 
frequently in all conditions suggests that cultural knowledge is activated while 
solving the task. These findings indicate that most of the provided objects were not 
prototypical for any specific function in the assembly of a house, thus participants 
needed to conceptualize them throughout the assembly. This is supported by the 
observation that instructors chose referential terms that did not assume any 
specific familiarity with the object in the given assembly context. They referred to 
objects in descriptive terms over consecutive references before they assumed some 
of them as familiar. 
Taking a look beyond this chapter, the observations on referential form in think 
aloud protocols strengthen the findings reported in chapter 6 on problem solving 
processes. In this previous chapter, the content-based analysis highlighted that the 
specific experiment of object assembly investigated in this thesis presented 
participants with a difficult task that resulted in problem solving behavior. The 
analysis reported in this chapter contributed new insights on the difficulties of 
conceptualization of object parts within the specific domain of a ‘house’. At the 
methodological level, the analysis highlighted that the analysis of referential form 
and referential change throughout the task should not be restricted to the first one 
to two instances of mention because in cases in which conceptualization is 
difficult, the moment of context specific interpretation would not be captured. 
Moreover, the methodological approach illustrated how phenomena of referential 
change as observed in interactive settings can be adopted and extended to describe 
phenomena of change in think aloud protocols, i.e. self-directed speech. Therefore, 
this analysis provides methodological tools for future analyses, such as categories 
of referential change and types of explicitly verbalized function assignment along 
with their distinct linguistic representation. 
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8.7 Appendix 
 
Figure 8.20: Material categorization task. 
 
domain unspecific (generic) 
  
domain specific 
  
constraints and 
percpetual object 
features 
super-ordinate synonyms super-
ordinate 
synonyms subordinate  syno-
nyms 
Stück(e)     Stock(werk), 
Etage(n), 
Geschoss 
Erdgeschoss Einkerbung
en 
  
Brett(er) Platte Wand 
  
  
  
  
Häuserwände 
  
  
  
  
Vorderwand Eckpunkte   
Deckel   Querwand Schräge   
Ding(er)   Trennwände 
für Toiletten-
kabinen 
Schlitze Rillen 
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Doppelschiene
n 
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Innenwand Löcher   
Ecke(n)   Seitenwände Bolzen   
Teil(e) Part Zwischen-
wände 
Stöpsel   
Sachen   Rückwand Kerben   
Eckpfeiler   Trennwand Schrauben   
Gegenstand Gegenstän
de 
Raumteiler Stecker   
Kanten   Eckwand Stift   
Gerade   Außenwand Dübel   
Halbkugeln Gnubbel, 
Noppen, 
Nubbsies, 
Pinökel 
Basis 
  
  
  
Grund-
fläche(n), 
  
  
  
Decke, 
Fundament 
Stöpsel   
Holz Holzding Fußboden Playmobil   
Keil   Zwischendeck
e 
Maßstab   
Seiten    Boden Stabilität   
Stangen       Fenster Verbindung   
Streben       Tür     
Abstützungen       Küchenzeile Verstärkun
g 
  
Krempel Zeug     Innenein-
richtung 
Steckverbi
ndung 
  
Materialien       Treppe Vertiefung   
Sticker Zeichen, 
Schild, 
Aufkleber, 
Etikett 
Gebäude 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Haus Keil  
Punkte Kontakt-
punkte 
Puppenhaus; 
Spielzeughaus 
  
Rest   Treppenhaus   
Konstruktur Gerüst Mehrfamilien-
haus 
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Bild   Traumhaus; 
Villa 
  
Regal      Balken   
Zweiteilung      Pfeiler   
Winkel   Dach 
  
  
  
  
  
Dachschräge   
Ständer Säulen Dachziegel   
Träger Stützen (Dach)giebel   
Leiste   Raum Zimmer     
Zweier   Garten      
Bühne   Möbel       
Füße Füßchen      
Ganze         
Teilstrecke         
Rahmen        
Durchgang           
Bank           
Vogelgarten           
Anbauraum           
Miniraum           
Front           
Ebene           
Grundplatte           
Zwischen-
boden 
          
Table 8.34: Overview nouns and their categorization. 
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8.7.1 Feature: nominal and pronominal phrase 
 condition 
reference 
number 
nominal 
phrase 
pronominal 
phrase no reference numerals ellipsis 
A 1st 110 (49.8%) 50 (22.6%) 58 (26.2%) 3 (1,4%) 0 (0.0%) 
A 2nd 59 (26.7%) 43 (19.5%) 119 (53.8%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
A 3rd 26 (11.8%) 32 (14.5%) 162 (73.3%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.5%) 
A 4th 19 (8.6%) 13 (5.9%) 188 (85.1%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
A 5th 10 (4.5%) 11 (5.0%) 200 (90.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
A 6th 5 (2.2%) 8 (3.6%) 208 (94.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
A 7th 3 (1.3%) 4 (1.8%) 214 (96.8%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
A 8th 0 (0.0%) 3 (1.4%) 218 (98.6%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
B 1st 103 (52.8%) 48 (24.6%) 43 (22.1%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
B 2nd 43 (22.1%) 53 (27.2%) 99 (50.8%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
B 3rd 35 (17.9%) 22 (11.3%) 138 (70.8%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
B 4th 14 (7.2%) 12 (6.2%) 169 (86.7%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
B 5th 6 (3.1%) 6 (3.1%) 182 (93.3%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
B 6th 6 (3.1%) 3 (1.5%) 186 (95,4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
B 7th 6 (3.1%) 0 (0.0%) 189 (96,9%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
B 8th 1 (0.6%) 3 (1.5%) 191 (97.9%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 1st 96 (49.2%) 73 (37.4%) 25 (12.8%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 2nd 54 (27.7%) 74 (37.9%) 67 (34.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 3rd 38 (19.5%) 37 (19.0%) 120 (61.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 4th 11 (5.6%) 25 (12.8%) 159 (81.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 5th 6 (3.1%) 17 (8.7%) 172 (88.2%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 6th 5 (2.6%) 6 (3.1%) 184 (94.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 7th 1 (0.5%) 2 (3.0%) 192 (98.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
C 8th 1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 194 (99.5%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
Table 8.35: Results referential form, variable: nominal vs. pronominal form in UOA from first to fourth 
reference; raw frequency with percentage in brackets (A: underspecified goal condition, B: verbal goal 
condition, C: verbal and visual goal condition) 
8.7.2 Referential process 
con-
di-
tion 
refer-
ence  
no re-
ference 
no 
further 
re-
ference 
re-
ducing 
re-
framing 
re-
peating 
rephra-
sing 
reusing singel 
re-
ference 
A 2nd – 3rd 5 (2.3%) 42 
(19.0%) 
17 
(7.7%) 
9 (4.1%) 22 
(10.0%) 
7 (3.2%) 3 (1.4%) 116 
(52.5%) 
A 3rd – 4th 5 (2.3%) 66 4 (1.8%) 4 (1.8%) 13 11 (5.0%) 2 (0.9%) 116 
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(29.9%) (5.9%) (52.5%) 
A 4th – 5th 5 (2.3%) 76 
(34.4%) 
5 (2.3%) 6 (2.7%) 9 (4.1%) 1 (0.5%) 3 (1.4%) 116 
(52.5%) 
B 2nd – 3rd 0 (0.0%) 38 
(19.5%) 
10 (5.1%) 9 (4.6%) 22 
(11.3%) 
13 
(6.7%) 
4 (2.1%) 99 
(50.8%) 
B 3rd – 4th 0 (0.0%) 70 
(36.1%) 
4 (2.1%) 5 (2.6%) 10 
(5.2%) 
2 (1.0%) 4 (2.1%) 99 
(50.8%) 
B 4th – 5th 0 (0.0%) 83 
(42.6%) 
2 (1.0%) 4 (2.1%) 4 (2.1%) 2 (1.0%) 1 (0.5%) 99 
(50.8%) 
C 2nd – 3rd 2 (1.0%) 49 
(25.1%) 
10 (5.1%) 9 (4.6%) 35 
(17.9%) 
20 
(10.3%) 
4 (1.0%)  66 
(33.8) 
C 3rd – 4th 2 (1.0%) 88 
(45.1%) 
8 (4.1%) 2 (1.0%) 20 
(10.3%) 
7 (3.6%) 2 (1.0%) 66 
(33.8) 
C 4th – 5th 2 (1.0%) 102 
(52.3%) 
2 (1.0%) 1 (0.5%) 16 
(8.2%) 
5 (2.6%) 1 (0.5%) 66 
(33.8) 
Table 8.36: Distribution of categories of referential change within conditions in UOA in second to fifth 
reference; raw frequency with mean percentage in brackets. (A: underspecified goal; B: verbal goal; C: 
verbal and visual goal). 
experiment participant instances of 
reframing 
% reframing 
respective object 
A 10 1 1,0 
A 13 1 1,0 
A 15 1 1,0 
A 19 8 8,2 
A 23 1 1,0 
A 25 1 1,0 
A 32 13 13,3 
A 35 2 2,0 
A 42 1 1,0 
A 46 2 2,0 
A 50 1 1,0 
A 52 2 2,0 
A 60 2 2,0 
B 11 2 2,0 
B 12 2 2,0 
B 16 1 1,0 
B 17 4 4,1 
B 29 3 3,1 
B 31 4 4,1 
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B 33 1 1,0 
B 47 4 4,1 
B 53 2 2,0 
B 54 7 7,1 
B 62 5 5,1 
C 14 1 1,0 
C 18 1 1,0 
C 20 1 1,0 
C 24 6 6,1 
C 28 9 9,2 
C 40 1 1,0 
C 48 2 2,0 
C 49 3 3,1 
C 59 3 3,1 
Instruction 2 4 7,7 
Instruction 4 3 5,8 
Instruction 6 6 11,5 
Instruction 9 4 7,7 
Instruction 12 1 1,9 
Instruction 15 12 23,1 
Instruction 17 15 28,8 
Instruction 20 2 3,8 
Instruction 21 5 9,6 
Table 8.37: Overview of which participants used reframing and how often it was used in first to fourth 
reference in UOA (A: underspecified goal condition, B: verbal goal condition, C: verbal and visual goal 
condition, UOA: unaided object assembly) and in instructions; raw frequency and percentage of 
reframed objects. 
8.7.3 Mapping process 
dependent variable condition mean standard deviation 
mapping total underspecified goal 3.12 0.81 
mapping total verbal goal 2.50 0.54 
mapping total verbal and visual goal 1.82 0.46 
direct mapping underspecified goal 2.59 0.71 
direct mapping verbal goal 1.94 0.37 
direct mapping verbal and visual goal 1.65 0.47 
APPENDIX 379 
 
 
representational 
mapping 
underspecified goal 0.53 0.17 
representational 
mapping 
verbal goal 0.56 0.27 
representational 
mapping 
verbal and visual goal 0.12 0.08 
ellipsis underspecified goal 0.06 0.06 
ellipsis verbal goal 0.06 0.06 
ellipsis verbal and visual goal 0.06 0.06 
Table 8.38: Results of mapping types sorted by conditions in self-assembly (mean and standard 
deviation of raw frequency). 
dependent variable condition mean standard deviation 
direct mapping underspecified goal 62.40 10.49 
direct mapping verbal goal 71.88 9.94 
direct mapping verbal and visual goal 53.92 11.74 
representational 
mapping 
underspecified goal 14.07 6.24 
representational 
mapping 
verbal goal 15.63 7.21 
representational 
mapping 
verbal and visual goal 7.84 6.08 
Table 8.39: Results of mapping types sorted by conditions in self-assembly (mean and standard 
deviation of percentage). 
dependent 
variable 
condition mean standard 
deviation 
deictic source underspecified goal 3.00 0.82 
deictic source verbal goal 2.50 0.54 
deictic source verbal and visual goal 1.76 0.43 
deictic source experiment self-assembly 2.42 2.54 
deictic source instruction 0.50 0.63 
nominal source underspecified goal 0.12 0.08 
nominal source verbal and visual goal 0.59 0.06 
nominal source experiment self-assembly 0.06 0.24 
nominal source instruction 0.94 0.85 
Table 8.40: Results of nature of source entity in both experiments (mean and standard deviation of 
percentage). 
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dependent 
variable 
condition mean standard deviation 
deictic source underspecified goal 69.12% 11.25 
deictic source verbal goal 87.50% 8.54 
deictic source verbal and visual goal 63.73% 11.81 
deictic source instruction 34.38% 11.02 
nominal source underspecified goal 7.35% 5.97 
nominal source verbal and visual goal 0.98% 0.98 
nominal source instruction 53.12% 11.71 
Table 8.41: Results of nature of source entity in both experiments (mean and standard deviation of 
percentage). 
Condition/Category 
source entity 
deictic source nominal source ellipsis 
underspecified goal 0.8 -1.7 -0.8 
verbal goal 0.6 -2.3 1.0 
verbal and visual 
goal 
0.4 -1.5 0.6 
instruction -2.6 7.5 -0.9 
Table 8.42: Standardized residuals for condition × category source entity. 
 
 9 Features of analysis: 
Constraints 
9.1 Introduction 
Traditional accounts of problem solving describe problem solving as a search 
through a problem space that is defined by the initial state, the goal state, and 
numerous intermediate states that are created by the application of operators 
(Newell & Simon 1972). Newly created states are evaluated with regard to their 
resemblance to the goal state. This evaluation process either results in the decision 
to proceed if the goal state is not reached or in ending the process if the goal state 
is reached.261 Since the search is based on entities in the search space, the 
representation of this search space is crucial. As Kirsh (1996:448) concludes  
“with a good representation, a problem may be easy to solve, requiring little 
search, but with a bad representation, the problem may be almost 
                                                        
261 See more on Newell and Simon’s (1972) theory on human problem solving in chapter 2. 
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impossible to solve in that form and may require inordinate amounts of 
search, calculation, and recall of states.”  
This is especially the case if information about the individual states is missing 
resulting in an incomplete search space. 
Traditionally, psychologists tend to study special cases of problem solving such as 
playing chess (e.g. Newell & Simon 1972) or dynamic decision tasks such as 
running an imaginary tailorshop (e.g. Roth 1985). In these well-defined tasks262 
complex cognition can be investigated in planning processes and actions. Knauff 
and Wolf (2010) define complex cognition as involving thinking, reasoning, 
problem solving, and decision making under complex conditions. Complex 
conditions are characterized by numerous dependent and independent variables, 
such as norms, time, participants, and objects. Everyday activities also involve 
complex cognition but they represent ill-defined problems in most cases (Holland 
et al. 1996:11). Holland et al. (1996:12) specify that solving ill-defined problems 
“depends on the parallel activity of multiple pieces of knowledge that both 
compete with and complement each other in revising the problem representation”.  
There are a number of differences between problem solving tasks that are 
traditionally studied and every day problems. First, in contrast to traditionally 
studied problem solving tasks, daily problem solving does not involve much 
planning (Norman 2002) because mental simulation and planning pose high 
cognitive load on the problem solver. Thus, in order to perform the numerous 
daily tasks efficiently in a reasonable amount of time, memory load needs to be 
reduced to a minimum. The theory of minimizing cognitive load is supported by 
experimental research reported in Kirsh (1995; 2010) and Norman (2002). These 
studies highlight that people combine internal knowledge, external information, 
and constraints to come up with fast solutions for everyday tasks (Norman 
2002:55) as well as newly encountered problems. Second, since everyday problems 
are ill-defined in nature, the problem solver is confronted with incomplete 
knowledge and uncertainty about constraints. Third, everyday problems involve a 
high level of activity. 
This chapter provides a brief summary of problem solving in terms of embodied 
cognition. It will focus on one source of information that is deployed in problem 
solving by interacting with the environment, namely the use of object properties, 
                                                        
262 In well-defined problems the initial as well as the goal state are known to the problem 
solver. Additionally, potential operators are known and need to be arranged in a meaning-
ful way to solve the problem successfully. Ill-defined problems are characterized by missing 
information on initial state, goal state, operators, and/or constraints (e.g. Holland et al. 
1996:11). 
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more specifically constraints. No definition of constraints has been proposed in the 
literature so far. However, based on the literature review, the following working 
definition is defined for this thesis. Constraints are devices that help to reduce the 
number of possibilities regarding the actions that can be performed in a specific 
context. As the field of embodied cognition is very young, not much empirical 
research has been reported so far. A general overview concerning the nature, 
functions, and use of constraints as reported in the literature will serve as a 
starting point for this explorative analysis. Based on previous findings and open 
questions, research questions and expectations will be formulated. After a 
description of the annotation procedure the results will be presented. The results 
of the explorative approach will be discussed in the light of the posed research 
questions in the final sub-section. 
9.2 State of the art 
Researchers surveyed people’s problem solving behavior in their naturalistic 
environments and they found that people apply a variety of strategies for 
extracting useful information. One of those strategies is searching for affordances 
and constraints inherent in objects (Norman 2002). A second strategy is the use of 
cognitive artefacts, i.e. “physical objects made by humans for the purpose of aiding, 
enhancing, or improving cognition” (Hutchins 1999:126)263. Those artefacts may 
either be structural, i.e. remembering kinds of glasses to remember a list of drinks 
(Hutchins 1999), or physical, such as a knot in a handkerchief.  
Another strategy that is connected to the concept of cognitive artifacts and that 
has been frequently observed is the arrangement and rearrangement of the 
external world in order to foster remembrance or gain new insights (Kirsh 1995; 
Kirsh 1996). The controlled manipulation of resources in the environment reduces 
demands on working memory, visual spatial memory, and visual search (Kirsh 
1996:442). Hutchins (2005) refers to one of Kirsh’s examples in which he describes 
that people arrange objects in a line during disassembly and when reassembling 
the object they assemble the objects as laid out in the line but in reverse order. 
This example illustrates a strategy in which an external structure is created, i.e. a 
                                                        
263  At the end of the encyclopedia entry Hutchin’s (1999:127) broadens this narrow 
definition by stating that “the cognitive artifact concept points not so much to a category of 
objects, as to a category of processes that produce cognitive effects by bringing functional 
skills into coordination with various kinds of structure.” But in order to grasp the general 
concept of cognitive artifacts, the narrow definition as quoted above is equally well suited. 
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line, in order to remember the sequential order of assembly of specific objects, i.e. 
a sequence of actions and objects needed. Hutchins (2005) argues that this 
creation and use of cognitive artefacts represents cases of conceptual blending 
resulting in material anchors.264 Whereas conceptual blending involves much 
cultural knowledge, such as lines representing temporal sequences, the basic 
strategy of rearrangement can already be used effectively by an 18 month-old child. 
Kirsh (1996) reports the example of a little girl who solves her puzzle by 
remembering the spatial locations of the individual objects pictured on the pieces 
(e.g. the cat in the upper right). In order to test her problem solving behavior, 
Kirsh (1996) rotated the puzzle by 180 degrees and observed her behavior again. 
After two unsuccessful tries and one seemingly accidental correct placement the 
little girl rotated the entire board by 180 degrees and started reusing her initial 
placement strategy. According to Kirsh (1996), this example illustrates that taking 
actions to reduce mental effort can be an effective problem solving method.  
Observations such as the little girl rotating her board support the claim proposed 
by researchers in the field of situated and embodied cognition. They state that 
human cognitive abilities such as thinking, remembering, and understanding a 
language are not based on the manipulation of abstract symbols in the mind but 
rest on an interactive process between humans and the environment (e.g. Zhang & 
Norman 1994; Hutchins 1995; Pecher & Zwaan 2005; Kirsh 2009; Vallée-
Tourangeau & Wrightman 2010). Kirsh (2009) points out that although the use of 
externalized representations is acknowledged and theoretically discussed by 
observing “that the environment provides organization for cognitive activity, that 
the world enables and supports such activities” (Kirsh 2009:303) there is a need to 
explain the mechanisms underlying the interaction between internal and external 
processes. In this claim Kirsh summarizes the core objective of situated cognition. 
The fact that it has been formulated by Colleen Seifert (1999) in a review on 
situated cognition ten years before illustrates that there is still much work to do in 
order to understand human cognition as being shaped by an interactive process 
between the individual and the environment. One basic assumption postulated in 
embodied cognition and supported in experimental research is that “perception 
and action are considered central to higher cognition” (Pecher & Zwaan 2005:2); 
not solely being input and output devices. Steffensen (forthcoming) takes this 
assumption as the starting point for his concept of interactivity which he defines as 
                                                        
264 Material anchors are created “if conceptual elements are mapped onto a material 
pattern in such a way that the perceived relationships among the material elements are 
taken as proxies (consciously or subconsciously) for relationships among conceptual 
elements“ (Hutchins 2005:156). 
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“sense-saturated coordination that contributes to human action” (Steffensen 
2013:195). In this line of thought perception is proposed to take place while acting 
and action is performed while perceiving, thus constituting “embodied and 
emotional action-perception cycles” (Steffensen 2013:199).  
Researchers in the embodied cognition community argue that the interaction 
between the environment and the individual cannot be adequately observed in 
data collected in laboratory studies because the environment is organized by the 
experimenter. In this controlled setting participants are not likely to rearrange the 
environment or ask for additional material such as pen and paper if it is not 
provided. But the attempt to collect data in natural settings poses a number of 
challenges. First, the data collection is time consuming, e.g. as described in 
Hutchins (1995). Second, challenges are presented by the analysis of the data. 
These challenges arise from the nature of everyday problems that are structurally 
different from experimental tasks. They are not well-structured since “human life 
unfolds in an indefinite problem space” (Steffensen 2013:196). Therefore identifying 
the interesting and important aspects in the data needs expertise and time. 
Steffensen (2013) and Kirsh (2008) present different methods to tackle the 
problem. Whereas Kirsh (2008) focuses on mathematical measures to assess cost 
and benefit, Steffensen (2013) presents a method that describes action and 
interaction on a very detailed and fine-grained level. Steffensen (2013) illustrates 
how the method of Cognitive Event Analysis can be used to analyze data collected 
“in the wild” 265  to gain “a more realistic view on human problem-solving” 
(Steffensen 2013:218). 
Cognitive Event Analysis is designed for analyzing video and audio recordings 
featuring one or more people working out a problem in their natural environment, 
e.g. in an office. In a very fine grained analysis it combines the analysis of body 
movements (such as gaze, body posture and orientation, motor movements), 
language (content, intonation, and timing), and interaction (eye contact, verbal). 
Steffensen (2013) argues that this work-intensive data analysis is necessary because 
only by looking at the different modalities of interaction between people and their 
environment it seems possible to reveal the mechanisms of real-world problem-
solving.  
                                                        
265 Hutchins (1995:xiii) stresses that these studies need to focus on “human cognition in its 
natural habitat – that is, to naturally occurring culturally constituted human activity”. 
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The great amount of modalities that are analyzed results from the assumption that 
a Distributed Cognitive System266 (hereafter DCS) is composed of at least five 
components, namely persons, technologies267 , artifacts268 , procedures 269 , and 
narratives270 (Steffensen 2013:201). Steffensen (2013) states that the DCS makes use 
of artefacts “because of their material affordances (…), or because human beings 
interpret them as giving off information” (Steffensen 2013:202). As described above, 
it is the latter feature that drives the use of constraints. Therefore, constraints can 
be considered to be one member of the category ‘artefacts’.  
In a recent study, Steffensen (2013) applied this method on a video-taped 
interaction between two office mates. His analysis highlighted that problem-
solving in an ill-defined problem scenario did not proceed in an analytical or logic-
based linear structure as assumed in traditional problem solving theories, such as 
Newell and Simon’s (1972). The observed problem solving process was rather a 
creative, near-chaotic solution-probing process. In this process both participants 
generated hypotheses on possible solutions and those were probed “until they, 
post festum, observed that one of the probes fits the problem space” (Steffensen 
2013:31).  
Encouraged by these findings a number of researchers (e.g. Hutchins 1995; Clark 
2008; Kirsh 2009) conclude that ‘realistic problem solving’ can only be studied in 
more naturalistic studies, studies ‘in the wild’ at best. Hutchins (1995: xiv) argues 
that only in the everyday world it is possible to observe how human cognition 
adapts to its natural surroundings. The experiment that is investigated in this 
thesis does not meet the latter criterion because it has been run in an experimental 
setting. However, in the presented study, participants are recorded assembling a 
two-story dollhouse in three scenarios that are equally likely to occur in real life. 
The assembly task exhibits the following characteristics of everyday problems ((a) 
and (b)) and interactive problem solving ((c) and (d)):  
 
                                                        
266 Steffensen (2013:199) defines a Distributed Cognitive System as “a self-organising entity 
that arises as human beings co-engage through interactivity, and connect up brains, bodies 
and aspects of the environment”. 
267 This thought is in line with Kirsh (2010) who suggests that using technology on external 
representations helps to foster new insights and reduces cognitive load. 
268 The notion of cognitive artifacts has been proposed by Hutchins (1999) first. 
269  The notion that procedures are an important way of interaction between the 
environment and the mind has also been stated by Kirsh (1995). 
270 Narratives may help to constrain possible behavior by providing “folk-theoretical 
schemes for understanding causality, ethics, emotions etc.” (Steffensen 2013:203). 
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(a) the task is action oriented,  
(b) it encourages few planning processes because objects can be 
rearranged,  
(c) the objects can be used as a model, and  
(d) thinking with things is encouraged because no constraints 
regarding the arrangement and possibility to disassemble parts are 
posed by the task instructions.  
The opportunity to manipulate physical objects externally changes mental 
processes because some object features are recognized by interacting with them 
only. Knowing about the characteristics of transformation of objects is important 
for imagining specific object arrangements or activities that represent intermediate 
states on the way towards the final goal state (Klix 1976:27). 
9.2.1 Functions and use of constraints 
Three basic strategies that are used by people to solve problems in interaction with 
the environment have been presented in the previous sub-section, namely exter-
nalization of thoughts, rearrangement of the environment, and the active search 
for affordances and constraints inherent in objects (Norman 2002). Kirsh (1995:43) 
explains that recognition and meaningfulness of affordances 271  depends on 
individuals, their experiences, and their knowledge. Contrary to Kirsh’s (1995) 
reasoning, Norman (2002:82) observed that participants with different prior 
knowledge, i.e. experts and novices, used the same methods and strategies when 
solving everyday tasks. Participants were observed to make use of different 
constraints in experimental settings. These constraints were provided by the in-
dividual object parts, the situation, and culturally learned assumptions about 
objects. Norman (2002) argued that affordances help to reduce cognitive load in 
everyday activities. 
Norman’s (2002)272 assumption about the facilitating effects of constraints by 
extending the mind towards the outside world is in the line of thought of 
researchers in distributed and embodied cognition (e.g. Agre & Chapman 1987; 
Kirsh 1995; Clark 2008). Kirsh (2009), more specifically, discussed the function of 
hints in the context of problem solving. He defined hints as “verbal and nonverbal 
                                                        
271 Kirsh (1995:43) defines affordances to be “a dispositional property of a situation defined 
by a set of objects organized in a set arrangement, relativized to the action repertoire of a 
given agent. Agents perceive an affordance, when they register that one of their possible 
actions is feasible in a situation”. 
272 Note that Donald A. Norman presented his arguments in 1988 already, the first year of 
the publication of “The design of everyday things”. Hence he was among the first 
researchers to formulate this theory. 
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cue[s] that act like a heuristic bias on search” (Kirsh 2009:291). In their function as 
heuristic bias, they are important in the process of candidate generation and 
evaluation. This proposal draws on a thought that Kirsh formulated in 1995 already 
by stating that “prima facie, choice is the product of search – visual search for the 
actions that are currently available, and mental search of the desirability of those 
available actions” (Kirsh 1995:43).  
Norman (2002), Kirsh (1995), and Steffensen (2013) investigated how people made 
use of external information in order to perform and act efficiently. Norman (2002) 
approached the topic by observing the process and results of the design of 
everyday things in which constraints are deliberately designed as clues for the user. 
Kirsh (1995; 1996; 2010) investigated how people actively used space to structure 
thought, cue the temporal order of actions, limit the possibilities of actions, and 
focus the mind on certain objects or actions. In a recent study, Steffensen (2013) 
observed that the physical manipulation of material artifacts supported the 
problem solving process by establishing an external focus of attention for two 
people who were engaged in a task (Steffensen 2013:19). This analysis, as outlined 
in the previous section, highlighted that this new focus of attention extended and 
restructured their problem space. 
To sum up, the literature review illustrates that external cues, such as constraints, 
help to reduce the amount of possibilities and thus generate a manageable amount 
of solutions by constraining necessary decisions. People have been observed to 
actively search for cognitive artifacts, such as constraints, because they have 
experienced that these artifacts provide important information, e.g. about spatial 
arrangements. 
9.2.2 Nature of constraints 
Focusing on the nature of constraints, Norman (2002) distinguished between 
physical, semantic, cultural, and logical constraints. These constraints were 
assumed to determine the possibility of performing certain actions. Physical 
constraints describe properties, which make certain actions impossible thereby 
reducing the number of possible actions to be performed. For example, a certain 
amount of holes allows for the exact same number of screws to be inserted and 
fastened thereby limiting their number and possible arrangement of objects. 
Norman (2002:84) points out that physical constraints are specifically valuable 
because no special training is required to use them efficiently. 
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Semantic constraints are bound to the situation, which may allow only specific 
actions to be performed. Norman’s example (2002:85) refers to his experiments in 
which he asked participants to assemble a lego motorcycle. In this specific scenario 
there is only one proper location and orientation for the policeman, i.e. he needs to 
sit on the seat facing front. This example illustrates that semantic constraints are 
based on world knowledge and knowledge about the situation thereby providing 
powerful and important clues about the task (Norman 2002:85). 
Cultural constraints are based on learned and accepted cultural conventions, such 
as handling screws. The rotation of screws for fastening and loosening them is 
conventionally bound, i.e. screw clockwise to fasten and counterclockwise to 
loosen. Furthermore, people conventionally tend to hide the bolts in the less 
visible parts of an object, such as bottom, side, or interior, whereas the screws are 
shown in the front or on top of a piece (Norman 2002:62). The concept of cultural 
constraints, as proposed by Norman in 1988, is supported by Hutchins’ (2011) 
notion of cultural practices. Cultural practices are defined as “emerging products 
of dynamic distributed networks of constraints” (Hutchins 2011:441). By these 
constraints they shape the way in which people perceive, i.e. see, hear, smell, and 
taste, the world “by highlighting what to attend to and what to see when 
attending” (Hutchins 2011:441). Constraints may either be mental and internal, 
physical as arising from the mechanics and physiology of the body or provided by 
the engagement with material artifacts, or mental and physical as arising in the 
interaction with other people (Hutchins 2011:441). Throughout his paper Hutchins 
(2011) stresses the great influence of cultural practices on people’s situated actions. 
Logical constraints result in straightforward decisions: “only one piece left, only 
one possible way to go” (Norman, 2002:86).  
Norman (2002) defined these classes of constraints based on observations in 
handling everyday devices, such as computers, VCR, or film projectors, and by 
observing participants assembling a lego motorcycle from 13 pieces. Throughout 
his book Norman (2002) illustrated that choices in operating devices and in 
assembly tasks were guided by these constraints that rule out specific actions and 
make others more likely. 
Considering the experimental set-up investigated in this thesis a fifth kind of 
constraint is proposed, namely task induced constraints. This category includes 
constraints that are imposed on the task by the instructions given to the 
participants. Possible candidates for this category can be identified by an analysis 
of the task instructions. If the instructions state that all objects need to be used, 
this presents the constraint that no object can be left. If the instructions state that 
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the task needs to be solved in ten minutes, this statement represents a time 
constraint. 
Based on the reported observations that people engaged in a problem solving task 
make extensive use of the environment, this part of the thesis investigates the use 
of object specific constraints in self-assembly. A fine-grained content based analys-
is of references to constraints in the elicited verbal reports will serve as a starting 
point for studying the nature, function, and use of constraints in unaided object 
assembly. Furthermore, these three features of constraints will also be examined in 
the instruction texts to investigate which constraints were evaluated to be im-
portant clues for others. After introducing the investigated research questions in 
the next section a description of the analysis procedure and the different categories 
that were used in the analysis are provided. Based on the reported findings, a 
discussion will highlight the answers that can be gained by this exploratory 
analysis. 
9.3 Research questions and expectations 
First, emerging research questions that can be investigated by analyzing the given 
data set will be formulated. Second, expectations that are raised by findings and 
theories reported in the literature review will be stated.  
The five research questions address two different fields of research; four research 
questions273 investigate questions concerning the nature and function of con-
straints in the specific experimental context (RQ 1 and 3-5) whereas one question is 
raised by the theory of embodied cognition (RQ 2). 
? Research question 1: Which constraints are mentioned? Can Norman’s 
(2002) classification be adapted to classify them? 
This initial question concerns the general nature of constraints that can be 
identified in the specific context of the dollhouse assembly. Looking at the 
individual object features representatives for each of Norman’s (2002) categories 
can be identified. Norman (2002:82;224) reports one experiment that can be 
compared to the one presented in this thesis in two respects. First, participants 
were also presented with a small amount of objects, i.e. 13 lego parts, that did not 
suggest any prototypical function. Second, they were not given any information 
                                                        
273 At some points within this sub-section the term research question is abbreviated by RQ 
for reading comfort. 
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about the final product, i.e. a motorcyle. Therefore, this experiment is comparable 
to the underspecified goal condition in the experimental design in this thesis. 
The following constraints are assumed to be noticed and mentioned by 
participants assembling the dollhouse. Based on Ericsson and Simon’s (1984 (1993)) 
theory of verbalization of thinking274, a distinction needs to be made between 
noticing an object and mentioning it in the verbal reports. Constraints might be 
noticed but this perception might not be conscious and thus it is not mentioned in 
the think aloud protocol. Furthermore, perception might be conscious and thus 
verbalized in concurrent verbalization but it might be forgotten at the end of the 
task and thus it is not reported in the retrospective report. To gain as much 
information about the perception of constraints as possible participants were 
asked guided questions about noticing and using specific constraints at the end of 
the experimental session (for more detail on the procedure see chapter 4). In the 
following paragraphs all theoretically possible constraints are introduced. 
The bevel that characterizes each object belonging to the second story (see Figure 
9.1 and see Figure 9.2) needs to be interpreted as a physical constraint because it is 
needed to securely position the roof part on top of the second story (see Figure 
9.3). It is assumed that the great majority of participants notices the bevels because 
they are very salient. Furthermore, it is assumed that their function as physical 
constraints is noticed. 
                                                        
274 For more information on their theory see chapter 3. 
  
Figure 9.1: Object that goes on the right hand 
side at the front of the board in the second 
story. 
  
Figure 9.2: Object that goes on the left hand 
side at the back of the board in the second 
story. 
 
Figure 9.3: The second story of the dollhouse. 
There are boreholes in the boards (see Figure 9.4) and at the bottom of the objects. 
Normally screws would be inserted into these boreholes to connect and fasten the 
objects. These boreholes can be interpreted as semantic constraints because they 
suggest the spatial arrangement of objects on the board (e.g. see Figure 9.9 on page 
396). They are not defined as physical constraints because the dollhouse can be 
successfully assembled without using them as a guide. It is expected that boreholes 
will be noticed by most participants but as they do not serve their normal function, 
i.e. holding screws, it is expected that they will be mentioned only rarely. 
 
Figure 9.4: One of the two boards that need to be used as floors. 
Two cultural constraints can be identified in the dollhouse assembly, namely the 
roof part and the label attached to it (see Figure 9.5). The roof clearly suggests a 
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house whereas the label ‘Selecta Spielzeug’ suggests that it is a children’s toy. If 
participants are very attentive, the label may provide a clue for a dollhouse. It is as-
sumed that the roof part will serve as a salient clue for building a house. The label 
is expected to be noticed and mentioned only seldom because it does not have any 
facilitating effect of the assembly. 
 
Figure 9.5: Roof part of the dollhouse. 
Additionally, the objects provide two kinds of logical constraints. The first one is 
the groove (see Figure 9.6) that is characteristic of the two objects functioning as 
middle parts on both stories (see Figure 9.7). If it is used, the two boards in the 
back can be inserted on both sides of this object part (see Figure 9.8). If this is 
done, the back row of the story is stable even without screws. The use of a groove 
can be assumed to be cultural knowledge because it is a technical device that is 
commonly used in constructions. Therefore, it is assumed to be frequently men-
tioned if it is noticed.  
The second logical constraint is the supporting system (see Figure 9.10) that can be 
found on top of each object that belongs to the first story (see Figure 9.9). If the 
objects are placed with the supporting system facing up, as shown in Figure 9.9, it 
helps to stabilize the second board on top of them. Both of these constraints help 
to stabilize the dollhouse structure but they are not necessary to assemble a 
sensible structure or a house. However, as these are very salient features, it is 
expected that participants will frequently refer to the supporting system. 
 
Figure 9.6: Object that is placed in middle 
position between the two larger objects in the 
second story. 
 
Figure 9.7: Arrangement of the back row of 
the second story. 
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Figure 9.8: Close-up of the left hand side of the 
arrangement of the back row of the second 
story illustrating the function of the groove. 
 
Figure 9.9: First story of the dollhouse looked 
at from a bird’s-eye view. 
 
Figure 9.10: Close-up of the supporting system 
that is found on each object belonging to the 
first story. 
Two additional constraints can be inferred from the instruction in the specific 
scenario, i.e. task induced constraints. First, the instruction explicitly states that no 
screws can be used, thus participants should not search for connecting devices. 
Furthermore, this implies that stable connections need to be made by different 
means. Second, in one condition (verbal and visual goal condition) a picture is 
shown to participants to visualize what the goal object looks like275. Matching the 
objects to the remembered picture limits the possibilities concerning their 
function and spatial arrangement. Therefore, it is expected that participants will 
mention the picture or their memory of the pictured dollhouse throughout the 
assembly using it as a guide. 
? Research question 2: In which part within the assembly process do parti-
cipants mention constraints? 
Two temporal dimensions need to be distinguished to formulate expectations 
regarding this question, i.e. the overall assembly process and the problem solving 
process as described by its process categories, such as hypothesis and action (see 
chapter 6). If the overall assembly process is considered, constraints are likely to be 
mentioned at all times. This expectation is based on the proposed embodied and 
emotional action-perception cycle (Steffensen 2013) which states that action is 
                                                        
275 For more details on the design see chapter 4. 
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accompanied by perception and vice-versa. Therefore, object features may be 
noticed at any time during the assembly. Nevertheless it might be possible that the 
amount of prior information has an influence on noticing specific constraints, such 
as the bevel. Possibly, participants in the verbal and visual goal condition notice 
them earlier because they match new objects with an already existing external 
model. It can be assumed that the function of the bevels within the goal structure 
becomes clear to those participants at an earlier stage in the assembly process. 
Thus they mention them early on. Participants who do not have any prior 
information, in contrast, may notice object features early in the assembly phase 
because they may take more time for inspection in the beginning in order to get a 
good overview of the objects that are available. Moreover, they may be more 
attentive to object features because they are looking for information to guide the 
assembly.  
Considering the specific structure of problem solving processes, constraints are 
likely to be mentioned in ‘description of object features’ (for more detail on the 
identified problem solving processes see chapter 6. Assuming that constraints are 
identified as clues regarding function and location of objects, associations about 
them are likely to be verbalized in ‘hypotheses’. 
? Research question 3: How does the discovery of constraints influence the 
problem solving process? 
Generally, constraints are assumed to limit the number of possibilities (Kirsh 2009) 
and provide information about the assembly structure. The discovery and 
understanding of constraints as clues regarding function and position of objects is 
expected to foster their strategic use by some participants. For example, it might 
be possible that participants use the boreholes and match the objects according to 
the boreholes on their bottom part. However, it is equally plausible to assume that 
participants do not use constraints if they cannot be used with regard to their 
conventional function, such as ‘boreholes hold screws’. Additionally, participants 
may use physical object features for sorting objects. 
? Research question 4: Which constraints serve which function in the 
specific assembly context? 
Previous theoretical considerations and to date limited experimental research on 
the function of constraints do not allow for directed hypotheses. Nonetheless, it 
can be assumed that some constraints are specifically likely to foster a certain 
function. Assuming that constraints observed in the assembly scenario are used to 
limit the number of possibilities, the perception of grooves is likely to foster 
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function assignment. Drawing on the notion of cultural practices (Hutchins 2011) 
the function of grooves can be assumed to be well known to anyone who has as-
sembled furniture before. The assignment of a function to stabilize the arrange-
ment of objects may be fostered by noticing and conceptualizing bevels. 
Additionally, salient object features, such as the supporting system and the bevels, 
are likely to be used to distinguish between objects. 
? Research question 5: Which constraints are evaluated as specifically 
helpful and are used in instructing other people on the same assembly? 
Assuming that instructors use constraints for the same strategic reasons as 
assemblers, for example for sorting and guidance concerning spatial arrangements, 
the following constraints are expected to be mentioned. First, instructors are as-
sumed to use the boreholes as markers for indicating the spatial layout of the as-
sembly product. Second, instructors are expected to use the supporting system and 
the bevel as characteristic features for distinguishing between the given objects. 
9.4 Analysis 
This section introduces the procedure developed for analyzing the collected data 
in order to identify constraints, define them, and describe their use as well as their 
influence on participants’ behavior. Four different data sets were analyzed to 
answer the research questions posed above, namely think aloud protocols, 
retrospective reports, instructions, and guided questions in which participants 
were questioned about noticing and using specific constraints (for more detail see 
chapter 4). Table 9.1 provides a general overview on the research questions, 
necessary analysis, and the data sets that are investigated.  
research question necessary data analysis data set 
Which constraints are 
mentioned? Can Norman’s 
classification be adapted to 
classify them? 
identify, describe, define, 
and classify nature of 
constraints (task specific 
and general classification) 
think aloud data, 
retrospective reports 
In which part within the 
assembly process do 
participants mention 
constraints? 
analysis of process episodes 
containing discourse units in 
which constraints are 
mentioned and analysis of 
temporal sequence of 
constraints across the whole 
assembly phase 
think aloud 
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How does the discovery of 
constraints influence the 
problem solving process? 
identify, describe, define, 
and classify function of 
constraints 
think aloud, retrospective 
report, guided questions 
Which constraints serve 
which function in the 
specific assembly context? 
frequency analysis of 
categories describing the 
nature of constraints within 
categories describing the 
function of constraints 
think aloud data, 
retrospective reports, 
instruction texts 
Which constraints are 
evaluated as specifically 
helpful and are used in 
instructing other people on 
the same assembly? 
identify the constraints that 
are mentioned and their 
function in the text 
instruction texts 
Table 9.1: Summary of general procedure and the data sets that were investigated to answer the 
research questions posed above. 
Before the analysis is described in detail, it shall be discussed which information 
can be gained from the four data sets to answer the research questions. As outlined 
at various points throughout this thesis, think aloud protocols contain the 
participant’s verbalized thoughts during the assembly. Regarding constraints these 
protocols highlight which object features are noticed. If they are considered to be 
important and meaningful, they will be re-mentioned throughout the assembly 
process. Therefore, two mental states can be distinguished. Constraints are either 
verbalized as they are noticed and attended to or they are mentioned because they 
are used, i.e. they serve a specific function within the assembly process. The 
strategic use of constraints can be studied in participants’ retrospective reports 
because those may contain more meta-information as participants may start 
reflecting on their behavior in retrospect.  
In order to assess if participants noticed constraints that the author considers 
important, i.e. the groove, the boreholes, and the label ‘Selecta Spielzeug’, few 
guided questions were posed after the retrospective report. These answers may 
highlight that constraints have been noticed but were not mentioned in the think 
aloud protocol because the participant did not evaluate them to be important or 
facilitating in the specific assembly context.  
The recorded instructions allow to assess the importance and function that in-
structors assign to individual constraints in order to facilitate the assembly for 
their partner. As instructors assembled the dollhouse in an explorative assembly 
phase themselves, these functions may reflect the functions identified in think 
aloud protocols. If this were the case, the results would allow for more general 
conclusions about the nature and function of the identified constraints. 
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9.4.1 Qualitative Analysis: Content based 
9.4.1.1 Think aloud protocols and instructions 
The first step of the analysis was done in the general annotation process as 
described in chapter 8. In this initial annotation process the category constraints 
was annotated according to the assumed constraints introduced and defined 
above. Furthermore, as this annotation was based on content analysis other 
instances in which participants referred to object features functioning as 
constraints were identified and annotated as well. In a second step, all annotated 
instances of constraints identified in think aloud protocols and instructions were 
combined in one table specifying the participant’s ID, the condition, the 
corresponding discourse unit, and the discourse unit content itself (see Figure 9.11 
for an example). 
 
Figure 9.11: Screenshot of first step preparing for the analysis; 1st column participant ID, 2nd column 
condition (here verbal and visual goal condition), 3rd column ID discourse unit, and 4th column discourse 
unit, i.e. actual verbalization. 
Then the discourse unit’s content was coded concerning the nature of the specific 
constraint. In more general terms, classes of constraints were defined according to 
Norman’s (2002) classification and each constraint was coded in this respect as 
well. The first classification of constraints, as identified in the data, is referred to as 
task specific nature because these categories are specific to the dollhouse assembly 
task. The second classification that is based on Norman’s (2002) categories is 
referred to as general nature because these categories are not dependent on the 
investigated task. In a third step, the process category for the respective discourse 
unit was extracted from the annotation scheme for process categories (for more 
detail see chapter 6) and the number of overall process units in the protocol was 
recorded. In a fourth step, the discourse units were analyzed with regard to 
functions that constraints serve in the participant’s assembly. One participant 
stated „die hier ham solche Einkerbung“ (“those ones here have such grooves”) 
indicating that he/she noticed the grooves (see Figure 9.12). The individual 
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descriptions were later classified in order to define more general categories of 
function. The example above was classified as perception because the participant 
simply mentions the object feature. 
The analysis of occurrences on constraints within the problem solving process is 
based on the identified problem solving episode for the respective discourse unit. 
In order to investigate the occurrence of constraints within the overall assembly 
process, the number of discourse units is divided into quarters and the discourse 
unit is defined within the respective quarter. 
 
Figure 9.12: Screenshot of final annotation scheme for think aloud protocols; 1st to 4th column cf. 
previous figure, 5th column constraint as verbalized in discourse unit, 6th column general category of 
constraint, 7th column English category, 8th column type of constraint, 9th column process category of 
discourse unit, 10th column category function, and 11th column sum discourse units in think aloud 
protocol. 
The same annotation scheme was used for instructions. The categories that were 
defined for think aloud protocols could be adapted for the majority of annotations. 
If instructions contained new functions, additional categories were defined. The 
annotation scheme is identical except for the missing column specifying the 
process category because the problem solving dimension of instructions was not 
investigated (see Figure 9.13). 
 
Figure 9.13: Screenshot of the final annotation scheme for instructions; 1st to 8th column cf. previous 
figure, 9th column category function, and 10th column sum discourse units in instruction. 
9.4.1.2 Retrospective report 
All utterances that contain references to constraints in the retrospective reports 
were extracted and annotated. The extracted references were annotated with 
regard to the task specific nature of the constraint as well as to its function as 
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outlined above (see Figure 9.14 for an example). The previously identified categor-
ies were used and new categories were defined if necessary. 
 
Figure 9.14: Screenshot annotation of retrospective reports; 1st column participant ID, 2nd column 
condition (here verbal goal condition), 3rd column utterance in which constraint is mentioned, 4th 
column constraint as mentioned in the utterance, 5th column constraint task specific category German, 
6th column constraint task specific category English, 7th column category function constraint. 
9.4.1.3 Guided questions 
The answers to the guided questions were annotated as follows (see Figure 9.15 for 
an example). Each question contained two sub-questions. The first sub-question 
asked if the constraint was noticed. The second sub-question asked if the 
constraint was used as a guide in the assembly. The answers to the first sub-
question were coded as noticed or unnoticed. The answers to the second sub-
question were coded as ‘no’, ‘yes’, ‘partially’, ‘irritated’, or ‘uncertain’. Additionally, 
interesting comments about the respective constraint were collected in case that 
they might be relevant for a future analysis.  
 
Figure 9.15: Screenshot annotation scheme guided questions; 1st column participant ID, 2nd column 
condition, 3rd column answer to first part of question 1, 4th column answer to second part of question 1, 
4th column answer to first part of question 2, 5th column answer to second part of question 2, 5th 
column answer to question 3, 6th column interesting remarks about the groove, 7th column interesting 
remarks about the boreholes, 8th column interesting remarks about the label. 
Example (1) exemplifies the category ‘partially’, example (2) exemplifies the 
category ‘irritated’, and example (3) exemplifies the category ‘uncertain’. All three 
examples are answers to the first question, concerning the use of the groove. 
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(1) „teilweise ja aber teilweise nein weil also es diente auf jeden Fall als 
Orientierung dass da die Rillen drin sind und dass man eben diese also 
bei dieser Kante halt ähm die Möglichkeit hat das da tatsächlich 
draufzustecken“ (“partly yes but partly no because well it helped as a 
guide for sure that those grooves are there and that one has the 
possibility to fasten these edges in there”) [50] 
(2) „ähm joa zumindestens hatte mich hier n bisschen irriitiert weil das 
irgendwie ähm ich weiß nicht also also es hat mich bei der Anordnung 
glaub ich gestört“ (“uhm well at least I was a little irritated because 
somehow uhm I don’t know well well it interfered with the 
arrangement I think”) [19] 
(3) „ein wenig nicht wirklich weil dieses an der Seite also so wie ichs 
zusammengebaut hab bleibt ja ein Stecksystem frei an beiden Seiten 
und das hat mich dann doch n bisschen verunsichert“ (“a little but not 
really because at the sides well at least the way I assembled it leaves a 
connecting system unused at both sides and this unsettled me a bit”) 
[23] 
9.4.2 Quantitative Analysis 
The different categories that were identified in the qualitative analysis for 
describing the nature and function of constraints in the different data sets will be 
analyzed by descriptive as well as inferential statistics. First, raw and mean 
frequencies will be reported to observe the general distribution of the individual 
categories in each data set. If categories are adequate to describe findings across 
data sets, these will be combined to evaluate the distribution in a larger data 
sample. To highlight if specifically salient differences are statistically significant, 
inferential statistics such as the chi-square test are reported. 
9.5 Results 
As outlined in the previous section there are numerous different steps of 
identification, description, and categorization involved in answering the research 
questions. In order to present the data in a coherent and comprehensive way, this 
section is divided into a number of sub-sections. At the broadest level the results 
are distinguished into quantitative results and qualitative results. In section 9.4.1 
the identified categories for describing the nature and function of constraints are 
presented and defined. This presentation distinguishes between the different data 
sources. The categories describing the nature of constraints are reported for think 
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aloud protocols, retrospective reports, and instructions. The described functions of 
constraints are investigated in those three data sets as well.  
In the section on quantitative results (9.4.2) the distribution of these different 
categories within the different experimental conditions is reported. In addition to 
mere frequency accounts the results of inferential tests such as the chi-square test 
are reported. Three sub-parts are distinguished here, namely nature and function of 
constraints from occurrence of constraints, and answers to guided questions. In the 
section on occurrence of constraints their distribution in the individual problem 
solving processes and across the whole assembly will be reported.  
However, before the results are presented in the different sections a general 
overview on the number of protocols (think aloud and retrospective), instructions, 
and guided questions that are analyzed will be provided. 
9.5.1 Details on analyzed data sets 
50 think aloud protocols were analyzed. In ten of those protocols no constraints 
were mentioned; more precisely in five protocols in the underspecified goal 
condition, two protocols in the verbal goal condition, and 3 protocols in the verbal 
and visual goal condition. In the remaining 40 protocols 160 constraints were 
referred to. The participant who used most constraints referred to 18 constraints 
while thinking aloud. On average, participants assembling the house for them-
selves referred to constraints 3.2 times (SD = 3.7). Participants in the verbal goal 
condition (M = 3.6 times, SD = 4.4) did so frequently whereas participants in the 
underspecified goal condition referred to constraints less frequently (M = 2.6 times, 
SD = 3.1). Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition (M = 3.4 times, 
SD = 3.7) were closer to those participants who were provided with some 
information about the nature of the goal object (see Figure 9.16). In all three 
conditions one outlier was observed. The one in the verbal goal condition deviated 
markedly from the mean, i.e. with 18 references to constraints. 
RESULTS 403 
 
 
 
Figure 9.16: Plot sum of constraints mentioned in think aloud protocols; distinguished by condition. 
Corresponding to the 50 think aloud protocols, the 50 retrospective reports of 
those participants were analyzed. Eleven participants did not mention any 
constraints in their retrospective report; four protocols in the underspecified goal 
condition, six protocols in the verbal goal condition, and one protocol in the verbal 
and visual goal condition. One participant did not refer to constraints in his think 
aloud protocol and did not mention any constraints in his retrospective report. All 
other participants mentioned constraints in at least one of the verbal reports. 
The remaining 39 participants mentioned 111 constraints in total. Constraints were 
referred to up to eight times with an average of 2.22 constraints in retrospective 
reports (SD = 2.1). Participants in the underspecified goal condition referred to 
constraints least often (M = 1.6, SD = 1.5) and participants in the verbal and visual 
goal condition most frequently (M = 3.2, SD = 2.4). This difference was statistically 
significant, t (27) = -2.41, p = .023. Participants in the verbal goal condition (M = 1.8, 
SD = 1.9) referred to constraints less often than participants with very specific 
information. this difference did not reach statistical significance, t (30.4) = -1.89, 
p = .069. Although a great range can be observed in all three conditions, no outlier 
was identified in either of them (see Figure 9.17). 
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Figure 9.17: Plot sum of constraints mentioned in retrospective reports; distinguished by condition. 
16 instructions were analyzed. Those instructions contained 136 references to 
constraints. All instructors referred to constraints at least once and the instructor 
who used constraints most frequently referred to constraints 20 times in his 
instruction. Instructors referred to constraints 8.5 times on average (SD = 5.7). 
Although there is a great range no outliers was identified (see Figure 9.18). 
 
Figure 9.18: Plot sum constraints mentioned in instructions. 
9.5.2 Qualitative analysis 
This section provides an overview of the categories that were identified to describe 
the nature of constraints and their reported function. As outlined when stating the 
research questions and in the section of analysis, the nature of constraints can be 
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defined with respect to two dimensions, namely with respect to the task specific 
dimension and the general dimension. In the presentation of the results the task 
specific nature will be presented first and then the general nature in terms of 
Norman’s (2002) classification will be considered. The reported nature and 
function of constraints were analyzed in the think aloud protocols first, thus those 
results are reported in the first sub-section. Then the adapted and novel categories 
for the instructions are presented. Finally, the constraints that were identified in 
retrospective reports will be outlined. 
9.5.2.1 Nature of constraints: task specific and general 
9.5.2.1.1 Think aloud protocols 
The analysis of the think aloud protocols revealed nine categories of constraints 
(see Table 9.2 for a summary). Participants used different words to refer to con-
straints, especially for those for which no conventional name exists, such as the 
supporting system. The identified categories contained the assumed constraints 
and two additional ones. The category connections contains references to objects 
that were either physically present (example (4)) or that participants searched for 
(examples (5) and (6)). 
(4) „scheint mir so ne Art Verbindungsteil zu sein“ (it seems to me that this 
is some kind of a connecting piece) [10] 276 
(5) „wo finde ich Verbindungsteile? “ (“where do I find connecting pieces”) 
[10] 
(6) „ist ähm doch irgendwo n Verbingsstück? “ (“is there uhm some con-
necting piece somewhere?”) [54] 
Participants referred to connectors either when noticing that no such connecting 
devices were provided (example (7)) or when searching for them (example (8)). 
(7) „es gibt wohl keine Stecker“ (“apparently there are no connectors”) [16] 
(8) „ich bräuchte irgendwelche Bolzen oder so“ (“I would need some bolts 
or so”) [24] 
Whereas references to connectors referred to connecting devices such as screws, 
connections were rather general in nature. Connections did not relate to a physical 
object but referred to the concept of a connection, i.e. something that connects to 
objects.  
                                                        
276 The numbers in square brackets denote the participant’s ID from whom the example 
was extracted. 
406 FEATURES OF ANALYSIS: CONSTRAINTS 
 
constraint (English 
category and 
German 
correspondent) 
references used in 
protocols277 
definition previously 
expected or 
unexpected 
label (Aufkleber) Aufkleber, Schild, Etikett, 
Zeichen 
Label ‘Selecta 
Spielzeug’ (see Figure 
9.19) 
Expected 
supporting system 
(Auflagerundungen) 
Noppen, Halbkugeln, 
Kontaktpunkte, Knubbel, 
Nubbsies, Kugel, Noppen, 
Pinökel 
Small half ball like 
wooden pieces used to 
rest the next board on 
them (see Figure 
9.10). 
Expected 
groove (Einkerbung) Einkerbungen, Schlitze, 
Rillen, Kerben, Vertiefung, 
Verbindung, Steckrille, 
Fugen 
In one rectangular 
piece with pillars on 
the sides there is a 
long narrow cut on 
each side of the pillar. 
These grooves are 
there to hold the two 
adjacent walls (see 
Figure 9.6 and Figure 
9.8). 
Expected 
picture (Foto) Bild, Farbfoto Picture shown to the 
participant in the 
verbal and visual goal 
condition. 
Expected 
borehole (Löcher) Löcher, Punkte Either the boreholes in 
the large boards or the 
boreholes on the 
bottom of the wooden 
pieces278. 
Expected 
bevel (Schräge) Schräge All parts belonging to 
the attic have bevels 
on the sides. 
Expected 
connector (Stecker) Bolzen, Stöpsel, 
Schrauben, Stecker, Stift, 
Dübel 
Something that 
connects the different 
parts to the base. 
Unexpected 
                                                        
277 Since these are specific German terms that do not have direct English correspondences 
no translations will be provided.  
278 The second option is hardly referred to hence both options are subsumed into one 
category. 
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connection 
(Verbindung) 
Verbindungsteil, 
Verbindungsecken, 
Steckverbindung, 
Stecksystem, 
Verbindungsstücke 
Connections that can 
be made. In this 
context it refers the 
function that grooves 
and connectors have 
within the assembled 
building. 
Unexpected 
no screwing (kein 
Schrauben) 
ohne Schrauben The statement that no 
screws are provided. 
Expected 
others Playmobil, Maßstab, 
Stabilität, Verstärkung, 
Gedanken 
Category that contains 
all references that 
cannot be classified in 
any of the other 
categories. 
 
Table 9.2: Constraints identified in think aloud protocols: examples and definitions. 
 
Figure 9.19: Roof part with the label ‘Selecta Spielzeug’ on it. 
9.5.2.1.2 Instructions 
Five constraints were identified in instructions. All of them could be classified 
according to the same categories as those identified in think aloud protocols. 
Sometimes the nouns that were used to refer to the individual constraints were a 
little different. There were no references to the label or missing connecting devices 
(see Table 9.3 for a summary). 
constraint (English 
category and German 
correspondent) 
references used in 
protocols 
definition 
supporting system 
(Auflagerundungen) 
Knubbel, Pinökel Small half ball like wooden pieces 
used to rest the next board on 
them. 
groove (Einkerbung) Einkerbungen, Fräsnaht, 
Fuge, Kerbe, Naht, Nut, 
Reingefräst, Rillen, Rinne, 
Schiene, Schlitz, Spalte 
In one rectangular piece with pillars 
on the sides there is a long narrow 
cut on each side of the pillar. These 
grooves are there to hold the two 
adjacent walls.  
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borehole (Löcher) Löcher, Punkte, 
Bohrlöcher, Lochbohrung 
Either the boreholes in the large 
boards or the boreholes on the 
bottom of the wooden pieces. 
bevel (Schräge) Schräge All parts belonging to the attic have 
bevels on the sides. 
connection 
(Verbindung) 
Steckverbindung Connections that can be made. In 
this context it refers the function 
that grooves and connectors have 
within the assembled building. 
others Ecken Category that contains all references 
that cannot be classified in any of 
the other categories. 
Table 9.3: Constraints identified in instructions: examples and definitions. 
9.5.2.1.3 Retrospective report 
Nine constraints were identified in retrospective reports. Seven categories could be 
adapted from the previous categorization in think aloud protocols and in-
structions. Additionally, participants noticed the similarity between objects as well 
as between object arrangements. They reported that they used this observation for 
sorting and assembling the same arrangement again. Therefore, this category was 
called analogy. Furthermore, participants reported that they noticed the roof part 
and that it suggested building a house or that it was recognized from the picture. 
An overview on the different categories with examples is provided in Table 9.4. 
constraint 
(English category 
and German 
correspondent) 
references used in protocols definition 
supporting 
system (Auflage-
rundungen) 
Halbkugeln, Kuhlen, Holzdinger, 
Kugeln, Pinöpel, Knubbel, 
Gnubbsies 
Small half ball like wooden pieces 
used to rest the next board on 
them. 
groove 
(Einkerbung) 
Einkerbungen, Ritzen, Rillen, 
Nuten, Schlitze 
In one rectangular piece with 
pillars on the sides there is a long 
narrow cut on each side of the 
pillar. These grooves are there to 
hold the two adjacent walls.  
borehole 
(Löcher) 
Löcher, Markierung Either the boreholes in the large 
boards or the boreholes on the 
bottom of the wooden pieces. 
bevel (Schräge) Schräge, abgeschrägte Teile, 
abgeschrägte Dinger, schräge 
Seiten, Teile ohne Ecken, schräge 
Platte, Schnittkante 
All parts belonging to the attic 
have bevels on the sides. 
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connection 
(Verbindung) 
Verbindungsstück, Stecksystem Connections that can be made. In 
this context it refers the function 
that grooves and connectors have 
within the assembled building. 
roof (Dach) Dach, rotes Teil The roof part is recognized as 
such and associated with a house 
that needs to be assembled. 
analogy 
(Gleichheit) 
ähnliche Teile, gleiches Schema, 
gleiche Teile, genauso wie unten, 
jedes Teil doppelt 
Similarity between objects and 
object arrangements is 
recognized and strategically used. 
others Puppenhaus, Querstreben, Größe, 
Ecken, Platten 
Category that contains all 
references that cannot be 
classified in any of the other 
categories. 
Table 9.4: Constraints identified in retrospective reports: examples and definitions; new categories are 
highlighted. 
9.5.2.2 Function of constraints 
Three data sets were investigated in order to study the function of constraints, i.e. 
think aloud protocols, instructions, and retrospective reports. The findings for 
each of them will be presented in separate sections. 
9.5.2.2.1 Think aloud protocols 
The verbalized use of constraints by participants who thought aloud while 
assembling the dollhouse was classified according to five categories. In some cases 
participants referred to a constraint, such as the picture, when drawing general 
conclusions, such as „auf dem Bild sah das gar nicht so schwer aus“ (“it did not 
look that difficult on the picture”) [14] (statement). Some participants verbalized 
seeing an object feature but did not conceptualize it as a constraint (perception). 
For some participants the recognition of a specific object feature led to insights 
about its function within the assembly structure (insights). Some participants 
made strategic use of constraints, e.g. by recognizing the boreholes and using them 
as guidance as to where objects should be placed (strategy). At the other end of the 
continuum some participants were left puzzled about the function of perceived 
features (puzzlement). Table 9.5 provides a definition for each function with 
examples; here the examples are translated into English but the German original is 
reported in Table 9.32 in the appendix. 
category definition examples 
insight understanding the function of a 
feature; 
assigning function to an object; 
“oh that is why it has such a 
groove here” [2] 
“it seems to me that this is some 
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no connectors are provided. kind of connecting piece” [10] 
“apparently there are no 
connectors” [10] 
strategy recognizing and making use of 
object features such as holes or 
grooves; 
using world knowledge to search for 
things that may be useful. 
“that they are on top of the 
holes” [14]; ”those have such 
grooves here so that I can slide in 
here” [23] 
“I would need some bolts or so” 
[24]; “where do I find connecting 
pieces?” [20] 
perception object features are perceived; 
objects and its assigned function are 
perceived. 
“and then this one here with such 
a groove” [8] 
“oh and here is a nice connecting 
system unused” [17] 
puzzlement asking oneself about the function of 
a perceived feature or placement of 
an object. 
“those knobs do they need to 
stand on the bottom?” [10]; “and 
what are these holes good for?” 
[44] 
statement stating a fact; 
evaluative statement about an 
object referring to the memorized 
picture; 
repetition of task instructions. 
“ it didn’t seem that difficult on 
the picture” [14] 
“but it looks similar to the 
picture” [27] 
“without screwing/ without 
screws” [31] 
Table 9.5: Classification of functions identified in think aloud protocols; examples are translated. 
9.5.2.2.2 Retrospective reports 
Eight different functions could be identified in the assemblers’ retrospective 
reports, ranging from perception of constraints on the one end of a continuum to 
strategic use of them on the other end. Some participants described that they 
observed specific object features (description) or simply mentioned noticing them 
(perception). Some used these features to distinguish between objects 
(distinguish). For some participant the function of constraints became evident 
during the assembly (function assignment) and in some cases constraints fostered 
insights about the assembly (insight). In contrast to those participants, some were 
left puzzled about the function of constraints (puzzlement). In some cases 
constraints were used strategically either by consciously disregarding them, using 
them for sorting objects, or using them for orientation as where to put objects 
(strategy). Table 9.6 provides an overview of the identified categories with some 
examples for illustration; again the German original wordings are reported in the 
appendix (see Table 9.36).  
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category definition examples 
description object features are 
described; 
general thoughts about 
observed features are 
reported. 
“I noticed these half ball like pieces 
(‘Halbkugeln’) here” [16] 
“then I thought about how it could work 
without screwing ah without screws because 
there are these holes in the boards” [31] 
perception features are reported 
to have been observed. 
“because I saw that there are ah holes for 
screws” [21] 
“but prior to that I saw the edges” [27] 
distinguish object features are 
used to distinguish 
between objects. 
“the I noticed that uhm some boards are 
beveled and those I thought uhm and the 
others straight“ [25] 
“afterwards I placed these uh pieces without 
bevels” [31] 
function 
assignment 
function is assigned to 
objects by means of 
constraints; 
function of constraints 
is explained. 
“this red roof for example reminded me of a 
roof” [10]; “well I noticed pretty fast that this 
has bevels here, that this needs to belong to 
the roof” [18] 
“it is difficult to arrange them differently if one 
wants to put these connecting pieces in 
between” [19]; “the I understood pretty fast 
that the beveled sides need to go on top in 
order for the roof to be fastened and that the 
whole thing has two-stories” [23] 
insight conclusions about 
objects are based on 
perceived constraints. 
“then I understood that the pieces that I 
assembled in the lower part probably need to 
be placed in the upper part because those are 
beveled because the shape would fit then” 
[47]; “but the walls were not beveled and the 
roof would not have fit on top therefore it was 
logical that the walls with the balls on the 
columns needed to go down” [59] 
puzzlement constraints cannot be 
conceptualized and 
leave the assembler 
puzzled. 
“I was irritated by those balls here because I 
thought they are so nicely curved they need to 
be placed somewhere on the top” [20]; “and 
along the way I asked myself why some are 
curved here and others are not” [22]; ”ah I was 
irritated that some have such balls on top and 
others don’t” [50] 
strategy strategic use of 
constraints by 
consciously 
disregarding them; 
using them for 
orientation e.g. in 
putting & arranging 
“then I put the picture out of my mind a little” 
[20] 
“then I was guided by those balls ah those balls 
on top and thought ok that is they cannot be 
placed on top thus I know what is up and what 
is down” [24]; “stuck them together in a way 
that the holes fit” [26]; “at some point the 
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objects; 
using them to sort 
objects. 
insight came something yes right I sorted it 
according to those holes and looked which fits 
where” [32] 
“right then we tried to separate between 
these beveled walls and ah balls” [16]; “and 
next I at these bevels I noticed them next and 
then I thought all right this needs to be 
connected to the roof and sorted uhm the 
pieces that need to belong to the second story 
and to the bottom one” [24] 
Table 9.6: Categories of functions identified in retrospective reports: definitions and examples (in 
English translation). 
? Think aloud and retrospective reports 
The overview in Table 9.6 highlights that the majority of functions that were 
described for think aloud protocols were also to be found in reports about the 
assembly, i.e. insight, puzzlement, strategy, perception. Furthermore, three 
additional categories were identified in retrospective reports. One newly defined 
category was very similar to that of perception, namely description. The distinction 
between perception and description was based on the observation that some 
discourse units did not contain verbs of perception (e.g. see, notice, or recognize), 
thus they were defined as description. The other two novel categories were more 
interesting in terms of the analysis of the influence of constraints on the assembly 
process. In their retrospective reports participants mentioned that they used con-
straints to distinguish between objects and they remembered that constraints 
helped them to assign function to objects or arrangements of objects. Two classes 
of functions can be distinguished with regard to the level of conceptualization that 
they express. Whereas perceiving and describing constraints signals the level of 
sensing, all other functions involve an active use of constraints which involves the 
level of interpretation (see Table 9.7 for a summary). 
data set class of perception at 
the level of sensing 
class of usage at the level of 
interpretation 
others 
think aloud perception strategy, insight, statement puzzlement 
retrospective 
reports 
perception, describe strategy, insight, distinguish, 
function assignment 
puzzlement 
Table 9.7: Summary categories defining the function of constraints mentioned in think aloud protocols 
and retrospective reports distinguishing between class of perception, class of interpretation, and 
others. 
9.5.2.2.3 Instructions 
The functions of constraints that were observed in instructions differ from those 
described in think aloud protocols but they are similar to those identified in re-
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trospetive reports. Whereas participants assembling the dollhouse verbalized 
noticing an object feature, instructors described object features (description). 
Pointing out object features served different functions in instructions, namely 
distinguishing objects, assigning function, and orienting objects. In order to 
distinguish objects, their salient features were stressed (distinguish). In some cases 
instructors described an object before assigning its function within the goal 
structure (function assignment). Some features, such as the boreholes in the 
boards, were used to coordinate the position of the object (orientation). Similarly, 
object features, especially boreholes, were used to describe the spatial arrangement 
and placement of other objects (placement).  
Some instructors told the partner about their own difficulties during the assembly 
(comment about self). Similar to those participants assembling the dollhouse for 
themselves some instructors pointed out the strategic use of specific constraints, 
such as boreholes or the groove (strategy). Table 9.8 provides definitions and 
examples for each category; the German original wordings are reported in the 
appendix (see Table 9.39). 
category definition examples 
description a) object features are pointed out 
b) the current assembly status is 
described 
a) “as you can see those have a 
groove here” [2] 
b) “there are no bevels positioned 
in here yet” [3] 
distinguish Features are highlighted to 
distinguish the object in focus from 
others. This is done by means of 
comparison or contrast. 
“all these elements that we 
previously used expect with a bevel 
on them” [3] 
function 
assignment 
Highlighting or mentioning the 
function that a feature serves in the 
whole assembly. 
“those two wooden ah those two 
back elements (‘Rückbauelemen-
te’) need to be put in this groove” 
[3] 
orientation Object features are used to explain 
the orientation of an object. 
“so that you have two holes on the 
right hand side in front of you” [2] 
placement Object features are used to 
describe where and how to 
position an object in relation to 
others. 
“exactly on top of these three 
holes” [2]; “and slide in the boards 
on the left and right hand side of 
the blue columns” [6] 
comment 
about self 
Comment about instructor’s own 
assembly process. 
“and I was wrong about the bevels 
all the times” [5]; “I also paid 
attention that those holes are 
down on this board” [5] 
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strategy Point out object features and 
explain their strategic use for the 
assembly process. 
“that we pay attention to those 
boreholes” [20] 
Table 9.8: Classification of functions identified in instructions. 
9.5.3  Quantitative analysis 
The categories that were defined in the previous sub-section were analyzed with 
regard to their distribution within each kind of verbal report (think aloud and 
retrospective) and within instructions. For think aloud protocols and retrospective 
reports results are reported distinguishing between conditions. Furthermore, for 
those categories that can be identified in different kinds of verbal reports (see 
Table 9.9 for an overview) the difference between those reports was investigated. 
Moreover, in order to study which constraints serve which function, the frequency 
of categories defining the nature of constraints was investigated within the 
categories defining their function. 
data set in which categories are 
identified 
category (nature of 
constraints) 
category (function of 
constraints) 
think aloud protocols, 
retrospective reports, & 
instructions 
supporting system, 
groove, hole, bevel, 
connection, others 
strategy 
think aloud & retrospective report  perception, puzzlement 
think aloud protocols label, picture, 
connector, no 
screwing 
insight, statement 
retrospective report roof, analogy  
instruction  orientation, placement, 
comment on self 
retrospective report & instruction  description, distinguish, 
function assignment 
Table 9.9: Overview on categories for constraints regarding their nature and function as identified in 
the different verbal reports. 
9.5.3.1 Nature and function of constraints 
9.5.3.1.1 Think aloud protocols 
The first part of this section focuses on the distribution of the categories describing 
the nature of constraints and the second part presents results on the distribution 
of categories describing the function of constraints. 
Across all conditions boreholes (52 times) were the most frequently mentioned 
category, followed by bevel (30 times), and groove (21 times) (see Table 9.10). 
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Differences between conditions showed in these three most frequently mentioned 
constraints (see Table 9.28 in the appendix). A statistically significant effect of 
condition on the dependent variables groove and bevel was observed, 
L?2 (16,   N = 149) = 30.9, p = .01279. Participants in the underspecified goal condition 
mentioned grooves more frequently than all other participants (M = 0.6, SD = 1.2), 
p < .05280. Participants in the underspecified goal and verbal goal condition referred 
to bevels more often than participants in the verbal and visual goal condition (see 
Figure 9.20), p < .01. 
Category raw frequency mean standard deviation 
borehole 52 1.04 1.92 
bevel 30 0.60 1.50 
groove 21 0.42 0.95 
supporting system 13 0.26 0.63 
connector 12 0.24 0.56 
picture 11 0.22 0.58 
connection 8 0.16 0.58 
label 8 0.16 0.62 
no screwing 4 0.08 0.34 
others 1 0.02 0.14 
all 160 3.20 3.70 
Table 9.10: Results frequency of categories describing the nature of constraints in think aloud 
protocols; sorted from most to least frequent. 
                                                        
279 The category picture was excluded from the statistical test because it can only be 
mentioned by participants in the verbal and visual goal condition hence it was certain to 
observe a significant main effect there. However, this significant effect would not be re-
presentative for considering differences between categories of constraints that can 
potentially be observed in all conditions. 
280 For standardized residuals see Table 9.29 in the appendix. 
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Figure 9.20: Bar plot displaying the distribution of mean frequency of the three most frequent 
categories describing the nature of constraints. 
So far constraints were defined in task specific terms but they can also be defined 
in more general terms by adapting the classification proposed by Norman (2002). 
In his classification he distinguished between logical, physical, semantic, and 
cultural constraints. Additionally, the category task specific was introduced. The 
results revealed that participants thinking aloud mentioned semantic constraints 
most frequently (72 cases, M = 1.4, SD = 2.1) (see Figure 9.21). Less frequently they 
referred to logical constraints (34 cases, M = 0.7, SD = 1.2) (see Table 9.30 in the 
appendix). A similar distribution was observed in all three conditions (for more 
detail see Table 9.31 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 9.21: Bar plot displaying the distribution of general constraints in think aloud protocols; mean 
raw frequency. 
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? Function in think aloud protocols 
Five categories were identified that described the function of constraints 
verbalized in think aloud protocols, namely insight, strategy, perception, 
puzzlement, and statement. Across conditions perception (50 times, M = 1.0, 
SD = 1.3) was the most frequently verbalized function. The categories insight and 
strategy were frequent as well (42 and 37 times respectively) (see Table 9.11). 
category raw frequency mean standard deviation 
perception 50 1.00 1.34 
insight 42 0.84 1.33 
strategy 37 0.74 1.19 
statement 16 0.32 0.62 
puzzlement 14 0.28 0.57 
all 160 3.20 3.70 
Table 9.11: Results frequency of categories describing the function of constraints in think aloud 
protocols; sorted from most to least frequent. 
Differences between conditions could be observed regarding the dependent 
variables perception and statement. Participants in the verbal and visual goal 
condition mentioned constraints in statements (10 times, M = 0.6, SD = 0.7) more 
frequently than participants in the other conditions (see Figure 9.22 and Table 9.33 
in the appendix). Participants in the verbal goal condition referred to constraints in 
perception frequently (22 times, M = 1.4, SD = 1.3). Perception was less frequently 
verbalized in the verbal and visual goal condition than in the other conditions. 
However, those differences in distribution did not reach statistical significance, 
?2 (8, N = 160) = 12.3, p = .14. 
 
Figure 9.22: Bar plot displaying the mean raw frequency of categories describing the function of 
constraints across conditions in think aloud protocols. 
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Concerning the distinction between perception and usage of constraints, no 
differences were observed between conditions. Participants generally tended to 
mention constraints at the level of interpretation rather than at the level of sensing 
(see Table 9.12 for more detail). 
condition class of 
perception at the 
level of sensing 
class of usage at 
the level of 
interpretation 
others sum 
underspecified 
goal  
3 (11.11%) 22 (81.48%) 2 (7.41%) 27 (100%) 
verbal goal 4 (13.79%) 25 (86.21%) 2 (6.90%) 29 (100%) 
verbal and visual 
goal 
6 (10.91%) 44 (80.00%) 5 (9.09%) 55 (100%) 
Table 9.12: Raw frequency and percentage of constraints mentioned in the different conditions in 
retrospective reports distinguishing between class of perception, class of interpretation, and others. 
9.5.3.1.2 Retrospective report 
As in the previous sub-section, the first part focuses on the distribution of the 
categories describing the nature of constraints and the second part presents results 
on the distribution of categories describing the function of constraints.  
Across retrospective reports bevel (25 times, M = 0.5, SD = 0.7) was the most 
frequently reported constraint. Supporting system (19 times, M = 0.4, SD = 0.7) and 
borehole (17 times, M = 0.3, SD = 0.7) were almost equally frequently reported in 
retrospective reports (see Table 9.13). 
category raw frequency mean standard deviation 
bevel 25 0.50 0.74 
supporting system 19 0.38 0.67 
borehole 17 0.34 0.66 
roof 14 0.28 0.46 
groove 8 0.16 0.37 
picture 8 0.36 0.42 
analogy 7 0.14 0.35 
others 7 0.14 0.40 
no screwing 3 0.06 0.24 
connection 3 0.06 0.31 
all 111   
Table 9.13: Results frequency of categories describing the nature of constraints in retrospective 
reports; sorted from most to least frequent. 
RESULTS 419 
 
 
Although trends marking differences between conditions with regard to the 
categories were not statistically significant, L?2 (16, N = 103) = 19.5, p = .24281, they 
are reported as this study wants to highlight differences that might be significant if 
a larger data set is investigated. Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition 
referred to bevels (12 times, M = 0.71, SD = 0.69) and the supporting system (10 
times, M = 0.6, SD = 0.9) more frequently than participants in the other two 
conditions (see Figure 9.23). Participants in the underspecified goal condition 
referred to grooves least often (1 time, M = 0.1, SD = 0.2) (see Table 9.34 in the 
appendix). 
 
Figure 9.23: Bar plot displaying the distribution of the three most frequent categories defining the 
nature of constraints between conditions in retrospective reports. 
So far the task specific nature of constraints was investigated. Returning to 
Norman’s (2002) more general classification of constraints, the following 
distribution in retrospective reports could be identified. Participants reporting 
their activities during assembly did not show a clear preference for one category of 
general constraints (see Figure 9.24). They mentioned logical constraints most 
frequently (34 cases, M = 0.68, SD = 1.02) but the difference was only marginal as 
compared to physical (25 cases, M = 0.50, SD = 0.74) and semantic constraints (20 
cases, M = 0.40, SD = 0.70) (see Table 9.35 in the appendix). 
                                                        
281Again, the category picture is excluded from the statistical test because it can only be 
mentioned by participants in the verbal and visual goal condition hence there needs to be a 
significant effect there. But this significant effect is not representative for considering 
differences between categories of constraints that can be (potentially) observed in all 
conditions. 
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Figure 9.24: Bar plot displaying the distribution of general constraints in retrospective reports; mean 
raw frequency. 
? Function in retrospective reports 
The 111 constraints that were identified could be classified into seven categories 
describing their function, namely description, perception, distinguish, function 
assignment, insight, puzzlement, and strategy. Considering their general 
distribution across retrospective reports, function assignment was most frequent 
(44 times, M = 0.9, SD = 0.9). The functions strategy (23 times, M = 0.5, SD = 0.8) 
and insight (13 times, M = 0.3, SD = 0.5) ranked second and third (see Table 9.14 for 
an overview). 
category raw frequency mean standard deviation 
function assignment 44 0.88 0.90 
strategy 23 0.46 0.79 
insight 13 0.26 0.49 
description 10 0.20 0.45 
distinguish 9 0.18 0.48 
puzzlement 9 0.18 0.44 
perception 3 0.06 0.31 
all 111 2.20 2.07 
Table 9.14: Results frequency of categories describing the function of constraints in retrospective 
reports; sorted from most to least frequent. 
Differences between conditions could be observed although they did not reach 
statistically significance, L?2 (12, N = 111) = 19.8, p = .07. Participants in the verbal 
and visual goal condition mentioned strategic use of constraints more frequently 
RESULTS 421 
 
 
than all other participants (15 times, M = 0.9, SD = 1.0) (see Figure 9.25). 
Participants in the underspecified goal condition reported insights by means of 
constraints least often (1 time, M = 0.1, SD = 0.2). Function assignment was most 
frequently reported by participants in the verbal and visual goal condition (19 
times, M = 1.1, SD = 0.9) and least frequently by participants in the verbal goal 
condition (9 times, M = 0.6, SD = 0.8) (see Table 9.37 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 9.25: Bar plot displaying the distribution of categories describing the nature of constraints 
identified in retrospective reports, within conditions; mean raw frequency. 
? Think aloud and retrospective reports concerning function 
The analysis of the distribution of function categories, with regard to the level of 
sensing and the level of interpretation, revealed that think aloud protocols 
contained information about constraints at the level of sensing in one third of the 
cases. Information about constraints at the level of interpretation were verbalized 
in almost 60% of the cases. This was different in retrospective reports. Participants 
remembered clearly more information about constraints at the level of inter-
pretation than at the level of sensing (see Table 9.15). 
data set class of perception 
at the level of 
sensing 
class of usage at 
the level of 
interpretation 
others sum 
think aloud 50 (31.25%) 95 (59.34%) 3 (1.88%) 160 (100%) 
retrospective 
reports 
13 (11.71%) 89 (80.18%) 9 (8.11%) 111 (100%) 
Table 9.15: Raw frequency and percentage of constraints mentioned in think aloud protocols and 
retrospective reports distinguishing between class of perception, class of interpretation, and others. 
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9.5.3.1.3 Instruction 
This sub-section reports findings on the analysis of nature and function of 
constraints mentioned in instructions. The first part focuses on the distribution of 
the categories describing the nature of constraints and the second part presents 
results on the distribution of categories describing the function of constraints. 
Out of those ten categories that were identified in think aloud protocols five were 
adapted for defining constraints identified in instructions, namely supporting 
system, groove, borehole, bevel, and connection. The results clearly revealed a 
preference for referring to the boreholes as constraints (73 times, M = 4.6, 
SD = 4.9). A one-tailed t-test revealed that boreholes were mentioned significantly 
more frequently than expected, t (15) = 3.8, p = .002. Bevel, ranking second, was less 
frequently mentioned (33 times, M = 2.1, SD = 3.0) followed by groove which 
ranked third (23 times, M = 1.4, SD = 1.3) (see Figure 9.26 and Table 9.16). A one-
tailed t-test revealed that grooves were mentioned significantly less frequently 
than expected, t (15) = 4.4, p = .001. The same was observed for bevels, t (15) = 2.8, 
p = .01. 
 
Figure 9.26: Bar plot displaying the distribution of categories describing the nature of constraints 
identified in instructions; mean raw frequency. 
category raw frequency mean standard deviation 
borehole 73 4.56 4.86 
bevel 33 2.06 2.95 
groove 23 1.44 1.31 
supporting system 3 0.10 0.40 
connection 1 0.06 0.25 
all 136 8.50 5.72 
Table 9.16: Results frequency of categories describing the nature of constraints in instructions; sorted 
from most to least frequent. 
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So far the categories defining constraints in task specific terms have been 
presented. Taking Norman’s (2002) classification into consideration, instructors 
showed the same tendency as participants thinking aloud during assembly. 
Instructors mentioned semantic constraints most frequently (73 cases, M = 4.6, 
SD = 4.8) (for more detail see Table 9.38 in the appendix). Logical constraints were 
referred to least often (26 cases, M = 1.6, SD = 1.2). Instructors did not refer to 
cultural and task induced constraints (see Figure 9.27). 
 
Figure 9.27: Bar plot displaying the distribution of general constraints in instructions; mean raw 
frequency. 
The function of the identified constraints could be described by seven categories, 
i.e. description, distinguish, function assignment, orientation, placement, strategy, 
and comment on self. The categories placement (43 times, M = 2.7, SD = 2.9) and 
description (40 times, M = 2.5, SD = 1.9) were the most frequent ones. Orientation 
ranked third with 30 times (M = 1.9, SD = 2.3) (see Figure 9.28 and Table 9.17). 
category raw frequency mean standard deviation 
placement 43 2.69 2.89 
description 40 2.50 1.86 
orientation 30 1.88 2.28 
distinguish 9 0.56 1.03 
function assignment 6 0.38 0.62 
strategy 5 0.31 0.70 
comment on self 3 0.19 0.40 
all 136 8.50 5.72 
Table 9.17: Results frequency of categories describing the function of constraints in instructions; sorted 
from most to least frequent. 
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Figure 9.28: Bar plot displaying the distribution of categories describing the function of constraints 
identified in instructions; mean raw frequency. 
9.5.3.1.4 Between verbal reports 
The comparison of the three most frequently mentioned categories describing the 
task specific nature of constraints showed that think aloud protocols and 
instructions had the same ranking, i.e. borehole, bevel, and groove although with 
different frequencies. Retrospective reports, on the other hand, showed a different 
ranking, namely bevel, supporting system, and borehole. The difference between 
these rankings was statistically significant, ?2 (4,  N = 282) = 11.2, p = .03. The 
standardized residuals revealed a main effect of kind of verbal report on the 
dependent variable bevel. Instructors referred to bevels significantly more 
frequently (33 times, M = 2.06) (see Table 9.18) than participants thinking aloud 
during assembly (30 times, M = 0.6) or recalling their activities after assembly (25 
times, M = 0.5), p < .01 (see Table 9.40 in the appendix for standardized residuals). 
kind of verbal 
report 
rank 1 rank 2 rank 3 
think aloud borehole  
(52 cases, M = 1.04) 
bevel 
(30 cases, M = 0.60) 
groove 
(21 cases, M = 0.42) 
retrospective 
report 
bevel 
(25 cases, M = 0.50) 
supporting system 
(19 cases, M = 0.38) 
borehole 
(17 cases, M = 0.34) 
instruction borehole 
(73 cases, M = 4.56) 
bevel 
(33 cases, M = 2.06) 
groove 
(23 cases, M = 1.44) 
Table 9.18: Summary of the three most frequent categories describing the nature of constraints in the 
investigated kinds of verbal reports. 
The distribution of general constraints within verbal reports showed that think 
aloud protocols were similar to instructions in first rank whereas retrospective 
reports show a different trend (see Table 9.19). Second and third rank were quite 
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close in think aloud data and retrospective reports thus the interpretation was not 
as strong as the difference between second and third rank in instructions. Taking 
this observation into account, the distribution of general constraints was similar 
between think aloud protocols and instructions but highly significantly different to 
retrospective reports, ?2 (4, N = 347) = 22.8, p = .00. Participants reporting their 
activities used semantic constraints significantly less frequently than the other 
participants, p < .01. Furthermore, instructors mentioned logical constraint 
significantly more often than the other participants, p < .01 (see Table 9.41 in the 
appendix for standardized residuals). 
kind of verbal 
report 
rank 1 rank 2 rank 3 
think aloud semantic 
(72 cases, M = 1.44) 
logical 
(34 cases, M = 0.68) 
physical 
(30 cases, M = 0.60) 
retrospective 
report 
logical 
(34 cases, M = 0.68) 
physical  
(25 cases, M = 0.50) 
semantic 
(20 cases, M = 0.40) 
instruction semantic 
(73 cases, M = 4.56) 
physical 
(33 cases, M = 2.06) 
logical 
(26 cases, M = 1.63) 
Table 9.19: Summary of the three most frequent categories describing the general nature of 
constraints in the investigated kinds of verbal reports. 
The comparison of the three most frequently identified functions of constraints 
showed that insight and strategy were among those three, both in think aloud 
protocols and retrospective reports but at different places within the ranking (see 
Table 9.20). The categories identified in instructions were different. However, this 
impression holds only at first glance because in instructions the two categories 
placement and orientation were individual categories whereas those were part of 
the category strategy in the other two kinds of verbal reports. This categorization 
was based on the observation that the number of placements of objects and 
references to constraints for means of orientation were frequent in instructions 
and needed to be analyzed separately. However, in order to compare the different 
kinds of investigated verbal reports, it was necessary to define one consistent 
category, thus placement and orientation were subsumed in the category strategy 
(column instruction combined in Table 9.20).  
The analysis of the resulting raw frequencies (see Table 9.21) revealed a highly 
significant effect of kind of verbal report on the dependent variables insight and 
strategy, ?2 (2, N = 193) = 55.7, p = .00. The analysis of the standardized residuals 
highlighted that the high frequency of insights in think aloud protocols 
contributed to this main effect, p < .001 (see Table 9.42 in the appendix for 
standardized residuals). Additionally, instructors and assemblers thinking aloud 
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referred to using constraints strategically significantly more often (p < .01 in both 
cases) than participants reporting their activities. 
kind of verbal 
report 
rank 1 rank 2 rank 3 
think aloud perception 
(50 cases, M = 1.00) 
insight 
(42 cases, M = 0.84) 
strategy 
(37 cases, M = 0.74) 
retrospective 
report 
function assignment 
(44 cases, M = 0.88) 
strategy 
(23 cases, M = 0.46) 
insight 
(13 cases, M = 0.26) 
instruction placement 
(43 cases, M = 2.69) 
description 
(40 cases, M = 2.50) 
orientation 
(30 cases, M = 1.88) 
instruction 
combined 
strategy 
(78 cases, M = 4.88) 
description 
(40 cases, M = 2.50) 
distinguish 
(9 cases, M = 0.56) 
Table 9.20: Summary of the three most frequent categories describing the function of constraints in 
the investigated kinds of verbal reports and additionally the distribution of categories if the category 
constraint is defined exactly the same in instructions as in the other two reports. 
kind of verbal report insight strategy 
think aloud 42 37 
instruction 0 78 
retrospective report 13 23 
Table 9.21: Raw frequency of categories describing functions of constraints between investigated kinds 
of verbal reports. 
9.5.3.1.5 Investigating the nature of constraints within functions 
After identifying the different categories describing the nature of constraints it was 
possible to investigate which constraints frequently served which function. This 
question was investigated by eliciting the distribution of categories on the nature 
of constraints within each functional category. Only those categories that were 
identified in at least two of the verbal reports can be statistically analyzed (see 
Table 9.43 in the appendix) therefore a table with raw frequencies is provided in 
the appendix (see Table 9.44). For a better overview Table 9.22 presents only a 
selection of those constraints that were ranked first to third most frequent in one 
of the categories.  
Boreholes were most frequently used strategically (M = 12.0). This trend got more 
marked when observing the results of the category strategy combined; here boreholes 
were used strategically most often (M = 28.7). Although bevels were also mentioned 
to be used strategically, this was done less frequently (M = 6.3). The analysis revealed 
that bevels fostered insights (M = 9.0) most frequently. Grooves and boreholes 
supported insights (M = 5.5 and M = 5.0 respectively). Boreholes (M = 9.5) and 
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grooves (M = 6.0) were the constraints that were perceived most frequently (see 
Table 9.22). 
Participants mentioned to be puzzled about the supporting system in the majority 
of cases (M = 4.0) but less often about boreholes (M = 2.5). Interestingly, boreholes, 
bevels, and grooves were described to a comparable amount. If participants made 
use of constraints to distinguish between objects, they most frequently referred to 
the bevel (M = 5.0) and less frequently to the supporting system (M = 2.5). If 
constraints were used in assigning function to objects or when function was 
assigned to constraints, this related to bevels (M = 6.0) as well as to grooves 
(M = 5.5) in most cases (see Table 9.22). 
 supporting 
system 
groove borehole bevel analogy roof 
insight 0 5.5 (3.54) 5.0 (5.66) 9.0 (0.66) 0.5 (0.71) 0 
strategy 0.67 (0.58) 0.33 (0.58) 12.0 (8.55) 3.0 (2.0) 1.33 (2.31) 0 
percep-
tion 
4.0 (4.24) 6.0 (8.49) 9.5 (12.02) 4.0 (5.66) 0 0 
puzzle-
ment 
4.0 (1.41) 0 2.5 (2.12) 0 0 0 
descrip-
tion 
0 6.0 (8.49) 7.0 (8.49) 6.5 (7.78) 0.5 (0.71) 0 
distingu-
ish 
2.50 (3.54) 0.5 (0.71) 0.5 (0.71) 5.0 (2.83) 0.5 (0.71) 0 
function 
assign-
ment 
2.50 (3.54) 5.5 (0.71) 1.0 (1.41) 6.0 (8.49) 0 7.0 
(9.90) 
strategy 
combined 
1.33 (0.58) 1.67 (2.08) 28.67 
(22.50) 
6.33 (4.16) 1.33 (2.31) 0 
Table 9.22: Overview frequency of selected constraints within functions; mean and standard deviation. 
A chi-square test was run to investigate the frequency of references to boreholes, 
grooves, and bevels within the different categories defining the function of 
constraints. The test revealed that the nature of constraints had a highly significant 
effect on the dependent variable function of constraints, L?2 (12, N = 226) = 82.0, 
p = .00. Bevels were significantly more frequent in the category distinguish than 
boreholes and grooves, p < .01 (see Table 9.45 in the appendix for standardized 
residuals). Boreholes were significantly less frequent in function assignment than 
the other two types of constraints, p < .01. However, boreholes were significantly 
more often referred to in the category strategy than the other two kinds of 
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constraints, p < .001. Additionally, grooves were referred to significantly less 
frequently, p < .01. 
9.5.3.2 Occurrence of constraints 
9.5.3.2.1 Within the problem solving process 
The distribution of references to constraints within the different problem solving 
processes revealed that constraints were most frequently mentioned in hypotheses 
(41.5%) and descriptions of object features (36.5%) (see Table 9.23). 
problem solving process raw frequency 
constraints mentioned 
percent constraints 
mentioned 
hypothesis 66 41.51 
comment on object features 58 36.48 
action 16 10.06 
description of mental state 12 7.55 
negative evaluation 2 1.26 
positive evaluation 2 1.26 
comment on self 1 < 1.0 
metalevel comment 2 1.26 
sum 159282 100.00 
Table 9.23: Frequency of constraints within the different problem solving processes; raw frequency 
and percentage. 
9.5.3.2.2 Within the overall assembly process 
Dividing the assembly process into quarters, the distribution of references to 
constraints between the four intervals revealed that constraints were most 
frequently mentioned in the third quarter of the assembly (58 times, M = 1.2, 
SD = 2.1). The frequency of constraints was comparable in the other three quarters 
(see Table 9.24). 
quarter raw frequency mean standard deviation 
first 33 0.66 1.22 
second 37 0.74 0.88 
third 58 1.16 2.10 
fourth 32 0.64 1.27 
Table 9.24: Frequency of constraints in each of the quarters of the assembly process, raw frequency, 
mean, and standard deviation. 
                                                        
282 In one case a constraint is mentioned at the end of the protocol thus it is excluded from 
the calculation here. 
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A chi-square test revealed a significant effect of condition on the frequency of 
references to constraints in the third quarter, ?2 (6, N = 160) = 17.2, p = .01. 
Participants in the verbal goal condition mentioned constraints in the third quarter 
of the assembly significantly more often (M = 1.9, SD = 3.2) than participants in the 
other conditions, p < .05 (see Table 9.46 in the appendix for standardized 
residuals). Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition referred to 
constraints significantly less often (M = 0.7, SD = 0.9) than expected in the third 
quarter, p < .05.  
As a trend it could be observed that participants in the verbal and visual goal 
condition mentioned constraints in the first quarter more often than participants in 
the other conditions. Furthermore, participants in the underspecified goal condition 
referred to constraints in the fourth quarter least frequently (see Table 9.25). 
condition 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter 
underspecified 
goal 
10 (M = 0.59, 
SD = 1.18) 
13 (M = 0.76, 
SD = 1.62) 
16 (M = 0.94, 
SD = 1.64) 
5 (M = 0.29, 
SD = 0.85) 
verbal goal 6 (M = 0.38, 
SD = 0.62) 
10 (M = 0.63, 
SD = 0.89) 
30 (M = 1.88, 
SD = 3.16) 
12 (M = 0.75, 
SD = 1.53) 
verbal and visual 
goal 
17 (M = 1.0, 
SD = 1.62) 
14 (M = 0.82, 
SD = 1.01) 
12 (M = 0.71, 
SD = 0.85) 
15 (M = 0.88, 
SD = 1.36) 
all 33 (M = 0.66, 
SD = 1.22) 
37 (M = 0.74, 
SD = 0.88) 
58 (M = 1.16, 
SD = 2.10) 
32 (M = 0.64, 
SD = 1.27) 
Table 9.25: Frequency of constraints within the four quarters of the assembly process, raw frequency, 
mean, and standard deviation. 
Besides the general frequency of constraints within quarters of the assembly 
process, the distribution of the identified functions within quarters was also 
interesting especially if differences between conditions could be observed. The 
reports of noticing constraints (perception) decreased from first to fourth quarter 
in the verbal goal condition (see Table 9.26).  
Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition used constraints in their 
function as fostering insights (41.7%) most frequently in the third quarter. They did 
so more often than participants in the underspecified goal condition (12.5%) and 
the verbal goal condition (14.3%). However, these result did not reach statistical 
significance, L?2 (6, N = 42) = 11.3, p = .08.  
Participants in the verbal and visual goal condition used constraints strategically 
less frequent in the third quarter (16.7%) than participants in the underspecified 
goal condition (43.8%) and participants in the verbal goal condition (25.7%). 
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Although the observed difference did not reach statistical significance the trend 
was marked, L?2 (6, N = 38) = 12.0, p = .06. 
condition
283 
quarter insight strategy perce-
ption 
puzzle-
ment 
statement 
A 1 4 (40%) 0 5 (50%) 1 (10%) 0 
A 2 4 (26.7%) 3 (20%) 5 (33.3%) 2 (13.3%) 1 (6.7%) 
A 3 2 (12.5%) 7 (43.8%) 6 (37.5%) 1 (6.3%) 0 
A 4 0 2 (28.6%) 6 (71.4%) 0 0 
B 1 2 (33.3%) 0 3 (50%) 0 1 (16.7%) 
B 2 2 (20%) 2 (20%) 4 (40%) 0 2 (20%) 
B 3 5 (14.3%) 9 (25.7%) 12 (34.3%) 3 (8.6%) 1 (2.9%) 
B 4 6 (50%) 2 (16.7%) 3 (50%) 0 1 (8.3%) 
C 1 6 (35.3%) 2 (11.8%) 2 (11.8%) 2 (11.8%) 5 (29.4%) 
C 2 2 (13.3%) 4 (26.7%) 5 (33.3%) 1 (6.7%) 3 (20.0%) 
C 3 5 (41.7%) 2 (16.7%) 2 (16.7%) 3 (25.0%) 0 
C 4 4 (26.7%) 5 (33.3%) 2 (13.3%) 1 (6.7%) 3 (20.0%) 
Table 9.26: Distribution of categories defining the function of constraints within the four quarters of 
the assembly process, raw frequency and percentage. 
9.5.3.3 Answers to interview questions 
This section focuses on the answers to the three guided questions that were posed 
at the end of the experimental session. The results for each of the guided questions 
is presented across conditions because no statistical effect of condition on answers 
was observed, L?2 (10, N = 99) = 6.1, p = .80. 
The majority of participants stated to have noticed the groove (43 cases, M = 0.9, 
SD = 0.4) (see Figure 9.29). Only few participants did not notice it (3 cases, M = 0.1, 
SD = 0.2). Out of those who noticed the groove almost equally many reported to 
have used it as a guide (18 cases, M = 0.4, SD = 0.5) and not to have used it (14 
cases, M = 0.3, SD = 0.5). Some participants stated that they were irritated by the 
grooves (7 cases, M = 0.1, SD = 0.4) and few made partial use of them (3 cases, 
M = 0.1, SD = 0.2) (see Table 9.48 in the appendix). 
                                                        
283 The conditions are abbreviated for a better overview: A stands for underspecified goal 
condition, B represents verbal goal condition, and C represents verbal and visual goal 
condition. 
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Figure 9.29: Bar plot displaying the answers to the first interview question. 
All participants stated that they noticed the boreholes (46 cases, M = 0.9, SD = 0.3) 
(see Figure 9.30). Interestingly, almost half of the interviewees stated that they 
used it (21 cases, M = 0.4, SD = 0.5) whereas equally many stated that they 
disregarded them (20 cases, M = 0.4, SD = 0.5). Five participants stated that they 
used the boreholes partially (M = 0.1, SD = 0.3) (see Table 9.49 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 9.30: Bar plot displaying the answers to the second interview question. 
Half of the interviewees stated that they noticed the label ‘Selecta Spielzeug’ 
during the assembly (29 cases, M = 0.6, SD = 0.5) (see Figure 9.31). From those 
participants equally many reported to have used the label as a guide (13 cases, 
M = 0.3, SD = 0.4) and to have ignored it. The remaining three participants stated 
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that they did not find it helpful to have noticed the label (M = 0.1, SD = 0.2) (see 
Table 9.50 in the appendix).  
 
Figure 9.31: Bar plot displaying the answers to the third interview question. 
9.6 Discussion 
The results that were presented in the previous sections will be discussed in the 
light of the research questions that were posed concerning the nature and function 
of constraints in unaided object assembly. 
The first research question aimed at identifying the nature of the identified 
constraints. In the analysis two kinds were distinguished, namely the task specific 
nature of constraints, i.e. the way in which they were expressed in the specific 
assembly context, and the general nature of constraints. For the description of the 
general nature, Norman’s (2002) classification of constraints was adopted and 
extended if necessary. Eight constraints were identified prior to the analysis based 
on general assumptions about constraints as devices that help to reduce the 
number of possibilities regarding the actions that can be performed in a specific 
context (Norman 2002; Kirsh 2009). Those constraints were either physical 
properties of the provided wooden objects (i.e. bevels, boreholes, little half-ball like 
wooden pieces (supporting system), and grooves), the object itself (i.e. the roof and 
the picture), or object features (i.e. the label ‘Selecta Spielzeug’). Furthermore, one 
constraint was stated explicitly in the instructions, namely that no screws can be 
used. The assignment of these expected task specific constraints to Norman’s 
(2002) proposed categories of physical (bevel), semantic (boreholes), logical 
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(groove, supporting system), and cultural (label, roof) constraints suggested that 
this classification could be adopted if one further category was introduced, namely 
task induced constraints (no screws, picture)284.  
The analysis of think aloud protocols revealed that boreholes were the most 
frequently mentioned constraint followed by bevel and groove in second and third 
position. This predominance of references to boreholes was unexpected, whereas 
the second and third position confirmed the expectations. Interestingly, 
participants in the underspecified goal condition referred to grooves significantly 
more often than participants in the other conditions. The grooves are not very 
salient but they can be noticed by close inspection of the objects. Those findings 
suggest that participants who needed to create a sensible structure from scratch, 
i.e. without any prior information, were very attentive to object features. This 
attentiveness can be interpreted as an expression of their effort to find hints to 
guide their assembly.  
Those participants who were provided with no or few prior information (verbal 
goal condition) mentioned bevels significantly more frequently than participants 
who were provided with an external model (verbal and visual goal condition). Since 
bevels are very salient object features, it is very unlikely that participants in the 
verbal and visual goal condition simply did not notice the bevels. It is more likely 
that prior information has an influence on the verbalization of perception. 
Participants who saw the picture may know the bevels’ function at the moment of 
perception, i.e. those objects need to be placed on the second story. This 
recognition happened so fast and unconsciously that it was not verbalized. 
However, participants who were looking for hints concerning the nature and 
function of objects noticed this constraint and tried to extract relevant information 
from this observation. This would be a conscious mental process and thus they 
verbalized noticing the bevel at the moment of perception. 
The distribution of constraints in retrospective reports revealed the expected 
ranking, i.e. bevels were most frequent, the supporting system ranked second, and 
the boreholes were mentioned in third position. Interestingly, participants in the 
underspecified goal condition reported using grooves least frequently of all 
participants. Although this difference did not reach statistical significance, it is the 
reverse trend to that observed in think aloud protocols. This discrepancy might be 
the result of a memory effect. If the function of a groove is culturally well known, 
then noticing the groove and its usage is forgotten after the assembly because it is 
                                                        
284 For the reasons for grouping the task specific constraints into these general categories 
see section 9.3. 
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not a prominent thought during the assembly. The analysis of the answers to 
question one, which asked participants if they noticed the grooves and if they used 
them in their assembly, supports this assumption. The answers revealed that the 
majority of participants noticed the groove (93,5%) and half of them reported to 
have used them as a guide at least partially (45,7%). These figures are in stark 
contrast to the observation that grooves accounted for only 13.12% of constraints 
mentioned in think aloud protocols and for 7.20% in retrospective reports. This 
comparison highlights that noticing and even using a constraint did not guarantee 
that it was verbalized. The observation that participants could recall noticing and 
using a specific constraint if it was pointed out to them, supports the assumption 
that the mental processes associated with this constraint were unconscious but 
that they were stored in memory. 
The distribution of general constraints across think aloud protocols revealed that 
semantic constraints were much more frequent than logical and physical 
constraints. This effect can be attributed to the high frequency of references to 
boreholes. Those account for 32.5% of all mentioned constraints in think aloud 
protocols and 22.5% in retrospective reports. This unexpected finding was 
supported by the answers to question two in which all participants stated that they 
noticed the boreholes. More than half of all interviewees (56.5%) reported that they 
used the boreholes at least partially. These findings highlight that although 
boreholes were not important for succeeding in the dollhouse assembly, they were 
frequently used even more often than their mentioning in verbal protocols 
suggests. Comparing these findings to the ones on mention of grooves in verbal 
reports, it becomes evident that boreholes were mentioned and recalled more 
frequently in verbal reports. The frequent reference to boreholes suggests two 
readings, either boreholes were unexpected for participants or that they were 
assigned a specific meaningful function. The second explanation will be 
reconsidered and discussed in reference to research question four. The results on 
the distribution of categories describing the general nature of constraints in 
retrospective reports revealed that logical constraints were most frequent. This 
observation confirmed prior expectations because the supporting system, which 
contributed most to the result, was expected to be a salient feature that was highly 
likely to be mentioned.  
In sum, the answers to the guided questions revealed that both boreholes and the 
grooves were more frequently noticed than verbalized. However, they also revealed 
that those constraints were more frequently noticed than used. This finding 
stresses that noticing a constraint does not imply using it. It suggests that after 
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noticing a constraint its meaning needs to be apparent to the problem solver 
because otherwise it will be disregarded. This explanation is in line with previous 
findings that highlighted that recognition and meaningfulness of constraints 
depends on the individual, his experiences, and his knowledge (Kirsh 1995). 
Furthermore, the observation that participants noticed and used constraints more 
frequently than they reported them highlights the importance to analyze different 
data sets for drawing valid conclusions.  
As a further step in the analysis, the adequacy of Norman’s (2002) classification 
needs to be evaluated. This can be achieved by comparing the percentage of 
constraints that can be classified by Norman’s (2002) classification to the 
percentage of constraints that cannot be classified by his categories. The additional 
category of task induced constraints is excluded from the analysis because it is a 
category of constraints that is specific to the context of an experimental setting. 
The results (see Table 9.27) clearly indicate that the great majority (96.9%) of task 
specific constraints can be classified in general terms using Norman’s (2002) 
categories. Thus it can be concluded that Norman’s (2002) classification can be 
adopted for describing the general nature of constraints used in an assembly 
scenario. 
data set constraints classified by 
Norman’s (2002) 
classification 
constraints not classified 
by Norman’s (2002) 
classification 
task induced 
constraints 
think aloud 144 1 15 
retrospective 
report 
93 7 11 
instruction 132 4 0 
sum 369 (96.85%) 12 (3.15%) 26 
Table 9.27: Number of constraints; raw frequency. 
Research question 2 aims at drawing conclusions about the use of constraints with 
respect to the temporal dimension of the assembly process. Two temporal 
dimensions were distinguished in the analysis. First, the overall assembly process 
was considered, i.e. from starting the assembly to the finishing statement. Second, 
the problem solving process was analyzed in terms of problem solving processes 
(for more detail see chapter 6). In terms of problem solving processes, constraints 
were expected to be frequently mentioned in the process introduced as description 
of object features because this category contains all references to object features 
such as color or shape on a descriptive level. Additionally, constraints were 
expected to be mentioned in hypotheses because this process category contains 
436 FEATURES OF ANALYSIS: CONSTRAINTS 
 
ideas about functions of objects or object parts within the assembly. As constraints 
were expected to provide hints regarding the function of objects and limit their 
possible use, they were very likely to be verbalized in hypotheses. The analysis 
revealed that the distribution of constraints within problem solving episodes was 
as expected; i.e. constraints were most frequently verbalized in hypotheses (41.5%) 
and description of object features (36.5%). 
Based on Steffensen’s (forthcoming) postulatation that perception happens during 
action and action happens while the environment is perceived, constraints were 
expected to be equally distributed across the entire assembly process. It was 
further assumed that this trend could be affected by the amount of prior 
information. The results were unexpected as they revealed an even distribution 
from first to second quarter but a peak in third quarter. The data for participants 
in the verbal goal condition contributed most to the observed effect. Those 
participants mentioned significantly more constraints in third quarter than all 
other participants. Additionally, participants in the verbal and visual goal condition 
referred to significantly less constraints in the third quarter. As pointed out in the 
section on analysis, references to constraints may signal two mental states of the 
speaker, i.e. either he/she notices the constraint at the time of speaking or he/she 
uses it again after previously noticing it. The analysis of the distribution of the 
categories defining the function of constraints within each of the four quarters 
allows to distinguish between these two options. If participants referred to a 
constraint in the function of perceiving, this constraint can be assumed to encode 
the status ‘not noticed and mentioned before’. If participants referred to the 
constraint in any other function, it is more likely that the constraint was previously 
noticed and mentioned already. An overview on the identified functions of 
constraints is presented later in this discussion because for the current purpose of 
interpreting the findings on the overall distribution of constraints, it is sufficient to 
distinguish between noticing and using constraints. 
Considering the frequency of the category perception across the assembly process 
verbalized by participants in the underspecified goal condition, the results suggest 
that those participants noticed constraints to a comparable degree throughout the 
assembly process with a peak in the fourth quarter. Different explanations seem 
plausible regarding this observation. Either participants did not succeed in 
conceptualizing and arranging the objects in the first half of the assembly time, 
thus they started observing the given objects at a more detailed level in the second 
half of the assembly. Or following Klix’s (1976) argument, participants noticed 
more constraints because they interacted with the objects for some time already. 
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This interaction can be assumed to make constraints more salient. Additionally, 
constraints can be expected to gain meaning for the assembler as a mental 
representation of the goal structure evolves. 
If Klix’s (1976) argument was the sole explanation, the same trend should be 
observed in the other two conditions as well. However, participants who were 
provided with specific prior information on the goal object (verbal goal and verbal 
and visual goal condition) noticed less constraints towards the end. First, this 
finding highlights that the results cannot be explained by Klix’s (1976) approach 
entirely. Second, the results observed in the verbal and visual goal condition 
confirm the assumption that participants who were provided with much prior 
information noticed constraints early within the assembly. Participants who were 
told about the general nature of the goal structure (verbal goal condition) started 
with a generic mental representation that can be assumed to get more specific 
throughout the assembly. Assuming that this representation evolves in the first 
half of the assembly process, the decreasing trend of noticing constraints along 
with the high frequency of references to constraints in the third quarter suggests 
that previously perceived constraints were integrated into the new representation. 
Additionally, newly encountered constraints may be conceptualized more easily 
and are thus more frequently verbalized. The comparison of the frequency of the 
category perception (34.3%) to that of categories encoding the use of constraints 
(42.9% of the times285) in the third quarter supports this interpretation.  
In this line of thought, the results obtained in the verbal and visual goal condition 
suggest that participants who were provided with a finished mental representation 
of the goal structure, integrated and interpreted constraints early in the assembly 
process which left fewer constraints to be discovered in the second half. Based on 
this evidence, the results highlight an influence of prior information on the time at 
which constraints were noticed and evaluated as meaningful. This interpretation 
suggests that Steffensen’s account (2013:199) could be extended by including the 
                                                        
285 This percentage has been calculated by adding the percentage of the categories strategy, 
insight, and statement as reported in Table 9.26. The category statement is considered 
although it includes general statements which do not encode active use of constraints 
because constraints are used to draw conclusions that may influence further thoughts and 
actions. The category puzzlement is not considered because objects may leave the 
participant puzzled even if he notices it a second time. This question can be tackled by 
annotating references to constraints as either new, i.e. not mentioned before, or repetition, 
i.e. it has been referred to before. This even more fine-grained annotation was not done so 
far because the approach adapted here provides enough insights regarding the research 
questions that have been posed. However, further analyses with even more specific 
research questions are possible.  
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problem solver’s knowledge state as one factor into his notion of the “embodied 
and emotional action-perception cycles”. 
Research question 3 focused on the influence of the discovery of constraints on the 
problem solving process. Prior to the analysis, it was expected that boreholes could 
be used as hints as to where objects should be placed on the boards. Additionally, 
participants were assumed to use salient physical properties such as the bevel and 
the supporting system to distinguish between objects. The analysis revealed 
numerous functions in think aloud protocols and retrospective reports. Some 
functions were identified across verbal reports whereas others were unique to one 
kind. In addressing the function of constraints in the previous part of the 
discussion, two general classes were distinguished, i.e. ‘class of perception’ and 
‘class of usage’. The class of perception includes the category perception in which 
participants simply report noticing a constraint. This category could be identified 
in both data sets. The class of usage subsumes three categories of function in think 
aloud protocols, i.e. insights, strategy, and statements. The last category implies 
usage of constraints implicitly because constraints were used to draw general 
conclusions about objects or the assembly process. These conclusions were likely 
to influence further thoughts and actions. Sorting objects was among the strategic 
functions of constraints. This kind of strategic use can be interpreted as one form 
of active rearrangement of the environment to facilitate understanding and 
remembrance (Kirsh 1995; Kirsh 1996). Although it can be assumed that the focus 
was probably more on understanding than on remembrance in the analyzed 
scenario. 
The analysis revealed that the majority of functions (i.e. four out of five) that were 
described for think aloud protocols were also identified in retrospective reports, 
namely insight, puzzlement, strategy, and perception. However, statements about 
constraints were unique to think aloud protocols. Additionally, three new 
categories were identified in retrospective reports, i.e. description, distinguish, and 
function assignment. 
Comparing the distribution of categories defining the function of constraints 
between conditions, an influence of amount of prior information could be 
observed. Participants who were provided with few prior information, mentioned 
perceiving constraints more often than participants who were provided with much 
prior information (verbal and visual goal condition). Those participants tended to 
state facts about constraints. This finding suggests that constraints are integrated 
into an existing mental representation. This integration allows for conclusions 
about them, stated as a fact. Additionally, the findings highlighted that parti-
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cipants who were provided with much prior information, tended to use constraints 
at the level of interpretation, whereas participants who were provided with no 
specific information reported constraints at the level of sensing. 
Furthermore, the frequency analysis of those two categories within each kind of 
verbal report highlighted differences between verbal reports. More specifically, 
participants thinking aloud mentioned perceiving constraints most frequently, 
whereas function assignment was the most frequently used category in 
retrospective reports. The categories insight and strategy ranked second and third 
in both verbal reports but in reverse order. This finding suggests that perception 
was most important when the assembler was engaged in the task and noticing 
constraints fostered understanding. In retrospective reports the assigned function 
to an object was prominent. This impression is strengthened by comparing 
references to constraints within the class of perception to that within the class of 
usage. The comparison highlighted that participants thinking aloud referred to 
constraints within the class of usage more than half of all times but they also 
referred to the class of perception in one third of all cases. Participants who 
reported their actions and thoughts during the assembly, in contrast, mentioned 
constraints within the class of usage in 80.3% of the cases. Constraints within the 
class of perception were only mentioned in 11.7% of the cases. These results 
highlight the different character of verbal reports and their complementary nature. 
Interestingly, participants who were provided with no specific goal information 
(underspecified goal condition) reported using constraints at the level of 
interpretation to a comparable amount as participants who started their 
experiment with much prior information (verbal and visual goal condition). This 
finding suggests that reporting function assignment in retrospective reports was 
based on information stored in long-term memory. In order to use constraints 
strategically, the assembler needs to know about the actual or potential function of 
that constraint. The results in think aloud protocols suggest that participants who 
were provided with an external representation of the goal structure, were more 
likely to understand the function of a constraint and could thus use them 
strategically to facilitate the assembly process. It can be argued that the constraints 
and their function were well remembered in retrospective reports due to the 
facilitation affect. Participants who needed to create the goal structure without any 
prior information are likely to remember the function for the same reason, i.e. 
because knowing the function helped them to proceed. This makes it an important 
detail to store in long term-memory. 
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By combining the findings on the nature with those on the function of constraints, 
it was highlighted that some constraints were perceived as specifically well suited 
to serve a specific function. In order to draw general conclusions, the largest 
possible data set needs to be analyzed. Therefore, the analysis was based on the 
findings in think aloud protocols, retrospective reports, and instructions. The 
results revealed that each constraint served different functions, e.g. bevels were 
frequently used in function assignment but they were also referred to when 
participants reported distinguishing between objects. However, some constraints 
were specifically prominent in one functional category, such as the cultural 
constraint (roof) that was specifically helpful in assigning function to the goal 
object by raising expectations concerning its general nature. The finding that 
grooves frequently served function assignment confirmed the expectation that 
cultural knowledge about the use of constraints influenced the assembly process. 
More surprising and unexpected were the findings on the frequent strategic use of 
boreholes. Prior to the analysis, it was expected that participants would not pay 
attention to the boreholes because as there were no screws they did not have a 
function within this specific assembly context. The unexpectedly high frequency 
suggests that participants pay attention to constraints even if they are not crucial 
for the successful completion of the task. The findings support the assumption that 
clues, provided by the environment, are used if they facilitate the problem solving 
process by reducing the number of possibilities (Kirsh 2010). 
By analyzing the nature and function of constraints in instructions, the importance 
of individual constraints was highlighted because instructors were expected to use 
constraints to facilitate the assembly process for their partner. Based on the 
previous observations, instructors were expected to use boreholes strategically, for 
indicating the spatial layout for example. Additionally, instructors were expected 
to refer to the supporting system and the bevel for distinguishing between objects. 
The results highlighted that instructors referred to constraints more frequently 
(M = 8.50) than participants thinking aloud (M = 3.20) and reporting their 
activities (M = 2.22). Moreover, instructors mentioned the same constraints that 
were previously identified. This finding suggests that instructors used their own 
experiences as assemblers to facilitate the assembly process for their partners. The 
analysis revealed that instructors used constraints strategically for distinguishing 
between objects, for assigning function, or for describing objects. However, 
constraints were most frequently used to coordinate the placement of objects and 
to describe their orientation. This observation confirms the expectation that 
boreholes were used for indicating the spatial layout of the assembly structure and 
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individual objects. Unexpectedly, the salient feature supporting system was hardly 
referred to at all and seldom to distinguish between objects. Instructors rather 
used bevels to point out differences between objects. If constraints were used to 
assign function to objects, which was rarely done, instructors always referred to 
grooves. At the level of description, instructors mentioned grooves, boreholes, and 
bevels. The observation that they mentioned those constraints to a comparable 
degree suggests that bevels were frequently described but its function was not 
made explicit. 
In sum, the qualitative analysis highlighted a number of constraints that were 
assigned different functions in unaided object assembly. Moreover, the 
quantitative analysis confirmed the expectation that constraints are verbalized at 
different frequencies. However, not the most salient constraints were mentioned 
most frequently. The analysis rather highlighted that constraints were mentioned 
that were evaluated as meaningful because they served a specific function within 
the assembly or give off information as to possible object configurations or actions 
that can be performed. This finding can be generalized by proposing two factors 
that influence the active use of constraints; first, the meaningfulness that can be 
assigned to a constraint and second the importance that is assigned to a constraint 
by the assembler. In general, the analysis illustrated how additional insights can be 
gained by analyzing different kinds of verbal reports and how trends that show in 
one kind of verbal report can be supported and strengthened by trends observed in 
other kinds of verbal reports.  
Given that this analysis, at least to my knowledge, is the first empirical study that 
investigates the nature and use of constraints the conclusions are tentative but as 
outlined in the discussion, the findings in different data sets make clear 
suggestions. Besides contributing first insights on the nature and function of 
constraints, this analysis presents one approach to the methodological challenges 
posed by analyzing everyday problem solving activities. Encouraged by the finding 
that Norman’s (2002) categorization can be adopted to describe the general nature 
of the identified constraints, the presented methodology seems well suited to be 
adopted to analyze the use of constraints in other problem solving experiments as 
well. 
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9.7 Appendix 
9.7.1 Nature and function of constraints in think aloud 
protocols 
category underspecified goal 
condition 
verbal goal condition verbal and visual goal 
condition 
label 3 (M = 0.18, SD = 0.73) 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.25) 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.75) 
supporting 
system 
3 (M = 0.18, SD = 0.39) 4 (M = 0.25, SD = 0.58) 6 (M = 0.35, SD = 0.86) 
groove 11 (M = 0.64, SD = 1.17) 3 (M = 0.19, SD = 0.54) 7 (M = 0.41, SD = 1.00) 
picture 0 0 11 (M = 0.65, SD = 0.86) 
borehole 16 (M = 0.94, SD = 2.01) 20 (M = 1.25, SD = 2.21) 16 (M = 0.94, SD = 1.56) 
bevel 2 (M = 0.12, SD = 0.33) 19 (M = 1.19, SD = 2.32) 9 (M = 0.53, SD = 1.07) 
connector 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.56) 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.58) 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.56) 
connection 3 (M = 0.18, SD = 0.73) 4 (M = 0.25, SD = 0.68) 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.56) 
no screwing 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.25) 1 (M = 0.19, SD = 0.54) 0 
others 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 0 0 
all 44 (M = 2.59, SD = 3.14) 58 (M = 3.36, SD = 4.40) 58 (M = 3.41, SD = 3.66) 
Table 9.28: Raw frequency, mean, and standard deviation of categories describing the nature of 
constraints in think aloud protocols. 
category nature of 
constraints 
underspecified goal 
condition 
verbal goal condition verbal and visual 
goal condition 
label 0.4 -1.2 0.9 
supporting system -0.4 -0.5 0.9 
groove 1.9 -1.8 -0.1 
borehole 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
bevel -2.3 2.1 -0.2 
connector 0.2 -0.3 0.1 
connection 0.4 0.5 -1.0 
no screwing -0.2 1.2 -1.1 
others 1.3 -0.6 -0.6 
Table 9.29: Standardized residuals for distribution of categories describing nature of constraints 
between conditions in think aloud protocols. 
category raw frequency mean standard deviation 
semantic constraint 72 1.44 2.08 
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logical constraint 34 0.68 1.15 
physical constraint 30 0.60 1.50 
task induced 
constraint 
15 0.30 0.65 
cultural constraint 8 0.16 0.62 
others 1 0.02 0.14 
all 160 3.20 3.70 
Table 9.30: Results frequency of categories describing the general nature of constraints in think aloud 
protocols; sorted from most to least frequent. 
category underspecified goal 
condition 
verbal goal condition verbal and visual goal 
condition 
logical 14 (M = 0.82, SD = 1.33) 7 (M = 0.44, SD = 0.89) 13 (M = 0.76, SD = 1.20) 
physical 2 (M = 0.12, SD = 0.33) 19 (M = 1.19, SD = 2.32) 9 (M = 0.53, SD = 1.07) 
semantic 23 (M = 1.35, SD = 2.00) 28 (M = 1.75, SD = 2.43) 21 (M = 1.24, SD = 11.86) 
cultural 3 (M = 0.18, SD = 0.73) 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.25) 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.75) 
task 
induced 
1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 3 (M = 0.19, SD = 0.55) 11 (M = 0.65, SD = 0.86) 
others 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 0 0 
all 44 (M = 2.59, SD = 3.14) 58 (M = 3.36, SD = 4.40) 58 (M = 3.41, SD = 3.66) 
Table 9.31: Raw frequency, mean, and standard deviation of categories describing the general nature of 
constraints in think aloud protocols. 
category definition examples 
insight a) understanding the function of a 
feature 
b) assigning function to an object 
c) no connectors are provided 
a) „ach deswegen hat der auch 
so ne Einkerbung“ [2] 
b) „scheint mir so ne Art 
Verbindungsteil zu sein“ [10] 
c) „es gibt wohl keine Stecker“ 
[10] 
strategy a) recognizing and making use of 
object features such as holes or 
groove 
b) using world knowledge to search 
for things that may be useful 
a) „dass die auf den Löchern 
drauf sind“ [14]; „die haben 
hier extra solche 
Einkerbungen / damit ich da 
reinstecken kann“ [23] 
b) „ich bräuchte irgendwelche 
Bolzen oder so“ [24]; „wo 
finde ich Verbindungsteile?“ 
[20] 
perception a) object features are perceived 
b) objects and its assigned function 
are perceived 
a) „und dann hier dieses auch mit 
so ner Einkerbung“ [8] 
b) „und oh hier ist ne schöne 
Steckverbindung über“ [17] 
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puzzlement asking oneself about the function of a 
perceived feature or placement of an 
object 
„diese Noppen sollen die unten 
stehen?“ [10]; „und wozu sind 
diese Löcher hier?“ [44] 
statement a) stating a fact 
b) evaluative statement about an 
object referring to the memorized 
picture 
c) repetition of task instructions 
a) „auf dem Bild sah das gar nicht 
so schwer aus“ [14] 
b) „aber so ähnlich wie auf dem 
Bild sieht das aus“ [27] 
c) „ohne Schrauben“ [31] 
Table 9.32: Classification of functions identified in think aloud protocols; examples in the German original.  
category underspecified goal 
condition 
verbal goal condition verbal and visual goal 
condition 
insight 10 (M = 0.59, SD = 0.87) 15 (M = 0.94, SD = 1.77) 17 (M = 1.00, SD = 1.27) 
strategy 11 (M = 0.65, SD = 1.27) 13 (M = 0.81, SD = 1.22) 13 (M = 0.76, SD = 1.15) 
perception 17 (M = 1.00, SD = 1.66) 22 (M = 1.38, SD = 1.31) 11 (M = 0.65, SD = 0.93) 
puzzlement 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.44) 3 (M = 0.19, SD = 0.54) 7 (M = 0.41, SD = 0.71) 
statement 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 5 (M = 0.31, SD = 0.70) 10 (M = 0.59, SD = 0.71) 
all 44 (M = 2.59, SD = 3.14) 58 (M = 3.63, SD = 4.40) 58 (M = 3.41, SD = 3.66) 
Table 9.33: Raw frequency, mean, and standard deviation of categories describing the function of 
constraints in think aloud protocols. 
9.7.2 Nature and function of constraints in retrospective 
reports 
category underspecified goal 
condition 
verbal goal condition verbal and visual goal 
condition 
supporting 
system 
4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.56) 5 (M = 0.31, SD = 0.48) 10 (M = 0.59, SD = 0.87) 
groove 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 2 (M = 0.13, SD = 0.34) 5 (M = 0.29, SD = 0.47) 
picture 0 0 6 (M = 0.35, SD = 0.49) 
borehole 2 (M = 0.12, SD = 0.33) 8 (M = 0.50, SD = 0.82) 7 (M = 0.41, SD = 0.71) 
bevel 6 (M = 0.35, SD = 0.79) 7 (M = 0.44, SD = 0.73) 12 (M = 0.71, SD = 0.69) 
connection 2 (M = 0.12, SD = 0.49) 0 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 
no screwing 0 2 (M = 0.13, SD = 0.34) 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 
others 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.25) 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.25) 5 (M = 0.29, SD = 0.59) 
roof 8 (M = 0.47, SD = 0.51) 2 (M = 0.13, SD = 0.34) 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.44) 
analogy 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.25) 2 (M = 0.13, SD = 0.34) 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.44) 
all 27 (M = 1.59, SD = 1.50) 29 (M = 1.81, SD = 1.94) 55 (M = 3.24, SD = 2.39) 
Table 9.34: Raw frequency, mean, and standard deviation of categories describing the nature of 
constraints in retrospective reports. 
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category underspecified goal 
condition 
verbal goal condition verbal and visual goal 
condition 
logical 6 (M = 0.35, SD = 0.61) 9 (M = 0.56, SD = 0.73) 19 (M = 1.12, SD = 1.41) 
physical 6 (M = 0.35, SD = 0.79) 7 (M = 0.44, SD = 0.73) 12 (M = 0.71, SD = 0.69) 
semantic 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.56) 8 (M = 0.50, SD = 0.82) 8 (M = 0.47, SD = 0.72) 
cultural 8 (M = 0.47, SD = 0.51) 2 (M = 0.13, SD = 0.34) 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.44) 
task induced 2 (M = 0.12, SD = 0.49) 2 (M = 0.13, SD = 0.34) 7 (M = 0.41, SD = 0.51) 
others 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 5 (M = 0.29, SD = 0.59) 
all 27 (M = 1.59, SD = 1.50) 29 (M = 1.81, SD = 1.94) 55 (M = 3.24, SD = 2.39) 
Table 9.35: Raw frequency, mean, and standard deviation of categories describing the general nature 
of constraints in think aloud protocols. 
category definition examples 
description a) object features are 
described 
b) general thoughts about 
observed features are 
reported 
a) „mir ist aufgefallen, dass hier diese 
Halbkugeln dran sind“ [16] 
b) „dann hab ich mir Gedanken darüber 
gemacht wies wohl ist ohne 
schrauben äh ohne Schrauben klar zu 
kommen weil ja die Löcher ähm in 
den Bodenteilen vorhanden sind“ [31] 
perception features are reported to have 
been observed 
„weil ich ja auch gesehen habe, dass es da 
irgendwie ähm Löcher für Schrauben 
gibt“ [21] 
„ich hatte zuvor aber erstmal die Ecken 
erkannt“ [27] 
distinguish object features are used to 
distinguish between objects 
„dann fiel mir auf, dass dann äh einige 
Platten so abgeschrägt sind und die 
dachte ich ähm und die anderen gerade“ 
[25] 
„danach hab ich dann diese äh ohne 
Schrägen Dinger eingebaut“ [31] 
function 
assignment 
a) function is assigned to 
objects by means of 
constraints 
b) function of constraints is 
explained 
a) „zum Beispiel dieses rote Dach hat 
mich an n Dach erinnert“ [10]; „also 
mir ist halt relativ schnell aufgefallen, 
dass es halt hier Kanten so 
Schnittkanten hat, dass es halt zum 
Dach gehören muss“ [18] 
b) „man kann sie also schlecht wenn 
mans dieses Verbindungsstück 
dazwischenstecken will irgendwie 
anders anordnen“ [19]; „bin ich ja 
relativ schnell drauf gekommen, dass 
die schrägen Seiten nach oben 
müssen damit das Dach halten und 
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dass das Ganze zweitsöckig ist“ [23] 
insight conclusions about objects 
are based on perceived 
constraints 
„bin dann auf die Idee gekommen dass 
die teile die ich unten eingebaut hab 
wahrscheinlich nach oben kommen weil 
die angeschrägt sind so wie das dass und 
weil die Form dann wieder ineinander 
passte“ [47]; „allerdings waren die Wände 
da nicht außen abgeflacht und äh das 
Dach hätte nicht raufgepasst also muss-
ten logischerweise die Wände mit den 
Kugeln auf den Säulen nach unten“ [59] 
puzzlement constraints cannot be 
conceptualized and leave the 
assembler puzzled 
„war die ganze Zeit irritiert von diesen Ku-
geln hier weil ich immer dachte so die sind 
so schön abgerundet die müssen ja irgend-
wo oben ähm wahrscheinlich sein“ [20]; 
„und ich hab mich zwischendurch gefragt 
warum die einen hier rund sind und die 
anderen nicht“ [22]; „äh Verwirrung hat bei 
mir gestiftet, dass mache solchen Pinökel 
oben drauf haben andere nicht“ [50] 
strategy strategic use of constraints 
by  
a) consciously disregarding 
them 
b) using them for 
orientation e.g. in 
putting & arranging 
objects 
c) using them to sort 
objects 
a) „hab dann irgendwie auch das Bild 
son bisschen aus dem Kopf gelegt“ 
[20] 
b) „dann hab ich äh mich an den Kugeln 
an diesen Kugeln oben drauf orientier 
und hab gedacht ok das ist dann da-
rauf können die nicht stehen dann 
weiß ich wo oben und unten ist“ [24]; 
„die zusammengesteckt, so dass die 
Löcher passen“ [26]; „ kam irgend-
wann der Durchbruch irgendwas ach 
ja genau ich hab das geordnet nach 
den Löchern und hab geguckt wo was 
reinpasst“ [32] 
c) „genau dann ham wir halt versucht 
schrägen Wände und die äh Kugeln zu 
trennen“ [16]; „und als nächstes hat-
te ich mich an diesen Schrägen die 
sind mir als nächstes aufgefallen und 
dann hab ich gedacht alles klar das 
muss irgendwie mit dem Dach zusam-
menhängen hab dann eben sortiert in 
ähm die Teile die vom Obergeschoss 
sein müssen und vom unteren“ [24] 
Table 9.36: Categories of functions identified in retrospective reports: definitions and examples 
(German original wording). 
category underspecified goal verbal goal condition verbal and visual goal 
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condition condition 
description 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 4 (M = 0.25, SD = 0.45) 5 (M = 0.29, SD = 0.59) 
perception 2 (M = 0.12, SD = 0.49) 0 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 
distinguish 4 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.56) 2 (M = 0.13, SD = 0.34) 3 (M = 0.18, SD = 0.53) 
function 
assignment 
16 (M = 0.94, SD = 0.90) 9 (M = 0.56, SD = 0.81) 19 (M = 1.12, SD = 0.62) 
insight 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 5 (M = 0.31, SD = 0.48) 7 (M = 0.41, SD = 0.62) 
puzzlement 2 (M = 0.12, SD = 0.33) 2 (M = 0.13, SD = 0.34) 5 (M = 0.29, SD = 0.59) 
strategy 1 (M = 0.06, SD = 0.24) 7 (M = 0.44, SD = 0.73) 15 (M = 0.88, 
SD = 0.99) 
all 27 (M = 1.59, SD = 1.50) 29 (M = 1.81, SD = 1.94) 55 (M = 3.24, 
SD = 2.39) 
Table 9.37: Raw frequency, mean, and standard deviation of categories describing the function of 
constraints in retrospective reports. 
9.7.3 Nature and function of constraints in instructions 
category raw frequency mean standard deviation 
logical constraint 26 1.63 1.15 
physical constraint 33 2.06 2.95 
semantic constraint 73 4.56 4.82 
cultural constraint 0   
task induced 
constraint 
0   
others 4 0.25 0.77 
all 136 8.5 5.72 
Table 9.38: Frequency of categories defining constraints in general terms in instructions; raw 
frequency, mean, and standard deviation. 
category definition examples 
description object features are pointed out 
the current assembly status is 
described 
„wie du siehst haben die hier so 
eine Rille, eine Fuge“ [2] 
„hier sind noch keine Schrägen 
eingebaut“ [3] 
distinguish Features are highlighted to 
distinguish the object in focus from 
others. This is done by means of 
comparison or contrast. 
„im Prinzip all die Elemente, die wir 
gerad schon hatten nur mit 
Schrägen dran“ [3] 
function 
assignment 
Highlighting or mentioning the 
function that a feature serves in the 
whole assembly. 
„in diese Einkerbungen kommen die 
beiden Holz kommen die beiden äh 
Rückbauelemente“ [3] 
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orientation Object features are used to explain 
the orientation of an object. 
„dass du auf der rechten Seite zwei 
Löcher vor dir hast“ [2] 
placement Object features are used to describe 
where and how to position an object 
in relation to others. 
„genau auf diese drei Löcher“ [2]; 
„und schieben die Bretter links und 
rechts von der Fräsnaht in die 
blauen Stangen rein“ [6] 
comment 
about self 
Comment about instructor’s own 
assembly process. 
„und bei den Schrägen habe ich 
mich ständig vertan“ [5]; „ich hab 
noch darauf geachtet, dass diese 
Löcher unten sind an dem Brett“ [5] 
strategy Point out object features and explain 
their strategic use for the assembly 
process. 
„dass wir die Bohrlöcher beachten“ 
[20] 
Table 9.39: Classification of functions identified in instructions, examples in German. 
9.7.4 Nature and function of constraints between verbal 
reports 
kind of verbal report borehole bevel groove 
think aloud 0 -0.4 0.5 
instruction 1.0 -1.1 -0.2 
retrospective report -1.6 2.4 -0.4 
Table 9.40: Standardized residuals for distribution of categories describing nature of constraints 
between investigated kinds of verbal reports. 
kind of verbal report semantic constraints logical constraints physical constraints 
think aloud 0.9 -0.5 -0.8 
instruction -2.9 2.7 1.1 
retrospective report 1.3 -1.6 -0.1 
Table 9.41: Standardized residuals for distribution of categories describing the general nature of 
constraints between investigated kinds of verbal reports. 
kind of verbal report insight strategy 
think aloud 4.1 -2.6 
instruction comb. -4.7 3.0 
retrospective report 0.9 -0.5 
Table 9.42: Standardized residuals for distribution of categories describing functions of constraints 
between investigated kinds of verbal reports. 
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9.7.5 Investigating the nature of constraints within 
functions 
 su
pp
or
tin
g 
sy
st
em
 
gr
oo
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bo
re
ho
le
 
be
ve
l 
an
al
og
y 
ro
of
 
la
be
l 
pi
ct
ur
e 
co
nn
ec
to
r 
co
nn
ec
tio
n 
insight 0 5.5 
(3.54) 
5.0 
(5.66) 
9.0 
(0.66) 
0.5 
(0.71) 
0 0.5 
(0.71) 
0.5 
(0.71) 
3.5 
(4.95) 
1.0 
(1.41) 
strate-
gy 
0.67 
(0.58) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
12.0 
(8.55) 
3.0 
(2.0) 
1.33 
(2.31) 
0 0.67 
(1.15) 
1.0 (1.0) 1.0 
(1.73) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
percep-
tion 
4.0 
(4.24) 
6.0 
(8.49) 
9.5 
(12.02) 
4.0 
(5.66) 
0 0 2.0 
(2.83) 
0 0 1.5 
(2.12) 
puzzle-
ment 
4.0 
(1.41) 
0 2.5 
(2.12) 
0 0 0 0.5 
(0.71) 
0 1.0 
(1.41) 
0.5 
(0.71) 
de-
scrip-
tion 
0 6.0 
(8.49) 
7.0 
(8.49) 
6.5 
(7.78) 
0.5 
(0.71) 
0 0 1.5 
(2.12) 
0 0.5 
(0.71) 
distin-
guish 
2.50 
(3.54) 
0.5 
(0.71) 
0.5 
(0.71) 
5.0 
(2.83) 
0.5 
(0.71) 
0 0 0 0 0 
func-
tion as-
sign-
ment 
2.50 
(3.54) 
5.5 
(0.71) 
1.0 
(1.41) 
6.0 
(8.49) 
0 7.0 
(9.90) 
0 0.5 
(0.71) 
0 1.0 
(1.41) 
strate-
gy 
com-
bined 
1.33 
(0.58) 
1.67 
(2.08) 
28.67 
(22.50) 
6.33 
(4.16) 
1.33 
(2.31) 
0 0.67 
(1.15) 
1.0 (1.0) 1.0 
(1.73) 
1.0 (1.0) 
Table 9.43: Overview frequency of constraints within functions; mean and standard deviation. 
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insight 1 11 10 18 1 0 1 1 7 2 
strate-
gy 
2 1 36 9 4 0 2 3 3 2 
percep-
tion 
8 12 19 8 0 0 4 0 0 3 
puzzle-
ment 
8 0 5 2 0 0 1 2 2 1 
descrip
tion 
2 12 14 13 1 0 0 3 0 1 
distin-
guish 
5 1 1 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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func-
tion as-
sign-
ment 
5 11 2 12 0 0 0 1 0 2 
strate-
gy 
com-
bined 
2 4 54 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Table 9.44: Overview frequency of constraints within functions; raw frequency. 
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groove 0.7 1.1 -0.8 1.1 -1.0 2.3 -2,9 
borehole -1.7 0.4 -1.2 -0.8 -1.9 -2.7 4.2 
bevel 1.4 -1.4 2.0 0 3.0 1.3 -2.5 
Table 9.45: Standardized residuals for distribution of categories describing the nature of constraints 
within categories describing the function of constraints. 
9.7.6 Frequency of constraints across assembly process 
condition 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter 
underspecified goal 0.3 0.9 0 -1.3 
verbal goal -1.7 -0.9 2.0 0.1 
verbal and visual 
goal 
1.5 0.2 -2.0 1.0 
Table 9.46: Standardized residuals for frequency of constraints within the four quarters of the 
assembly process. 
condition 1st half 2nd half 
underspecified goal 23 (52.27%) 21 (47.73%) 
verbal goal 16 (27.59%) 42 (72.41%) 
verbal and visual goal 31 (53.45%) 27 (46.55%) 
all 70 (43.75%) 90 (56.25%) 
Table 9.47: Frequency of constraints within the two parts of the assembly process, raw frequency and 
percentage. 
9.7.7 Answers to guided questions 
answers raw frequency mean standard deviation 
noticed groove  43 0.86 0.35 
groove unnoticed 3 0.06 0.24 
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used groove 18 0.36 0.48 
groove unused 14 0.28 0.45 
groove partially 
used 
3 0.06 0.24 
groove irritated 7 0.14 0.35 
uncertain 1 0.02 0.14 
Table 9.48: Answers to the first interview question, i.e. “Did you notice this groove? And did you use it 
as a guide?”; raw frequency, mean, and standard deviation. 
answers raw frequency mean standard deviation 
noticed borehole  46 0.92 0.27 
borehole unnoticed 0 0 0 
used borehole 21 0.42 0.50 
borehole unused 20 0.40 0.50 
borehole partially 
used 
5 0.10 0.30 
Table 9.49: Answers to the second interview question, i.e. “Did you notice the boreholes? And did you 
use them as a guide?”; raw frequency, mean, and standard deviation. 
answers raw frequency mean standard deviation 
noticed label  29 0.58 0.45 
label unnoticed 17 0.34 0.48 
used label 13 0.26 0.44 
label unused 13 0.26 0.44 
label not helpful 3 0.06 0.24 
Table 9.50: Answers to the third interview question, i.e. “Did you notice this label? And did you use it as 
a guide?”; raw frequency, mean, and standard deviation. 
 

 10 Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigated problem solving processes in unaided object assembly and 
their linguistic representation. In the experimental studies participants were faced 
with the task of assembling a two-story dollhouse. As they were not provided with 
a manual, they needed to figure out the function of each of the 13 wooden objects 
and their arrangement by themselves. 
Studying performance on assembly tasks is scientifically interesting because people 
engage in assembly tasks, especially furniture assembly, quite frequently 
(Richardson 2007). In this field of research, most researchers tended to focus either 
on manual design with the aim to create better manuals (e.g. Marcus et al. 1996; 
Maes et al. 2004; Tversky et al. 2009; Daniel & Tversky 2012) or on general 
procedures (e.g. Helander & Willén 2003; Richardson et al. 2004). Understanding 
of general procedures is specifically interesting with regard to the automation of 
assembly steps. A few months ago, for example, computer scientists demonstrated 
that two robots can jointly assemble a coffee table sold at the IKEA furniture store 
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(Knepper et al. 2013). This table consisted of five wooden objects; those were four 
legs and the tabletop, i.e. a square board in descriptive terms. The robots did not 
use the instructions but figured out how objects needed to be arranged and 
fastened by themselves; the computer script simply contained general operations 
that are necessary in an assembly task.  
This thesis extended previous research on manuals and general procedures by 
investigating mental processes that are involved when humans solve an assembly 
task. Mental processes were studied by eliciting verbalizations of thought during 
assembly performance, i.e. think aloud protocols, and analyzing those ver-
balizations concerning their content as well as their linguistic structure, i.e. verb 
phrases, noun phrase, and discourse markers. These protocols were supplemented 
by other kinds of verbal reports and performance measures, such as assembly 
success and time. The aim of this extended approach was two-fold. First, it was 
intended to shed light on people’s performance by studying which problem solving 
processes are verbalized and identify structural patterns describing their 
occurrence. Second, the linguistic analysis aimed at describing features of problem 
solving processes to highlight systematic recurring patterns. Methodologically, 
these aims were approached by combining content-based protocol analysis with 
Cognitive Discourse Analysis that focuses on the investigation of linguistic features 
in verbal data. 
10.2 Main findings  
Think aloud protocols are widely used in problem solving research (e.g. de Groot 
1969; Newell & Simon 1972; Roth 1985; Bartl & Dörner 1998). It is assumed that 
verbalizations in think aloud protocols represent traces of problem solving 
processes that are generated while solving the task (e.g. Ericsson & Simon 1993). 
Traditionally, problem solving research focused on the investigation of logic based 
and well-defined problem solving tasks, such as chess or the Tower of Hanoi. More 
recent studies investigate problem solving behavior on real world problems such as 
navigation through an unfamiliar environment (e.g. Tenbrink et al. 2011) or 
collectively solving a problem in an office environment (e.g. Steffensen 2013). 
Similar to the approach presented in this thesis, the analysis of think aloud 
protocols or transcripts of conversations was supplemented by analyses of other 
kinds of verbal reports and further performance measures in these studies.  
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The use of think aloud protocols raises the controversially debated question of 
reactivity, i.e. the influence of verbalization on task performance. Studies in-
vestigating this kind of reactivity yielded different results (e.g. Ahlum-Heath & Di 
Vesta 1986; Deffner 1989; Short et al. 1993; Schooler et al. 1994; Gilhooly et al. 2010). 
However, it is generally agreed that the wording of the instructions and the nature 
of the task determine if there is an effect and in which direction, i.e. positive or 
negative. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to collect a silent control group to 
compare their performance to that of participants thinking aloud. In the presented 
experiments, the comparison of the mean assembly times recorded for the silent 
control group to those recorded for the group assembling while verbalizing their 
thoughts revealed that participants thinking aloud were significantly faster. This 
finding suggests that verbalization of thoughts facilitated assembly performance. 
However, verbalization did not affect assembly success. This observation suggests 
that verbalization speeded up performance but it did not influence performance 
on the conceptual level. 
10.2.1 Problem solving processes in unaided object 
assembly and their linguistic representation  
The analysis of think aloud protocols revealed seven problem solving processes, 
out of which five are well described in the literature, namely hypothesis, action, 
evaluation, dead end, and fresh start. Additionally, two categories were identified 
that are not described in traditional accounts, i.e. description of mental state and 
comment on object features.  
In the present problem context, hypothesis was the most frequently verbalized 
process. Hypotheses concerned different aspects of the assembly process. These 
aspects were related either to the level of conceptualization of objects, the level of 
planning, or to the level of physical manipulation. At the level of conceptual-
ization, assemblers proposed functions of objects, such as “presumably those are 
the floors and those over here are the walls” [16]. This specific aspect of explicit 
function assignment was investigated in more detail. The linguistic analysis 
revealed two different types of explicit function assignment that express different 
levels of certainty. Function was either assigned with high certainty by stating 
“those are the floors” (direct mapping) or with a tentative character as in “those 
look like walls” (representational mapping). In direct mapping phrases the verb 
‘sein’ (be) was most frequent indicating that the assigned nature is assumed as 
given. In some cases, participants used markers such as modal verbs or modal 
adverbs, as ‘presumably’ in the example above, to weaken the proposal. In 
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representational mapping phrases verbs such as ‘aussehen wie’ (look like) expressed 
function assignment based on comparisons or verbs such as ‘nehmen als’ (use as) 
highlighted that the speaker’s decision was related to the current situation. 
At the level of planning, future actions were specified as in „ok dann ähm kommt 
das natürlich alles aufs zweite“ (“ok then uhm this goes on the second”) [16]. In 
this example, ‘second’ refers to the second story and the speaker recognizes that 
some objects need to be placed on the second story. At the level of physical 
manipulation, hypotheses expressed possible configurations of objects or their 
position, e.g. “probably this way in order for the walls to stand like this” [16]. The 
linguistic analysis revealed that hypotheses were commonly marked by verbs of 
being and having, such as ‘be’, ‘look like’, and ‘stand’ in the given examples. Verbs 
were most frequently marked by the present tense and indicative mood. In some 
cases, the subjunctive mood was used to indicate the tentative character of the 
formulated assumption or proposal. This character was emphasized by the modal 
verb ‘können’ (could), modal adverbs that signal tentativeness (e.g. ‘vermutlich’ 
(presumably), ‘wahrscheinlich’ (probably)), and adverbs that mark indefiniteness, 
such as ‘einige’ (some), ‘irgendwie’ (somehow), ‘irgendwo’ (somewhere), and 
‘irgendwas’ (something). 
The second most frequently observed process was that of evaluation. This super-
ordinate category comprises two categories that can be distinguished based on the 
conclusions that are drawn, namely positive evaluations and negative evaluations. 
In the given context, different aspects of the assembly task were evaluated. First, 
participants evaluated their understanding of the task or more specifically of the 
structure that they were instructed to assemble, e.g. “suddenly everything becomes 
clearer” [27] in the sense of ‘now everything makes sense’. Second, assemblers 
evaluated the possibility that objects could be inserted or fastened, e.g. “yes they fit 
in here” [27], and that the structure would be stable, e.g. “now it does not bounce 
that much anymore” [27]. Third, assemblers evaluated sub-assemblies, e.g. “and 
then we have assembled the basement already” [58]. 
As illustrated by the examples, evaluations were commonly marked by verbs of 
being and having in the present tense. This highlights that assemblers evaluated 
current states. Positive evaluations frequently contained the discourse marker ‘so’ 
(so) signaling confirmation of previous expectations (Erben 1972) as well as the 
ending of sub-processes (Tenbrink 2008). This finding strengthens the interpreta-
tion that participants focused on the present situation and manipulated objects in 
the physical world rather than mentally simulating possible actions. Additionally, 
affirmative particles such as ‘gut’ (good) along with ‘sehr gut’ (very good), and the 
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comparative ‘besser’ (better) were identified in numerous positive evaluations. 
Negative evaluations frequently contained negations such as ‘nein’ (no) or ‘keine’ 
(none) and adverbs signaling uncertainty; ‘irgendwie’ (somehow) was specifically 
prominent. 
Besides hypotheses and evaluations, actions were frequently verbalized. The 
majority of actions started at the moment of speaking. Only few instances of 
planning were identified. Planning phrases indicated that sub-processes needed to 
be performed. In the example “thus I will work on the second story now” [24] a 
plan was verbalized that involved numerous actions although they were not 
specifically spelled out at that moment. Immediate actions were expressed by 
phrases such as “this I put in the edge now” [27]. As expected, the linguistic 
analysis highlighted that actions were marked by verbs of doing and happening, 
such as ‘work’ or ‘put’ in the present tense and indicative mood as shown in the 
examples. The future tense was rarely used in the investigated assembly context. 
Additionally, actions were marked by temporal markers that stress that the present 
situation is the reference frame, e.g. ‘jetzt’ (now). 
Dead ends and fresh starts were rarely observed in the analyzed data. This could be 
an effect of the experimental design because participants were allowed to move 
objects freely and all actions could be redone if they proofed to be wrong. Some 
protocols contained utterances in which helplessness was expressed, e.g. “by now I 
am ready to give up” [32]. In some cases, assemblers verbalized reasons for this 
dead end state, e.g. “and at the moment I see I do not know how to proceed” [54] 
or “I do not know where to start” [37]. In some fresh starts participants explicitly 
verbalized the decision to start over again, e.g. “ok maybe I start over again” [62] or 
“back again” [59]. 
In sum, think aloud protocols contain much information on hypotheses 
concerning function and position of objects, evaluations of achieved sates as well 
as actions that are performed. These are components of the general ‘search and 
test’ procedure as proposed by Newell and Simon (1972). The combination of 
existing information along with the generation of new information in hypotheses 
expresses the verbalization of the search process through the problem space. The 
verbalization of actions resembles the execution process within the ‘test’ procedure 
that is completed by the evaluation process. Processes that were less frequently 
observed, such as dead end and fresh start, resemble alternative ending or 
beginning sequences of a ‘search and test’ procedure. However, it seems that these 
were rarely verbalized because of the given reversible nature of the task. 
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In addition to these processes, two processes were frequently verbalized that were 
not described in the literature before. First, the content-based analysis revealed 
numerous instances in which assemblers described their mental state, e.g. “I am 
curious about the parts that are in the box here” [10] or “a little difficult (…) I find it 
a little difficult because I don’t if these parts shall be up or down” [18]. As these 
examples illustrate, descriptions of mental state contain statements about the 
assembler’s consciousness. The linguistic analysis revealed that those statements 
were frequently marked by verbs of sensing such as ‘think’, ‘believe’, and ‘hope’ in 
present tense and indicative mood. The frequent use of the personal pronoun ‘I’ 
signals that the speaker refers to himself/herself as the source of information as in 
“right now I am asking myself …” [10] or “what is written there I do not know” [18]. 
As the first example illustrates, emotions were also expressed in descriptions of 
mental state, in this example the assembler refers to curiosity. 
Second, assemblers also mentioned object features such as color, shape, or other 
physical properties, e.g. “this looks like an edge” [27] or “so uh there are these half 
like balls up here” [16] that were based on perceptual information. Sometimes 
object features were commented on by stating that a specific feature that was 
previously encountered was missing, e.g. “surprisingly there is no such notch here” 
[25]. Some objects were expected in the present context based on prior knowledge 
or because of physical properties but those were not provided, e.g. “apparently 
there are no connecting devices” [16]. This comment on a missing object implies 
that the assembler expected to find connecting devices of some sort. Comments on 
object features were frequently marked by verbs of being and having in present 
tense and indicative mood supporting the assumption that participants verbalized 
noticing features at the moment of perception or shortly after. 
These additional processes highlight that participants followed the instruction to 
verbalize whatever came to their minds even feelings that are raised. This suggests 
that participants did not select information that is not verbalized in public 
normally, such as turning to oneself for an answer. This impression is strengthened 
by those cases in which participants admitted that they felt overwhelmed and did 
not know how to proceed, i.e. in dead end states. The verbalization of object 
features suggests that participants verbalized perceptual information when 
perceiving it. Moreover, the analysis of process sequences highlighted that such 
comments were frequently followed by a hypothesis. This pattern suggests that 
participants integrated these features into the existing mental representation and 
used them as cues for processes such as function assignment. This aspect is further 
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investigated in the analysis of constraints that will be reviewed in the next sub-
section. 
Besides identifying problem solving processes and describing their linguistic 
structure, the annotated data was analyzed to highlight recurring sequences of 
processes. The analysis highlighted traditionally assumed sequences of processes 
that are generally described as a ‘search and test’ procedure (e.g. Newell & Simon 
1972). Moreover, the analysis revealed that the expected sequence of hypothesis ? 
action ? evaluation was very frequent. As outlined above, hypotheses represent 
expressions of the search process in which potential arrangements and 
conceptualizations of objects are generated, i.e. referred to as ‘new states’ in 
Newell and Simon (1972). The verbalization of actions reflects the instantiation of 
these new states. Combined with the evaluation of the created state, this execution 
of actions represents the proposed test procedure. Furthermore, it was possible to 
extract common four process sequences, such as hypothesis ? action ? evaluation ? 
hypothesis. This sequence suggests that the closing of one ‘search and test’ 
procedure was followed by a new ‘search’ process. This sequence represents the 
cyclic nature of problem solving processes that is proposed in the literature (e.g. de 
Groot 1969; Dörner 1987).  
However, it needs to be stressed that a great variability of process sequences was 
observed. Besides these commonly proposed sequences, the analysis revealed that 
processes were repeated before new processes were verbalized, e.g. hypothesis ? 
action ? action ? hypothesis. Due to this great variability, it was difficult to assess 
the prominence of individual combinations because frequency of individual 
combinations decreased drastically by including one more process into the 
analysis, i.e. analyzing sequences containing three instead of two processes. This 
observation illustrates the difficulties that are encountered if processes are 
analyzed in more than one protocol. However, it also suggests that there may be 
more variety regarding the structure of the problem solving process than 
previously assumed. This interpretation can be supported by findings reported by 
Wedman et al. (1996). Their study of processes verbalized during analogical 
problem solving highlighted that expected processes were missing and they did 
not offer a generalization of the identified patterns although this was one of the 
proposed research aims. Although, Wedman et al. (1996) do not explicitly discuss 
this missing result, it can be suspected that the observed variance did not allow for 
valid abstractions.  
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An alternative explanation is to be found in the nature of the analyzed data set, i.e. 
think aloud protocols. As is generally acknowledged (e.g. Ericsson & Simon 1993; 
van Someren et al. 1994), think aloud protocols can never be complete in the sense 
that all thoughts and therefore all mental processes are reported. Thus, it is 
possible that some processes were not verbalized. However, it can be argued that 
this effect was compensated for by the large number of processes that was 
analyzed, i.e. 2,756 processes. Nonetheless, it could be possible that all 50 
participants systematically did not verbalize some processes. However, this 
possibility seems unlikely given the finding that all problem solving processes that 
are reported in the literature were identified. 
In sum, this review of the major findings highlights that problem solving processes 
that are commonly assumed in the literature (e.g. Newell & Simon 1972; Dörner 
1989) can be identified in an assembly task as well. This observation suggests that 
solving a real world problem involves the same basic problem solving processes as 
solving a logic based problem. The linguistic analysis revealed systematic patterns 
of verb type (modal as well as general), modal adverbs, temporal markers, personal 
pronouns, and discourse markers for those processes that were most frequently 
verbalized. Importantly, these patterns are observed in natural language that was 
unconstrained and can therefore be expected to reflect participants’ thoughts as 
closely as possible. Furthermore, these patterns emerged in the analysis of a large 
data set, i.e. 50 think aloud protocols, and could be related to previous studies, 
hence it is proposed that these linguistic features represent general process 
markers. 
10.2.2 On functional conceptualization of objects and 
limiting possible actions by constraints 
One important step within problem solving is the functional conceptualization of 
objects. Defining the function of an object within the goal structure resembles a 
new state within the problem space. These conceptualizations are tested and if 
they are evaluated to be useful and adequate, they are adopted. So far, 
conceptualizations of objects were studied as phenomena of addressee design, i.e. 
in communicative settings (e.g. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; von Stutterheim et al. 
1993; Mangold-Allwinn et al. 1995; Rieser 1995). In these experimental designs, 
objects need to be identified in order to assemble larger structures or to solve 
matching tasks successfully. Success is only possible if speaker and addressee agree 
on one reference to an object. Therefore, the reference represents the agreed and 
shared conceptualization (for more detail see chapter 8). In experiments in which 
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think aloud protocols are elicited, low communicative intention is assumed 
because no addressee is present or explicitly introduced. Thus, it is proposed that 
object references in think aloud protocols express the speaker’s current mental 
representation of the referred object.  
The analysis of noun phrases revealed that participants generally tended to refer to 
objects by domain unspecific nominal references, such as ‘Ding’ (thing) or ‘Teil’ 
(part). However, one object was frequently referred to by a house specific 
reference, namely the roof part, i.e. ‘Dach’. This result highlights that the objects 
themselves, except for the roof part, were not prototypical examples of house 
specific parts, such as wall, floor, or ceiling. Overall, participants referred to half of 
all objects by domain specific terminology at least once during the assembly. This 
finding suggests that objects were conceptualized within the assembly context but 
not as frequently as expected. These observations provide a static view on con-
ceptualization throughout the entire assembly process. 
The analysis of referential change, in contrast, provides a dynamic view. The 
qualitative analysis of referential change from first to fifth reference revealed five 
categories that described this change. These categories were adopted from 
literature on the referential production in communicative settings and refined for 
the specific framework of think aloud protocols. The analysis revealed that 
references were either reduced (e.g. ‘Ding’ (thing) to ‘das’ (it)), repeated, rephrased 
within the same frame of reference (e.g. ‘Ding’ (thing) to ‘Teil’ (part)), reframed 
from unspecific to specific (e.g. ‘Ding’ (thing) to ‘Wand’ (wall)), or previously 
mentioned references were reused.  
It is proposed that these categories indicate different changes in conceptualization 
of objects. Whereas repeating, rephrasing, and reusing signal persistence of 
conceptualization, reducing signals a change in familiarity from unfamiliar within 
the given context to familiar and in focus. Reframing signals change of 
conceptualization by means of function assignment. A frequency analysis 
highlighted that participants tended to reduce, repeat, or rephrase subsequent 
references. The assemblers’ preference to repeat subsequent references signals that 
conceptualizations tended to be maintained. The observation that references were 
reduced from first to second mention most frequently highlights that familiarity 
was established early in the assembly process. Moreover, Horton and Gerrig (2002) 
pointed out that consistency of expression is a principle of speech economy. 
Interpreting this phenomenon from the speaker’s internal production perspective, 
Bock (1986:379) argued that people used the same structure repeatedly in cases in 
which production of new structures would result in hesitations and pauses. 
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Fukumura and van Gompel (2012) stated more explicitly that “repeating the 
recently mentioned word is usually easier than producing a word that has not been 
mentioned” (Fukumura & van Gompel 2012:1305). These observations support the 
assumption that assemblers did not tailor their utterances for an imagined 
addressee but relied on their own discourse model throughout the assembly. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that participants were very engaged in solving 
the assembly task and did not try to find different, possibly more adequate re-
ferences to the provided objects.  
Concerning the methodological level, these findings stress that object 
conceptualizations can be investigated by means of linguistic analyses of referen-
tial form. However, different aspects such as referential form and referential 
change need to be combined to highlight and interpret general trends, such as 
maintenance of referential form. 
Besides studying conceptualization of objects, it was investigated which object and 
features of objects guided participants concerning this conceptualization as well as 
location and arrangement of objects. Researchers working in the framework of 
situated cognition pointed out that problem solvers use constraints to limit the 
selection of possible operations within the problem space (e.g. Norman 2002; Kirsh 
2010; Steffensen 2013). The analysis of constraints mentioned in the collected data 
highlighted nine constraints; those were mentioned at different frequencies. On 
the descriptive level, constraints referred to physical properties of the provided 
wooden objects (i.e. bevels, boreholes, little half-ball like wooden pieces (sup-
porting system), grooves), the object itself (i.e. the roof and the picture), or object 
features (i.e. the label ʻSelecta Spielzeugʼ). Furthermore, one constraint was stated 
explicitly in the instructions, namely that no screws can be used.  
The frequency analysis revealed that constraints were mentioned at different 
frequencies based on their nature as well as with regard to the kind of verbal 
report that was analyzed. Participants thinking aloud mentioned boreholes 
significantly more frequently than all other constraints. Bevels and grooves ranked 
second and third. Participants who recalled their thoughts, in contrast, mentioned 
bevels most frequently. The supporting system ranked second and the boreholes 
were mentioned in third position. The reversed ranking of boreholes could be 
explained by the observation that participants tended to mention everything that 
came to their mind in think aloud protocols. Boreholes were salient for two 
reasons. First, they were perceptually salient because they created a specific spatial 
layout on the boards. Second, they could be expected to be functionally salient 
because they are generally important in an assembly task as providing the 
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fastening points, i.e. where the screws need to be inserted. Based on these 
considerations, it can be argued that boreholes were mentioned when they were 
perceived but as they did not have their expected, conventionalized function in the 
given context, they were forgotten and thus not reported in retrospective reports. 
This interpretation is supported by the answers to the guided question at the end 
of the experimental session. Those revealed that the great majority of participants 
noticed the boreholes but only half of them used them in some way. In the same 
line of thought, the finding that grooves were rarely mentioned in retrospective 
reports might be the result of a memory effect. If the function of a groove is 
culturally well known, then noticing the groove and its usage is forgotten after the 
assembly because it is not a prominent thought during the assembly. Concerning 
the methodological level, these findings highlight that different kinds of verbal 
reports need to be elicited to gain information at different levels, such as 
immediate perception and memory. Moreover, future studies should include a 
second measure such as eye movements to support the suggested interpretations. 
Besides describing the nature of the identified constraints on a qualitative level 
and their general distribution on a quantitative level, the function of constraints 
was studied. Concerning the unexpected prominence of boreholes it was 
specifically interesting to show which function boreholes served. The analysis 
revealed that boreholes were reported to be used strategically significantly more 
often than bevels and grooves. Strategic use either referred to orientation regarding 
placement, e.g. “stuck them together in a way that the holes fit” [26], or 
consciously disregarding constraints “then I put the picture out of my mind a little” 
[20]. The use of constraints to understand the spatial layout supports the 
assumption that constraints were used to restrict the possibilities of object 
placement and arrangement. If bevels were used strategically, they were most often 
used to distinguish between objects as reported in “right then I tried to separate 
between these beveled walls and uh balls” [16]. Furthermore, bevels were reported 
to foster insights, as in the following example “but the walls were not beveled and 
the roof would not have fit on top therefore it was logical that the walls with the 
balls on the columns needed to go down” [59]. The frequency analysis highlighted 
that bevels and grooves fostered function assignment significantly more frequently 
than boreholes. This finding suggests that bevels and grooves could be used 
according to their conventionalized function thus fostering insights that were 
related to background knowledge, whereas the function of boreholes needed to be 
defined for the specific context. 
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To summarize, the most unexpected finding was revealed by combining qualitative 
content-based analysis and frequency analysis of the three verbal reports. These 
analyses highlighted that assemblers did not mention constraints, i.e. object 
features, that are most salient but rather those that were evaluated as meaningful 
in the given task context. Moreover, by summarizing the findings on the function 
of constraints, two conceptual levels could be distinguished. At one level, 
constraints were interpreted, as in insights, function assignment, and strategic use. 
If constraints were interpreted, they influenced the problem solving process by 
restricting possible moves and suggesting the ones that were most likely to be 
successful. At the other level, constraints were only perceived and described. In 
this case, noticing the constraints did not contribute to the search process at that 
moment. 
10.2.3 Influence of prior information on problem solving 
processes 
The analyses revealed that prior information had significant effects on different 
aspects of the assembly process. On the performance level, prior information had 
an influence on assembly success and the distribution of process categories. On 
the linguistic level, an effect of prior information was observed on the use of 
pronominal forms, the kind of referential change throughout the assembly, and 
representation of explicit function assignment. Furthermore, prior information 
had an effect on the kind of constraints that were mentioned in think aloud 
protocols. 
Regarding assembly success, all participants, theoretically, had the same chance to 
assemble the original dollhouse because they could have used the boreholes that 
marked the spatial layout on the boards and that corresponded to boreholes on the 
object parts. Additionally, some physical object features constrained possible 
actions and could have guided the assembly as outlined in the previous section. 
The analysis revealed that participants who saw the picture before the assembly 
were more successful in assembling the original dollhouse than participants who 
did not see the picture. This finding suggests that an external model provided 
better and more reliable clues about objects than the objects themselves. 
However, the analysis of assembly success in terms of the goal information that 
was provided in the instruction highlighted that object features were also noticed 
and informative. The analysis revealed that participants who were told to assemble 
a two-story dollhouse were most successful. This finding suggests that knowing 
about the general nature of the object was sufficient to succeed in assembling a 
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two-story house. Theoretically, these participants could rely on their general 
knowledge about a two-story house and the features of the given objects. The 
observation that a comparable number of participants who did not know anything 
about the goal object succeeded in assembling a two-story house strongly suggests 
that object features were salient enough to be recognized and that they provided 
meaningful guidance. Based on the observation that participants who saw the 
picture succeeded less frequently in reaching the formulated goal state, it can be 
assumed that the picture influenced participants’ strategies. Apparently, these 
participants tried to match the given objects to the memorized picture and it 
seems as if they did not use object features as a guide in cases in which this 
matching was unsuccessful. Participants who did not have an external 
representation relied on the given objects to provide information regarding 
possible configurations. Therefore, they seem to pay more attention to object 
features. 
This assumption is supported by a significant difference between assembly 
conditions regarding the frequency of the process category comment on object 
features. Participants, who needed to create a model of the goal object by 
themselves, verbalized comments on object features significantly more frequently 
than participants who saw the picture. Additionally, those assemblers referred to 
the groove, a physical property that was not immediately salient, significantly more 
frequently. If these observations are combined with the findings on assembly 
success, it indicates that participants who needed to construct the goal object from 
scratch, were more attentive to object features as they were looking for clues about 
the nature of a possible goal object. Nonetheless, a second interpretation needs to 
be considered; this difference may not reflect the frequency of noticing but rather 
the frequency of verbalizing what is noticed. Assuming that participants who know 
about the goal object, either verbally only or visually as well, can conceptualize 
object features faster because they understand their function shortly after noticing 
them, these thoughts were not verbalized because the act of perception was not in 
focus of attention. This interpretation is supported by the finding that assemblers 
who held a mental representation of the goal structure mentioned bevels less 
frequently than the other assemblers did. Bevels were salient object features but if 
assemblers remembered the picture well, they recognized that these objects belong 
to the second floor. The process of function assignment might have been so fast 
that it did not reach the necessary level of attention to be verbalized. 
The possibility of missing information needs to be considered as one option in all 
analyses of think aloud protocols since there is no way of knowing which 
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information is not verbalized. However, alternative interpretations can be 
supported by providing evidence from analyses of different aspects of the 
phenomenon, from analyses of the same aspect in different verbal reports, or by 
other performance measures. Therefore, findings on the distribution of problem 
solving processes will be considered here as well. 
The frequency analysis of processes revealed that participants who were not 
provided with any prior information, verbalized significantly more evaluations and 
actions than participants in the other conditions. This finding suggests that these 
participants tested their hypotheses more frequently than participants who held a 
mental representation of the goal object earlier in the assembly process. This 
strengthens the interpretation that these participants were more attentive to 
features and changes resulting from their actions. The difficulties in assigning 
function to objects were mirrored in the significantly lower frequency of domain 
specific nominal references as compared to the other participants. It can be 
assumed that this difficulty of function assignment resulted in an enhanced focus 
of attention to object features. The focus on the overall assembly structure, rather 
than on individual parts, was also expressed in functional terms that were 
explicitly assigned to objects. Participants without prior information assigned 
structure-based terminology, such as ‘Haus’ (house) and ‘Etage’ (story) 
significantly more frequently than participants with prior information. 
The reported findings from different perspectives of the analysis suggest that prior 
information influences how much attention participants pay to the individual 
objects, i.e. how closely they inspect them. Participants who are provided with an 
external representation of the goal structure tend to pay less attention to 
individual object features than participants who need to create a sensible goal 
structure from the presented objects by themselves. Moreover, the task to 
construct a goal structure is linguistically reflected in the frequency of referring to 
structure-based terminology as compared to part-based terminology when 
explicitly assigning function to individual objects. 
10.2.4 Influence of communicative intention on problem 
solving processes 
As expected, the analyses revealed significant effects of communicative intention 
on the linguistic level of object conceptualization and mention of constraints. 
Concerning object conceptualization as expressed in noun phrases, the analysis 
highlighted that instructors tended to refer to objects by noun phrases with 
domain unspecific nouns from first to fourth reference. This was markedly 
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different from assemblers who tended to refer to objects by pronouns significantly 
more often in first and second reference. The instructors’ tendency to refer to 
objects on the descriptive, non-functional level supports the assumption that the 
individual objects did not suggest a prototypical function. If objects had suggested 
a prototypical function, it can be assumed that instructors would have used it to 
facilitate identification. The fact that they maintained an unfamiliar status 
throughout the assembly strengthens this impression by suggesting that even after 
repeated introduction the object cannot be easily identified.  
One possible strategy to compensate for a missing conventional referential term is 
the process of negotiation, i.e. offering a reference and wait for the addressee’s 
confirmation. However, this is only possible in cases of direct interaction, as 
reported in Rieser (1995) and von Stutterheim et al. (1993), for example. If 
negotiation is not possible, the speaker may offer a conceptualization by explicitly 
assigning a reference and presume it as given thereafter. Contrary to prior 
expectations, the analysis revealed that explicit function was not significantly more 
frequent in instructions than in self-assembly. However, on the descriptive level, 
one further category of mapping phrases was identified in addition to the two 
strategies of direct mapping and representational mapping that were identified in 
think aloud protocols. Instructors were observed to reframe objects within one 
utterance, e.g. „die ähm Teile mit den langen Holzplatten dran also die hinteren 
Wände“ (“those uhm parts with the long wooden pieces well the walls in the 
back“) [B8]. In this example, the descriptive but unspecific reference ‘parts with 
the long wooden pieces’ is reframed to the specific reference ‘walls’ highlighting its 
function within in the goal structure. Since this strategy occurred exclusively in 
instructions in the elicited data set and similar examples were reported in two 
studies on assembly instructions (Rieser 1996; Daniel & Tversky 2012), it is assumed 
that it is a communicative strategy. Since only few cases of explicit mapping were 
observed in instructions, more data is needed to draw general conclusions about 
the implications of this specific kind of function assignment. 
The analysis of the static view on referential form was supplemented by the 
analysis of maintenance and change of referential form throughout the 
instructions. This analysis of referential change highlighted that instructors 
repeated or rephrased references most frequently. The finding that references were 
rephrased could imply that instructors forgot the initial reference thus choosing 
another one that signals the same state of unfamiliarity. These results highlight 
that instructors who were familiar with the objects before the instruction 
considered their addressee’s point of view when choosing a referential term. 
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Combined with the previously discussed findings, the results suggest that 
instructors adapted to the addressee’s unfamiliar knowledge state and that they 
focused on completing the task rather than conceptualizing the individual parts 
therein. This might be an effect of the task that focused explicitly on instructing 
the addressee on the assembly while this person is performing the same actions. 
Thus, the manipulation of the current state to reach the goal state was in focus 
rather than learning the assembly for subsequent assemblies. This interpretation is 
supported by findings reported by Maes et al. (2004), who compared the frequency 
of referential overspecification in written instructions of participants who were 
told that the reader would perform the action while reading the instruction to 
those written for an addressee who needed to learn the procedure, i.e. here set an 
alarm clock. The results revealed the general trend that participants who were told 
to write an instruction for a reader who performed the procedure while reading the 
instruction included fewer detail in their referential phrases concerning shape, 
size, and location of objects than those in the other condition. 
The analysis of constraints revealed that communicative intention also had an 
effect on their use. In general terms, the analysis of the nature of constraints 
mentioned in think aloud protocols and in instructions revealed that the same 
constraints were mentioned. In both verbal data sets, boreholes and bevels were 
the constraints that were frequently mentioned. However, there were differences 
with regard to the function of boreholes. Instructors used boreholes predominantly 
to coordinate the placement of objects or to describe the spatial layout. Assemblers 
working for themselves, in contrast, tended to verbalize the perception of these 
features and sometimes described insights that they gained by noticing them. This 
difference can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it highlights that the 
same constraints may serve different functions. Although boreholes seem 
uninformative in the assembly scenario when no screws are provided, they are 
assigned a strategic function when there is a need to coordinate actions. On the 
other hand, it may as well be possible that instructors discovered the function of 
boreholes during their own silent assembly and used it during the instruction by 
verbalizing their own strategy. Combined with previous findings, it might be 
possible that the use of constraints specifically facilitates coordination in a context 
in which identification of and reference to objects is difficult because of a lack of 
shared terminology. 
At the methodological level, the reported diversity of findings on problem solving 
processes involved in unaided assembly and their linguistic representation 
highlights the range of insights that can be gained by combining protocol analysis 
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with a systematic linguistic analysis. The following section takes a critical view on 
the applicability of Cognitive Discourse Analysis and the contribution of this thesis 
to testing and refining the methodology. The thesis closes by outlining possible 
future directions. 
10.3 Assessment of methodology 
This section discusses the general advantages of Cognitive Discourse Analysis 
(CODA) highlighting contributions of this thesis to strengthen them. Moreover, 
the limitations that were faced in this thesis are discussed and some suggestions 
are made on how they can be addressed in future studies. 
One characteristic of CODA is the application of discourse analytical frameworks 
to the specific discourse type of verbal reports that do not involve a specific 
addressee. This thesis, specifically, highlighted that well-established frameworks 
can be extended for a systematic investigation of phenomena in think aloud 
protocols. In the analysis of referential form and change, for example, frameworks 
established in communicative paradigms were adopted for the analysis of object 
references in think aloud protocols. This thesis contributed a theoretical proposal 
on the different levels of speaker – addressee interactivity and engagement as well 
as a systematic investigation of differences concerning object reference and 
functional use of constraints. The comparison between references in think aloud 
protocols and instructions contributed new empirical support for the basic 
assumption that think aloud protocols contain self-directed speech as opposed to 
addressee-oriented speech. The analysis of linguistic patterns associated with self-
directed and addressee-directed speech highlighted discourse task specific 
differences as well as conceptual differences. 
This latter contribution is also important with regard to one of the disadvantages 
of applying Cognitive Discourse Analysis. Researchers who apply this methodology 
need expertise and practice to distinguish between discourse task specific aspects 
and those aspects that are very likely to reflect mental processes. A comprehensive 
review of previous findings along with a detailed description of the investigated 
tasks and discourse types can facilitate the application of the methodology. 
Tenbrink (e.g. 2008; 2010) as well as Tenbrink and Gralla (2009) provide first 
overviews, which should be extended by the findings summarized in the 
theoretical introduction to CODA and the empirical findings obtained in this 
thesis. This future work needs to be emphasized because different researchers 
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expressed interest in applying the methodology as has been experienced in 
discussions after a number of my talks and in workshops by Thora Tenbrink. 
Cognitive Discourse Analysis extends the kind of information that can be gained by 
protocol analysis by highlighting linguistic patterns (Tenbrink 2010). It is 
acknowledged that verbal protocols capture information that reaches the speaker’s 
attention (e.g. Ericsson & Simon 1993; van Someren et al. 1994). However, by 
studying the linguistic representation of this information and contrasting it with 
other possible linguistic representations, unconscious choices can be highlighted. 
If these findings are contrasted with findings of the same discourse type, e.g. 
retrospective reports, on different tasks, correlations between linguistic 
representations and mental processes can be identified. This thesis contributed 
new evidence for this postulation by providing insights on the correlation between 
linguistic features and mental processes across different discourse types on one 
task. The application to a problem solving task that was not investigated by CODA 
before highlights the general applicability of the methodology. 
Tenbrink (e.g. 2008; 2010) repeatedly stresses that Cognitive Discourse Analysis can 
be applied to systematically analyze natural and unconstrained data in real-world 
problem solving tasks. The results reported in this thesis support this proposition 
because problem solving processes that were described in the literature could be 
identified highlighting their characteristic linguistic representation. Furthermore, 
as the qualitative analysis described the individual processes at a more fine-grained 
level, processes were highlighted that were not described before. This finding is 
interesting given that Tenbrink and Gralla (2009) suggested that the identification 
and description of differences in thought processes and their externalization in 
diverse discourse tasks could inspire theories on modeling cognitive processes. The 
findings reported in this thesis provide some suggestions regarding a model of 
human problem solving that is not as well-organized as assumed by traditional 
information processing theories and observed in problems that have a clearly 
defined inherent structure, such as chess. As this observation is also reported by 
Steffensen (2013), the analysis should be extended to other real-life problem 
solving tasks in future work; more specific suggestions will be made in the next 
section. 
However, the application of CODA also suffers the disadvantage of high labor 
intensity that is specific to verbal protocol analysis. The analysis requires data 
transcription and if participants are free to say everything that comes to their 
mind, these reports can be quite long. Additionally, the coding procedure is time 
consuming in CODA because numerous aspects need to be coded to systematically 
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investigate linguistic patterns and identify relevant aspects. This thesis contributes 
an in-depth analysis of object references, verb type and form, as well as on nature 
and function of constraints that could be used as a starting point for new studies. 
The reported analyses are based on natural, unconstrained data; therefore, it can 
be argued that they cover a wide range of possibilities and can thus be applied in 
the investigation of other discourse tasks as well. 
To conclude, the application of CODA revealed new insights on the nature of 
problem solving processes involved in unaided object assembly and highlighted 
characteristic linguistic patterns for most of them. One of the main contributions 
of this thesis to the refinement and extension of this methodology is the systematic 
analysis of selected aspects of the linguistic structure of the elicited data along 
with the theoretical framework that is adopted in these analyses. There is still 
much work to be done to tackle the outlined limitations of the methodology; some 
suggestions for further work on them will be made in the following section. 
10.4 Directions of future research 
The inspiring discussions after my talks along with encouraging and constructive 
feedback on selected aspects of this thesis suggest that the presented approach is 
well received in the cognitive science and cognitive linguistics community and 
should be pursued in future work. The following two main directions of future 
research are suggested; i.e. focusing on the refinement of the methodology to 
address its limitations and focusing on the application of the proposed framework 
on different tasks. 
The work on this thesis highlighted that future research should aim at reducing 
the labor that needs to be invested in preparing the data for analysis and selecting 
which aspects are informative with regard to the posed research questions. 
Concerning the preparation of the data, transcriptions are very time consuming. 
One of the findings in a web-based study on strategies employed in analogical 
problem solving (Gralla et al. 2012) was that planning protocols contained 
information that is typical of think aloud protocols, i.e. precise descriptions of the 
actions along with temporal markers. These linguistic features together with fast 
reaction times on solving the actual task suggested that participants actually 
solved the task when asked to provide a plan and entered the solution afterwards. 
If this effect could be replicated in another study, written planning protocols might 
be used instead of verbal protocols in some studies. 
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Regarding the selection of informative aspects, new directions are explored in an 
on-going collaboration with Sven Brüssow. Based on the findings obtained in this 
thesis, we assumed that the linguistic structure highlights the nature of mental 
processes in problem solving. We reasoned that it might be possible to identify 
processes based on a restricted number of words already if the linguistic structure 
of the target processes is well defined. Thus, we tested how much information can 
be maintained by the elicitation of n-grams of verbal reports. In first analyses, we 
selected n-grams that contained between three and five units and coded those 
according to the process categories that were described in this thesis. Generally, it 
showed that trigrams were more informative than bigrams as they provided 
important information, compare, for example, „macht keinen“ (makes no) to 
„macht keinen Sinn“ (makes no sense). In order to assess if this procedure is 
sufficient to highlight the task specific nature of protocols, we compared think 
aloud protocols collected on two distinct tasks, i.e. the self-assembly data and data 
on a scheduling task (for more detail see chapter 7). The qualitative analysis of the 
automated collocation protocol analysis reliably revealed the task specific problem 
structure. Additionally, it highlighted general problem solving processes, such as 
evaluations and hypotheses. So far, this work is in a preliminary state but 
encouraged by our findings and feedback on a presentation of this approach286 that 
Sven Brüssow gave in Freiburg, we believe that this approach might be a 
reasonable extension of the work presented so far. 
Concerning the application of the proposed framework to a different experimental 
setting, it would be interesting to test if the proposed technique for highlighting 
sequences of problem solving processes in think aloud protocols, works for 
different tasks as well. This is specifically interesting regarding the observation 
that problem solving as verbalized while working on real-world problems seems to 
be less structured than previously described for logic-based problems. The findings 
in this thesis suggest that this might be the case. Furthermore, the observation 
that hypotheses are very frequently used in the recorded data suggests that the 
notion of ‘solution probing’ (Cowley & Nash 2013; Steffensen 2013) might be one 
successful strategy in problem solving that has not been described before. 
Steffensen (2013) observed that the participants formulated numerous hypotheses 
regarding possible solutions. Those hypotheses were not evaluated right away but 
numerous were verbalized and only evaluated later in the process, finally leading 
the way to a satisfactory solution. Similarly, Dörner (2006) proposed that 
                                                        
286 The presentation was entitled “Do measures of word association help facilitate the 
analysis of verbal think-aloud protocols?” and was presented in a colloquium at Freiburg 
University in November 2012. 
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successful problem solvers engaged in a dialogue posing questions and formulating 
statements and hypotheses. The finding that participants working on the assembly 
task silently took longer to complete the task than participants thinking aloud 
supports the idea that inner dialogue and hypothesis testing are an important part 
in problem solving.  
The investigation of this phenomenon could be started by re-coding existing data 
sets applying the proposed framework before designing a new experiment or by 
running a new experiment right away. If existing data sets are re-coded, it is 
important that the think aloud protocols were elicited on a similar task, i.e. ideally 
an assembly task, and that a silent control group was tested. Since these 
requirements are very specific, it is more likely that a new study needs to be 
designed. The design of a future study should encourage hypothesis generation 
and testing. Based on the reported findings and those reported in the literature 
(e.g. Wedman et al. 1996; Steffensen 2013), it is assumed that unstructured tasks 
that involve the need to conceptualize objects in a specific context are specifically 
suited to encourage hypothesis generation. Furthermore, a future design needs to 
include a silent control condition to test whether there is an effect of verbalization 
and if so in which direction, i.e. facilitating or hindering performance. 
Future application of the framework should also incorporate different performance 
measures for triangulation. Generally, the extension of the presented approach by 
recordings of eye movements and fixation points would be of great interest. Based 
on assumptions about the relation between fixation time and rates, and mental 
processes (e.g. Knoblich et al. 2005; Henderson et al. 2007; Land 2007), converging 
evidence could be established for the relation between verbalized thoughts and 
mental processes. More specifically, it would be a reasonable extension to the 
proposed analysis of use and function of constraints for two reasons. First, new 
technologies (e.g. Tobii Eyetracking 287  or SMI Eyetracking glasses 288 ) allow 
participants to move almost unconstrained while working on a task. This new 
development would allow to record participants natural behavior and speech while 
engaged in solving a problem. Second, fixation points and durations are specifically 
interesting to evaluate if participants noticed a constraint and how they referred to 
it if at all. The combination of the linguistic analysis, as outlined in this thesis, and 
eye movement data could help to find more evidence for the suggestion that 
                                                        
287 On Tobii Eyetracking see http://www.tobii.com/de/eye-tracking-research/germany/re-
search/akademische-forschung/; 20.06.2013. 
288  On SMI Eyetracking glasses see http://www.eyetracking-glasses.com/products/eye-
tracking-glasses/technology/; 20.06.2013. 
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participants verbalize object features that are meaningful to them and thus reach 
attention whereas features that are noticed but not meaningful are not verbalized. 
Moreover, it might be possible to describe the relation between the duration of 
fixation on a feature and the likelihood to be mentioned in retrospective reports.  
In sum, these possible future directions highlight that this thesis provides a solid 
base regarding the framework of investigating problem solving in unaided object 
assembly that should be extended in a number of ways in the work to come. 
Moreover, the discussion of the methodology highlighted how current limitations 
could be addressed in future studies.  
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